In fact, the garrison at Harpers Ferry was in a perilous position. Geographically, the town was dominated by Maryland Heights to the northeast and by Loudon Heights to the southeast. If the Confederates seized the high ground, their artillery could bombard the town at will. Nor was its commander, alcoholic old Dixon Miles, the sort to withdraw on his own initiative or to take effective defensive measures. (Miles' only claims to fame at that point were his habit of wearing two hats at once and his having been accused of being drunk during the first battle of Manassas.)

When his division closed on Harpers Ferry from the southeast, Walker was permitted to occupy Loudon Heights without opposition. McLaws, with his and Anderson's divisions, moved southward toward Maryland Heights. There, on 12 September, McLaws' column encountered Col. Thomas Ford's brigade, the only part of the garrison assigned to defend this vital position. On the morning of 13 September, McLaws ordered an attack on the Union garrison holding Maryland Heights. Col. Ford stayed away from the front, leaving the defense of Maryland Heights to Col. Eliakim Sherrill of the 126th New York.

Sherrill did everything humanly possible to encourage his men, many of them raw recruits. Two Confederate attacks were beaten back; but, when Sherrill was wounded in the mouth during the third assault, his men broke for the rear. McLaws seized his objective and began bringing up guns.

Jackson's column moved less quickly toward its goal, but the Union commanders seemed intent on playing into his hands. Retreating before Jackson's advance, Gen. Julius White's garrison from Martinsburg had withdrawn into Harpers Ferry, where Miles insisted on sitting tight. Although White was Miles' senior in rank, he seemed reluctant to oppose the old man's wishes. Jackson closed in, virtually isolating the Federal garrison.

On 14 September, Walker's batteries opened fire, followed by McLaws' and Jackson's. A.P. Hill's Light Division maneuvered for an advantageous angle from which to attack Bolivar Heights, the western perimeter of Miles' defenses.

Only cavalry commander Benjamin "Grimes" Davis, a southern Unionist leading a New York regiment, seemed able to move Miles, badgering his commander into permitting 1,400 troops to attempt to escape by night. The Federal troopers filed across to the Maryland side of the Potomac and followed a road McLaws had neglected to patrol. On their way northward the escaping cavalry fell in with a Southern wagon train. Davis, using his Southern accent, talked the teamsters and their escorts into joining the Federal column. These Confederates realized too late that they had been tricked into becoming prisoners of war. Davis eventually reached Greencastle, PA, with his cavalry and his captives. Then he circled southeastward to join the Army of the Potomac.

Davis' example interested other officers in attempting to escape from the trap which Harpers Ferry had become, but Miles refused to authorize any move. He baldly stated that he would follow orders. White continued to sit idle, while Miles convinced himself that, having followed orders, his next step was to yield to the Confederates. On the morning of 15 September, Miles ordered the surrender of the garrison, a decision which left his officers and men feeling betrayed. One officer, Col. George Stannard, commander of the 9th Vermont, even tried to march his regiment out of the town before it could be surrendered, but he was ordered to turn back.

No one wept when the last shell from the Confederate guns mortally wounded Col. Miles, but the damage was done. Jackson was the master of Harpers Ferry with all its men, munitions and supplies. (Gen. White and Col. Ford later faced courts-martial in connection with this fiasco, and the latter was dismissed from the service.)

Harpers Ferry was surrendered only just in time to save Lee, who had accompanied Longstreet's column, from serious difficulties. On 13 September, the Army of the Potomac went into bivouac around Frederick. There an event transpired which revealed to the Union high command all of the Confederate commander's plans and dispositions. Corporal Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana, XII Corps, found an envelope containing a copy of Special Order 191, addressed to D.H. Hill, wrapped around three cigars. Though Hill spent the rest of his life denying that he had dropped the order, he was known for his delight in fine cigars.

By noon the Lost Order had been passed up the chain of command to McClellan, who was stirred to unwanted activity and optimism. Temporarily confident of an easy victory, McClellan ordered his columns toward the passes through South Mountain. Burnside's column, led by Reno's IX Corps, was to advance on Turner's Gap while Franklin's column was to proceed to Crampton's Gap. Sumner's column became McClellan's reserve, while Porter reunited V Corps in preparation for a fight. By evening Stuart had informed Lee of unusual activity among the Union host east of South Mountain. A civilian passed similar intelligence to Lee.

Realizing the peril confronting him, the Confederate commander ordered Jackson to complete the capture of Harpers Ferry as quickly as possible. Longstreet and D.H. Hill were ordered to march their men to Stuart's aid. Hill, a combat commander of proven ability and a sharp tongue ("Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"), rushed his lead brigade to Fox's Gap, one of the approaches to Turner's. The other brigades were to follow as quickly as possible.

Early on 14 September, Burnside's right wing started toward Turner's Gap. By 9 a.m. Cox's Kanahwa Division, troops from West Virginia recently attached to Reno's IX Corps, made contact with Garland's brigade of D.H. Hill's division at Fox's Gap. After fierce fighting, Garland fell mortally wounded and his outnumbered men fled toward Turner's Gap. Hill dealt with this emergency by deploying artillery supported by a scratch line of staff officers, teamsters and cooks, a ruse which stalled Cox's advance until fresh Southern troops arrived. Climbing South Mountain on its few roads slowed IX Corps, permitting Hill to solidify his defensive perimeter.

Meanwhile, Lee hurried up reinforcements. Hood's division was ordered to Hill's aid, but that commander's men demanded his release from arrest - he had squabbled with "Shanks" Evans, the commander of an independent brigade, over some captured wagons. Lee sent for Hood, who began expostulating about his right to the disputed wagons. Lee had expected Hood to be more conciliatory, but he gave the young Texan temporary release from arrest. (After the campaign was over, the whole matter was laid to rest without further fuss.) Hood rushed his men to Turner's Gap, where they were committed to the defense of the Confederate right. His division arrived there in time to check a new Union attack.

Jessie Reno tried to inspire his men to the ultimate effort by leading the assault himself, but he was shot dead. After Reno fell, the life went out of IX Corps' attack, and nightfall would find that part of the Southern position safe. Back on the stricken field at Fox's Gap, a wounded officer from Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes, fearing death to be near, entrusted a message for his wife to a wounded Confederate soldier. Hayes would in fact live to achieve the rank of brigadier general and to serve as president of a reunited Republic.

The real danger to the Confederate hold on Turner's Gap would develop on the left. Hooker's I Corps, which followed Reno's command, was unable to reach the battlefield until late afternoon. As they arrived, Hooker, a bold and ambitious commander, rushed Gibbon's brigade up the National Road toward Turner's Gap. This attack was repulsed with loss by Colquitt's brigade of Hill's division, but Gibbon's attack earned for his brigade the nickname "the Iron Brigade."

Next Hooker swung the rest of his leading division to the right of the road to flank Colquitt. Rodes' brigade of Hill's command checked this attack, wounding Hatch, the division commander. Meade's Pennsylvania Reserve Division moved out beyond Hatch's division, now led by Doubleday, while Ricketts brought up his division to join in the assault. The combined weight of these forces drove Rodes' brigade back onto Colquitt. Three understrength brigades from D.R. Jones' division of Longstreet's command arrived in time to prevent a rout, but the Confederate position at Turner's Gap was fatally compromised. Only nightfall prevented this phase of the battle of South Mountain from becoming a serious Confederate defeat.

Meanwhile, a more desperate situation had developed southward at Crampton's Gap. Franklin's VI Corps moved forward cautiously, but, at about mid-afternoon on 14 September, his men launched an attack on Col. Thomas Munford's dismounted brigade of cavalry, the small garrison of this vital pass. Munford's men were overrun, and the road to Maryland Heights was open to Franklin.

McLaws had sent two regiments of Howell Cobb's brigade to help Munford, but they arrived in time only to be overrun themselves. The Confederate commander threw together yet another line to protect his gunners bombarding Harpers Ferry. If that line had been carried, two Confederate divisions would have been lost and Dixon Miles' garrison sprung from Jackson's trap.

Apparently uninspired by this opportunity, Franklin let victory slip through his grasp. Scarcely 7 miles from Maryland Heights, he ordered his men to encamp for the night. Darius Couch's division of IV Corps, attached to VI Corps, wandered in later but this reinforcement seemed to be wasted on Franklin. On the next day, Miles surrendered, relieving McLaws and Anderson from the perils of their situation.

During the night of 14 September, Lee, despairing of his perilous position, planned a rapid retreat into Virginia. On the next day, however, he heard from Jackson that Harpers Ferry had surrendered. Lee already had selected a site behind Antietam Creek, a stream running from north to south into the Potomac, for any necessary rearguard action. Buoyed by the news of another victory, Lee stopped in Sharpsburg, behind the Antietam, and ordered that the glad tidings be spread among Longstreet's men. Then he prepared to give battle.

Munford's cavalry, D.R. Jones' division, and Evans' brigade were assigned to watch the crossings of the Antietam, especially the Middle Bridge opposite Sharpsburg and the Lower Bridge southward at Rohrbach's farm. D.H. Hill's and Hood's divisions were assigned to the left, which bent back toward the Potomac, with Stuart's remaining troopers to their left on the Nicodemus farm. Hill's men took position in a Sunken Road just west of Antietam Creek, while Hood occupied the Miller farm to Hill's west and just north of the junction of the Hagerstown Turnpike and Smoketown Road.

Places were also chosen for the besiegers of Harpers Ferry, who were marching northward to Sharpsburg. The Stonewall Division and Ewell's division were ordered, upon their arrival, to take position on the left. Walker was ordered to the right; Anderson and McLaws, who would arrive late, were to stay in reserve. This disposition had certain weaknesses.

One of these was the inability of Lee's men to cover the Upper Bridge, which the Army of the Potomac could use to cross Antietam Creek dry shod. More serious was the fact that the Potomac was at Lee's back. In case of disaster, the Army of Northern Virginia would have been forced to retreat down a narrowing funnel toward A.P. Hill's division, which still occupied Harpers Ferry.

McClellan Moves Quickly

Lee's orders were predicated on the usual slowness of movement of any force under McClellan's command. In fact, the Army of the Potomac spent almost all of 15-16 September moving over South Mountain and across Pleasant Valley toward the Antietam. Despite rainy weather, more rapid movement was possible, but McClellan seems to have lost the optimism caused by the finding of the Lost Order.

As he moved, McClellan began dismantling the column structure employed on the march up from Washington. Burnside was sent to the left with IX Corps under Cox, but Hooker's I Corps was sent to the right to cross the Upper Bridge and threaten the Confederate left. Sumner's II Corps moved straight ahead to the bluffs overlooking the Middle Bridge, where it was joined by the reserve artillery, the cavalry, and Sykes' division of Fitzjohn Porter's V Corps. Morell's division was ordered to close on V Corps headquarters the following day. Mansfield's XII Corps, however, was detached from Sumner's command and sent to follow Hooker. Franklin's command, VI Corps and Couch's division, was left behind in Pleasant Valley.

With this arrangement of forces, McClellan hoped to feint with his left and then strike with his right. Once the Confederates had been weakened by these actions, a decisive blow was to be launched at Lee's center. This plan might have succeeded if McClellan had put in all of his 75,000 men against Lee's scattered 40,000, but certain factors stood against Federal chances of victory. The most important was McClellan's character. As has been noted, the euphoria created by the finding of the Lost Order had evaporated, leaving room for McClellan's old timidity and his conviction of being outnumbered. Thus McClellan dithered while Jackson marched to Lee's aid.

The Federal commander also failed to concentrate command of his right flank in Hooker's hands, leaving that part of his plan illcoordinated. Nor did McClellan see that Burnside, who was grumbling over the loss of his wing command, was adequately supervised. Burnside, in turn, allowed himself to be mesmerized by the bluffs overlooking the Lower Bridge, convincing himself that the water was deep and that the bridge was his only path to victory. (Confederates born in the Sharpsburg area were later to state that the Federals could have waded the waters of Antietam Creek without difficulty.) Cox, an abler man than Burnside, seems to have felt too constrained by the presence of his disgruntled superior - who refused to take command of IX Corps - to take any positive action of his own.

Besides Burnside's fascination with his bridge, the Antietam created another problem for the Unionists. Any forces sent to Hooker's aid - or any assault on the Confederate center - would involve moving troops to the western bank. Only late in the battle would the Union commanders begin searching for fords which would provide more direct routes than a march to and across the Upper Bridge. Thus, terrain complicated the problems of coordination caused by McClellan's failings as a general.

By evening of 16 September, Hooker's men made contact with Hood's division in the woods east of Miller's cornfield. After a sharp fight, the advance of Seymour's brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves was checked just before night closed in. By dawn of the next day, Jackson's divisions, the Stonewall Division under J.R. Jones and Ewell's division under Lawton, had relieved Hood's men at Miller's farm. S.D. Lee's artillery battalion was moved in east of the Dunker Church, below the intersection of the Hagerstown and Smoketown roads, to support Jackson's line. Walker's two brigades had closed on Munford's brigade watching the lower fords of the Antietam, and the divisions of McLaws and Anderson were arriving from Harpers; Ferry.

To complete this concentration, Lee decided to bring up A.P. Hill's Light Division from Harpers Ferry. Thus Lee had his forces well in hand, with the advantage of internal lines of communication. As has been noted, McClellan's men prepared to attack on the morrow under hesitant leadership and with the local terrain inhibiting their cooperation with one another. The stage was set by men and by nature for the bloodiest day in American history.

Lee's First Offensive The Maryland Campaign of 1862

Introduction
Harper's Ferry
Battle of Antietam: Union Attack
Antietam: Fortune Favors the Confederates
After the Battle
George Sears Greene: Profile (very slow: 211K)
Lee's Invasions: Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 326K)