The masses of artillery employed by both sides at Verdun required effective observation to achieve their ends. This was especially true at Verdun where. after the first days, friend and foe were likely to be quite close together, and where the front was very constricted,

For a battery to fire on a target, someone had to see the target, and then tell the battery where it was, and then, often correct the battery's fire if it was not falling correctly.

Three main methods were employed by both sides to achieve this spotting-of targets.

First and simplest was to position the battery where it commanded a wide field of view, so that it could do its own observation, or to send an artillery observer to such a commanding point and have him direct the fire of the battery. This had the drawback that the commanding points were usually exposed to enemy fire, and often were not available. The Germans were also hampered in this method because their observers had to be in a line between the battery and the target, while the French had evolved a method using Trigonometry which made the observer independent of the battery.

The second method, and the one most favored by the Germans, involved the use of tethered balloons in telephone communication with the batteries. This was the optimum method as communication was constant, but it did have sighting limitations, and the balloons were vulnerable to attack by enemy fighter aircraft.

The third method, and the one that was to be revolutionized at Verdun, was the use of Aircraft. Aircraft communicated with the batteries through primitive radios, or more frequently through maps marked with target or shellfall locations and dropped to the batteries in containers. This was often the only method of observing the heavily defiladed positions that occurred in the hills around Verdun.

For the start of the battle, the Germans created a new concept -- "air power" -- they had assembled 4 Zeppelins, 14 tethered "Drachen" balloons, and 168 Aircraft. While this massive concentration of Air Power was ill-used, it still sufficed to allow the Germans to completely dominate the skies over Verdun, and to direct the constant devastating bombardment of the initial days. The French, with uncharacteristic rapidity, responded to this threat and had over 200 Air- craft on the Verdun front in a month.

Most significant, however, was the "Groupe des Cigognes" (Storks), which was formed for Verdun, and which contained most of the greatest French Aces: Nungesser, Fonck, Guynemer, et, al. Almost immediately after this group began operations at Verdun, in early March, the Germans were swept from the skies. The French attained a quick air superiority that was only challenged for a few weeks when Oswald Boelcke brought his talent and ideas to Verdun for the Germans.

However Immelman, the other German air hero, was killed shortly after his arrival, though not until he had evolved the idea that was to lead to the "Flying Circus". Once he left, French air superiority was uncontested for the rest of the battle.

This air superiority not only gave them good observation, but it was a morale booster for the troops in the trenches to see the skies filled with friendly aircraft, just as it depressed the op posing troops. The only consolation or the Germans was that by the time the French had assumed air superiority, the Germans had possession of Fort Douaumot, which had an unexcelled view of the surrounding terrain. One French writer estimated the cost to the French of losing this position (Douaumont) was 100,000 men over the course of the battle.

Verdun: The Situation

Introduction
Artillery
Other Weapons
Barrages
Observation
Forts and Terrain
Infantry

Verdun Game Variants

Introduction
Initial Order of Battle
Forts
Artillery CRT Variation
Observation
Use of the Artillery Shell Table