Maida

II. More on the Battle of Maida

by Harry Jarosak

In the June issue of EEL Jim Arnold wrote a repeal of one of his former articles dealing with the Battle of Maida (4 July 1806). His contention, in keeping with a list of detractors, was that the early opinion of Oman and Fortesque regarding the French formations have been erroneously perpetuated. While, in Wellington's Army (1912), Oman indeed included a footnote expressing puzzlement over the formations, the body of the text contained the following:

    At this fight the French General Reynier had deployed the whole, or the greater part, of his battalions, who were not as usual fighting either in ordre mixte or in battalion column. (77-78)

    This was about the only instance and French came into action both or less parallel front. Usually against line. (78)

This whole afair is very confusing, since Oman had utilized the two sources mentioned in the footnote for his first work, "Column and Line in the Peninsula War" (1910). In 1929 Oman wrote a collective work of his various papers, the famous Studies in the Napoleonic Wars. This contained both "Column and Line. in the Peninsula" and the "Battle of Maida". In the former he asserted that Napoleon's favorite format was the ordre mixte to combine the advantages of both column and line here was no retraction in the preface and no footnote in the text. In fact, rather than a mere collection of past works with little relationship, Oman referred to another part from "Column and Line".

The only one of them, indeed, who has left a clear and philosophic summary of the consequences of attacking in heavy columns a well-placed British line is Bugeaud, whose interesting paragraphs I have already quoted in the pages of this volume which deal with the Battle of Maida. (106)

In the other study Oman referred to the Battle of Maida as "the forerunner of all the great battles of the Peninsula war so far as tactics go...The first clash of Kempt's brigade...and Compere's heavy battalion columns...gives the key to the whole tactical superiority of the British infantry..."(37)

According to this account of Maida, Reynier's forces descended the hill in three columns.

The three columns coming down the hill at the same moment, but having very different distances to cover in order to qet into line, it soon resulted that the French Army, like the British, fell into an echelon of brigades, with the left advanced, Compere leading... (p. 51)

As it was, Kempt and Compefe met long before the other sections would make contact. The 1 Leger in two battalion columns approached the right and center of Kempt's line. While Oman stated that "Deducting the skirmishers on the eastern flank of each force, who were now bickering in the woods, the two French battalions had 1600 men in line..." (p. 52), just afterward he wrote: "...While if Compere looked to his right rear he could see the 42nd Ligne, also two battalions, corning on in column at a similar distance." (p. 53)

Oman called it "...the fairest fight between column and line that had been seen since the Napoleonic wars began on the one side two heavy columns of 800 men each, drawn up in column of companies, i.e. with..." (p. 53)

Referring to the fire fight effect, Oman said: "The first laid low almost the whole first line, but the mass still came on." (p. 54)

Obviously this was not a reference to a technical line formation, since Oman still had them in column. Indeed, his map shows the French in column. There is no footnote abridgement.

Among his sources for Maida, Oman cited Bunbury, de Watteville, Lord Seaton, Col. Stewart, Engineer Boothby, Reynier's dispatch and French archival material. I have re-checked the sources I have available as follows:

Bunbury:

    "Their 1st Legere (3 battalions) led on by General Compere, and supported by a regiment of Poles, advanced in line upon the brigade of British light infantry..." (p. 244)

Charles Stevens of the 20th Regiment and Lord Seaton described the battle, but unfortunately made no mention of formations.

Boothby watched from afar:

    "From hence, therefore, with the veteran Major Fischer, I saw the general movements of the battle, near enough to be filled with the most terrible interest, to see masses descend from the heights, tracked by smoke and fire, to see opposing bodies approaching to collision, and by the rapidity of motion to distinguish horse from foot, and where approaching columns had been lost to sight, to recognize their conflict from the sudden smoke of the volleys, but though near enough for this, I was too distant to pretend to give the description of an eyewitness, not indeed being able to distinguish one regiment from another, or indeed the enemy from our­selves, except from the direction in which each was moving." (p. 72)

He wrote the account from "Subsequent observation and inquiry." (p. 76) Boothby mentioned the charge and the equal shock of opposing forces: "lines of troops" (p. 78)

From this obscure reference, it would be hard to conclude that he intended a line in our technical sense of the term, whereas he previously witnessed the advance in column.

Some other sources Oman did not cite are the following:

Joseph Anderson, an ensign in the 78th Regiment, described the French attack:

    As soon as these formidable French columns came sufficiently near, and not till then, our lines were called to 'attention' and ordered to 'shoulder arms'. Then commenced in earnest the glorious battle of Maida, first with a volley from our brigade into the enemy's columns and from our artillery at each flank without ceasing, followed by independent firing as fast as our men could load; and well they did their work! Nor were the enemy idle; they returned our fire without ceasing, then in part commenced to deploy into line. (pp.12-13)

Anderson was in Acland's brigade to the left of Kempt's. The first fire would have included Kempt's devestating volley into the 1 Leger. There was some deploying into line as a firefight developed, but this might have been a reference to the 42nd or the 1 Leger.

It is important to remember that Oman mentioned Reynier's intention to get his columns into line. Probably the 1 Leger was too shattered and it was the 42nd that started deploying.

Sir Lee Knowles in the British in Capri 1806-1808 included a number of first-hand accounts of Maida.

Richard Church, a Lieutenant in the 39th Foot, did not mention the French formation. Major John Hamill described only the British formation. However. Knowles' text supported the column theory: "The French charged with their accustomed gallantry, and in their accustomed column formation." (p. 87)

Knowles, Oman, Chandler, Fortesque, and Rothenberg, are secondary sources. Oman demonstrated confusion over the French formation, but did not correct it in his latter work, Studies.

Thus far, I think that there is a good possibility that the French advanced in column with the intention of deploying. The first British fire caught them in column and there was some attempt to deploy in order to better return fire. Hopefully there will be more interest and contributions in this matter from the readership.

Bibliography

Anderson Recollections of a Peninsular Veteran, Edward Arnold, London, 1913.
Boothby, Under England's Flag, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1900.
Bunbury, Narratives...Great War with France, Richard Bently, London, 1854.
Knowles, The British in Capri, John Lane, London, MCMXVIII.
Oman, Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, Charles Scribners, New York, 1930.
Oman, Wellington's Army. Francis Edwards, London, 1968.
Stevens, Reminiscences, Winchesters, MDCCCLXXVIII.

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