NOTES
[1] This was Model's reaction, expressed to his son in 1943, upon hearing of Field Marshal von Paulus' capitulation at Stalingrad. Kessler, Leo, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, Chelsea, 1989, p. 208.
[2] His father was a Royal Prussian Director of Music. For Model's early life, see von Mellenthin, EW, German Generals of World War II, Norman, 1977, p. 147; Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 17; "Model," by Carlo D'Este, in Hitler's Generals (Corelli Barnett, ed.), New York, 1989, pp. 319, 320. There is a dearth of detail in this area, as Model had his personal papers destroyed in the waning days of the war.
[3] Lucas, James, Hitler's Enforcers, New York, 1996, p. 86. Model's nonmilitary family background and age were similar to those of Erwin Rommel (a Swabian who was born on 15 November, 1891, and whose father was a schoolmaster). As a young subaltern, Model's personality had the same hard edge as did that of the future Desert Fox, who "was businesslike and impersonal.... He had a hard streak in him, and he exhibited no tolerance for the lazy or inefficient." Mitcham, Samuel, Rommel's Greatest Victory, Novato, 1998, p. 11.
[4] Model was a tough boss, a real `driver'. Von Mellenthin commented that whenever Model entered a situation during this period of his career, he "invariably had the effect of a cat among the pigeons...." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, pp. 147, 148. See also D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 321 - "During the inter-war years he gained notoriety for his ruthless performance of duty..," running roughshod over subordinates.
[5] Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 148. Goebbels liked Model's "energetic and impulsive nature." Id. Cf., von Mellenthin, EW, Panzer Battles, Norman, 1956, p. 281, n.2 - "There is no truth in the story that Model was a man of humble origin and that he had close connections with the Nazi Party. He was a product of the German General Staff, brave, efficient and hard-working, although somewhat unorthodox in his methods."
[6] Model was always a dynamo, seemingly inexhaustible, and very often utterly ruthless. Von Mellenthin wrote, "The impression of perpetual forcefulness that Model gave was no mere superficial pose. His restless spirit was always bursting with energy, and on top of that he was utterly convinced of his own ability." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 148. With respect to 3 5 Panzer, "Within the division he was regarded with mixed feelings; his troops appreciated his forcefulness, his willingness to share their hardships and his dynamic leadership from the front, while his staff thought him obnoxious." D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323.
[7] Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, pp. 89, 90. Model insisted that even his rear area/train troops be drilled in infantry tactics. Id. This precaution paid big dividends during the fast-moving 1941 campaign in Russia.
[8] Haupt, Werner, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia, 1941-45, Atglen, 1997, pp. 31, 38. See also Carrell, Paul, Hitler Moves East 1941-43, Winnipeg, 1991, p. 71. Model won the Knight's Cross in July, 1941, for which he received the personal congratulations of ColonelGeneral Guderian near Smolensk.
[9] "He shared the conviction of the senior panzer commanders that it was vital to keep the enemy on the run and disorganized, so that they could not set up firm lines of defense." Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 90.
[10] On 24 August Model's advance units grabbed the 800 yard-long bridge over the Desna near Novgorod - Seversk, the gateway to the Ukraine, in a coup de main conducted under his personal direction. For descriptions of this daring action, see Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-43, pp. 107-111, and Lucas, James, War on the Eastern Front, New York, 1979, pp. 186, 187.
[11] General Sir John Hackett, the future author of the famous novel The Third World War and an actual opponent of the Desert Fox, said of Rommel, "His method of command was forceful, direct and personal. If he wanted something done, he was there to get it done, and he was harsh on those he thought had failed him." Mitcham, Rommel's Greatest Victory, p. 108. Guderian said of Model, "During my description of the 1941 Russian campaign I have portrayed his character enough; he was a bold, inexhaustible soldier, who knew the front well and who won the confidence of his men by his habitual disregard for his personal safety. He had no time for lazy or incompetent subordinates. He carried out his intentions in a most determined fashion." Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, Costa Mesa, 1990, p. 336.
[12] At one point 3d Panzer's spearhead had three (3) operable tanks. Lucas, War on the Eastern Front, p. 104. Combining and recombining assault groups was becoming a Model specialty. Id., p. 190. During this drive, one of his Kampfgruppen advanced 200 km in seven hours. Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 90.
