by Jerrold Thomas
At Verdun, once the initial advances were over, the infantry took a greatly subordinate role to the dominating artillery. The infantry could do little but dig and die. The obstacles of trenches, barbed wire, and machine guns became secondary to the incessant, concentrated bombardment, which levelled the trenches almost as fast as they could be dug, making the contest one of the shovel vs. the shell. In the initial phases of the battle, all the difficulties belonged to the French. Using, in the woods, a form of the infiltration tactics to be used in 1918, and the surprise of their new flamethrowers and giant minethrowers, the Germans made rapid progress, and established a three to one loss ratio against the French. Once the woods had been cleared in the first rush, these methods no longer worked so well -- the front was now too open and too constricted for infiltration, and the flamethrowers and minethrowers became very vulnerable to enemy fire. Infantry tactics then became the standard Barrage - Rush - Counterattack tactics of most WW I battles, with the difficulties for both sides compounded by the density of artillery. The Barrage could involve one gun per defender, and the counter-barrage (the correct term for what is referred to as counter battery fire in the game of VERDUN) could involve everything up to heavy artillery, since both sides had many guns available and waiting for a target. Trench warfare reached new levels of horror. The troops dared not stir from their trenches on either side, and it was not unusual for troops to be on the line for months and never see an enemy soldier. Patroling was unheard of -- just getting to or moving back from the front line often involved 10 - 30% losses, even when done at night. In this situation the lines became so fixed that the gunners didn't need to see in order to fire on the trenches or access routes. In these conditions, bringing up food or evacuating wounded could only be done, sometimes, at night. It often took ten hours to make a 3 mile approach march to the trenches, with the heavily laden (60 to 80 pounds) troops sometimes drowning in shell craters, or being wounded and left to die because another shell might be incoming on the same spot. One man moving might attract a whole battery's fire. For most of the battle the French, being inside the salient with an inferior artillery and inferior supply and medical establishments, suffered more than the Germans, though at times the difference was marginal. The battle left a profound psychological impression on all who participated in it, but it was particularly significant to the French. At one time or another 70% of the French army saw service at Verdun, due to a system called the "Noira", whereby a division would be on the line for only a few days or weeks, and would be pulled out of the line before it was decimated. Seventy-six French divisions passed through the inferno of Verdun as opposed to forty-six German divisions. The relative significance of the infantry is indicated by the fact that casualties in the ten-month battle were almost exactly in proportion to the tonnage of shells or their numbers - it took 200 rounds to kill one man, or 50 to wound one. One significant aspect of the VERDUN infantry CRT is its reflection of the nature of infantry combat - if a position was not carried at first rush (i.e. a ROUT) the attacker was in for enormous losses, regardless of the relative "odds" of the situation. The only problem with the CRT is that, if anything, losses are too low - there is no provision for the enormous "wastage" present at Verdun, except for the French reinforcement rate. Also well reflected in the Infantry CRT is the importance of morale. Unshaken troops could (and did) repulse attacks by enormous odds, even though the troops might have taken grevious losses from artillery fire -- such was the case with French Colonel Driant, whose two battalions of Chasseurs took over 90% losses and yet still held out for several days against overwhelming odds. In contrast, demoralized troops would surrender without firing a shot, as happened with the French initial reserves, who were African Colonials who had never endured such a barrage before, and who broke under it. Verdun: The Situation Verdun Game Variants
Initial Order of Battle Forts Artillery CRT Variation Observation Use of the Artillery Shell Table Back to Table of Contents -- Panzerfaust #67 To Panzerfaust/Campaign List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1975 by Donald S. Lowry This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |