by Major Wilbur E. Gray, US Army
Massena's refusal left Korsakov in a terrible quandary. Should he try to escape or should he try to defend the city? Further bad news that evening made his choice an easy one He and his council of war soon learned that Freiherr von Hotze's Austrian force had been overwhelmed on the Linthe by General Nicolas "John of God" Soult's 7,000 French. In fact, both von Hotze and his chief of staff had been shot dead when they personally lead some reinforcing troops in a futile charge to stop the French. Now Soult was hot footing it north in an attempt to linkup with Massena and encircle the city. Korsakov therefore decided upon a breakout to the north, which was attempted the next day at 0600 hours. French artillery raked the flanks of the fleeing columns, supposedly with such "vigor and skill that they soon threw the Russians into disorder and confusion." French infantry and cavalry attacks actually isolated
LTG Sacken's command near the Niederdorf Gate, where
they were cut down nearly to the last man. Sacken himself
stayed with his troops and was hit in the head by a French
musket ball (he survived his wounds). The remainder of
Korsakov's army escaped, finally regrouping in the Rhine
village of Dorflingen on 28 September. Korsakov
immediately destroyed all bridges across the river and
began to prepare defensive positions. He, along with most
of his regimental commanders, were relieved by the Czar by
the end of October, 1799.
[18]
No one knows exactly what the French losses were
during this battle, but Czarist casualties were extremely
heavy, perhaps as much as 15,000 killed, wounded and
taken prisoner. Records do show that the Russians left
three generals, 142 officers and over 5000 soldiers behind
on the fields of Zurich. The French also captured the entire Russian baggage train (over 289 vehicles), 118
caissons, 26 guns and nine regimental standards. This was
decisive victory. [19]
Obviously, the effects of this battle were profound in
the extreme. When Suvorov heard of the disaster he
exclaimed, "Hotze! They are used to it, they are for ever
being beaten. But Korsakov, Korsakov and his 30,000 men!
What a victory for an enemy barely equal in numbers!"
Then he immediately turned to the NE and avoided
Massena's victorious army by marching to safety through
the Pragel, Kinzig and Panixer Passes.
The battle also convinced Czar Paul I to abandon the
Second Coalition. There would be defeats in the
Netherlands (where General Hermann would actually
manage to get himself captured), and the British had
actually had the gall to occupy the island of Malta. As
Grand Master of the Knights of St John, such disgraceful
activity by his erstwhile ally could not be ignored! When
news of Korsakov's defeat and Suvarov's retreat hit the
Imperial Palace in St Petersburg, Paul declared he had nearly
had enough and the coalition, for all practical purposes,
collapsed. Thus was Republican France, and the
revolutionary ideals for which it stood, safe for a few years
more. [20]
But perhaps the most important result of this battle
was something that was not recognized by its participants,
at least not those on the loser's side. This was simply that
Zurich was yet one more example of the fact that war had
changed, and only a massive change in society's
perception about it would allow autocratic Europe a
reasonable chance of success. The rules of war, as it
pertained to both the soldiers and the society that molded
them, had now been republished in a new, revised edition.
A precious few, such as Prussia's General Gerhard J.D. von
Scharnhorst, recognized this, but were officially told to shut
up and behave themselves.
Such a reaction was to be expected. After all,
reactionary Europe was in many respects trying to preserve
its own vision of society by destroying the very altemative
that made such "new thinking" possible. And if the only
way to beat the French was to become like them, then
victory for the Revolution was assured. This was a tough
pill to swallow for most, making rejection of such ideas all
too easy.
Thus the majority learned nothing from the wars of
the Revolution and defeats like Zurich. It was only after
some extensive remedial study in the classrooms of Jena
and Austerlitz that the need for change would become clear
to all. But by then, of course, it was much too late.
[1] Haythornthwaite,
Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (hereafter referred to as Italy,p. 20;
Haythomthwaite,Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars:
Infantry, p. 12, et al.
Chandler, David G., Napoleon's Marshals, New York,
1987. First presented as a lecture at Historicon 1993. The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army or the United States Government.
Alpine Thunder The Battle of Zurich 1799
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