Maida

I. Extract from the Letter
of Reynier to Joseph

by Jim Arnold

Note from Editor. I can not prevent myself from underlining the importance of the letter of Reynier to Joseph as a key point in our discussion on Maida. Keep in mind that Reynier was the French comman­der at Maida!

Dear M. Lochet: ­

I appreciate your interesting response to my article. Surprisingly, shortly after I sent it to you I came across another source. I found, (Reynier's) report of Miada which he sent to Joseph Bonaparte. It is included on page 161, of Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Joseph and dated July 54 1806.

It's interesting to remember that Oman writes in the footnote I cited that he couldn't find a French account that explicitely describes the French in line. (Reynier's) letter to Joseph does so. The key sentence is "The 1st and 42nd regiments, 2400 strong, under the orders of General Compere, passed the Lamato, and formed into line, having their left on the Lamato."

I don't know whether it is possible to include this in the article but regardless this letter is of great interest: (Reynier) does say the British fire was extremely well kept up and the charging French got to a range of 15 paces before being repulsed.

Extract from the Letter:

    The 4th of July, at sunrise, I perceived a movement in the enemy's camp, and that their troops approached the sea. Many thought that they were going to re-embark. They marched along the coast in two columns toward the mouth of the Lamato; they then retired a little from the sea, and the head of a column appeared at one time to be directed towards my camp. They made several marches and countermarches, having always on their flank a ship of the line, a frigate, and several gunboats. They extended their right towards the Lamato, and seemed to prepare to pass it, so as to intercept my road to Monteleone; They formed in two lines, and advanced the first, quitting thus the protection of their ships and gunboats, I thought that the moment was favorable to an attack; that, as they were, somewhat divided by the Lamato, I could crush, by a vigorous charge, a part of their army; that the rest, particularly those who had turned my right by advancing towards the Monteleone rosd, would be unable to re-embark and must surrender, and that no time was to be lost in seizing this opportunity; By passing the Lamato I could, without losing time or encountering any obstacle, attack them with my infantry, my light artillery, and my cavalry, which, unhappily, consisted of only 150 men of the 9th chasseurs. I should have lost these advantages if I had allowed them to pass the Lamato, because the ground on the other side is uneven, and full of marshes and thickets, which would have prevented my making the attack with the vigour and quickness which were requisite to render its success complete. It was necessary to beat them before the crowd of banditti which hovered about my rear was sufficiently organized to attack me from behind through the wood while I was employed in fighting the English towards the sea.

    At 9 in the morning I put my troops in motion; two light companies were ordered to thread the thickets which line the bed of the Lamato. The 1st and 42nd reqiments, 2400 strong, ­under the orders of General Compere, passed the Lamato, and formed into line, having their left on the Lamato. The 4th Swiss battalion and twelve companies of the Polish regiment, 1500 strong, under the orders of Brigadier-General Peyri, passed the Lamato, and formed in a second line in echelon behind the right of the 42nd making my centre. The 23rd, light infantry, 1250 men strong, under the orders of General Digonnet, crossed and formed on my right. Four pieces of light artillery and the 9th chasseurs, under the orders of General Franceschi, were also part of my centre.

    The English had eight field-pieces; their flanks were protected by a ship of the line, a frigate, and some gunboats.

    The light troops, detached along the Lamato, were pressed by the English, who were crossing the river. The first line of enemy advanced a little, following the skirmishers, whom I made retreat, in order to draw them on. I ordered the 1st regiment of light infantry to advance its left in order to support the skirmishers, and the rest of the brigade of General Compere to move by echelons, the Swiss and the Poles to follow this advance in a second line and the 23rd infantry, which had wandered a little towards its right, to re-approach the Swiss, as I wished to direct all my efforts on the centre of the enemy.

    As soon as the 1st light infantry was within half gun-shot of the English regiments, which remained carrying arms, its ­drums beat the charge, and the 42nd regiment charged the instant after at the same distance. The English battalions then opened a fire, exceedingly well kept up, which at first did not stop the charge at the French regiments; but when they had only fifteen steps to make in order to reach the enemy's line with the bayonet, and destroy it, the soldiers of the 1st regiment turned their backs and fled.

    Those of the 42nd perceived this movement, and, though they had only a few more steps to take, began to hesitate and followed the example of the 1st. As soon as I perceived the flight of the 1st regiment, I turned towards the second line, to charge with that, but the Poles were already in flight.

    The Swiss battalion, carried away little by the example of the other troops, hesitated; however, I made several of its companies advance, which checked a little the enemy's pursuit of the 1st and the 42nd. I went instantly to the 23rd regiment, to see if it was possible to make, with this regiment and the chasseurs, a new attack on the enemy's centre; for his advance exposed his left flank, and left a great interval, through which he could have been taken in flank; but this regiment was a little too far to the right, and was already engaged in checking the left of the enemy, and would have been destroyed if it had moved to join in my intended attack.

    The troops which had disbanded having fled to a great distance from the field of battle, I had no more at hand. All that I could do was to try to preserve the remainder of my force, to take the road to Catanzaro and Cotrona in order to rally them, to send my wounded to Cotrona, the place to which I had already been advised to retire, and wait there for the reinforcements which your Majesty will send, in order to drive quickly the English from the continent, to avenge our defeat, and succour the garrisons of Scylla and Reggio.

Note from Editor. Only the pertinent part of Reynier's letter to Joseph has been reproduced here.

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