A History of Sailing Tactics
in the Age of Fighting Sail

Part II: Signal Reform

By Jon Williams
Ship Drawings by W.H. Keith
Illustrations by A. Karasa

The Royal Navy, in the meantime, was going through a period of innovation, inspired chiefly by the intelligent leadership of Admiral the Hon. Richard Howe, known throughout the fleet as "Black Dick". Howe's career on the North American Station from 1776-1778 and his command of the Channel Fleet in 1782-83 were marked by a series of innovations, among which his reform of the signal books stand as the greatest.

In 1777 Howe, using a system directly borrowed from the works of Villehuet, issued a new Signal Book in which he gave his squadron a numerical system in which ten flags, standing for the numbers 1-10, were hoisted in combination, thus producing the signals running from 1 to 999. There were also 15 unique flags which were used in special circumstances. The reform, which was to be refined in succeeding years by Howe and other admirals such as Kempenfelt, could be used to produce a virtually unlimited number of signals and was to form the basis of the first official Admiralty signal book issued in 1799.

Howe also championed a number of tactical innovations. One of these was a system for ordering a squadron or fleet to concentrate their attack on an enemy rear, presumably in order to pin the rear and force the rest of the enemy's fleet to turn and fight. This resembles nothing so much as Raleigh's system for attacking the "windermost enemy", for each ship, after passing the enemy rear, was to tack and take up position at the end of the line, a kind of 18th Century caracole.

Howe experimented also with a new theory that the admiral, rather than engage in combat himself, should maintain a detached command over his fleet by shifting his flag to a frigate in order to get closer to an enemy and scout their positions before engaging, afterwards standing off out of the gunsmoke and confusion in order to keep a better control over his squadrons. Howe used this approach against d'Estaing in 1778 in a battle off Rhode island, though he apparently intended to return to his flagship before the battle started - in any case, the battle was aborted by a storm. Rodney also used this tactic, unsuccessfully, in 1780, and it was abandoned by the British, although it became a standard, for a while, in the French Navy, after de Grasse was captured off the Saintes in his flagship and the French decided to risk no more of their admirals.

A third attempted tactical innovation championed by Howe was his decision, when attempting to relieve Gibraltar in 1782, to engage the numerically superior Spanish fleet at night, trusting to superior training on the part of the British to carry the action. This was perhaps influenced by Rodney's action off St. Vincent in 1780, when he captured or destroyed 7 of the 9 enemy during a night battle fought also during a storm. Howe's attempted night action never came about, as the Spanish showed a reluctance to engage.

Howe's brief tenure in command showed an agile mind at work. Tought most of his tactical innovations did not prove out and were discontinued, his reform of the signal books, backed by his prestige and his friendship with George III, was a lasting achievement. His experience off North America and Gibraltar were to prove useful when in 1794, he introduced the tactical innovation that shattered the formal school of tactics forever.


A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part II

A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part I

A History of Sailing Tactics in the Age of Fighting Sail Part III


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