by Greg Novak
Perhaps the best parable of the Alamo is the often seen balcony and stairway that shows up in the various movies on that subject. Not existing at the time of the siege, it was added by John Wayne for his production as a stage mechanism. In most of the early scenes of the movie, Travis is often seen as looking down on his men, a rather aloof character. This stands in sharp contrast to the characters of Bowie and Crockett, who are always seen with and among the common defenders. It is only at this movie’s version of the “line in the sand moment” that Travis descends to the level of the common man. This stage device was so effective that just about every Alamo movie since that time has added the balcony and porch to their Alamo set. And so it is with the Alamo story, the reality of the moment has been overlaid with stories, books and films, so if becomes difficult to tell when truth ends and myth begins. Recently, F. J. Schaller Jr. has started a series on the Alamo for the HMGS Dispatch. I read the first part with some interest, and looked forward to the second and third part, which covered the Mexican Army. Upon reading it, I find that I must disagree with a number of his findings, both on the Mexican Army itself, as well as the storming of the Alamo. Specific places where I find myself in disagreement with him are as follows: The Mexican cavalry should have been the key element of the Mexican drive into Texas but was instead a near total failure. It’s presence helped convince Fannin to surrender outside Goliad but little of it was able to push on further into Texas due to the wretched state of the cavalry mounts. The provisional government of Texas was well aware that no Mexican invasion of Texas could occur until the grass had started growing on the southern Texas plains. Therefore the earliest that Santa Anna could move north was early April, and all planning was based on this fact. There would be time to set up a Texas government, and time to raise, organize and train a Texas Army to oppose that invasion. Santa Anna’s dash north in late February threw this timetable into total disarray, but at a cost of destroying his mounted arm. Lacking forage and the spring grass, the winter march north ensured that most of the Mexican cavalry never made it further than San Antonio. The Cavalry Brigade made it to that city on March 10th, and was ordered to return to Mexico after being inspected and found unfit for service. On the armament of the Mexican infantry, it is very often forgotten that the standard weapon of any nation’s infantry in 1836 was the smoothbore musket. The Mexican Army was neither better nor worse in its choice, as the India pattern Brown Bess was still in service with the British Army. The problem with the firepower of the Mexican infantry was twofold. First there was a problem with the gunpowder issued to the Mexican Army. It tended to be of a poorer quality then normally found, a fact commented on when captured by Texas units. Added to this was the fact that often copper ball was issued for use with the muskets instead of lead. This meant that the effective small arms range of the Mexican infantry was greatly reduced. The Mexican Activo Battalions should not all be rated as green or considered militia. While San Luis Potosi Activo Battalion was new to combat, the Toluca Activo Infantry battalion was veteran, and considered the equal of any permanente battalion. Order of BattleAs to the Mexican troops that served at the Alamo, the following is an Order of Battle for that action: Arrived February 23rd. Santa Anna’s Headquarters - Total strength 47 officers and other ranks
Second in Command: Major General Don Vicente Filisola 21 other officers ranging from major general to lieutenant, including 3 engineering officers Cavalry Escort: 1 troop of picked men and 26 officers and other ranks Vanguard Brigade (also referred to as the 1st Division)
Second in Command: Colonel Eulogio Gonzalez Attached Artillery: Captain Mariano Salva
2 6lb. field guns 2 4lb. field guns 2 7” howitzers (1) Dolores Permanente Cavalry Regiment: Total Strength 379 officers and other ranks
Attached formations
Detachment Coahuila Activo Cavalry Regiment: 30 officers and men Presidial Troops: 55 officers and men Jimenez Permanente Infantry Battalion
340 officers and other ranks includes 26 volunteers (2) Matamoros Permanente Infantry Battalion
370 officers and other ranks includes 78 volunteers (2) San Luis Potosi Activo Infantry Battalion
495 officers and other ranks (1) Some sources claim that only one howitzer arrived with the Vanguard Brigade, However based on reports of the effect of the Mexican artillery, it seems more likely that two weapons were present. (2) Volunteers were supposed to have been just that, somewhat experienced men who wished to enlist in the permanent battalions. Instead they were raw recruits, often either pressed into service or taken from prison. Mexican Army orders throughout this period remind commanders that these men are not to be used for military purposes until they have finished their training. RecapTotal Artillery 65 officers and other ranks, 8 guns
This is the force that kept the Alamo under a loose siege from February 23rd to March 3rd. This force was unable to breach the walls with the artillery present, and not able to stop Texican movement in or out of the Alamo. While some skirmishing occurred from time to time, no assault on the Alamo was attempted contrary to the different movie versions. Santa Anna ordered reinforcements forward from the next element of the Mexican Army, the 1st Infantry Brigade or 2nd Division, which was following in his footsteps north to San Antonio. When this force arrived on March 3rd it brought with it Brigadier General de Cos, Santa Anna’s brother in law and an officer currently on parole after surrendering the Alamo to the Texians back in December Headquarters Troops: Brigadier General Martin Perfecto de Cos and 3 officers
(1) The 1st Brigade had with it 2 12lb. field guns, 2 6lb. field guns and 2 4lb. field guns. The 4lb. field guns were most likely sent forward with the detachment, though some accounts claim that one of the weapons was a howitzer. When it was suggested the commander of the 1st Brigade, Brigadier General Antonio Gaona. forward the 12lb. field guns with the detachment, as they would be most useful in a siege, the general refused. Supposedly he stated that if Santa Anna wanted these weapons, he would have sent for them, RecapTotal Artillery 20 officers and other ranks, 2 guns
The orders issued by Santa Anna for the dawn attack on the morning of March 6th were very precise. Among the information given was the equipment issued to each column, and included instructions that the “volunteers” were to remain behind and not used as part of the attack. Those carrying ladders were to sling their arms, and all soldiers were to have shoes or sandals, and have their chinstraps down! Column Number 1Ordered against the northwest side of the Alamo from the north. Commander: Brigadier General de Cos.
