The first set of Fighting Instructions (of which there were many during the period of the Dutch Wars) to formally prescribe the line-of-battle were issued on 29 May, 1653 over the signatures of Blake, Deane, and Monck, and ordered the fleet, on seeing the signal for a general engagement, to form in the admiral's "wake or grain", i.e., astern or ahead of him. The fact that this was the first set of Fighting Instructions to actually prescribe the line-of-battle doesn't mean that the line wasn't used previously -- just that its use was so commonly assumed by the English that up till now they hadn't bothered to mention it. Certain advantages of the line were clear. If the ships were lined up bow-to-stern, each ship could fire its broadside without having any of its friends getting in the way. if the intervals between ships were kept small, the ships ahead and astern also prevented the enemy from firing into their vulnerable bow or stern (known as a "raking" shot, from a ball being able to travel the length of a ship, doing vastly increased damage). The Dutch, on the contrary, grouped their squadrons loosely about their admirals. Dutch Fighting Instructions ordered the squadrons to "support" one another in combat, but gave no direction as to how that support might best be achieved. Although this allowed for a greater tactical flexibility, it also meant the ships kept getting in each other's line of fire. The English also felt that it gave full rein to the cowardice of certain Dutch captains, who could hide behind their fellows in order to avoid action. It is possible to make certain other assumptions about the English use of the line. When the entire fleet was present it would have been divided into three squadrons, the Red, White, and Blue, each of which would have one admiral, vice-admiral, and rear-admiral. When the signal for the line was given, the line would have formed up close-hauled, as near to the wind as possible. This was for two reasons: the fleet would still be trying to gain the weather gage, and secondly, ships could only back sail when they were near the wind, which allowed effective station keeping (Fig. 4). Another assumption we can make is that the lines were very rarely regular. Fleets in the Dutch Wars were enormous, as they included large numbers of merchantment hired into service which fought alongside the regular naval vessels. Often the fleets would total over 100 vessels, ranging from ships with over 100 guns to "ketches and smacks", which presented the admirals with a near-insuperable problem of command control. The tactics prescribed in the Fighting Instructions probably presented an ideal for which the English strove, but very rarely attained. in practice there were probably a number of smaller lines, each maneuvering against the enemy as they saw fit. The battles of the Dutch Wars often resembled brawls between not-very-coordinated bodies of opponents. But still, the English adoption of the line gave them an edge in those brawls, and by the end of the Dutch Wars the Netherlands had lost their position as a first-rate naval power, never to regain it. Their admirals had realized the inferiority of their tactics and attempted to use the line themselves, but had no success in impressing the new tactics on their captains. And the French Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Contentin, Comte de Tourville, who had fought alongside the British at the Battle of the Texel in 1673, had observed the English tactics and decreed that henceforth the line-of-battle would be the standard formation of the French fleet. Tourville had the utter confidence and trust of Louis XIV, and therefore had the authority to make his decree stick. it was the French who would be the main naval opponents of the English for the next 150 years. By the end of the Dutch Wars the English had codified their tactics in a series of Fighting Instructions to the fleet. From close reading of these instructions, we can see how the English intended an action to be fought, and what tactics were thought best in given situations. And furthermore, it is clear that two schools of thought developed in regard to tactics. I propose, for the course of these articles, to call them the "formal" school (as exemplified by the tactics of the Duke of York, later James II), and the "unfettered" school (of Monck and Rupert). It should be made clear that these schools of thought were in fact largely in agreement on the nature of naval tactics, and that their differences were chiefly a matter of emphasis and personal style. I use the terms "formal school" and "unfettered school" more for my own personal convenience, in pointing out these areas of emphasis, as to suggest that there were any rigid schools of thought and disagreement. I shall describe the tactics of the formal school first, as their tactics are more easily stereotyped. This is unfair to them, as the proponents of the formal school were intelligent and talented men, and furthermore successful commanders at sea. But their tactics, at least as they expressed them on paper, were rigid, and lend themselves more easily to formal explication. This apparent rigidity made them the targets of many 19th Century naval historians, Mahan in particular, who were working with the advantage of hindsight. it should be kept in mind that it was the formal school who triumphed over their rivals, and who dominated naval tactics for the better part of the next century; and that the tactics of the formal school had been proved in action against a dangerous enemy -- York and Blake were not dry academicians, but successful "naval generals". On sighting the enemy, the admiral would give the signal to form line of battle. This line would be formed on the close-hauled tack (Fig. 4), firstly because it made for easier station keeping and secondly because each fleet would be trying to seize the weather gage from its opponent. When forming their line, the ships