Maida

IV. A Perplexing Look on the Articles
on Maida and the Discussion on
Columns vs. Line

by S.J. Park

Dear Mr. Lochet,

I am somewhat perplexed by the article on the battle of Maida and the subsequent discussion of columns vs line in E, E & L # 56. I think Oman's presentation deserves a fuller discussion.

First Arnold cites a paper given by Oman to the Royal Artillery Institution in 1907 and another to the British Academy in 1910, without saying where he obtained them. He cites the recantation of Oman in a footnote to Wellington's Army in 1912. I happen to have both articles as they were published by Oman in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars in 1929 In this work he acknowledges their publication by the RAI and BA, but does not mention the dates. Presumably then, Studies is not Arnold's source.

Secondly, in the first (RAI) article, entitled "The Battle of Maida", Oman gives the following sources: (1) Bunburry, (2) de Watteville's "notes" (he was a Swiss in the British service), (3) a letter from John Colbome (see below), (4) a quote from Col. Stewart in the regimental history of the 78th Foot (not General Stuart), (5) the diary of Charles Boothby of the RE, and (6) Reynier's unpublished dispatch on the battle to Napoleon which is in the French archives and gives the casualty figures. Question, did the version Arnold used have the same sources? (All of this may be irrelevant)

In the article, Oman gives the verbatim quote used by Arnold in the paragraph of his article and then, quoting from Reynier's dispatch:

    "The English remained with ported arms until the 1st Leger came within half musket shot; they then open a tremendous fire, which at first did not stop the charge, but when the columns were only fifteen paces from the hostile line and could have broken it with one more thrust...they broke and fled."

What could be clearer than that (p 54, emphasis mine)?

Continuing, Oman describes the attack of the 42nd Ligne and Poles, also in column, which were broken up the same way (p58). Then, regarding the French right: "Digonet, the French General who commanded in this part of the field, had deployed the 25rd (Leger, 2 Btns) on one side of his guns and the Swiss (the French had a Swiss body also) on the other and stood on the defensive....There resulted a fierce frontal fire engagement...which was settled by British flank fire...looking down the French line." (p. 60).

That is the way I have always known Maida and substantially the way it is described by Piers Mackesy in The War in the Mediterranean 1803-10 and conforms to the Colbome letter given by G.C. Moore Smith. The Life and Letters of John Colborne, Field-Marshall Lord Seaton although neither give as much detail as Oman does. The Bunburry book, which I have never been able to obtain, is cited as the last word on a lot of things. It is the source of the incompetent behavior of General Stuart at the battle, the same Stuart who highly praised Bunburry. It is also the source of a lot of undeserved calumny heaped on Sir David Dundas and the "18 movements". That and the tone of some excerpts that I have seen (cf. his remarks on the Corsican Rangers, comments apparently not borne out by the other observers) tends to make me suspicious. Also, Bunburry was writing a memoir while Reynier was composing (presumably with staff assistance) on the spot report.

This suspicion, coupled with General Reynier's record, lead me to the conclusion that the 1929 version is correct. Reynier made a career of seeing his own commands and those of others shot to pieces by British infantry. See the battles of Alexandria and Busaco. In the rather vague 1912 footnote, Oman does not state what evidence "Col. James" showed that the French were in line. It seems that a man of Oman's stature would have forgotten his change of mind and reprinted the 1807 version. Oman was a historian of reknown quite apart from his Napoleonic efforts. He was an expert on the weapons and tactics of the middle ages and wrote the section of the Cambridge Medieval History and a book on the Byzantine armies.

In the absence of more specific data. I am inclined to continue to believe that the attacking portion of Reynier's army was in column although the right wing deployed into line to fight the rearguard action.

I must confess that I find a lot of the debate on French tactics somewhat irrelevant. To assume that French officers deliberately attacked in mass formations is to assume that they were fools instead of the long professionals they are known to have been. They patently did attack in what to British observers seemed to be columns in most cases These were probably versions of the ordre-mixte except at Maida Busaco and Waterloo and they no doubt always intended to deploy into line for any fire fights. (These remarks may not hold up in the 1815-14 campaigns.) Quimby is on the right track when he says that at first they were unfamiliar with British methods and later were misled by Wellington's concealing and screening tactics.

If you read all of Oman's works carefully, he rather grudgingly concedes these points. In my opinion, the real answers to the problems we are debating come in the standard of musketry and light infantry tactics of the British and will come to light from the type of analysis attemted by General Hughes in Firepower.

Maida Special Readers Forum

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