The following is my personal theory of what happened on the morning of March 6th. All of the Mexican columns started within 300 yards of the Alamo. Santa Anna for the first time in the siege suspended the round the clock bombardment, so it can be assumed that the garrison was in a deeper sleep then normal. The overall perimeter of the Alamo was some 1900 feet, with some 18 artillery pieces mounted for defense, of which 16 were on the perimeter. Deducting 80 men to serve as gunners, the Texicans had perhaps 170 infantry to line the walls. (Recent research indicates that at least one additional company of volunteers entered the garrison after “Deaf” Smith left on the night of the 3rd, so the garrison mustered between 220 and 250 defenders.) To the north and east, the Texican canister hit all three Mexican columns as they started towards the walls. The saving grace for the Mexican soldiers was that after the first shots were fired, there was a delay as the Texican gunners awoke and scrambled to their weapons and fired additional rounds. Most commentators assume that the Mexican columns were driven back by fire, reformed, and attacked yet again, based on Mrs. Dickerson’s statement that there were two rounds of artillery fire. To me, the open terrain in the area would make this near impossible. If the Mexicans troops were to fall back, they would want to move out of range of the Texican artillery before they could reform. Doing so would require them to drop back some 600 yards or more, which would take them out of action for some time, as well as causing even more casualties as they retreated under fire. There was no nearby terrain that would provide cover, so the troops could only find safety by moving even further away from the Alamo. Since the attack started about 5 AM, and ended 90 minutes later, it is doubtful that the Mexican columns could have fallen back any distance, reformed and returned to attack the Alamo yet again. As the Texican artillery was mounted on top of the walls, and was unable to depress to fire at close range, the safest place for the Mexican infantry was under the guns. I believe that the Mexican infantry to the north headed for that safe zone. Ladders were tossed away in the scramble to safety and the troops piled up under the walls. Within the first fifteen minutes therefore, the attack lost its impetus. On the east side, column Number 3 found itself under flanking fire from the chapel and the corral, and most likely moved away from it seeking safety. As the closest safe point was against the northeast wall, where the Texican fire could not bear, that is where the troops would head, adding to the mass of troops and confusion on that sector. Once the Mexican infantry was under the shelter of the walls, a firefight broke out between the two sides. With their artillery unable to bear any longer, the Texican defenders were reduced to firing their small arms over the walls, exposing themselves in the process. Travis is thought to have died in this manner while defending the northern wall. The defenders kept inflicting casualties, though in lesser numbers than before, and the attackers were now causing casualties as well, and there were far fewer defenders. Cos supposedly directed men of his column to advance along the west wall, seeking a point at which they could enter the Alamo. However, while individual Mexican soldiers began to now climb the walls and enter the buildings on the western side of the Alamo, the loss of cohesion of the first three columns meant that this was done in small groups. The Mexicans were unable to move forward in any strength, but the defenders could not keep the attackers off the wall as their numbers were slowly reduced. What the Texican’s needed was a force to counterattack with, and there was none at hand. While this struggle was going on in the north, let us return to the southern side of the Alamo. I believe that the fourth column under Morales was the “smoke and mirrors” column. With only three light infantry companies facing at least five field guns on a 400-foot frontage, plus any supporting infantry, Morales did not have much of a chance to storm the works. My guess is that the majority of his command operated in skirmish order, in order to reduce casualties as well as keep the Texicans confused as to Morales intentions. Facing what was believed to be a threat to the southern defenses, the Texican commanders there would be reluctant to detach troops to reinforce the northern defenses. At some point in time, Morales noted that the Texican infantry helping defend the southwest corner and the 18lb. gun located there had been reduced in number, possibly shifting north to repeal Cos’ men. Morales then led a detachment of his troops around to the west side of the Alamo, at a point out of sight from the defenders of the lunette. His light infantry was able to scale the walls in this area and capture the 18lb gun mounted there. Morales quickly turned that weapon on the Texican defenders, while his troops moved on the main gate, taking the lunette from the rear. The battle had lasted about 40 minutes, and at this point Santa Anna committed his reserve. The organized Sappers and Grenadiers advanced on the north wall and moved through the troops huddled there. They may have picked up the ladders as they advanced, but regardless they swept over the wall and into the compound itself. Seeing the reserves now advancing, the troops of the first three columns began to follow in their wake. The next forty minutes was a mixture of rearguard actions by the defenders and a steady advance by the Mexicans. An artillery duel took place across the compound itself, as the Texican defenders of the Chapel turned their weapons around to fire on the Mexicans troops, and the Mexicans responded in kind as they turned the captured cannon on the chapel, convent and long barracks. The 18lb gun was very effective in this, firing at point blank range. This I think is the second exchange of artillery fire heard by Mrs. Dickerson. By 6:30 the battle was over with the last defenders of the chapel falling at their posts. Casualties The oft-repeated claim that 600 Mexicans were killed in the attack on the Alamo is difficult to sustain. That would mean that 33% of the Mexicans attacking were killed, and since there would be three to four times that in wounded, the entire Mexican force would have been wiped out. Sadly, among some Texas historians, it is an article of faith that the Mexican dead numbered at least 1,500 or more, ignoring the fact that the attacking force only numbered some 1800. There are a number of Mexican reports filed on the assault, and it is interesting to note that all tend to agree that between 60 to 70 soldiers were killed in action, and an additional 230 to 260 seriously wounded. The soldiers who were wounded but whom remained with their unit are not counted, though they probably numbered an additional 200 plus. Of the serious wounded, half or more were to die in the hospitals at San Antonio due to a lack of medical care. A confirmation in the Mexican losses can be seen in the battalion returns for those battalions not destroyed at San Jacinto. Based on returns of February 1836 and May 1836, the Zapadores lost 14 enlisted men, Jimenez lost 50 enlisted men and San Luis lost 46 enlisted men, for a total of 110 enlisted men. The last two battalions also fought at Colsto Creek against Fannin on March 19th, so not all of their losses occurred at the Alamo, but for the moment lets accept 110 men from those three battalions. The battalions lost at San Jacinto, Matamoros, Aldama, and Toluca did not formally report their losses before they were destroyed. Their combined enlisted strength was some 1,060 prior to the attack on the Alamo. When the three battalions left San Antonio on March 11th, they mustered 675 enlisted men between them. The Mexican Army returns of May 14th show that an additional 203 members of these three battalions were in the San Antonio garrison, so the loses of these three battalions are some 182 enlisted men. A list of Mexican officers killed or badly wounded at the Alamo numbers 26 names, so a maximum number of Mexican losses would be 110 + 182 + 26 = 318 dead or badly wounded. Though the Texican losses were long thought to be in the neighborhood of 180+ defenders, recent work indicates that the garrison may have mustered between 220 and 250 defenders. The number of defenders killed was reported as 250 odd men. The figure of 182 defenders comes from those bodies burned at the Alamo itself, but it appears that there were two other burial pyres for those defenders who attempted to flee the Alamo when it was apparent that it was lost. Postscript Historians can disagree on many issues – and this is one where much debate and discussion has been made. I have tossed my .02 into the ring in the hopes that this might help gamers look at this interesting era in a different light. More Alamo: The Alamo Part 1 The Mission San Antonio de Valero The Alamo Part 2 The Mexican Army The Alamo Part 3 The Texan Defenders The Alamo Part 4 Days of Glory The Alamo: A Rebuttal Of Sorts Back to Dispatch December 2003 Table of Contents Back to Dispatch List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by HMGS Mid-South This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com