could form "in order of sailing", meaning the fastest ship got to lead the line and the rest followed as they sailed into place; or in order of battle, a more formal order that would have been dictated by the admiral ahead of time. The order of battle took more time to arrange, of course, since each ship had to locate its place between the ships next ahead and astern. There was no question of fleets avoiding battle. The terms of 17th Century combat were clear: the honor of the flag demanded a fight, even if one fleet was decidedly inferior to the other. No provision was made in the Fighting Instructions for pursuit of an enemy who fled at the first sight of a foe. The situation simply hadn't arisen. Sometimes one fleet would be handed the weather gage by the fortunes of war, by being well upwind of the enemy when the fleets first sighted one another. Both fleets could then take the time to make certain they were on the same tack, and arrange their lines as best suited them. Often this meant that one fleet would shuffle its line so as to bring their own admirals into battle with the enemy flagships -- there was still a prevalent notion that the admiral's ship was in some sense the champion of the fleet, taking on the enemy's champion in single combat. But if the fortunes of war weren't so clear in deciding which fleet was to the weather of the other, it often fell out that the two fleets approached each other on opposite tacks, each trying to seize the weather gage. Whichever admiral succeeded would then be heading in the opposite direction from his opponent, a situation in which the fleets would swiftly move past one another, possibly without exchanging a shot, and would therefore have to spend many more hours working themselves into position again. In order to prevent this, the admiral to weather would have to get his ships into the other tack. There were a number of ways to do this. The simplest was to order his whole fleet to wear simultaneously, each ship moving downwind from the starboard tack to the larboard tack, or vice versa (Fig. 5). This was not a particularly difficult order to give, but it meant disorganizing the entire fleet for a while, and the admiral might not want to do this, particularly if the enemy were very close to leeward and in a position to take advantage of his temporary disorder. He could then order his ships to tack simultaneously (Fig. 6) so as not to give ground to leeward, although this required a certain amount of confidence that all his ships would tack without failing in irons. However it was done, changing tacks simultaneously with the whole fleet meant reversing the entire order of battle, first to last. There might be reasons why an admiral wouldn't want to do this -- his rearmost ships might be his slowest, say, and following them would slow down the whole fleet; or for some particular reason he might want his ships to engage in their original order. in that case he could order the ships to wear in succession, meaning one after the other, each captain waiting to sail up to the same patch of ocean where the first ship in the line wore before wearing himself (Fig. 7). Or, again if he was optimistic, he could order his fleet to tack in succession. Changing tacks in succession meant that the admiral would have to have a particularly good sense of timing, because the order could not be undone once it was given without disorganizing the entire fleet. If he mistimed his maneuver, his enemy might sail on past without his being able to engage, and the opportunity given by the weather gage might be wasted. But the formal school expected a certain kind of behavior from the enemy. Once a fleet had conceded the weather gage to its opponent, it was expected to reduce sail considerably, or heave the entire fleet to, until the enemy had sorted itself out for the attack. After all, honor demanded a battle, and conceding the weather gage also meant conceding the initiative concerning when the battle began. Quite often, the leeward fleet did just what was expected of it, and the battle proper could begin. Tactics, as expressed by the Fighting Instructions, were quite formalized. The entire fleet would all bear down on the enemy together, maintaining formation. Technically, they would change their formation from "line ahead" to a "line of bearing", (Fig. 8) meaning they would maintain their relationship to one another while altering their course so as to steer for the enemy. The van squadron would steer for the van of the enemy, the center for the center, the rear for the rear. It was conceded that the fleet in the leeward position had the advantage while their enemies were bearing down on them. All their broadsides were able to fire, while the attacker's ships might not be able to train their guns far enough forward to get a shot. It was assumed by all concerned that when the windward fleet bore down on their enemies, they would take some damage without being able to make a reply. Once the windward fleet had caught their opponents, they would "haul their wind" so as to steer parallel to the enemy, forming their line of battle once again, and fight it out at close range. The first ship of the windward line would fight the first ship of the enemy, and so on (Fig. 9). This assumes the fleets are of equal strength. if one fleet had an advantage in numbers, it would attempt to use its extra ships to sail to the opposite side of the enemy van or rear, thus catching the enemy between two fires. This was known as "doubling" the enemy, and it was the maneuver the inferior fleet most feared. It was agreed that doubling the rear was easiest (Fig. 10), but that doubling the van might prove the superior tactic if it were possible, as causing confusion in the enemy's van was more likely to communicate the confusion to the rest of the fleet, by creating something in the nature of a "freeway pileup" at sea as the center and rear ships began sailing into the