The attempts to create a Nelson school of formal naval science would no doubt have been more productive -- certainly more realistic -- had the British been up against a competent naval opponent. The attempts to define Nelson's methods in such a rigid and doctrinaire manner would have come up with opposition in the real world, and perhaps received more care and thought.
But the British were preeminent at sea, and their well-drilled crews and lack of competent opponents guaranteed their ultimate success, except of course for a few nasty shocks from America during the War of 1812. The British were permitted their sloppy tactical thinking, for there was no one to gainsay them.
Had steam not supplanted sail, there would of course have been another testing of theories during the next war - but the only naval wars fought under sail before the arrival of steam and ironclad warships were against the Barbary pirates, Turks, and the likes of Madagascar and the Burmese - not exactly the first line of naval powers.
The Nelson touch was not the culmination of the preceding 300 years of naval history. It was, rather, part of an ongoing evolution in naval thought, an evolution cut off suddenly by the development of the steam warship. The Nelson touch was part of a process, not its conclusion, and Nelson was not the last word. A reaction would have set in sooner or later, and it's interesting to speculate about the direction naval tactics would have taken had war under sail continued as a reality.
Nelson's impetuous attack at Trafalgar was a result of two compelling realities: his desire to prevent the allies from escaping to Cadiz, and also his desire to take advantage of the disorganization of the enemy line. The attack was made possible by the fact that the allied fleet was of a decidedly inferior quality. Its crews were not well drilled, its officers were inexperienced in sea duty and station keeping, and there was dissention in the higher ranks, with few of the other admirals trusting Villeneuve or his abilities.
If the allied fleet had been of better quality - had Villeneuve been a Suffren or de Grasse, with enough time to drill his crews in maneuver and warfare at sea - would Nelson's attack have succeeded? Would his columns have been able to penetrate a well-trained, well-maintained line?
The Battle of Lissa, mentioned above, provides a few clues. Hoste maintained such a close line in the fact of Dubourclieu's impetuous attack the quarterdeck of his ships were actually shadowed by the jibboom of their next astern -- that Dubourdieu was unable to penetrate the line, and instead had to go clean around it. This suggests that a reversion to old-style tactics in the face of Nelsonian attacks may have demonstrated some success -- a well-drilled line might have shattered the impetuous columns, much as Wellington's older linear tactics, brought to perfection, tore into the impetuous French columns in the Peninsula.
But Nelson, of course, would probably not have been so impetuous against a better-trained fleet - he may well have reverted to his three-column attack, delivered at a less acute angle to the enemy fleet so as not to expose his lead ships to destruction. This more sophisticated version of the attack from windward would almost certainly have penetrated the line at some point, given a determined and aggressive attacker, and would have suffered less damage on the approach - and once the cohesion of the defensive line was shattered, the advantage would belong to the attacker, who had concentrated more ships in a single area.
The greater sophistication of the Nelson touch would have required a
more sophisticated defense. The French officer Mathieu-Dumas suggested
that the best tactical system to employ against the British would be a double line, with reserve squadrons posted in the wings able to rush to the point of contact and regain local superiority (Fig. 8). This system would probably have resulted in a very confused battle, but it would probably have met some success if used by a well-trained and disciplined fleet.
Another suggested counter to the Nelson touch is suggested by a battle fought early in the War of 1812 between the frigate United States under Commodore Stephen Decatur and the British frigate Macedonian. Macedonian came into the battle from upwind, and charged toward the American frigate in proper post-Nelsonian fashion.
But Decatur, instead of passively waiting for the enemy, kept easing downwind while keeping Macedonian under constant fire. This had the effect of prolonging the British approach, keeping the British in the arc of the American's broad side guns the entire time, with Macedonian being unable to reply by a full broadside. By the time Macedonian arrived at close quarters, it has too shattered to be effective.
