At 2:30 p.m., the British skirmish lines moved forward, followed by the attack formations, and contacted the German forward patrols in front of the main defensive line. In twenty minutes the British drove the German patrols into the main defensive positions. The British continued forward until the advancing lines came under fire from the German trenches. The attack stalled at this point. Between 2:50 and 3:30, the British officers rallied their troops and continued forward into the machine gun fire. The 63 PLI quickly disintegrated because of lack of sleep, sea-sickness, and the demoralizing effect of being fired upon for the first time. The officers of the battalion valiantly tried to rally the sepoys by leading by example. Four of the ten British officers fell with six Indian officers within this short time span. At least one section of the 63 PLI reached the railroad cut. Lieutenant G. N. Proctor (83rd W. L. I. attached) and Jemadar Abdul Rahman led 25 men in an attempt to gain the railroad cut. All of the men were shot or fell away, leaving only the two officers crossing the bridge across the cut. When the two officers discovered that they were alone, they tried to retreat the way they had come. Lieutenant Proctor survived the retreat, but Jamadar Rahman was killed. When the 63 PLI routed, it left a large hole between the 2/LNL and the 101st. It was at this moment that Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham (C.O., 101st) received a new order. His original orders from Brigadier General Wapshare were to “envelop the enemy’s right.” His new order was to close ranks upon the 2/LNL to constrict the front and fill the gap left by the 63 PLI. Complying with his new orders, Cunningham began a series of events that would doom the attack. The routing 63 PLI also affected the 98th positioned behind the battalion. The 98th was already shaken by the sound of machine gun fire to its front. It became demoralized as the fleeing sepoys of the 63 PLI crashed through its ranks. Then, at the worst possible moment, the 98th was attacked by swarms of bees stirred up by the troop movements and stray bullets. It was too much for the sepoys, and they joined the routed 63 PLI fleeing toward the perceived safety of the beach and water. While the attack of the British left flank foundered, the 2nd and 3rd Kashmir Rifles continued forward along their designated paths of advance, ignoring the 2/LNL’s deflection to the right. The 13 Rajputs reinforced the Rifles’ attack, and a mixed group of companies from all these battalions succeeded in a bayonet charge across the railway cutting. They reached the buildings in Tanga and captured a machine gun. A group of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles found a gap in the German defensive line on the unguarded left flank of the 6. F. K. at the harbor. The leading units reached the Kaiser Hotel before being checked in their advance. Captain C. R. F. Seymour, 13 Rajputs, captured two German flags from the hotel. The success allowed the 2/LNL the opportunity to cross the railroad cut into the town. From the beginning of the British advance into the open ground in front of the entrenched German positions, the German askari had maintained a fire that the British and Indian troops had never experienced before. According to British accounts, the Germans employed fire tactics “certainly never taught in India . . . [using] controlled bursts of fire, directed by observers in trees[.] [This fire was] often effective . . . [and] demoralizing [in its] effect on troops who had never been under fire.” The weakest part of the German line was occupied by the 6. F. K. and when all of the German officers were either killed or wounded, the askari began retreating. The 4. Sch. K. followed the retreat that continued to the Kaiser Hotel where Dr. Lessel and his small European command tried to rally the retreating askari. It was not enough, and Lessel’s command was forced to retreat with the other units. The Street Battle Beginning around 3:45, the battle became a severe contest in the streets of Tanga. The 28th Mountain Artillery Battery, deployed aboard ship in the harbor, contributed to the chaos by blindly shelling the town. The 28th fired 150 rounds into the town during this time but, although its position enfiladed the German front line, it had no observers in position to direct the fire. The recoil of the guns rocked the ship leeward. The Fox began shelling the town, but was requested to cease fire because some of the shells were falling on British troops. With the British moving through the town, Oberstleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck, at about 4 p.m., released his personal reserve. Hauptmann von Prince counterattacked with his European Abteilung into the left flank of the 2/LNL supported by four machine guns of the 1. F. K. and 17 F.K. This stalled the 2/LNL advance, but Hauptmann von Prince was killed in the Ngoma Square in the center of Tanga. Following the German counterattack, the 2/LNL officers held a brief council and decided that, although they could see that the 2nd and 3rd Kashmir Rifles were having some success, the 2/LNL should retreat to the railroad cut. This was accomplished with heavy casualties as the German machine guns fired down open streets that the British troops had to cross. Major F. J. Braithwaite was killed in this withdrawal. The Kashmir Rifle battalions conformed to the British retreat by falling back upon the railroad cut. During this retreat, Major C. G. Ames (52 Sikhs, attached and senior officer of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles) was severely wounded. The mixed British/Indian companies were able to establish a defensive position using the railroad cut supported by the two machine guns of the 61 KGO located on a nearby knoll. South Flank The British officers fighting the house-to-house battle could not know why the left flank of the 2/LNL was left open. The 101st continued to advance through the thick vegetation although it was isolated from the main attack. Ordered to close upon the 2/LNL, it could not make contact as the 2/LNL was well in front because the British soldiers were not carrying the heavy equipment that the 101st Grenadiers carried. The advance of the 101st was also impeded when the