It would appear that by mid-1960 the French Army had won the Algerian war. But a curious thing happened. Suddenly a series of new revolts erupted in the French armed forces in Algeria. The ALN was able to watch from the countryside the French military power withdraw within itself in a fight between factions of the Army and the DeGaulle government. In the process, the war in Algeria had almost ground to a halt, the French agreed to the independence of Algeria, and the French Army was withdrawn and almost immediately began extensive reorganization to equip it for the nuclear battlefield environment. The ALN from the countryside and the forces in Tunisia then entered the cities and took possession of them, and the Algerian war was ended in agreement between the belligerents.

In the revolt of 13 May 1958, staged at Algiers, the French Army toppled the French government in Paris. A new government was formed under Charles DeGualle, whom the Army felt would press for victory in Algeria. These were the halcyon days of the French Army in politics. But DeGaulle followed policies of attempting to extricate France from Algeria. Dissatisfaction quickly arose with the new government.

In January 1960 Army 'activist' colonels revolted again, this time against DeGaulle. A year later, the generals followed the path of the colonels and themselves staged a coup against DeGaulle. Neither worked. When DeGaulle persisted in withdrawal from Algeria, some of these officers formed a paramilitary 'Secret Army Organization' which fought the French government until July 1962 in an attempt to force France to remain in Algeria.

In a very real sense, this military-political conflict in France, and the French defeat in Algeria, related back to the Battle of Algiers. France made very real mistakes in the course of the Algerian War, all of which went far toward defeating them. For one thing, the French gave independence to the neighboring states of Morocco and Tunisia, establishing independent nations friendly to the FLN on both its flanks. For another thing, and the French generals were correct here, if the aim of France was to retain control of Algeria then a full range of resources should have been brought to bear on the FLN insurgency sooner. Yet, if France wanted Algeria, why did the French give independence to Morocco and Tunisia, both examples that would unavoidably motivate all Algerians toward independence themselves?

After the Battle of Algiers another mistake was made, this one by the French Army. They felt Algiers proved that they could do anything that was necessary to win the Algerian War. Many of the French officers began to see victory in Algeria and adopted 'French Algeria' as their slogan, a goal which explicitly involved military victory. These men launched the coup of 1958, and those of 1960, 1961 and 1962 after the government they installed proved less willing to press for military victory than the former one. Yet the conflict these officers initiated paralyzed the French Army, which for the first time in the war had attained a clear military advantage over the ALN.

But even in 1960 the French Army would have faced much hard fighting before a victory. Yet the irony remains. France lost the Algerian War at the time of their greatest victory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambler, John. Soldiers Against the State. NY: Doubleday, 1968.
Blonde, Georges. La Legion Etrangere. Paris: Cercle du Livre de France, 1965.
Bocca, Geoffrey. The Secret Army. Englewood (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1968.
Brace, Richard and John. Ordeal in Algeria. Princeton (NJ): Van Nostrand, 1960.
Clark, Michael. Algeria in Turmoil. NY: Praeger, 1959.
Gorce, Paul de [a. The French Army. NY: Braziller, 1963.
Henissart, Paul. Wolves in the City. NY: Simon and Shuster, 1970.
Kelley, George. Lost Soldiers. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1966.
Larteguy, Jean. The Centurions. NY: Dutton, 1962.
Mercer, John. Legion of Strangers. NY: Holt, 1964.
Paillat, Claude. Dossiers secretes de I' Algeria. (3 vols). Paris, Livre Contemporain, 1961-1964.
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Wolf, Eric R. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. NY: Harpers, 1969.

Colonial Twilight The French War in Algeria

Introduction
Origins of the Algerian War
War Comes to Algiers
The Year of Mobilization
The New War Strategy
Battle of Algiers
Challe's Campaign of 1959
Jaws of Victory