Connections 2000

Global Defense and Wargaming

Lecture by ?


The multi-faceted situation facing the US today is a far cry from the bi-polar Cold War period. New threats, not only in places that in the past were not so much hot spots as superpower bargaining chips, but with new styles of threats, have forced a transformation in the actions and re-actions of US armed forces. And just as the US is being called upon to respond to these multitude of commitments, the US military is being reduced in order to reap the peace dividend. That means fewer assets, fewer bases, and fewer people are available to confront global pressures on national security.

As a way of examining such changes, start with the strategic objectives. During the Cold War, the US focused on national survival, in the sense of preserving our territory, Constitutional government, and economic system. Today, the Communist threat has receded, and our focus has diffused to include survival as well as the concept of security in which critical and significant areas and interests are elevated. For example, as the USSR fades as world villain, regional hegemonies spring up to fill the power vacuum.

In lock step, there's been a systematic change in which Defense issues are increasingly requiring participation by other government departments. For civilians, armed forces are secondary--the economy takes precedence. And as technology advances, it directly affects not only enemy targets, but the enemy's mindset as well.

For example, the Cold War military expected to fight prolonged overseas wars from permanent bases, where information was an adjunct to defending and destroying "fixed" targets. Today, while some bases remain open, responding to overseas threats requires transitory bases and distant deployments, with electronic information as the "glue" that binds global war activities.

The triad of Diplomatic, Economic, and Military aspects have yielded to technological, knowlegde-based warfare spreading across multiple fields. For example, in the Gulf War, the Air Force wanted to send a F-15E to destroy a statue of Saddam Hussein. With smart-bomb technology, it certainly could be done. However, the statue is a cultural icon protected by world treaty and could not be targeted. Thus, what would be a military strike mission now requires expertise in anthropology, law, and psychology where planners must weigh consequences--good and bad--before dispatching assets on missions. And this example is relatively straight forward. When you consider the "hybrid" militaries around the world with "asymetric capabiliites" (military-speak for irregular weaponry and terror weapons along with traditional army, navy, air force weapons), you can see that the complexity has multiplied tremendously.

2015 Scenario: Russia

In a situation "wargamed" out, a 2015 scenario posited that 10 million Chinese decided to migrate to Russia. The Chinese government declares they'll stabilize the region and tells everyone else, including the Russians, to stay out. Russia calls for US aid.

The US sends carrier groups across te Pacific. China responds with a missile attack against Japan--except only targeting US bases, not the Japanese military. In addition, the Chinese attack US bases in Guam, and target the US carrier groups. Over the course of eight or nine days, over 800 missiles hit the groups, sinking them -- although exhausting Chinese missile inventory as well.

What this wargame pointed out was the difficulty in maintaining a safe axis across the Pacific in the event of a shooting war. At another level, it also showed the need to shape the military from a "blunt instrument to a tailored and defined tool."

And yet, with air campaigns over Iraq and Kosovo expected to cow the enemy into submission, USAF "end strength" is down 40% from Cold War heyday, with increasingly aging aircraft to boot. During the Cold War, the US could count on 51 major bases worldwide. Today, it's down to 17.

There's been a proliferation of Surface-to-Air missiles as countries snap them to to make up for inadequate air forces. In 1985, four nations could build SAM components. In 1998, that number jumped to 11, and by 2005, estimates are 22 nations could build them. (Personally, I thought it was more, but there must be wiggle room for types and capabilities.--RL)

In addition, while only two nations have developed a "land attack cruise missile" (My guess is that SCUD missiles are not technically included in this category--RL), by 2005 the estimates are 11 nations will be able to do so, with half the countries willing to sell such technology on the open market. As you can imagine, this presents additional security worries to overseas deployments.

Finally, the F-15 is starting to show its age, being matched or eclipsed by other contries' advanced jet fighters. In 1985, 17 nations coul put aircraft up that could give as good as they could get. In 1995, that number is up to 50, and by 2005, it might be as high as 62. Advanced missiles take a similar upward bound in deployment, from 11 countries in 1995 to 25 by 2005.

All this is part of the transformation of the Air Force in the 1990s. Part of it is positive. Years ago, air power promises often exceeded actual results. Now, the credibility gap has been reduced. The adaptations of new and diverse technologies improve mission success and accuracy. Ground forces are no longer teh focal point. Air power is now acknowledged to be an equal partner in shaping war strategy.

This idea of transformation butts heads with an accute financial shortfall. It's a balancing act, especially in a peacetime economy, to integrate athe new and maintain the existing assets. Four planning precepts exist near and dear to the USAF heart: long range, mobile, situational awareness, and indivisibility. The first two are self-evident. The third refers to using the right tool an dthe right time for the right job, and the last reflects the idea that functions shouldbe integral to the tools. Stealth fighters are an example of such success in meeting all four criteria.

John Boyd

One of the latter day theorists who shaped the transformation of USAF thinking and procedures is John Boyd. He wanted to change not only the proicess ofplanning, deploying, and using USAF assets, but also to change the language. He argued that current language uses "Clauswitzian" terminology, whereas the modern USAF should replace Napoleonic era terms with modern phraseology based on physics. Successful conversion remains to be seen, but his concepts started to be put into use during the Gulf War. During Desert Storm, in a 24-hour period, over 1300 sorties were flown against 150 commercial and command targets, with a 70% success rate.

His idea was to defeat the enemy's knowledge base and screw up the enemy's decision making process. In other words, to make them deaf, dumb, and blind. He also wanted to shorten the mid-phase ("halt") of defend/attack sequence: enemy initiative, enemy halt, and regain strategic initiative.

Evidently, folks listened to Boyd, as he captured the attention of a variety of Defense Department civilian and military leaders such as the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs to attend his marathon briefings. Oddly, he never wrote anything down--just gave briefings as long as 13 hours in duration.

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© Copyright 2001 Hal Thinglum
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