disorganized van. It was easiest for the windward fleet to double the enemy, since if a leeward squadron tried it they would probably have to tack at some point or another in order to weather their enemy, or otherwise have to wait for a favorable shift of wind. The inferior fleet was strictly enjoined to try to prevent themselves from being doubled. The Duke of York's Fighting Instructions ordered the inferior fleet to "stretch the line" so as to match leading ship against leading ship, rearmost ship against rearmost, in hopes of preventing the enemy from doubling. Once the ships began to slug it out, the leeward fleet had certain advantages. If one of their ships was badly disabled, it could drop out of the line to leeward in order to make repairs or seek safety, and the ship next astern could forge ahead to close the gap in the line. Also, ships that had been damaged in their rigging or rudder could often not sail upwind. if any of the windward fleet's ships were so disabled, they would not be able to disengage and stood a very good chance of being captured by the enemy. Be that as it may, the lines would continue to smash at one another until one fleet had enough. At that point, it would try to withdraw. This withdrawal was much easier for the leeward fleet to perform, as all that was required was that they all throw up their helms and sail downwind. The windward fleet would have had to pinch right up into the wind in order to get away, possibly sacrificing all their disabled ships. The Duke of York strictly instructed his captains not to "stay, take, possess, or burn" any enemy ships until instructed to do so by their admirals. He wanted to keep all his ships fighting in the line until the entire body of the enemy withdrew, rather than having them pursuing individual ships and losing the cohesion of the line of battle. The point was not so much as to break the enemy formation, as to prevent one's own formation from being broken. The Duke of York is often accused by historians of being overly rigid in his concepts of battle, too formal in his tactics, and not leaving enough scope for the individual actions of his captains. This does not take into account the handicaps against which the 17th Century admirals were working: fleets composed in large part of hired merchantmen and warships captained by men of no sea experience, appointed to their position because of their social standing, very few of whom were willing to bring their ships into point-blank range and get to grips with the enemy. The Duke strictly prescribed the line-of-battle in such peremptory terms because it was the best way he saw of getting his captains to fight at all. He left them little scope for individual action, because their individual action under the circumstances would very likely have been to run away. And there is something else that exonerates him, an article in his Fighting Instructions for 1673, in which he prescribes a method for cutting through the enemy fleet in order to overwhelm a part of it while containing the rest, a tactic most historians would credit to Nelson at Trafalgar, 132 years later. This article intended to formalize a tactic that had been discovered accidentally by Monck and Rupert at the Four Days' Battle in 1666. The English were in the leeward position, with the Dutch bearing down to attack their center. The English van squadron (under Sir Christopher Myngs) then tacked so as to be in a position to relieve the center, but his lead ships (under Prince Rupert) took advantage of a gap in the Dutch formation to drive right through it, cutting the Dutch in two. The English then concentrated on the leeward half of the Dutch, which were caught between two fires and greatly disorganized, after which they were forced to run. The English themselves were in considerable confusion as a result of this maneuver, because few of them, during the heat and confusion of battle understood what they had just done. But the Duke of York realized the possibilities of this maneuver, and in his Second Supplementary Order gave formal instruction for breaking the enemy line from leeward in the same manner as Prince Rupert, with the van squadron then dividing, part of them holding off the enemy to downwind, while the rest close with the body of the enemy to leeward, who would have been cut off (Fig. 11). Furthermore, this maneuver was to take place at the initiative of the commander of the British van, without waiting for orders from his commander-in-chief. This maneuver was never actually performed in combat, and after William of Orange drove James from the throne it was dropped from the signal books. Still, the manner in which James anticipated the "Nelson touch" -and furthermore by an attack from leeward, which Nelson never contemplated -shows that he was far from the hidebound conformist which subsequent historians have made of him. The above description of a typical formal battle conducted with linear tactics shows what would happen in an ideal battle, where both sides cooperated in producing a stereotypical engagement. This rarely happened in practice, and for a number of reasons. Firstly, the environment of the sea is not such as to favor rigid linear systems. The sea is always in motion, and the wind is moving above it. During the course of a battle the wind could shift or change in intensity, fogs or storms could descend, a black squall could strike part of a fleet while leaving the remainder unhindered, an unexpected tide or current could carry entire fleets away from each other, or friendly squadrons out of supporting distance. Secondly, the system of the formal school is such as to require a fairly good sense of timing from all concerned. With both fleets striving to gain the weather gage, many hours were consumed before the issue was decided. Sometimes fleets maneuvered within sight of one another for days before joining combat. Sometimes the wind could shift dramatically, and the