Part I

"It Doesn't Take a Hero"

Gen. Schwarzkopf's It Doesn't Take a Hero is one book that provides exactly what it promises in the preface, a highly personal account of the general's life, beginning with his birth and continuing through to his retirement from the Army.

As many other reviewers have noted, Schwarzkopf is not blessed with an abundance of modesty; his recollections are clearly related with an eye towards history. As a source for determining the reasons behind the big decisions in the war the falls short, just as most autobiographies do. The natural human tendency is to make oneself look as good as possible. The historian can usually correct for this by comparing reports written at the time, the recollections of other witnesses, and a dose of common sense.

A more interesting aspectof Schwarzkopf's book is the way it mirrors modern American society. Hew Strachan stated that the work was wrote with "...its eye ... on the world of the television chat-show." He goes on to express great disappointment in the book's lack of serious military analysis, stating that neither General U,S. Grant nor Gen. G.C. Marshall would have pinned their names to this work. A valid point, but one that misses its own significance. Neither Grant nor Marshall would have written that book because the Nation that they fought for was different from the one that Schwarzkopf served. They were men of their times who responded as such, as has Schwarzkopf. Our society encourages emotional, personal accounts, for better or worse, and the book was produced in that environment.

The description of the Gulf conflict comprises only half the book, and it is only marginally the more interesting one. Schwarzkopf makes it clear that he considers the Gulfconflict a culminating point for the U.S. military, a renaissance in fact, with that in mind he goes to great lengths to describe the depths to which the Army fell both during and after Vietnam. He pulls no punches in his criticisms of Army policies and personal, these criticisms are hardly new to students of U.S. military history, but to the general reader his scathing condemnation of the Vietnam "combat culture" as simply an "accumulation ofbad habits." may come as a surprise. He never names individuals whose competence or honor he calls into question, refusing to sully their names in his best selling book. Though possibly done for legal reasons, this is a touch of class that does not detract from the value of the work, since historians seeking to confirm the incidents can find out the names of the individuals involved by simply checking Army files.

Finally, he takes pains at the end to answer questions that he is often asked about the war's conclusion. Every American war in the 20th Century seems to have acquired a sense of unfinished business, whether brought about later by those who see opportunities missed, or at the time, by insubordinate generals desiring to expand a war beyond its current scope. Schwarzkopf clearly states that he supported the timing of the cease fire, a fitting final statement from an officer in an Army that has never attempted to usurp the authority of the Nation's civil government.

A Survey of Gulf War Literature

Triumph Without Victory Review.
It Doesn't Take a Hero Review.
Desert Victory Review.
The Gulf Confict 1990-1991 Review.