A latter generation would have the perfect term to describe what was happening here on the banks of the Rio Grande in the winter of 1861/1862. It would be classified as a sideshow, a campaign of little or no importance to the outcome of the war as a whole. To the soldiers who fought for control of the New Mexico Territory it was anything but that, as they fought a hostile land, the elements and the enemy as well. In late February of 1862, the first of several battles to decide the fate of the New Mexico Territory was fought, as the armies of the blue and the gray clashed at Green Valley.
The prewar New Mexico Territory, which consisted of the present day states of New Mexico and Arizona) was perhaps best considered as a diamond in the rough, offering the promise of possible wealth, but not a guarantee. Texas had long coveted the territory, first claiming it in 1836, and even attempting to conquer it in 1841, but had waived its claim in 1850 under the terms of the Compromise of that year. The famed Santa Fe Trail had produced wealth for those merchants who had brought their wares down from Missouri, and miners claimed to have found wealth in the hills of the territory, but it lacked the population and wealth of a California or a Colorado.
The Butterfield Stage Line, the twice monthly mail run across the country, ran across the territory, and the Pacific Railroad, linking California to the United States, and sought as a military need by Secretary of War and Senator Jefferson Davis, was to follow the same path.
At the same time, the problems faced by this territory in dealing with the Apache’s and Navaho’s were nearly unsolvable. The residents, first under Spanish, and then under the Mexican rule had been engaged in a 300 year battle for control of the area. Now that the Americans were in control, the relentless war continued. By 1860, New Mexico ranked second to only Texas as the primary base for the United States Army. (It should be noted that in 1852 the Secretary of War proposed to Congress that the government purchase all privately owned property, evacuate all citizens, and giving the territory back to the Indians as the chief industry of the area was the support of the army.)
The New Mexico Territory had a unique importance to the southern states in that officially it was a territory in which slavery was to have been allowed. The realities of life in New Mexico were such that no slave owner was willing to risk his valuable property in such a place, but on paper it was considered a proslavery. Thus, in any conflict between the North and South, the southern states would attempt to keep that which they considered as rightly theirs.
Secession
After Lincoln’s election in 1860 and as secession pulled state after state out of the Union, officers of the old Army followed their states and resigned their commissions to return home. Among the officers who left the territory under such conditions was Henry Hopkins Sibley, inventor of the Sibley Tent and Stove, and Major in the 2nd Dragoons. Sibley, a native of Louisiana and graduate of the West Point class of 1838, journeyed to Richmond to meet with Jefferson Davis, and proposed a Confederate invasion of New Mexico. On June 17th, 1861 he was issued a commission as a Brigadier General in the newly formed Confederate States Army, and returned to Texas to recruit his command.
While Sibley’s appointment as commander of the Army of New Mexico was to be expected, in so far as he had made the proposal, he was perhaps not the best choice for command. Alone among his fellow officers in New Mexico, who resigned their commissions, but made no attempt to subvert the government of the United States while still on active service, Sibley attempted to organize a mutiny of the United States Army forces stationed in New Mexico. He argued with his fellow Southern officers that they should take control of the territory with their existing commands, a position that was rejected by all of his fellow southern commanders. They instead made sure that they turned over to the appropriate authorities all of the men, equipment and funds that had been entrusted to them, completed their paperwork, and then departed for home. It is an interesting statement that none of Sibley’s fellow southern officers were willing to return with him to New Mexico as officers in the Army of New Mexico.
Nevertheless Sibley returned to Texas, and from late August to early October of 1861 organized a what was known as either the Army of New Mexico, Sibley’s Texas Brigade, or the Arizona Brigade at San Antonio. His force was made of the following units:
Shortages of weapons and equipment were a problem for the Brigade, with the result that the regiments were often armed with whatever the men brought with them. Carbines, shotguns, revolvers, lances, all would were pressed into service to arm the command. An additional set of problems faced by the brigade was that Sibley himself, who was 45 years old, not in the best of physical condition, and seems to have a fondness for the bottle. His reviews of the troops in the field were usually conducted from a carriage or field ambulance, a method not inclined to inspire confidence in a cavalry command. In late October his command set out for El Paso, the jumping off point for the invasion of New Mexico, some 550 miles from San Antonio.
Reaching that post in late December, Sibley reorganized his command for the march north up the Rio Grande. As only one battalion of the 7th Cavalry had arrived, (the other having been delayed) he substituted for it a battalion of the 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles, which was currently garrisoning the area. (When the second battalion of the 7th arrived in El Paso, it would then remain at El Paso in its place). He reinforced the Mounted Rifles with several Independent Companies that were operating in the area, and added to his command Light Battery B, 1st Texas Regiment of Artillery. Pausing to let his troops rest and refit, he resumed his advance in early January moving slowly to Mesilla, the newly named capital of the Confederate Territory of Arizona.
From there the Butterfield Stage headed west to California, and Sibley sent one of his Independent Companies along it to capture Tucson. Proceeding north, the advance elements of his command reached the abandoned post of Fort Thorn on February 4th, 1862. He was in a position to strike at the last bastion of Union control along the Rio Grande, Fort Craig.
Union Defense
Facing Sibley at Fort Craig was one Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, the newly promoted commander of the yet unformed 19th Infantry, and an officer who served with Sibley in those prewar days. In fact, Sibley’s ‘plot’ to seize New Mexico had been taken seriously by then Major Edward R. S. Canby of the 10th Infantry. The commander of the Department of New Mexico in 1861 was Colonel William Loring of the Mounted Rifles. Loring had submitted his resignation in May of 1861, and while awaiting its acceptance turned over day to day command of the department to Canby. Canby, fearing that Loring was in on Sibley’s plot, deposed him in June, and assumed command of the Department of New Mexico. Now, as department commander, Canby once again found himself under threat of attack by Sibley.
Canby had feared an attack by Confederate forces since last June, and had been trying to prepare his department. The garrison at Fort Fillmore, the southernmost post in his department and only 40 miles up the Rio Grande from El Paso had been forced to surrender in July, with the lost of seven companies of the 7th Infantry, and 3 of the Mounted Rifles. Canby had been able to stop Washington from recalling the rest of his Regular Army units, but those units that remained were dealing with a rapid turn over in commanders, as officers resigned and were replaced on almost a revolving door basis. For Regular Army units, who were used to working with the same officers for years, this turnover was extremely unsettling. To fill the vacant officers slots in his regular army units, Canby promoted NCO’s, a radical step in the Regular Army.
Volunteers and militia were called upon to defend their homeland from a Texan attack, an appeal that brought numbers of both into the field. However, Canby, who had been in the New Mexico Territory for some time, disliked and distrusted the inhabitants, and the feeling quickly be mutual. Equipment and weapons were lacking, funds were badly needed to pay both the regular army units as well as the volunteers and promises made were not kept. A number of volunteer companies were enrolled into service as cavalry, with the men supplying their own mounts. After hard service had worn down the mounts, the men were informed that they had been actually enrolled as infantry, and that the government was not responsible for their mounts.
By early February, though Canby had a good sized force in the field, it was not a very cohesive force. As Canby waited for Sibley to move north, he organized his command into five columns.
1st Column: Captain H. R. Selden
5th Infantry Battalion 306
7th/10th Infantry Battalion 310
McRae’s Artillery Battery 130
Halls Artillery Battery 37
2nd Column: Colonel B. S, Roberts
3rd/5th New Mexico 297
New Mexico Mounted Militia 200
3rd Column: Colonel Christopher Carson
2nd Battalion, 1st New Mexico 258
4th Column: Colonel M. E. Pino,
2nd Battalion, 2nd/3rd New Mexico 238
5th Column: Colonel Armijo
Unassigned:
A quick note on the geography of the area is in order. The road north ran along the west bank of the Rio Grande by Fort Craig. On the east side of the river, a mesa stood, which effectively blocked movement along the east bank. Canby’s plan was to stand fast, blocking the road and forcing Sibley to attack Fort Craig. There his troops could stand on the defensive as Canby did not trust his volunteers in the open. Sibley’s brigade arrived at Fort Craig on February 15th, with Sibley himself on the sick list, and the brigade under the actual command of Colonel Tom Green.
Green saw no reason to attack the post, and instead tried to draw the Union troops out of the fort into battle. The Confederate forces fell into line of battle about 2 miles south, and awaited Canby’s response. Canby called his troops out, but refused to close to battle. As the Confederates refused to attack the fort, the day ended in the classic Mexican standoff.
The March
Unable to storm the fort, a Confederate council of war called on the 16th resolved to go around it. A serve dust storm halted operations on the 17th and 18th, but on the 19th Sibley’s brigade moved south, and crossed the Rio Grande. A route over the mesa was located, but no water could be found except at either end where the route reached the Rio Grande. Nevertheless the brigade moved north on the 20th, only to find the going worse then expected. The brigade halted on top of the mesa for the night in a waterless camp.
Canby marched out of the fort on the 20th with his cavalry, McRea’s battery, and the 3rd and 4th Columns in an attempt to intercept the Confederate column. The cavalry and artillery found the going difficult, and the volunteer infantry found themselves attempting to attack the Confederate camp unsupported. The Confederates took up a strong position on top of the mesa, and with the aid of their artillery the volunteers were driven back in disorder. Canby withdrew the artillery and cavalry back to Fort Craig, but left the volunteers as a covering force on the east side of the river. The two armies were encamped within sight of each other, some 4 miles apart.
Sibley, though still ill, took command of his army at this point, and issued orders for the 21st. Half of his command would screen the movements of Confederate supply train by threatening to attack Fort Craig from the east. The remaining half would march north to the Valverde fords of the Rio Grande, where both water and a crossing point were to be found. They would cross to the west bank, and block the Federal supply line north from Fort Craig. The remaining half of the force would follow as soon as possible, and link up with the 1st force. Then the Federal forces at Fort Craig would have to fight or surrender.
Canby realized what his opponent might do, and took steps to deal with a Confederate thrust towards Valverde. Colonel B. S. Roberts was ordered to take his reinforced column at first light to Valverde, and prevent the Confederates from reaching the river.
Thus, as the sun rose on the morning of the 21st, the stage was set for the westernmost battle of the Civil War.
More Green Valley
4th Texas Cavalry: Colonel James Reily
10 companies and 4 - 12# mountain howitzers
5th Texas Cavalry: Colonel Tom Green
10 companies and 4 - 12# mountain howitzers
7th Texas Cavalry: Colonel William Steele
10 companies
Army of New Mexico
Colonel ERS Canby
1st Dragoons 86
Company D
HQ, Companies B, D, F, I, 5th US Infantry
Companies C, F, 7th US Infantry
A, H, 10th US Infantry
Colorado Volunteers
3 - 6# guns, 2 12# howitzer
1 12# mountain howitzer (Manned by G, 2nd Dragoons, I, Mounted Rifles)
2 - 24# howitzerMounted Rifle Battalion 210
Companies C, D, G, K, Mtd Rifles
3 companies 3rd, 1 company 5th
4 companies1st Battalion, 1st New Mexico 254
4 companies
4 companies1st Battalion, 2nd New Mexico 252
4 companies
2 companies 2nd, 2 companies 3rd 1st/2nd Regiments New Mexico Militia 272
6 companies 1st,4 companies 2nd Company K, 5th Infantry
Company H, 7th Infantry
Company F, 10th Infantry
Company G, 1st Dragoons
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