The initial deployment of this force could have occurred at any point along the 780 mile coast of the German colony. It was eventually decided by the London Cabinet and the India Office, independent from the War Office, that the port of Tanga should be secured before making any attempt on Daressalaam. If the Usambara Railroad could be captured, the Germans would have to evacuate the Kilimanjaro area and the Uganda Railroad would be secured. General Aitken was ordered by the India Office, directed by the British Cabinet, to contact Sir H. Belfield (Governor of the East African Protectorate). Belfield and Indian Expeditionary Force “C” was to advance from Tsavo in order to threaten Neumoshi. Aitken was to occupy Tanga in coordination with Belfield’s attack. The operation was to begin as soon as Aitken arrived at Mombasa by 1 October. These plans where then changed to use a smaller force under Lieutenant Colonel Drew to move from Voi to Tsavo to threaten Neumoshi. Drew’s orders were then changed again to capture the water holes at Longido Mountain. Drew had 1,500 troops, two machine guns, and four field guns to accomplish this objective. He assembled his columns at Namanga Camp (Oldoinyo Erok) at the end of October in anticipation of the operations planned for 3 November. General Aitken questioned this order in writing, consulting the Army Headquarters at Simla as to the intention of his orders. Army headquarters notified Aitken that the Committee of Imperial Defense considered the changes advisable for “good and sufficient reasons.” Aitken showed in this correspondence that he believed an invasion at Daressalaam, as in his original orders, would have had a better chance of success. He also demonstrated his limited knowledge of German troop dispositions, but ordered to invade at Tanga, he set himself to the task. Aitken had no illusions about the viability of the objectives anticipated from his task force. His 8,000 man force was expected to conquer a German colony larger than France. He was not allowed to attain this through a coup. Originally, his conquest was to begin with a surprise attack on the “open” port of Tanga supported by a diversionary attack against Neumoshi. When the diversionary assault was redirected against Longido, twice as far from Tsavo, any potential for suprise was lost. General Aitken suspected that the Germans would dig in and send for reinforcements. He knew that this situation would challenge his motley collection of officers and men. One can only imagine the image of pending disaster that appeared to him as the transports gathered outside Tanga harbor. Arrival of the Initial British Landing Force: November 2-3 Aitken was correct in his suspicions concerning the German intention to contest the British occupation of Tanga. Hauptmann Adler arrived in Tanga with two Zuege [A German “zug” equaled a platoon of 40 men. The plural of “zug” is “zuege.”] of the 17. F. K. (80 askari) and four machine guns during the afternoon. By 9 p.m., an hour before the landings began, Leutnant Baldamus deployed a ten-man patrol covering Beach “A” at the “Red House” (named for the color of its roof). A machine gun was placed near the hospital that fired upon one of the boats searching for mines. The rest of the zuege and three machine guns were deployed in Tanga. Abteilung Auracher was deployed inside the safety of the town as well. The 4. Sch. K. had arrived with 20 sailors and 35 askari, and these were also hidden in the empty streets of Tanga. At 10 p.m., the 1 and 2 Double Companies/13 Rajputs under C. R. F. Seymour and the Imperial Scout detachment under Lt. J. A. Ferguson approached the silent, dark cliffs that could be plainly seen above Beach “A” in the moonlight. The double companies drifted toward the beach in two lighters, each armed with a machine gun in the bow. The lighters were slipped about 300 yards from the shore and almost immediately became grounded on the reefs. Leutnant Baldamus recognised the vulnerable position of the tightly packed lighters and ordered his askari to open fire from the Red House on the helpless sepoys. The British responded with the machine guns on the lighters. In a clever ruse to make the British believe that there was artillery present, the askari set off several large fireworks used to signal ships in the harbor during peace-time. The H. M. S. Fox responded by firing several 4.7-inch rounds toward the area where the fireworks had been detonated. Baldamus retreated from the Red House toward Tanga following the British machine gun and artillery barrages. When the Germans ceased firing, Captain Seymour led 50 sepoys from each lighter, stripped of all heavy equipment, through the chest-deep water to the beach. After resting, the sepoys climbed the cliff to secure a defensive line around the Red House while the Imperial Brigade scouts pushed inland for half a mile. Once the British sepoys were established on the beachhead, Hauptmann Adler deployed his 