single company on the extreme left flank was reinforced by a second company, but the line had to halt while this movement was carried out. The four leading companies passed some native huts east of the workshops when the 101st came under heavy fire. Major H. Tatum (commanding the assault) was killed instantly at the head of the advance. Subadar Siwajirao Kali and Dinkanao Jadhao atttempted to lead a company forward, but failed. The 16. F. K. in their shallow trenches south of the railway watched the 101st struggling to advance. As the 101st moved into the German fire, British observers noted that the German kompagnie began to waver and several askari were seen fleeing. This must have heartened the officers of the 101st and created a dire situation for Oberleutnant von Brandis. Forced by the situation, von Brandis made his decisive order to counterattack. He could not know that his desperate move would strike the leading companies of the 101st who had lost half their number and all of their officers. The 16. F. K. swept the 101st before them, with the sepoys racing back to the safety of the vegetation they had just negotiated. This was about 4 p.m., the same time when von Lettow-Vorbeck ordered the release of Abteilung von Prince’s reserve. Simultaneously, he unleashed Abteilung Baumstark on the two flanking companies of the 101st. This counterattack dismembered the 101st. The fleeing sepoys were protected by only the machine gun crews of 101st and 63 PLI that pinned Abteilung Baumstark. Seeing the success of Abteilung Baumstark, von Lettow-Vorbeck released the fresh 13. F. K.. It swung to the right of Baumstark. The 13. F. K. had four machine guns, an unusually high number, and Lettow described the company as being a very well trained, veteran unit. The 13. F. K. continued forward until it was stopped by the reserve companies of the 101st east of the cemetery. Still hoping for a decisive victory at 4:45, von Lettow-Vorbeck committed the newly arrived 4. F. K. (Oberleutnant Spalding) to reinforce the stalled Abteilung Baumstark. The bayonet charges of the 4. F. K. and 13. F. K. decided the day, although the fresh kompagnien were pinned by the fire from the two 101st companies and machine guns. This slim British line was all that kept the German askari from pressing forward to the landing beaches and destroying the disorganised British landing forces. The Situation at 5 p.m. The British at this time had an organised force of only two companies of the 2/LNL, two companies of the 98th, two machine guns of the 61 KGO, two machine guns of the 63 PLI, and three companies of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles with two machine guns deployed in the railroad cut. Two companies of the 101st continued to support the British left flank. The rest of the companies of all the battalions originally committed to the attack were dispersed and only localised units continued to resist. The disorganisation of the British units was compounded by the rout of the porters, who dropped their loads and fled after being fired upon by friendly naval fire. Dressed in khaki and wearing tarbooshes, the fleeing porters were mistaken for German askari breaking through the British lines. As the sun began to set, the last cohesive British companies retreated to the beaches and dug shallow trenches. The 2/LNL and 13 Rajputs rallied behind the front lines and were the only units capable of another attack at this time. The 2nd Kashmir Rifles also rallied, but in conditoin only to support a limited attack by the other two battalions. The 3rd Gwalior was also fresh and could have supported another attack next to the 2nd Kashmir Rifles. The German units were equally disorganised and at sunset, bugles recalled the askari and the firing died away. After observing the success on the German right flank, von Lettow-Vorbeck attempted to reorganise Abteilung Baumstark with the view to immediately pursue toward Ras Kasone. However, this attempt failed and, as it became dark, he entered Tanga to organise a similar attack on the German left flank. He was frustrated because he could not find any of his troops and was fired upon by the last British troops occupying the railroad cut. He learned from a stray unit of askari that when the bugles recalling the 4. F. K., 13. F. K., and Abteilung Baumstark had been heard, all of the other German officers had misunderstood the signal to mean the peacetime practice of retreating to Kange Station. For the second time during the battle Tanga was virtually abandoned by the Germans. Plans and Movements from 6 p.m. to 5 a.m.: November 4-5 Major General Aitken intended to use his four reorganised battalions in a bayonet charge into Tanga under the full moon on the night of 4/5 November. Had he just committed to this action, the battle would have been won. However, he cautiously decided to send a patrol under Captain R. Meinertzhagen (G. S. O. 3 Intelligence) to determine whether the Germans were still occupying the town. Meinerzthagen moved into Tanga, exchanged shots in the darkness, and reported that the town was still occupied. This was enough to convince General Aitken to postpone the intended attack. General Aitken had three choices during the night. He could attempt one last attack, hold the Ras Kasone peninsula, or re-embark the invasion force. He decided that an attack was too risky and that holding the peninsula served no purpose with no reinforcements available. He decided that preserving the force by re-embarking was the best course, beginning the morning of 5 November. Ironically, von Lettow-Vorbeck and his escort happened to be in Tanga at the moment that Captain Meinertzhagen arrived. By chance the two patrols contacted one another and briefly exchanged fire in the darkness. While General Aitken decided to re-embark his troops, Oberstleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck reorganised his Abteilungen and reoccupied Tanga. He sent patrols out into Ras Kasone during the night. Schutztruppe Deutsch Ostafrika The Battle of Tanga, November 1914 Background Preliminaries Tanga Preparation for Battle The Battle: Nov. 4, 1914 Denouement: Nov. 5-6, 1914 Tabletop Tanga: Wargaming the Battle Back to Table of Contents -- Courier #86 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com