While drawing conclusions about fleet maneuvers from single-ship actions is a dangerous act, I suspect that there is a lesson to be learned here. Against a Nelsonian column attack - or indeed against the regular line-of-bearing attack by a fleet using formal tactics - the time of greatest danger for the attacker is during the approach. If the defending fleet manages to prolong the approach by a continuous easing downwind, or even by wearing simultaneously as Hoste did at Lissa, keeping the enemy under fire while ensuring that he cannot reply effectively, then the force of the enemy attack will be blunted. Even Nelson's columns might be too shot up to have full effect. in any case, they will be weakened.
Using the HEART OF OAK rules -- which, all modesty aside, I think are the best simulation of maneuvering under sail -- I have tried to develop a system of tactics capable of countering the Nelsonian attack, and although drawing conclusions about history from wargames is another dangerous thing to do, I have come up with some interesting answers.
Based on my experiments, the simple reversion to linear tactics can work, although it works best when the defending fleet is of a superior quality. Mathieu-Dumas' suggestion of a double line with supporting squadrons in the wings has the advantage of concentrating a lot of firepower in a small space of ocean, but the battle tends to become very confused when all the supporting squadrons are committed, and if the attack develops only against the first line the second line is useless.
The system of easing off ala Decatur, combined perhaps with wearing simultaneously a la Hoste, seems to have the best chance of success. it requires excellent timing, and if wearing maneuvers are used the fleet tends to become disorganized, which only increases the danger when the Nelsonian fox finally gets among the chickens. But quite often the prize is worth the risk - if the leading ships in the attacking columns are damaged, they will be worth a lot less when the battle dissolves into melee, and the defender stands a better chance of winning by overwhelming each attacker as it arrives.
But confusing wargames with reality can be dangerous, and as a historian I hesitate to draw too many conclusions even from a game I happen to think is good. it would be wiser to observe that some form of counter-tactic would almost certainly have been developed, and that its success would have depended on the circumstances surrounding its use. Nelson did not hesitate to throw away his own book when leading the attack at Trafalgar, and neither would any future admiral worth his salt, if by doing so he could create a victory.
The history of sailing tactics rather resembles a pendulum, the movement of which was suddenly arrested by the appearance of the steam warship and the ironclad. The first, rightward swing can be seen in the attempts to bring order out of chaos, signified by the attempts to systematize tactics in the period following the Armada, leading by the Dutch Wars to the enshrinement of formal linear tactics first by the British and subsequently by the other naval powers. Then comes the counterswing, as linear tactics grew too formalized and stereotyped, led at first by intellectual spirits like Anson and Howe, then by brasher giants like Nelson, who threw the old rulebook aside and wrote his own.
With Trafalgar a new swing begins again, with a new formal school developing around Nelson's new tactics. Had the pendulum not been arrested, we would have seen another swing in reaction to Nelson's tactics becoming hidebound -- and we can only speculate what the next swing would have brought.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allen, Joseph, BATTLES OF THE BRITISH NAVY, Henry G. Boyhn, London, 2 vols, 1852.
Browne, THE FLOATING BULWARK, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1963.
Clowes, Wm. Laird, THE ROYAL NAVY, A HISTORY, Sampson Low, Marston, &
Company, London, 9 volumes, 1898.
Corbett, Julian S., FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, Naval Records Society, 1905.
Corbett, Julian S., SIGNALS AND INSTRUCTIONS, Naval Records Society, 1909.
Creswell, John, BRITISH ADMIRALS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: TACTICS IN
BATTLE, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1972.
Kemp, Peter, ed., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS & THE SEA, Oxford Press, London, 1976.
Manceron, Claude, THE WIND FROM AMERICA, Knopf, New York, 1978.
Marcus, G.J., THE AGE OF NELSON, Viking, New York, 1971.
Marcus, G.J., HEART OF OAK, Oxford Press, London, 1975.
Robinson, S.S., A HISTORY OF NAVAL TACTICS, Naval Institute Press, 1942.
Warner, Oliver, THE GLORIOUS FIRST OF JUNE, Batsford, London, 1%1.
A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part III
A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part II
- Battle of Toulon and Minorca
Additional Instructions, Anson, and Hawke
Morogues, Villehuet, and Ushant
Signal Reform
DeGrasse and Suffern
A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part I
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