17. F. K. with one zug on his left flank near the harbor. Two zuege were deployed with the four machine guns at the center bridges of the railroad cut. Abteilung Auracher and the 4 Sch. K. were deployed on his right flank in the native town. Hauptmann Adler then posted officer patrols in front of his main defensive positions while the British continued debarking on the beach. By 4 a.m. on November 3, all four double companies of the 13 Rajput were landed along with three companies of the 61 KGO with General Tighe and his staff. Tighe sent out aggressive patrols and captured the signal tower that dominated Beach “B” and captured a German flag. The other patrols sent toward Tanga bumped into the German patrols, and brief firefights erupted in the darkness. In the confused fighting, Captain Seymour’s patrol penetrated to the railroad cut, where it was fired upon by two of the four concealed machine guns. First Blood It was obvious to General Tighe by 4:30 a.m. that the Germans were alerted and the initial British time-table was in complete disarray. The attempted surprise attack had failed and Tanga could not be occupied during the night. Tighe, however, discounted Captain Seymour’s report of machine guns being present and continued to believe that he was opposed by only a few patrols of polizei. Intending to push the Germans out of Tanga, Tighe ordered two double companies with two machine guns of the 13 Rajputs under Major J. A. Stewart, at 5 a.m., to advance along the Range road. The 61 KGO had landed another company during this time, and Tighe held the two double companies of the 13 Rajput and four companies of the 61 KGO in reserve above the beach. The lead company of the 13 Rajputs emerged from the bush about 5:30a.m. and deployed in a ditch 200 yards from the main German positions at the southern bridge across the railroad cut. After a brief respite, the sepoys attempted to cross the open ground between the ditch and the German positions. As the sepoys advanced into open ground, the Germans opened a lively rifle and machine gun fire. The Zanzibar porters, unused to enemy gunfire, immediately discarded their loads and fled back into the bush. The 13 Rajputs deployed in skirmish order and began exchanging fire with the German defenders, but at a considerable disadvantage. To make the situation more perilous, the 13 Rajput machine guns were scattered in pieces when the Zanzibar porters fled. Officers dispatched sepoys to find the gun pieces. The machine guns were eventually assembled, but the crews could find no targets. With four companies of the 13 Rajputs solidly pinned by unexpectedly heavy enemy fire in front of Tanga, General Tighe ordered the remaining double companies of the 13 Rajputs and three single companies of the 61 KGO to support the attack. Only a single company of the 61 KGO remained as beach security. The Race Ironically, about the time that Tighe ordered his reserve companies forward, the first troop trains arrived from Moshi at Kange Station, bringing Abteilung Merensky. [Abteilung = combat group] Although four miles from Tanga, Oberleutnant Merensky immediately set out on foot toward Tanga with two zuege of the 1. F. K. (Hauptmann Ruckteschell), three zuege of the 6. F. K. (Oberleutnant Poppe), and the 6 Sch. K. Europeans. The companies of the 61 KGO advanced on the British left flank of the deployed 13 Rajput companies in an attempt to turn the flank of the two German machine guns located at the middle bridge across the railroad cut. Captain Manson led a section of the 61 KGO in an attempt to capture the machine gun section at this bridge, but was killed with his entire section as they attempted to cross open ground. Another attack by the 61 KGO on the German machine gun position resulted in heavy casualties. The 17. F. K., however, was running out of ammunition after fifteen minutes of combat. Taking advantage of the slackening German fire, the 61 KGO charged again across the open ground and this time succeeded in penetrating the 17. F. K. perimeter, threatening its rear from the German right flank by moving into and through the railroad cut. At this moment, Abteilung Merensky arrived from Kange Station and immediately deployed to launch a bayonet charge into the exposed left flank of the 61 KGO companies. Oberleutnant Merensky ordered the two fresh zuege of the 6. F.K. to envelop the British right flank while the 1. F. K. zug deployed in the center of the attack and the 6 Sch. K. deployed on his right flank. The 6. F. K. did terrible execution with their new 98K Mauser rifles in the open ground. The 61 KGO reeled back from the unexpected attack, and the German askari were only stopped by the rapid fire of a contingent of the 61 KGO directed by Captain Carr-Harris (R. E.). Captain Carr-Harris was killed directing this fire. By 8 a.m., Abteilung Merensky continued maneuvering around the British 61 KGO left flank. Not knowing the situation, General Tighe ordered the 13 Rajput and 61 