A History of Sailing Tactics
in the Age of Fighting Sail

Part II: Additional Instructions,
Anson, and Hawke

By Jon Williams
Ship Drawings by W.H. Keith
Illustrations by A. Karasa

At least one of the problems had, in fact, already been addressed. The 17th Century custom of always offering battle, even if the fleet was inferior to the enemy, in the belief that the honor of the flag required it, was coming to an end. Through the War of the Austrian Succession, the British were beginning to encounter enemy fleets that, because they were inferior, fled at the first sight of their enemies.

By 1755, a set of Additional Fighting instructions had been issued by Admiral Bowcawen that included a new command, that of "General Chace" [sic], an order by which all ships in the fleet were to engage in pell-mell pursuit of a fleeing enemy. Rooke's Fighting Instructions had no provision for this, having signals only by which an admiral could order individual ships to pursue, or order individual squadrons in chase - but not entire fleets.

Bowcawen's Additional Fighting Instructions were also used by Hawke later in the war, and became standard for the British navy thereafter. But they were probably based on an earlier set of Additional Instructions in use as early as 1747, in the two Battles of Finisterre.

Both Battles of Finisterre had a great deal in common, as they both concerned the pursuit of an inferior French fleet by a superior English one. In the first battle, Anson with his fleet of fourteen sail managed to capture every single one of his six opponents as well as many ships of their convoy. He had tried to engage in the standard way but found that the French, rather understandably, tried to make their escape, at which Anson made a signal for a general chase and the British fleet engaged the retiring French in the order in which they managed to catch them.

In the second battle Hawke, with fourteen ships, found himself against eight Frenchmen who were also guarding a convoy. Hawke made no initial attempt at formal battle but instead ordered a general chase. When he neared the enemy he tried to form line of battle, but found it was taking too long and ordered a general chase again, and though the first British ships were severely handled by the French, Hawke captured six of the enemy.

It is probable that the order for "General Chace" originated with Anson, who was both an aggressive fighter and a man who drilled his squadrons constantly in maneuvering under sail. Now, for the first time, the British had a system by which they could vigorously pursue a fleeing enemy in such a way as to stand a chance of capturing a large number of their ships.

The Additional Fighting Instructions were presumably available to Byng if he'd wanted them, and might have served to salvage his disaster in the Battle of Minorca. But he considered his superiority over the enemy too slight to take the risk, and paid the penalty for his failure.

Anson and Hawke both commanded in the next war, again the the Bay of Biscay, and further expanded their Additional Fighting Instructions, though with a difference. Anson's instructions give an order for General Chase that instructs his fleet to "take or destroy such Ships of the Enemy as they may be opposed to, by engaging them as closely as possible, and pursuing them... without having any regard [for] the Line of Battle...". In other words, a pell-mell pursuit.

Hawke, who commanded later, issued a more densely-worded set of orders. Summarized, they stated that when the order is given, each ship is to engage the enemy nearest, and having driven off or captured it, is to then assist the friendly ship nearest, all with regard to the 21st Article of the Printed Instructions [which ordered the fleet not to pursue till the main body of the enemy is defeated].

Hawke's orders, in other words, are aimed at preserving the cohesion of the British fleet, perhaps at the expense of capturing a few prizes, whereas Anson simply aimed at pursuit and destruction of the enemy without regard to maintaining the order of his own squadrons. Hawke, by the definitions given earlier, shows himself a member of the formal school, and Anson of the unfettered; but once again the classifications defy stereotype.

For it was Hawke, not Anson, who commanded at Quiberon Bay during the "year of victories", 1759. The enemy, inferior in numbers, made off at the first sight of the British, and Hawke then made what was perhaps the boldest decision ever made by an admiral commanding at sea. He made the signal to engage without giving the signal for the line, and therefore ordered his entire fleet in what was necessarily pell-mell pursuit of the enemy, over shoal water, with the wind blowing a full gale, with no pilots available for the waters in which he proposed to enter, with no knowledge of whether the ground would hold an anchor, and with night coming on. It was a situation in which the entire fleet could easily have been lost... but Hawke made his decision without hesitation, and won a victory so stunning that it crippled the French navy for the rest of the war. Of the 21 original French ships, eight got away, six fled up the river Vilaine at the cost of dumping their guns and stores and remained inactive for over a year, and the rest were captured, sunk, or wrecked. Two British ships were lost, both run aground on uncharted shoals.

The rest of the Seven Years' War displayed no more major fleet actions, chiefly for the reason that the French had no more real fleets (they had also lost their Toulon fleet to Bowcawen the same year, after another chase). The application of any further tactical innovations would have to wait until 1778.


A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part II

A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part I

A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part III


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