[13] "Under the leadership of General Model the 3 Panzer Division had gained, very early in the campaign against the Soviet Union, a reputation for combat efficiency, the product of the aggressive driving force and tactical Brillowoance of its commanding general. Model was not only a charismatic leader but one whose degree of self confidence was matched by his pragmatic approach to battlefield problems." Lucas, James, Battle Group!, London, 1993, p. 59. These traits resemble those of the famed Desert Fox: "When he [Rommel] saw his chance, he became a restless and ruthless thruster, who did not ask of his men any more than he asked of himself - which was to be superhuman." Mitcham, Rommel's Greatest Victory, p. 131.
[14] "Model was a soldier's soldier and had so impressed the power of his personality upon his men that they were confident of a swift and overwhelming victory in the now imminent offensive." Lucas, Battle Group!, p. 59. For a description of 3rd Panzer's role in Typhoon, see id., pp. 58-73.
[15] Hasso von Manteuffel, later the renowned Panzer Leader, winner of the Diamonds, and eventual commander of 5 Panzer Army during the Battle of the Bulge, was one of Model's Kampfgruppe commanders. Model regularly mixed and matched combat elements in a constant effort to keep offensive pressure on the Soviets, and on occasion lent battlegroups to 4 Panzer Division (which together with the 3rd Panzer made up the armored elements of XXIV Panzerkorps). Under intense shellfire, Model personally supervised his engineers' construction of a bridge over the Susha River on 23 October, near Mtensk. Id.
[16] Replacing General Hans Reinhardt, who in turn had been promoted to command 3 Panzergruppe. Reinhardt was later to serve under Model at Army Group Center, where he commanded 3 Panzer Army on the Army Group's northern flank.
[17] D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323. The transfer requests generally were ignored. Interestingly, Hans Rottinger, the Corps' Chief of Staff and an admirer of Reinhardt, wrote a description of the Corps' operations during this period in which he never once mentioned Model by name. See Newton, Steven, German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, Atglen, 1994, pp. 13-54. Apparently, he and Model had worked together in the mid-1930's and had developed an intense dislike for each other. Id., p. 14.
[18] Id, pp. 30-54.
[19] For a finely detailed and informative discussion of how and why the `stand fast' orders came about and succeeded in this crisis, see Wray, Timothy, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II, Prewar to March, 1943, Fort Leavenworth, 1986.
[20] Otto Schellert, commander of the 253 Infantry Division (a part of the encircled XXIII Corps), wrote an account of the desperate fighting in the face of the Soviet breakthrough. See Newton, German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, pp. 55-79.
[21] Dramatic recountings of this terrible winter battle, the successful conclusion of which suddenly thrust Model to the foremost ranks of the Webrmacht's combat leaders, are found in Carrell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943, pp. 347-369, and Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, pp. 118-120.
[22] The threat to the rail line at Sychevka was so serious that Model flew to Fuhrer HQ on 1920 January to ask for a panzer corps to restore the situation. Hitler agreed to reinforce 9 Army, but wanted the panzers committed at Gzhatsk, 100 miles further south near the Vyazma-Moscow highway. According to observers present, Model turned directly to Hitler and said, "Who commands the Ninth Army, mein Fuhrer, you or I? Model then stated emphatically that he knew the situation on the ground better than those at Fuhrer HQ, who had "only maps." After staring Hitler down for a few (no doubt interminable) seconds, Model returned to his explanation of the situation; Hitler eventually agreed to his plan, with the proviso that its failure would cost Model's head. After the meeting Hitler is reported to have said to an aide, "Did you see that eye? I trust that man to do it. But I wouldn't want to serve under him!" Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 149; D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323; Mitcham, Samuel, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Chelsea, 1990, pp. 315, 316.
[23] His commanders had asked that the counteroffensive's 21 January start date be postponed due to the -45°C temperatures. Model responded, "Why, gentlemen? Tomorrow or the day after won't be any warmer. The Russians aren't stopping their operations." Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943, p. 355.
[24] Almost ten Soviet divisions were wiped out, and several others wrecked.
[25] Model maximized his time at the front by constant, sometimes daily, use of his Fieseler Storch. During the winter battle he actually landed on the Volga ice when visiting one of his beleaguered regiments. He earned the nickname "Terrorflieger" for his habit of dropping into rear echelon units to comb out excess staff and rear personnel and sending them to the front. Fraschka, Gunther, Knights of the Reich, Atglen, 1994, p. 213. On 23 May Model caught a bullet while flying low over a partisan-infested area: the bullet went up his leg and exited through his shoulder. A blood transfusion was needed to save his life, and he was in the hospital until 10 August. Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 122; Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 98.
