Part I

'The Gulf Confict 1990-1991'

Clearly the best work for the serious student of the war is the The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh. Covering every aspect of the conflict from its recent origins to its most recent repercussions, they attempt to provide a broad based academic work and succeed admirably.

Working in a traditional historical manner, they use painstaking research to carefully describe and evaluate events. Their language does not invoke the images that the other books might provide and they resist the temptation to speculate on the thoughts and personalities of their subjects; this may discourage the non-academic reader. The Gulf War already has produced its fair share of colorful memoirs, this book represents the first wave of serious scholarship and a beginning at sorting the important from the trivial in the outcome.

The coverage of the diplomatic aspects of the war is incredibly complete, the authors examine the domestic situation that leads each coalition partner to join the coalition and explain the domestic pressures that they endured once joined. The Iraqis are not ignored either. They are considered not as living targets but rather as participants who acted and reacted in what they perceived were their own interests.

The basic nature of the conflict is described perceptively: "Saddam was on the military defensive but on the political offensive. President Bush could go on to the military offensive but, simply because he was leading a disparate coalition rather than a unitary state, he was on the political defensive." This simple, clear statement explains the approach the authors took in narrating and analyzing the conflict, and why they wereso successful at it.

Other reviewers have been equally pleased with this work: "...one of the most comprehensive and analytical on the Gulf crisis that does not "...assume ... internationalgoals...dominated over domestic political objectives ......"

These views of the book are quite correct, but H.D.S. Greenway summed up the books impact by saying that ... it is unlikely that there will be a better balanced or more comprehensive chronicle of that seminal event."

Conclusion

Desert Shield/Storm spawned a wide host of books, most of little or no value to the historian. They are destined to join the dusty library shelves next to forgotten volumes on previous wars, written by participants who lacked the will or the vision to see and paint the larger Picture. Clearly, the book by Dunnigan and Bay deserves this fate, as does Patrick Bishop's erratic memoir. Regardless of literary merit, Schwarzkopf's book will continue to draw attention from historians and students. Hiro's copious hatchet job will also fade away, doomed because of its incestuous sources and glaring biases. Friedman's analysis will serve as weapon in the debate on dwindt . ing military resources, but unless it becomes a blueprint for the budget cuts it will eventually become a little read reference. Molly Moore's descriptive account will remain important for the unspoken reason that it is written by a women, As the status of women in the military increases, and they are found doing jobs that are more and more combat oriented, works that deal with women in combat situations will become increas ingly important. The U.S. News and World Report will probably be encouraged to produce more books, but their actual datelines will be of more historical significance.

Freedman and Karsh's work has set the standard of work in the field from now on. By concentrating on both sides in the conflict they have escaped the jingoism of Dunnigan and the tunnel vision of the other American writers who concentrate on U.S. affairs so closely that they missed the larger picture. By carefully researching and documenting their findings, they avoided the trap of inaccuracies that plague Hiro. Finally, by refusing to relinquish their professional detachment, they have provided a truer view of the war and its aftermath than either Bishop or Moore.

The final point belongs to Patrick Bishop, who's emotion laden prose occasionally rises to the occasion and illuminates a sad truth: "The good things in Iraq are the people. Most ... were good-hearted .... Their misfortune was their leaders, a misfortune that was not of their making and which needed suicidal bravery to remedy."

A Survey of Gulf War Literature

Triumph Without Victory Review.
It Doesn't Take a Hero Review.
Desert Victory Review.
The Gulf Confict 1990-1991 Review.