Part I

"Desert Victory"

Desert Victory is a workmanlike book from naval analyst Norman Friedman. It covers, like most of the other works, the immediate outbreak of the crisis and a cursory examination of the causes. Moving to a chronicle of events, it concentrates on events within the American military and Government. This focus remains throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the lessons the war taught, along with several appendices on the organization of the various forces involved, and records of daily Allied and Iraqi air losses, as well as Iraqi Naval losses.

The work is scholarly in tone, but the copious notes expand points in the text far more often than they document sources. Friedman's position in the naval establishment shines in his analysis, which fully supports the naval view. His parochialism is evident when he blames the strengthened position of the 18 Chairman of the JCS for allowing Powell to "block" Schwarzkopf's suggestion to continue the ground war, but he presents the correct view of the naval forces as the most immediate option in the Gulf. "Sea power, in the form of carriers and marines, was the block that prevented Saddam Hussein from immediately pressing on into Saudi Arabia, and these forces were also the main defense ... for some months after the crisis began."

Friedman's book is uncompelling. It will work best as an example of what leading defense experts thought the lessons of the war were, when historians examine this conflict in 50 years. As an analysis Friedman seems to be right on target in most of his opinions, certainly he is correct in stating that "The coalition won..." because of "...superior training, superior command and control, and superior logistics" as opposed to simply because of superior firepower.

A Survey of Gulf War Literature

Triumph Without Victory Review.
It Doesn't Take a Hero Review.
Desert Victory Review.
The Gulf Confict 1990-1991 Review.