fleet that had held the weather gage could lose it in a moment. If the fleets were approaching each other on opposite tacks they might end up in gunshot range before the windward fleet could tack or wear around to take the same tack as the enemy. In this case, fleets would sail past each other quickly, exchanging broadsides, and then have to work into position all over again (Fig. 12). If there was time to tack or wear, the maneuver might be performed too early or too late. if too early, the windward rear squadron might end up engaged with the enemy center, and the windward center with the enemy van, leaving the windward van and enemy rear without opponents. If the change of course came too late, the windward van might be matched up with the enemy center, producing a similar problem (Fig. 13). Also, the windward fleet might every easily end up following the lead ship toward the enemy instead of turning together, and end up attacking the enemy in line ahead rather than in line of bearing, as Byng did at Minorca in the mid 18th Century. The van squadrons would engage at close range, the center squadrons at long, and the rear not at all (Fig. 14). Plus of course the enemy might not be persuaded to cooperate entirely with the fleet's intentions. if the leeward fleet did not choose to wait with backed topsails for the windward fleet to get their attack in gear, but instead kept sailing on their chosen tack, then the attackers might get stretched out in trying to attack them, and once again end up with one of those windward-van-attacks-enemy- rear situations. Plus there were many other things that could go wrong. Signals could be ignored or misunderstood. The smoke of battle could obscure a critical portion of the battle from the admiral. Admirals could die in battle and the command devolve upon subordinates who were unaware of their sudden assumption of authority. The fluid dynamics of warfare under sail tended to erode the tactics of the formal school, and provide opportunities for their philosophical opponents. In general, the unfettered school consisted of land generals like Monck and Rupert who were accustomed to seek a decisive moment in battle and then plunge in with sabers drawn. At sea they were prepared to take tactical risks and to use initiative in seizing opportunities given them by the enemy. The tendency of formal battles to dissolve into a series of smaller engagements helped them enormously. But still, it was the Duke of York and his philosophical brethren who triumphed. In part this was because they could systematize their tactical conceptions and set them down on paper so as to be understood by subordinates, whereas Monck and Rupert, whose tactics depended on fluid opportunities, could only offer general guidelines such as "seize the initiative" and "exploit opportunities". The formal school won out because its tactics could be codified, and their rivals' could not. THE APOTHESIS OF THE FORMAL SCHOOL In 1691 the Right Honourable Edward Russel, Admiral of the British fleet, issued his new series of Fighting Instructions. These were based on the Duke of York's instructions of twenty years before -- some in fact were in the same words -- but were arranged and codified in a somewhat more logical manner, and included a more sophisticated signalling system so as to allow the admiral to communicate his intentions more clearly. Admiral Rooke, in 1703, reissued these instructions in a slightly revised form, and it was Rooke's instructions that were to become standard in the British fleet for almost a century. Rooke's Fighting Instructions were kept in print by the Admiralty for most of the 18th Century. Although many historians, such as Mahan and Corbett, believed that the Fighting Instructions had in fact been adapted by the Admiralty as official doctrine -- Corbett calls them the "Permanent Fighting Instructions" -- this was not in fact the case. They were not officially prescribed by the Admiralty or any authority, but were kept in print by the Admiralty as a convenience to its flag officers, so that they would not have to write up new systems of signals each time they took command of a fleet. Individual admirals were free to modify, supplement, or even discard the Fighting Instructions as they saw fit. Many chose to issue "Supplementary Instructions", that either clarified various aspects of the Instructions, or introduced new points of doctrine and tactics that had not been considered when the original instructions were drawn up. But the Supplementary Instructions were peculiar to the individual admirals, and the fleet as a whole had no common set of instructions save for Rooke's. Insofar as Rooke's Instructions were the standard article for so many years, they had a certain official cachet, and as such they bear inspection. The Fighting Instructions had thirty-two articles, of which relatively few actually had to do with fighting. Twenty-two were maneuvering signals, five dealt with steps to be taken in regard to disabled ships, and only five had anything to do with tactics. By this point the formal school of tactics had become so well understood that there was little need for any more than five signals having to do with combat. The Duke of York's maneuver for dividing the enemy fleet was dropped, apparently considered too dangerous. At the outset the fleet was to attempt to gain the weather gage of the enemy, and in battle the van was to engage the enemy van, the rest following. The squadrons themselves were allowed a high degree of tactical flexibility and maneuver, and were to maneuver independently of one another if necessary. if any ship was disabled so as to leave a gap in the line, the next astern wasto clap on sail and close the gap. No ship was to pursue the enemy until the main body of the enemy was "put to the run". This last was demonstrated in Rooke's Battle of Malaga in 1704. Rooke, commanding the center squadron, was in some difficulty from