Of the major military powers of the 1930's, France was among the slowest to appreciate the vital role that air power would play in any future war. While Hermann Goering secretly built up a powerful and experienced (in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39) Luftwaffe, while Japan developed aircraft of astonishing performance and effective air combat tactics, and while Britain's RAF gradually geared up for both offensive and defensive missions, the military leaders of France seemed content to continue a low rate of production of inferior machines.

A report from the French Air Ministry in October of 1937 suggested that the French Air Force (FAF) was better organized and possessed more modern aircraft than the RAF. In reality, the RAF was becoming much better prepared for war than its cross-channel counterpart. An illustration of the opposing attitudes towards air power is that the FAF received only 19% of the total French military budget in 1937, whereas fully 54% of Great Britain's armed forces allocations went to the RAF that year.

Rearmament of the FAF did not really begin until March 15, 1938, following a prophetic announcement by Chief of Air Staff General Vuillemin that Germany could wipe out the French Air Force in just fifteen days. Air Minister Guy la Chambre promptly announced an expansion program with a goal of 2,600 first-line aircraft by 1940, with a further 2,120 machines in reserve. At the time of his announcement, French aircraft production had stagnated at only 40 per month or even less.

The year 1939 saw an excellent recovery of aircraft Production, which rose from only 39 machines in December of 1938 to 100 of all types just two months later, French aircraft production eventually attained a rate of 157 per month, a remarkable three-fold increase in just a few months. But during this same period Britain was assembling 600 airplanes per month, and German warplanes rolled out of the factories as often as 700 times a month. Contemporary estimates for relative air strengths at the outbreak of war in September of 1939 gives the French Air Force 1,792 first-line military aircraft, compared to 2,075 for the British and an overwhelming 3,699 modern combat planes in the Luftwaffe.

Estimates vary as to the actual number of aircraft available to the Armee de l'Air on May 10, 1940; not even internal French reports are consistent on this point. According to Vuillemin, who should have been in the best position to know, the FAF had first-line strengths of 850 fighters (of which 790 were modern designs), 260 bombers (140 modern), 180 reconnaissance planes (170 modern), and 440 observation planes (260 modern). This gives a total of 1,730 first-line aircraft, of which 1,360 were of modern design and capabilities. These figures fall far short of la Chambre's stated goals of 2,600 firstline and 2,120 reserve aircraft by 1940. Other reports are even less favorable, giving the French only some 100 bombers (of which only about half were the highly useful dive bombers) and 450 fighters operational at the beginning of the war.

Fortunately, France was not alone in her opposition to the Nazi aggressors. Great Britain's Royal Air Force stood ready to resist any air assault from the east. The British were much better prepared for a modern air war than were the French, but British air participation in a war fought on (and above) French soil would be severely hampered by the distances between airfields in England and the battle zone. Therefore, a number of RAF squadrons were based in France to provide immediate air support upon the outbreak of hostilities.

As of May 10, 1940, 25 squadrons of British airplanes were stationed on French airfields, including six squadrons of Hawker Hurricanes (at 16 planes per squadron, for a total of 96 fighters). The bombing contingent was labelled the "Advanced Air Striking Force" (AASF) and included 256 Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim light bombers. A group of Lysander liaison aircraft brought the total to 474 British machines in France at the time of the attack. Air Marshall Arthur Barratt commanded these forces, which had a nominal sphere of operations north of Namur but went into action over the entire front.

Arrayed against this thin line of defenders was a most impressive selection of Luftwaffe elements. The bombing force included 1,120 medium bombers, of which about half were Heinkel 111's and the remainder Junkers 88's and Dornier 17's. Some 380 of the highly feared Ju-87B Stuka dive bombers were on hand. The singleengined fighter force consisted of about 860 Messerschmitt Bf-109E's, which were much superior in performance to the French and British fighters of the time.

In addition, 355 twin-engined Bf-110C fighters were available for long-range fighter missions. Finally, supply and paratroop operations were to be executed by the 475 Ju-52 tri-motor transports and about 45 gliders. And, in addition to the qualitative and quantitative edge the Luftwaffe held over the Allied air forces in hardware, the German pilots were war-seasoned and had developed effective tactics for air combat and ground support missions.

More French Air Force in World War II

Introduction
Preparation for War
The Machines
The First Week
The Beginning of the End
To The Armistice, 1941-1945