by John Prados
General Maurice Challe, an officer of the Air Force who was considered to be loyal to DeGaulle, took over the Algerian command in December 1958. It was Challe who had headed the team which planned the successful invasion segment of the Suez affair, and Challe had a reputation as one of the best French strategists. Arriving in Algeria, Challe decided that in order to win the war a certain amount of risk-taking was necessary. Accordingly, Challe determined to count on the strategic isolation of the ALN by the border defenses and to concentrate major French forces for offensives, a measure from which the previous French commanders had shrunk. The 1959 campaign was the most ferocious of the war. In February the French launched operation 'Couronnes' in the Ouarsenis area of Willaya No. 5, long an ALN stronghold. Here the ALN retaliated with an offensive of their own, perhaps the first such ALN operation of the war, conducted with six battalions against the coastal towns around Oran. The French commander in this area, General Gambiez, then inaugurated an accelerated program to pacify Oran province. Along the Cheliff River there was intense fighting throughout May. After the beginning of summer, however, ALN activities seemed to fall off, and Gambiez proclaimed the pacification of Oran complete. In June 1959 the ALN made an attempt to get some of their 30 Tunisia-based battalions into Algeira by launching heavy attacks at Bone, a city near the Morice Line. It was hoped in this way to distract French attention from a mass ALN infiltration across the Morice Line. French quadrillage forces were able to defend Bone successfully, and alerted to the prospect of an ALN infiltration, the French redoubled their efforts along the Tunisian border. Thus the ALN's large reserve force was successfully kept at bay, and in June Challe mounted a new offensive, 'Ariege' into the Aures Mountains. Willaya No. 7, the original ALN base, suffered heavy losses as a result. Then on 22 July Challe opened an offensive in Kabylia, 'Jumelles,' the centerpiece of his strategy. Kabylia was Willaya No. 3, and was the strongest of the ALN zones. The French offensive began with amphibious landings by the equivalent of a full division of the Foreign Legion reinforced by a regiment of paratroops, making one of the few parachute drops of the Algerian War. The French forces, and subsequent reinforcements, fanned out in the Tizi-Ouzou area and there fought an extended series of battles with the ALN. By 21 September, Challe had claimed 4,400 ALN dead from this one operation alone. Challe's offensives seriously affected the strength of the ALN inside Algeria. The war had begun with an estimated 2,000 ALN troops. These had multiplied to 6,000 regulars by 19S5 and to 18,000 in April 1956. In 1956 the ALN had standardized the organization of their units. At that time they had moved from a company (katiba), with 110 men, to a battalion (failek) of 350 men as their basic maneuver unit. The ALN had itself reached peak strength in 1957 with about 40,000 regular troops and 80,000 local guerrillas, and they had maintained this strength through 1958. But the Challe offensives cost the ALN so heavily that their regular forces inside Algeria were reduced to about 12,000, and the ALN had to drop back to the company as their basic manuever unit. The 30 full strength ALN battalions in Tunisia, which together with special units and base forces must have amounted to about 17,000 troops could do little to affect the conflict inside Algeria. It was in this context that a break first appeared in the ALN front. In March 1960 the leaders of Willaya No. 4, the ALN zone surrounding Algiers, contacted French authorities on the prospect of accepting DeGaulle's preferred 'peace of the brave,' or cease fire. The leaders travelled to France in June and met with DeGaulle with the result that apparently they had decided to capitulate in the fall. But negotiations being held between the FLN as a whole and the French, then being conducted in Switzerland, collapsed in the summer of 1960. In the wake of this event, the ALN colonel commanding Willaya No. 4 was killed by his deputy, who vowed to continue fighting. Colonial Twilight The French War in Algeria
Origins of the Algerian War War Comes to Algiers The Year of Mobilization The New War Strategy Battle of Algiers Challe's Campaign of 1959 Jaws of Victory Back to Campaign # 73 Table of Contents Back to Campaign List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1976 by Donald S. Lowry This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |