Schutztruppe Deutsch Ostafrika
The Battle of Tanga
November 1914

Preparation for Battle

by Dennis L. Bishop and Holger Doebold

Oberstleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck arrived with his staff in Korogwe (first railway station north of Tanga) about 8 p.m. and received word of the landings and the first firefights from wounded German officers. He thought that German patrols had fought skirmish actions at Ras Kazone in the evening of 2nd November with the 13th Rajput and 61st K.G.O, and 2/LNL. He had no idea of the magnitude of the German victory or the debacle created by Baumstark’s decision to retreat to Kange Station.

Lettow-Vorbeck moved to a position 6 kilometers west of Tanga and met Hauptmann Baumstark about 3 a.m. in order to get a clearer picture of the situation. Lettow-Vorbeck decided to reconnoitre Tanga immediately. Together with Hauptmann von Hammerstein and Dr. Lessel, he went by bicycle to the railway station in the center of Tanga. At a post of the 6th Feldkompagnie he didn’t get the desired information, so he entered the empty streets at night without an armed escort. He soon reached the harbour and could see the British transport ships only 400 meters away. The enemy had made no attempt to occupy the town. In the moonlight the ships made perfect targets and Lettow-Vorbeck regretted he did not have his two C73 fieldguns of the Hering Battery available at that moment. They continued to the hospital building, where they left their bicycles and walked to the beach. On their way back to the hospital they were challenged by an Indian sentry of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles, who did not fire in spite of Lettow-Vorbeck answering the call with the German password “Stambuli”. Had the sentry fired, perhaps the outcome of the forthcoming battle the next day would have been very different.

Returning to Tanga, von Lettow-Vorbeck organized his defenses, ignoring von Schnee’s order not to defend Tanga. Early on the morning of 4 November, the 6. Feldkompagnie skirmished between Tanga and the landing zone at Ras Kazone. Between 4 and 6 a.m., Lettow-Vorbeck issued an order to Hauptmann Baumstark to reassemble most of the available troops near the railway station at the center of Tanga. He realized that there, the houses of the European settlement stretching between the railway station and the harbour to the north would give them at least partial protection against naval bombardment. Ludwig Deppe, medical staff officer at the hospital building, counted one cruiser and nine transport ships in the harbour at this time.

By 6 a.m., the Germans were redeployed with two zuege and a machine gun of the 6. F.K. and one zug of the 16. F. K. in the railroad cutting. Two zuege of the 16. F. K. with two machine guns were deployed in a shallow trench east of the native village. Behind the German left flank, von Lettow-Vorbeck placed one zug of the 17. F. K. and the SchutzAbteilung Lessel. Hauptmann Baumstark’s composite abteilung consisting of two zuege of 17. F. K., a composite company made up of the 4. Sch. K., 6. Sch. K., one zug of the 1. F. K., and Abteilung Auracher was located behind the German right flank.

Sometime before 10 a.m., Hauptmann von Prince arrived with his European Abteilung of his own 7. Sch. K. and the 8. Sch. K. under Hauptmann Demuth. Also during this interval, the 13. F. K. arrived. Oberstleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck held this company in reserve under his personal command. The strength of the schutztruppe at this time is estimated at 300 Europeans, 900 askari, and 21 machine guns.

It can only be inferred that the situation at Beach “A” had not been resolved by 5 a.m. when the sun rose. At 7 a.m., General Aitken succeeded at landing the 63 PLI at Beach “C”. The 63 PLI was followed by the 101st nearly an hour later at the same beach. Both of these battalions must have successfully cleared the beach head because at 9:30 a.m., the 98th landed at Beach “C”.

Aitken’s plan of attack was based upon his pre-war experience in India and his assurance that the Indians would “make short work of a lot of niggers” by his officers. He moved the Bharata into position just beyond the Fox covering the approach from Beach “C” to allow both ships’ guns the best direct fire visibility. Aitken assumed that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s position extended no further south than the workshops. He proposed to advance on a frontage sufficient both to make a frontal assault and to turn the German right flank. His plan was to use the Composite Battalion on the British right flank in a frontal assault to tie down the German defenders while the 27th Brigade enveloped the Germans’ open right flank and cut off their retreat.

By shortly after midnight, the British attack positions placed the 2nd Kashmir Rifles on the right flank in a 200 yard frontage of four lines with one company in each line. To the left of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles were the four companies of the 3rd Kashmir Rifles in two open order lines of two companies each. The 2/LNL were to lead the attack from the center using the tracks that converged on Tanga as guide posts for their advance. The 2/LNL had a frontage of 300 yards and was echeloned with two double companies in front and two double companies in support. Each of the 2/LNL companies was deployed with a half company in the first line and a half company in support. The 63 PLI was sandwiched on the left flank of the 2/LNL and the 101st. The 63 PLI was allocated a 200 yard front and was formed into four double company lines.

The 101st was considered the next best battalion to the British 2/LNL but it was poorly deployed, having too much to do in its position. The 101st committed two double companies to the attack with one double company protecting the British left flank and one double company in reserve. The 13th Rajput was located behind the 3rd Kashmir Rifles, and the 98th was located behind the 2/LNL. The 61 KGO was located behind the 13 Rajput. The half battalion of the 3rd Gwalior was designated to protect Beach “B” where supplies were being unloaded.

A curious event took place about 2 p.m., when a boat from the Assouan attempted a landing at the Tanga jetty to buy food. The Germans drove it off, inflicting several casualties on the men inside the boat. One can only ponder how and why this occurred.

Schutztruppe Deutsch Ostafrika The Battle of Tanga, November 1914

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