6 center companies and 1 light company 250 officers and men? Detachment - San Luis Potosi Activo Infantry Battalion
108 officers and other ranks (1) Ten ladders, two axes and two crowbars were assigned to this command, as there was a gate on the northwest side of the Alamo. (1) There is some debate as to how many men took part in the attack from the San Luis Potosi Activo Battalion. Santa Anna’s orders indicates three center companies were to take part, while the report by de Cos adjutant indicates that only picked men (trained) were sent forward by the battalion. As with the “volunteers”, it appears that the untrained members of the battalion were not committed to action. From the adjutants report it appears that the column had the light infantry company out front as skirmishers, with the Aldama Battalion deployed in two lines each three companies wide. Each company deployed in two ranks with a third rank of officers and file closers. The detachment from the San Luis Potosi Battalion formed in a similar manner behind Aldama, giving the formation a depth of 9 ranks. Figuring 15 men per company frontage - with an average of 36 men per company, the formation was about 100 feet wide with a total strength of about 350 officers and men. The length of the north wall was 218 feet, so this frontage put the maximum numbers of soldiers into the smallest space without making the column too deep, while giving Column Number 2 the space it needed to advance alongside. Column Number 2Ordered against the northeast corner of the Alamo Commander: Brigadier General Castrillon.
6 center companies and 1 light company 320 officers and other ranks?? San Luis Potosi Activo Infantry Battalion
100 officers and other ranks (1) Ten ladders were assigned to this command. (1) If the adjutants report is correct, then the number of troops from San Luis Potosi Battalion would be about 100 picked men. No report exists for the formation of this column, but based on its size one is tempted to assume that it would form in a similar manner as the 1st Column. With the north wall having a frontage of 218 feet, this formation would also allow the maximum pressure on the northeast corner. Column Number 3Ordered against the east side of the Alamo Commander: Colonel Jose Maria Romero
Six center companies 230 officers and other ranks?? Matamoros Permanente Infantry Battalion ( - Light and Grenadier Companies)
Six center companies 230 officers and other ranks?? Six ladders were assigned to this command. No report exists for the formation of this column either, but based on its makeup one is tempted to assume that the two battalions went in side by side as both units were permanente. One might guess that they formed each battalion on a two-company frontage, giving each battalion about a sixty-foot frontage and a depth of 9 ranks. The goal of this attack is somewhat confusing due to the L shaped nature of the Alamo. An attack on the east wall north of the corral and convert yard would expose the column to flanking fire from that area, while an attack further south into the corral - convent yard area would require the Mexican troops to fight through those areas before tackling the long barracks area. Column Number 4Ordered against the south side of the Alamo Commander: Colonel Juan Morales
Two ladders were assigned to this command. One must wonder whether this column was designed as an actual attack or as a diversion. Because of the wooden palisade between the chapel and the southern gatehouse, the southern side of the Alamo is often viewed as the weakest link. Crockett for that reason supposedly chose to take command at that post. What this ignores is the fact that the defenses of the Alamo included a lunette outside the main gate. This lunette not only provided that no direct attack on the main gate could be carried out, but also ensured that the southern walls would have flanking protection from the artillery stationed there. However any Mexican movement against the southern walls would prevent the defenders from reinforcing the northern sectors where the main attack was to fall, hence the need for a column in this area. The ReserveMajor General Santa Anna The Grenadier companies of Jimenez, Matamoros, Aldama, Toluca and San Luis Potosi Infantry Battalions
Sapper (Zapadores) Battalion, Corps of Artillery
These troops were held to the north of the Alamo where Santa Anna could send them in at the proper moment. Recap of the Mexican attack strengths
More Alamo: The Alamo Part 1 The Mission San Antonio de Valero
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