Dillip Hiro's book, Desert Shield to Desert Storm is both refreshing and frustrating. The book presents the Arabic view of the conflict far better than any of the otherworks reviewed, indeed it can be argued that it is the only work to actually present the Arabic view. The importance of this is often overshadowed by the factual inconsistencies that fill the work. In his attempt to fairly represent the Arabic view, Hiro often goes to far in the opposite direction, accepting as fact Iraqi claims that are clearly false and relating Arabic views of the United States as fact rather than opinion.

Hiro's long list of previous works dealing with the Middle East mark him as an author with more than a casual, opportunistic knowledge of the issues involved in the war. His work covers the origins of the conflict thoroughly, beginning with the modern formation of Iraq and Kuwait during the slow disintegration of the imperial system during the 20th Century. The book then covers the familiar ground of events, but unlike the other works, Hiro spends as much or more time on the Arabic side of the conflict as he does on the Western view. This welcome change of emphasis reminds the reader that the war neither started nor continued in a vacuum that the allied forces could essentially control. Hiro drives home his point by continuing the narrative historically, refusing to draw conclusions about the war's after effects until he had dealt with the latest repercussions, the Kurdish and Shia uprisings, which were still echoing as he wrote. He thus clearly demonstrates that he understands the war as one act in the continuing drama of the Middle East, intimately linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict and and the collapse of the Ottoman, French and British Middle Eastern empires.

The frustration in Hiro's book comes to the reader when one tries to determine the validity of his arguments by examining his evidence and shifting through his bias. Though he meticulously footnotes his information, his main sources appear to be newspaper accounts whose accuracy and objectivity he never questions. This naivete appears even more astonishing when the reader recalls the many instances where Hiro accuses both the Allies and the Iraqis of manipulating the media for military and political gain. In general, Hiro appears to favor press reports that paint the Allies in a rather poorer light than sober analysis might indicate, and the Iraqis in a better light than was warranted. For example, "...17 Iraqi planes destroyed in air combats, with the loss of 16 allied aircraft" noted from New York Times on Jan. 21, 1991. Hiro's statement makes the air war appear much closer than it was, implying that the Iraqi planes shot down at least some of the Allied aircraft. In fact, no Allied aircraft were shot down by Iraqi fighters throughout the entire campaign. Hiro compounds his errors by stating that the "...first week...was a mixed bag, militarily and politically, for both sides."

In his discussion of the causes and background of the war, Hiro relies not on newspaper accounts, but rather on published works dealing with the subject in question. Many times, he cites his own books, without mentioning the self-supporting circle this incestuous practice develops. He never presents any information on the relative reliability of the works cited. In fact, his unquestioning use of these sources implies that they be taken strictly at face value.

Recent history is fraught with this peril, governments being reluctant to provide contemporary official documents for the historian to peruse. Middle Eastern governments are particularly close with this sort of information. In the West, much information is available early, and is easily accessible, but this leads many writers to concentrate on these good sources and produce a very one-sided view of the conflict. Hiro's attempt to provide a broader narrative faces even greater challenges, attempting to extract information from societies that are long accustomed to withholding it. Sources are available, obviously biased and often false, but available. Hiro fails to attempt to interview any of the major players from any of the nations involved. He never makes the reader aware of any attempts to obtain archives from any of the various nations involved. Indeed, his credentials are noticeably absent from the preface and introduction, making it difficult to perceive his own biases without carefully examining his statements about "Iran's reasonable demands" and his view that President Bush "lacked...vision...charisma...."

More Gulf War Literature Survey

Introduction
A Woman at War Review.
Famous Victory Review.
From Shield to Storm Review.
Desert Shield to Desert Storm Review.

A Survey of Gulf War Literature Part II

Triumph Without Victory Review.
It Doesn't Take a Hero Review.
Desert Victory Review.
The Gulf Confict 1990-1991 Review.