KGO to disengage. This order triggered a general rout as the sepoys tried to disengage from the aggressive German askari. The situation became so desperate by 8:30 a.m. that Tighe landed another fresh double company of the 61 KGO at Beach “A”. When Abteilung Merensky approached the British beach head at Beach “A”, they were met by the fresh double company and the beach security company. Abteilung Merensky was stopped in front of these three companies and the routed British companies reached safety behind the line. The surviving British officers tried to sort out the disarray of porters and sepoys as Tighe ordered the last double company of the 61 KGO landed about 10 a.m.. Total casualties in the first combat for the British were 5 out of 12 officers and 49 out of 690 other ranks of the 13 Rajputs, 2 out of 12 officers and 91 out of 766 other ranks of the 61 KGO. The situation was desperate enough for Aitkin to order the landing of the 2/LNL at Beach “B”. Meanwhile, General Tighe decided that another weak attack would only be likely to fail and further erode the morale of the British force. He directed the newly arrived 2/LNL to take up defensive positions covering the beaches and contacted Major General Aitken by wireless, reporting that the 13 Rajput and 61 KGO could not be relied upon and requesting four fresh battalions to take Tanga. Troop Movements: November 2-3 At the first sign of British warships, Oberstleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck telegraphed all of the outlying abteilung commanders to begin arrangements to move toward Tanga. Two companies (13. and 16. F. K.) under Hauptmann Baumstark moved immediately toward Tanga from their position at the north of the town. Two companies (7. and 8. Sch. K.) from Taveta and the Kilimanjaro district, made up entirely of European troops, were moved together with askari companies to Neumoshi. Two lorries helped to move the troops from Taveta. Eight trains were available on the northern Usambara railway to transport these troops without further delay 300 kilometers to the east, directly into the battle zone at Kange Station. The German troops were unloaded at this point from fear of the British naval guns. The railway was narrow gauge, so each of the trains only had the capacity to transport one company. Altogether five and a half companies, together with smaller units, were moved by rail during the 2nd and 3rd of November. Ironically, Major Kraut and his Abteilung did not receive the orders at Longido Mountain because the telegraph lines were knocked down by giraffes. This would result in the Battle of Longido, which would undo the entire British plan at Tanga. Hauptmann Baumstark arrived first from Vanga and Baumstark with the 16. F. K. under Leutnant von Brandis and assumed command of the German defensive forces. He retreated all of the units to Kange Station during the night. Either he believed that they could not repel a new attack by the superior enemy forces, or he followed Schnee’s orders not to defend the town. Regardless of his reasons, only small patrols were left in the town of Tanga during the night of 3 November. Back on Beach “A,” the fighting elements of Force “B” were landed during the day under a downpour of rain that lasted all afternoon. The 2nd Kashmir Rifles landed first with the base supply depot. These units were followed by the Punjab Coolie Corps and then by the Composite Battalion (3rd Kashmir Rifles and 3rd Gwalior half battalions) of the Imperial Service Brigade. Around 4 p.m., General Tighe had arranged the defense of the beaches. The 2nd Kashmir Rifles protected the northern sector, the center was protected by the Composite Battalion, and the 2/LNL was shifted to the British left flank. At 5 p.m. Major General Aitken went ashore. He found the beach in total chaos. It was congested at sunset with the stragglers from the 13 Rajput and 61 KGO. In addition to these demoralised sepoys milling around, there were hundreds of porters without commands. Struggling through this chaos, the depot troops attempted to set up some kind of logistic support. It was enough to convince General Aitken that any attempt to land the remaining battalions in the darkness would be a fruitless exercise. He decided to put off landing the 63 PLI, 98th, and 101st battalions until daylight. An unfortunate result of this decision was that the 63 PLI stood ready to disembark until 11p.m. when it finally transferred to lighters. It was recalled to the tugs and then to the transport Assouan with orders to begin disembarking again at 6 a.m., 4 November. Already seasick, the unfortunate sepoys were also to be committed without sleep. Schutztruppe Deutsch Ostafrika The Battle of Tanga, November 1914 Background Preliminaries Tanga Preparation for Battle The Battle: Nov. 4, 1914 Denouement: Nov. 5-6, 1914 Tabletop Tanga: Wargaming the Battle Back to Table of Contents -- Courier #86 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com