by Karl E. Wiegers
To the Armistice The second phase of the Battle for France opened on June 5. One day earlier, the German military high command (OKW) claimed that so far 1,841 Allied aircraft had been shot down: 1,142 destroyed in air-to-air combat and 699 which fell to the effective fire of German antiaircraft guns. An additional 1,600 to 1,700 machines had been destroyed on the ground. Comparing these figures to those reported for the numerical strength of the combined continental Allied air forces on May 10 indicates that the Luftwaffe had been most effective in eliminating Anglo-French air power as a factor in the Battle for France (although it must be kept in mind that such figures are often exaggerated, as both sides would discover in the Battle of Britain). Indeed, by June 5 the remaining fighter units in the AASF could operate only 35 or 40 Hurricanes in their three squadrons. Prime Minister Reynaud pleaded for Churchill to send ten more Hurricane squadrons immediately and another ten as soon as possible, but Churchill insisted that he could only replenish those three squadrons currently operating in France. Reynaud further suggested that the French General Weygand command a combined Anglo-French air force. However, RAF leaders rejected a unified command for fighter aircraft and agreed to submit their bombers to a joint commander only if he were a British officer. This lack of agreement helped perpetuate the command and control problems that plagued the Allied air elements. As of June 12, Barratt's Advanced Air Striking Force had been whittled down to about 70 or 80 operational bombers in six squadrons. All of these were Fairey Battles, suited only for missions at night. The remaining British fighter planes were augmented by six or eight Englandbased RAF squadrons which flew to France every day to fight, refuelling at those French airfields still in friendly hands. Even the United States made an effort to beef up the Allied air forces struggling for life in Europe. On June 13, 50 American Curtiss-Wright SBC-4 dive bombers and 93 Northrup A-17A light attack bombers were sent to Halifax in Canada, where the French aircraft carrier Bearn was anchored. Unfortunately, this ship and its cargo never made it to Europe. The armistice which terminated the hostilities between France and Germany was signed on June 22, 1940, and went into effect early on the morning of June 25. One of the terms of the agreement provided that the remaining airplanes of the French Air Force were to be stored under supervision, rather than being surrendered to the occupiers. The Armee de l'Air also was limited to a complement of 50,000 airmen. 700 French warplanes were sent to North Africa. where they formed the core of the Vichy French Air Force, under commanding Generals Bergeret and Odic. 1941-1945 0ne of the most controversial episodes of World War II took place on July 3, 1940, in the Algerian harbor of Mers-el-Kebir. On that day a force of British battleships and carrier aircraft attacked a group of vessels of the Vichy French Navy at anchor inside the harbor. When the smoke had cleared, the French had lost an old battleship and a modern battlecruiser and destroyer, with another battleship badly damaged. Air strikes launched from the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal were intercepted but not thwarted by ground-based French fighter planes. The threat of future naval actions between French and Allied forces prompted Germany to permit the Vichy government to maintain up to 21 air groups in North Africa and a few others in French West Africa, for the defense of French naval units stationed in African ports. By November of 1941, Vichy's African airbases were operating about 400 aircraft, including 8 fighter, 5 reconnaissance, 13 bomber, and 2 transport groups, for a total of 28 air groups. In addition, the French Navy had about 100 planes in 17 groups - two of fighters, seven of bombers, and eight of reconnaissance/ torpedo bombers. These air elements did go into action against British and American naval units which engaged French warships near the coast of North Africa, but they made no important contribution to the Axis war effort. Many of the French warplanes listed in Table 1 continued to see active service long after the capitulation in 1940. The archaic Amiot 143 and Farman 222 bombers gave up their night bombing roles after the armistice and served Vichy France and later the Allies as transports in North Africa and Tunisia until late 1944. Many Bloch 174 and 175 bombers served Vichy France in North Africa (a few also flew with the Luftwaffe), and in Tunisia in 1942 some 174's were fitted to conduct dive bombing attacks two years too late. Several dozen Breguet 693's saw combat with the Italian Air Force in 1942 and 1943, while Germany commandeered engines from others to equip their Henschel 129 close support and Messerschmitt 323 transport aircraft. The LeO 451 and its various subtypes operated with both Vichy and German bomber squadrons, and the Allied Air Forces later used them as transports. Potez 633's were flown by the Greek and Romanian air forces, while the later model 63.11 was used in large numbers by the Luftwaffe, Vichy French (air force and navy squadrons), and Free French. French fighters also saw widespread action later in the war. The MS.406 was used by Finland and by Vichy. The latter sent some to Syria to fight against the RAF. Vichy France also operated the Bloch MB.155 (successor to the MB.152) and the excellent (for its time) D.520. Prior to the armistice, production of the D.520 had reached the incredible figure of ten per day, and the Vichy government soon restored this machine to production. 411 D.520's were impressed by the Luftwaffe in 1942, with many ending up in the Bulgarian, Italian, and Romanian air forces. In 1944 a squadron of Free French pilots turned some recaptured D.520's against their erstwhile German owners, now on the defensive in southern France. Conclusion The role of the Armee de l'Air in the Battle for France reflected the lack of planning that the French high command had devoted to modern air combat, with respect to both hardware and doctrine. The decisive use of even a small number of modern dive bombers could have upset the German attack long enough to help the Allied ground troops offer a more effective defense. Aerial reconnaissance could have provided invaluable information about German ground operations. But the dive bombers did not exist; the recon planes did not fly; and the Luftwaffe controlled the skies over France. In addition, the participation of British units came close to bleeding white the RAF Fighter Command just before its desperate struggle in the Battle of Britain. The French Air Force was no better prepared for the Second World War than the French Army - both succumbed to the blitzkrieg. More French Air Force in World War II
Preparation for War The Machines The First Week The Beginning of the End To The Armistice, 1941-1945 Back to Grenadier Number 12 Table of Contents Back to Grenadier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1981 by Pacific Rim Publishing This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |