North Wind Rain

The Red Army and the Far East

by Mark E. Stille

Because of the repeated border clashes with the Japanese and the constant threat of war, Soviet forces in the Far East (which includes those in the Far East Front in the easternmost Soviet Union and the TransBaikal Military District facing the western part of Manchuria) contained some of the most combat ready units in the entire Red Army. Events in Europe from 1939 up until the outbreak of war in June 1941 shifted Soviet attentions to preparing their forces in the western Soviet Union for the coming clash with the Germans.

Nevertheless, the Far East garrison was maintained at levels aimed at deterring the Japanese from any military adventures against the Soviet Union. Even as the war with the Germans began to go badly and the Soviets seemed on the edge of collapse, the Soviets made every effort to maintain, if not the quality, at least the quantity of their Far East forces. These efforts must be seen as successful as the Japanese never felt they had the degree of superiority needed to successfully attack the Soviets.

As early as April 1941, the Soviets began to move limited forces from the Far East to the west. By 22 June, mobilization had produced an additional 171 divisions to bring the Red Army's pre-war total to 303 divisions. Table 1 gives the distribution of forces within the Soviet Union.

The rifle division dominated the force structure of the Red Army's Far East forces. The Soviet April 1941 rifle division organization called for the creation of a modern and balanced fighting unit which on paper appeared to the counterpart of any similar western unit. Table 2 outlines the differences between the Japanese and Soviet infantry divisions of the period.

This displays the very different types of units that were preparing to square off. The Soviet division was a smaller formation, but was supported by five battalions of artillery and was well-supplied with antitank weapons and its own armor. The IJA division was infantry intensive. Supporting artillery was limited to three battalions of which only one was not equipped with light field guns. Of the two types of divisions, the Japanese unit was at full strength as the divisions of the Kwantung Army had been brought up to full wartime strength in the weeks preceding the planned attack.

Conversely, Soviet divisions remained well understrength. In 1939, Divisions in the Far East were strengthed beyond their normal numbers, but in 1940, the rosters actually fell below peacetime strengths. However, by June 194 1, no rifle division in the Red Army was at authorized strength and many were missing key units.

Overall, those rifle divisions in the Far East were in much better shape then their contemporaries in the west and were much more likely to actually have their organic antitank, antiaircraft and armored components.

The rifle division was the backbone of Soviet defenses in the Far East. Of the 21 divisions (plus two additional motorized rifle divisions) garrisoning the theater in June 194 1, only two were transferred before September. A significant weakening took place in September and October with six divisions being moved to the west. However, in their place, a total of 12 divisions were formed in the theater between August and November.

Additionally, as an emergency measure, a number of rifle brigades were brought into service. The three prewar rifle brigades in the Far East had been quickly disbanded when the war began to bring other units up to strength. But as the threat of a Japanese attack loomed, another eight were formed through October; of these, five were formed by taking person net from fortified regions on the border and forming them into field units. When the threat of a Japanese invasion faded, they were returned to their parent units. Other infantry forniations available in September 1941 included an airborne brigade and three naval infantry brigades-all high caliber units.

The Far East Front and the Trans- Baikal Military District also possessed strong armored forces in 1941. In June, there were four tank divisions in the Far East; before the end of the year, another six were formed. By September, five still remained in the Far East but three were slated to transfer to the west.

To compensate for the movement of armored forces to the west, two new tank divisions were raised locally out of available assets. These units were never fully formed and were disbanded after the threat of a Japaricse invasion passed. By mid-1942, only two tank divisions remained in the entire Far East. Both of these units were assigned to the Trans-Baikal Military District and both Survived until 1945 to take part in the offensive against the Japanese.

On paper, a Red Army tank division was a formidable unit with two tank regiments, a regiment of motorized infantry, and a supported motorized artillery regirnent.

Of particular significance was the fact that each division was authorized a total of 375 tanks--this would give the Soviets more tanks in a single division that the Japanese possessed in all of Manchuria! However, as evidenced in the opening months of the war against the Germans, the tank divisions were flawed instruments in combat.

In the Far East, all tanks were older types, either BT series or T-26; none of the modern T-34s or heavy KVs could be spared for a secondary theater. Of these older types, many were not operational. On average, 29% needed capital repairs and 44% needed lesser maintenance. Additionally, there was a shortage of vehicles, especially prime movers for artillery. personnel shortages were also in evidence, particularly in the most skilled positions.

Against the Germans these weaknesses proved fatal; against the comparatively lightly armed IJA, the tank divisions would have been formidable opponents.

Artillery

Artillery was another area of significant Soviet advantage, In June 1941, the Soviet Far East Command possessed numbers and types Of guns only dreamed of by the Japanese. Each of the 21 rifle divisions in the Far East had 78 guns over 75mm, including 12 heavy 152mm howitzers. In addition to these divisional assets, the Soviets had another eight corps artillery regiments cacti with 24-36 assigned weapons between 107mm and 152mm and another 14 regiments of High Command artillery regiments with 24-48 guns or howitzers of 122mm and above.

Though there were continuing problems with modern fire direction and the availability of prime movers, Soviet artillery had proved itself to be formidable in the 1939 Nornonhan clash and provided the Soviets with an undisputed and considerable firepower edge.

In spite of Soviet advantages in armor and artillery, the combat effectiveness of their forces was severely impacted by the massive purge against the leadership cadres of' the Red Artily. As the disasters in the initial part of the war against the Germans demonstrated, the Red Army was not ready for war. At the command level, officers were inexperienced and most were filling positions one or two levels above their training. They proved unable to master modern tactical and operational techniques.

At the regimental and battalion levels, inexperienced officers were also the norm. Staffs were not up to strength and proved unable to property coordinate operations. In total, the Red Army proved itself unable to conduct complex operations combining combat arms and massing combat power where and when it was needed.

The army's training program was accelerated in 1940 following the dismal performance against Finland, but by 1941 the combat capability of the Red Army was still adversely impacted by the Purges. In any conflict with the Japanese. Soviet forces in the Far East Would have displayed the same growing pains as those of the Red Army units fighting the Germans.

In September 1941, as the Kwantung Army reached its peak strength, Soviet Far East forces remained strong. In spite of the pressures of the war against the Germans, the Soviets made every attempt to maintain the deterrent value of their Far East forces. On 1 September, a total of 31 divisions remained in the theater, equal to the number present on 22 June. Many of the remaining divisions were preparing to transfer to the west, but new formations were being raised to compensate for their departure. While these new units were not as well equipped or trained as their predecessors, they did serve to maintain force levels and provided Japanese intelligence with at least the perception that Soviet forces in the Far East were not being appreciably weakened.

By the end of 1941, 32 divisions remained in the theater. When this is compared to the 31 that began the war in the Far East, the importance of the theater to the Soviets is amply demonstrated. Table I details the order of battle for Soviet forces in the theater throughout 1941.

As already discussed, available armored units in the Far East in September 1941 remained imposing. Five divisions were present, but three were preparing to transfer to the west. Two additional divisions were formed before the end of the year to take their place. The tank divisions were supported by three motorized divisions. As the weaknesses of the tank divisions were amply demonstrated in 1941, the Soviets resorted to the formation of a large number of tank brigades to maintain the maximum number of tanks in the field. In the Far East, the first of these Units, each with 67 tanks and a motorized rifle battalion, were formed in November 1941.

North Wind Rain Japanese Invasion of Manchuria

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