Maida

Analysis, Comments, and
Considerations on Maida Articles

by Jean A. Lochet

From the above data, comments, etc. (and also from the two articles published in issue # 56) we can draw some conclusions.

In all honesty, I do not see in the data published above, anything that can change the conclusions that were presented in issue # 56 by Jim Arnold and the writer.

On the contrary, the letter (or dispatch) from Reynier to Napoleon (presented in this issue, pages 5 and 4, by Jim Arnold) very clearly spells out the French formation for the 1st Leger and the 42nd de Ligne that is a LINE. That is certainly the best piece of evidence presented in this forum.

Before I'll go any further with my analysis, I must point out that that a key quotation of my article "Historians, Falsehoods and the Napoleonic Wargamer" (issue # 56, pages 54-5 etc.) has been ignored. It is the footnote of page 77 from Oman's Wellington's Army. 1809-14 which is reproduced (once more) below:

    Till lately I had supposed that Reynier had at least his left wing, or striking echelon, in columns of battalions, but evidence put before me seems to prove that, despite of the fact that the French narratives do not show it, the majority at least of Reynier's men were deployed. This is borne out by Bunbury's narrative, p. 244, where it is definitely stated, as well as by Boothby'a, p. 78.

I must point out (once more) that Wellington's Army was published after Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, which included a chapter on Maida. in which Oman presented the French in column. Oman in Wellington's Army, included the correction on the French formation at Maida—i.e. that the French were in line and not in column, (see above) Mr. Park in his letter gives us (page 9) the sources used by Oman in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars:

"....in the first (RAI) article, entitled "The Battle of Maida", Oman gives the following sources: (1) Bunburry, (2) de Watteville's "notes" (he was a Swiss in the British service), (5) a letter from John Colborne (see below), (4) a quote from Col. Stewart in the regimental history of the 78th Foot (not General Stuart),(5) the diary of Charles Boothby of the RE, and (6) Reynier's unpublished dispatch on the battle to Napoleon which is in the French archives and gives the casualty figures."

And then, Mr. Park, quotes Reynier's dispatch to Napoleon as per Oman in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, in the article "The Battle of Maida:

    "The English remained with ported until the 1st Leger came within half musket shot; they opened a tremendous fire, which at first did not stop the charge, but when the columns were only fifteen paces from the hostile line and could have broken it with one more thrust...they broke and fled..."

Mr. Park to add: "What could be clearer than that?

Well, I must agree that is a definite statement! However, Oman told us that the dispatch from Reynier to Napoleon, held in the French archives and never published, was the source for the above quotation. That could be true. However, and that contrary to Oman's claim, a dispatch, or more exactly a letter from Reynier to Joseph Napoleon, the King of Naples in 1805, was published in Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte, and dated 5 July 1806, that is the day after Maida...The text of which can be found page 5 and was sent to us by Jim Arnold. I reproduced below a bad copy of the pertinent part, in which Reynier clearly reports the 1st Leger and the 42nd de Ligne in line.

    Lamato. The 1st and 42nd regiments, 240 strong, under the orders of Gen. Compere, passed the Lamato, and formed line. Saving their left on the Lamato, the 4th Swiss battalion, twelve companies of the Polish regiment, 1500 strong, under the orders of Brigadier-General Peyri, passed the Lamato, and formed in a second line in echelon behind the right of the 42nd, making my centre. The 23rd light infantry, 1250 men..."

Please note! "The 1st and 42nd regiments...passed the Lamato, and formed into line."

Now let us compare the above letter from Reynier to Joseph Napoleon to Revnier's dispatch (to be found in French archives and unpublished, according to Oman) as published by Oman in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, in the chapter: "The battle of Maida", page 54, and reproduced below:

    "The third turned the whole to flight. Reynier, who was watching from the rear, writes in his dispatch : "The English remained with ported arms till the 1st Leger came within half musket sliot; they then opened a tremendous fire, winch did not at first stop the charge, but which the columns were only fifteen paces from the hostile line and could have broken it by one more thrust, the soldiers of the 1st turned their backs and ran to the rear all together."

Oman in the above quotation, says clearly "COLUMNS". Oman in the same book', page 64, says th t Reynier wrote is dispacth at Catanzaro on July 5th:

    "Reynier's dispatch, which he wrote at Catanzaro on July 5th -- 24 hours before Stuart got his completed -- is a curious document, in that he shows no notion whatever of the reason why he was beaten. He throws all the blame on his men; he had, he says, only 5,350 men (understating by a thousand), but that ought to have sufficed to throw 6,000 or 7,000 English into the sea. He thinks he acted for the best, "but I was not well seconded either by the number or the morale of the troops. Many of the soldiers did not conduct themselves with the vigour of regiments wlio had so distinguished themselves in earlier battles. A part of them are still so demoralized that I could not count on their standing in face of the enemy again. Combien je suis malheureux d'avoir ete abandonne par mes troupes au moment ou elles dcvroient decider la victoire."

Reynier's letter mentioned above was also written on the 5th of July, at Gatanzaro:

    [205] General Reynier to Joseph
    Cantanzaro, July 6, 1806.

    Sire,

    The interruption of my communications has prevented my writing to your Majesty since my letter of the 29th, in which I mentioned the sailing of the English expedition and of the flotilla from Messina.

Are we sneaking of two different letters or dispachea (or whatever)?

There are some striking identical and common points, too numerous to quote. Oman's quotation (from Reynier's dispatch) tells us quite a different story than Reynier's letter to Joseph. The following is the continuation of Reynier'a letter to be found pages 3-5 of this issue):

    The enemy appeared to us to be more numerous than ourselves by one-third: he extended much beyond our wines although he was drawn up in two lines, and had a detached corps beyond Lamato. He may have had 8OOO infantry and 2000 armed peasants.

    Even before the battle the country had begun to rise abroad all the inhabitants assumed the white flag and the red cockade. Cantanzaro rang the tocsin and displayed the white flag.

    As the troops were encamped beneath its walls, I thought it necessary to occupy it, in order to force it back into obedience, and the provisions of which we were in want.

    If many of the soldiers wanted the vigor for which I hoped for soldiers of such established reputation, I am satisfied with the officers, they did their duty well. General Compere was indeed in the arm at the head of the 1st regiment; he was thrown from his horse and taken prisoner.

    Major Gastelouis of the 1st regiment was killed. Major Cavel of the Swiss regiment was dangerously wounded. Major Bey of the "23rd regiment was wounded, as well as Marchaud, Buchaunne and many brave men.

Please compare the above with Oman's quotation to be found in the previous page. This is, unfortunately not the only discrepancy between Oman's quotation from Reynier's dispatch and Reynier's letter to Joseph. Following is Oman's comments on Reynier's losses: (page 64)

    "....Reynier in his dispatch acknowledges a loss of 1,300, but this figure is too low..."

The following is found in Reynier's letter to Joseph:

    I do not know my loss exactly yet but I have with me about 4000 men, of whom 300 are wounded.

That is quite a difference!

I can not help wonder why Oman wrote the following, (to be found on pages 54 and 55) on Reynier and never tryied to correct it (as far as I know) .

As one can see, Oman did not called Reynier a fool, but what he said was not very "glorifying" and even deserved, since, according to Oman, Wellington's Army, 1809-1814, as previously seen, Reynier's troops were not in column at Maida:

    Reynier ought to have known better what to expect; he had seen the battles in front of Alexandria, but evidently had not learnt the lesson which they might have taught him; there, indeed, line and column had not been pitted against cadi other with the beautiful simphcity that was witnessed at Maida. What is odd is that even Maida did not teach him thc truth. Three years later he tried the same old tactics at Bussaco, with equally disastrous results, so that Bonaparte exclaimed: "Ney and Massena had never seen the English before; but that Reynier, whom they have already thrashed twice, should have attacked in this way is simply astounding." Even after his Calabrian experiences he remained with the comforting belief that a courageous column could smash any linee, and that if the experiment did not come off it was the fault of faint hearts in thc rank and file.

Oman, in the above quotation speaks of beautiful simplicity.... the beautiful simphcity that was witnessed at Maida...Well, another falsehood I guess! At the very least, Reynier's reputation is tarnished.

To what extent? Well I can not help quoting Mr. Park (see page 10):

    "This suspicion coupled with Reynier's record, lead me to the conclusion that the 1929 version is correct. Reynier made a carrier of seeing his own commands and those of others shot to pieces by British infantry."

That is proof that Oman's work achieved the objective. Allow me to say that one did not become a general in Napoleon's Army by being an imbecile or unfit for command!

I am just presenting one more point.

One should not think that the possibility of Oman "twisting" around facts to fit his theory or point of view is unreasonable. Quite on the contrary, in many instances he appears to simply forget the facts (We should go back on that in our next issues). A good example of that is to be found in Oman's second interpretation of Maida. in Wellington's Army when he says:

    A conclusive proof of the efficacy of the double when opposed to the triple rank was very clearly given at the half-forgotten Calabrian battle of Maida, three years after the commencement of the second half of the great French War. At this fight the French General Reynier had deployed the whole, or the greater part, of his battalons, who were not as usual fighting either in ordre mixte or in battalion column. The result was very decisive -- 5000 British infantry in the thinner formation received the attack of 6000 French in the heavier, and inflicted on them, purely by superior fire-efficiency, one of the most crushing defeats on a small scale that was ever seen, disabhng or taking 2000 men, with a total loss to themselves of only 320. It is worth while remembering that some of the officers who were afterwards to be Welhngton's trusted heutenants were present at Maida, including Cole, Kempt, Oswald, and Colbome. This was about the only instance that I know where Enghsh and French came into action both deployed, and on a more or less parallel front. Usually it was a case of "column against line."

Please see for yourself. Oman's says: "This was about the only instance that I know where English and French came into action both deployed... Well that is pure HOGWASH! I know, just from memory three instances in which English and French came into action in line. One of them is in Oman's History of the Peninsula War, volume VIII, page 556 (Wellington on the Bidassoa):

    "...The French, in the same fashion, gradually formed a long line on their side of the ravine..."

The second one is from Jack Weller's Wellington in the Peninsula, page 254:

    "....For the first time in the war, almost a complete French division formed a line; seven battalions were arrayed in a continuous three deep line..."

The third one can be found in E. E & L # 57, pages 22 and 25.

What to think of Oman's interpretation of Reynier's dispatch?

I have thought of the problem and, so far, did not cone to a definite answer, but with some alternatives:

    (1) Oman simply corrected Reynier's dispatch and simply changed line to columns since he thought, very honestly, that Reynier's troops were in column.

    (2) Oman dehberatly changed line to column to fit his theory that the French were in column at Maida.

    (3) There is a second dispatch from Reynier in which Reynier claims the French in column. (That is highly improbable in my humble opinion)

    (4) There is some kind of a mistake in the letter from Reynier to Napoleon, perhaps a bad translation etc. ?

That does not explain why Oman also discounted the eyewittness report from Bunbury's narrative, p.244, which also describe the French in line...Bunbury"s narrative were the same when Oman wrote: (1) Studies in the Napoleonic Wars and several years later Wellington's Army!

Perhaps, there again, Oman choosed to ignore the fact that Bunbury describes the French in line (and not in column) as a mistake and choosed to ignore it on pretty much the same basis he may have deci- ded to ignore Reynier's dispatch?

The same remarks also apply to Boothby's quotation which unfortunately is not very clear.

At that point, what should we think of the other eyewittness reports describing the French in column?

Well, that is, of course, a key point. We have to go back to one basic point. That is the question of the formations used by the French. If one buy the story, elas too often accepted, that the French always fought in column and seldom in line, one has problems! Now, on the other hand, if one accepts the fact that columns were mostly used to move onto and around the battlefield faster than a line, and, that, with some exceptions, columns of attacks were sopposed to deploy, one has a much easier task to accept the eyewittness accounts describing the French in columns. Of course they were in columns when they came down from their camps to attack the British! That was their way to move and then to deploy if need arrised. (see somewhere else in this issue the different formations adopted by the French at lena).

A further point of extreme, but apparently overlooked, importance, is the fact that several eyewittnesses report that the visibihty on the battlefield and especially before the exchange of fire between Compere and the British light infantry was very poor. That is clearly said by: (1) Boothby, (2) "Extracts from "Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte".

The extracts from "Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte" become, at that point, of the upmost importance for two reasons. The first reason is that it is the only account that explain that the French infantry (1st Leger and 42nd de Ligne) deployed behind a screen of French cavalry, that, because of the heat and of the dust masked the deployment).

The second is the introduction of a new eyewitness report. That is the report of Griois, whoa commanded the French battery at Maida and reported as one of the sources of the author of "Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte .

I don't have the report under my eyes, very unfortunately, but, I assume that the report describes the French in line--otherwise the other would not have described the French in that formation.

Needless to say that I am seeking that account of the battle of Maida by Griois, which was pubhshed in 1828, in volume IV of the "Spectaculaire Militaire" (premiere serie) under the title of "Rectification d'une Erreur de Walter Scott" (I.E. "Rectification of an firror of Walter Scott). Combat de Maida (I.E. "Battle of Maida). Apparently the controversy on Maida is not new. It is simply time to bring the truth out. I think that the Letter from Reynier to Joseph Napoleon does just that.

As usual comments would be appreciated. Of course, if the data presented here is wrong...then I am wrong...but I doubt very much of that!

I would hke to point out, that in the above presentation and forum, there is one article, the article authored by Mr. Park, that is in complete disagreement with what Arnold and myself have written on Maida. Yet Mr. Park's article is presented integrally. Mr. Park and I do not see eye to eye, but that is a minor detail. I believe we are both gentlemen seeking the truth since Mr. Park says: "In the absence of more specific data, I am inclined to continue to believe that the attacking portion of Reynier's army was in column..."

I further believe that Mr. Park's article also reflects the opinion of some readers that did not participate in this forum. Remember our journal is essentially one of opinions. The above is one more example of its purpose.

(*) Note that the poor visibility during the deployment of the French into line explain why some eyewitnesses only report the French in column since they did not see the deployment of the columns to lines.

Maida Special Readers Forum

Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 58
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1981 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com