his French opponent, who had both superior numbers and ships. But Sir Clowdisley Shovell, commanding the English van, had driven the French van off, assisted greatly by an explosion on his opposite number's flagship. The English van was still in cohesive formation and capable of concerted tactical action. Shovell had the choice of pursuing the French van (which quite possibly would have forced the rest of the French to retire, as his vice-admiral Leake pointed out to him by means of a messenger, and would at the very least have allowed him to capture some of the enemy) or of aiding his hard-pressed admiral, and he chose the latter. Apparently he decided that a pursuit of the disorganized French van would throw away his own tactical advantage, i.e., the cohesion that still remained to his unopposed van squadron. By means of a remarkable maneuver, Shovell's entire squadron was ordered to throw all sails aback and sail stern-first through the water to Rooke's relief. Shovell and Rooke together managed to fight the French to a standstill. The English produced a victory of sorts, but it was not a decisive one. Shovell's action has been criticized by subsequent historians, Mahan in particular. Whether Shovell was right or wrong, the Battle of Malaga does illustrate one of the differences remaining between the formal and unfettered school: should cohesion in the fleet be maintained even at the expense of what might be a decisive, though risky, stroke against the enemy? I n the case of Shovell, Rooke, and others of the formal school, the answer was an unqualified "yes." In France the formal school had also triumphed. The doctrine of England's primary maritime enemy had been set by Tourville, and given an intellectual foundation by Tourville's onetime secretary, a Jesuit mathematician named Paul I'Hoste, who published his L'Art des armees navales, ou Traite des evolutions navales in 1697. His theory of tactics, like Russel's, was based on the close-hauled line ahead. Like the English, he recommended the superior fleet to attempt to double the enemy -- Noste preferred doubling the rear, and demonstrated with diagrams why doubling the van was too complicated and risky. In order to avoid being doubled, L'Hoste recommended stretching out the order of the ships, just like the English. Many of I'Hoste's recommendations on maneuvering a fleet had to do with formations from which a line-of-battle might more easily be formed, and mechanical contrivances by which ships might more easily keep station. in all of this I'Hoste shows considerable sophistication, much more so than the English, who never considered such matters. L'Hoste, like his English counterparts, considered maneuvers aimed at breaking the enemy's formation, and remarked "this maneuver is as bold as it is delicate, and consummate technical skill is necessary for it to succeed. He then points out various ways of foiling the maneuver, and concludes that it is not greatly to be feared as long as one's own fleet remains in good order. He does not recommend it for the French unless one of three conditions pertains: if the maneuver must be attempted in order to avoid a greater evil; if the enemy has allowed a gap to appear between his squadrons; or if the maneuver i's necessary in order to rescue some disabled ships. Thus we have both the French and British, as a result of combat experience in a series of wars, adopting virtually the same tactical system. The next thirty years of general peace in Europe allowed the systems to become formalized and, to a degree, ossified. Through these years a number of changes were also taking place in the type and composition of navies. The system of hiring merchantmen as warships was fading away, as it was becoming obvious that the merchantmen were overmatched by regular men of war. Fleets now had many fewer ships, but the ships they had were all full-time men o' war. The design of the ships had changed somewhat, as rigging and hull design became more sophisticated. jib sails began to appear between the foremast and bowsprit, allowing ships to point closer to the wind. By 1720 or so, warships were able to sail six points from the wind, a point nearer than at the beginning of the Dutch Wars. The British service in particular became increasingly professional ized, without the amateurs appointed to command because of social influence. And warship design was becoming more standardized. Ships were "rated" by number of guns, starting with the "first rate", with 100 or more guns disposed on 3 gun decks. Second rates had 90 or more guns, third rates had between 60 and 80, fourth rates between 50 and 60. During the course of the 18th Century it was realized that ships with 50 or 60 guns were too small to stand in the line-of-battle, and the 74-gun third-rate ship became standardized in most Western navies as the usual line-of-battle ship. The class of frigates was also appearing. Originally a frigate was any ship with a single gun-deck, but the Admiralty order of 1750 standardized the frigate as a single-decked warship built for raiding, carrying dispatches, and pursuit, carrying between 28 and 36 guns. The number of guns on frigates gradually increased as the century went on, as the French and later the Americans began building bigger and bigger frigates that carried heavier ordnance, and the British were forced to conform. Continued next issue. A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part I Introduction and the Basics First Sailing Tactics Line Tactics A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part II Battle of Toulon and Minorca Additional Instructions, Anson, and Hawke Morogues, Villehuet, and Ushant Signal Reform DeGrasse and Suffern A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part III Tactical Developments The Nelson Touch Tactics After Nelson Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VI No. 1 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com