[26] "Above all, Model was imaginative: to do one's duty was simply not enough. What he demanded, in his own words, was 'never failing demoniac genius, fully conscious of his own creative power of mastering everything.' " Eisenhower, John, The Bitter Woods, New York, 1969, p. 346. See also D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323.
[27] Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 94. During the heavy fighting in late August, "Generaloberst Model ordered that no command post be allowed to withdraw and that the last clerk and cook must take up their carbines....No commander knew
the units that were subordinate to him, since he held them for only a few days or even just several hours; then he would have to give them up or get new ones; or he might also be sent to a different scene." Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 128.
[28] Id. "...[H]is success fostered their conviction that he was a lucky general." D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 324.
[29] This groundbreaking view of the RussoGerman war post-1941 is thoroughly developed in Bartov, Omer, Hitler's Army, New York, 1991. With the destruction of much of the Wehrmacht's armor in the 1941 campaign, and the concentration of most of its remaining air and armor assets in the south for the 1942 summer offensive, the German Army in the northern and central sectors of the Eastern Front at the time resembled a 1914-1918 army. Indeed, 9 Army itself had lost units to the needs of Fall Blau in the south, a fact noted by the Soviets in choosing its sector as a target for their 1942 offensive operations. Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 93.
[30] For a full discussion of the operations of "Cavalry Brigade Model" in Operation Seydlitz, see Newton, German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, pp. 137-149. Note that Model planned the operation but did not actually lead it, as he was still in the hospital.
[31] Operation Mars (25 November-15 December) has generally been overlooked by historians, mostly because the Soviets threw a shroud of secrecy over it in their post-war writings. Soviet casualties were appalling (estimates of over 200,000 dead), and their great offensive was literally stopped in its tracks by Model and 9 Army. Col. David M. Glantz has, using recently available Soviet sources, explored this battle in depth in Glantz, David, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, Lawrence, 1999. Zhukov, who purportedly "never lost a battle," was badly beaten by Walther Model in the swampy forests west of Moscow. See also Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, pp. 130-134.
[32] Hitler, increasingly aware of the crisis developing around Stalingrad, told Model to "hold at all costs" because, if successful, the Mars offensive would threaten Berlin itself. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 2, 281.
[33] Id., pp. 34, 35. Prior to the commencement of Mars Model once again displayed the personal effort which so marked him as a "hands on" commander. "He passed new information to his commanders, personally inspected defensive dispositions, checked counter-attack plans, provided needed support, and demonstrated an essential command presence on the potential field of battle." Id., p. 72.
[34] Id., p. 282. His troops had full confidence in their leader, however, for "[Elverybody knew that where Model was in command the good fortune of war was present: the most daring enterprises came off and the most critical situations were retrieved." Carrell, Hitler Moves East, p. 349 (speaking of his troops' mood during the Rzhev battles).
[35] Model's first professional mentor was Lt. General Friedrich von Lossberg, an outstanding defensive specialist of the First World War. D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 321.
[36] Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 95.
[37] Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 146.
[38] Id., p. 148.
[39] On 28 April Model met with Hitler and argued that he lacked both men and armor for the coming offensive. He strongly advised that the Fiihrer should cancel the attack, and instead wait for the Soviet summer offensive and then launch a counteroffensive with the mighty armored forces the Germans had accumulated. Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, Operation Citadel, Novato, 1987, p. 89.
[40] Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 307. See also Perrett, Bryan, Knights of the Black Cross, New York, 1986, p. 170. Model's opinions were undercut somewhat by his superior, Field Marshal von Kluge (CinC of Army Group Center), who when asked for his views replied that Model's estimates of Soviet strength were "exaggerated." Von Kluge probably knew better, but (speculatively) was quite possibly mortified by the credence Hitler gave to the views of von Kluge's subordinate, Model. Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel, p. 92; Glantz, David, and House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, Lawrence, 1999, p. 2.
[41] Note that Model has been blamed for the fatal postponement of Citadel. Hart, B. Liddell, The German Generals Talk, New York, 1979, p. 69. However, Model's arguments to Hitler of April 28 certainly did not advocate a delay to July 5 (emphasis added)!
[42] Model went on leave in early June, returning June 11. Upon his return 9 Army's combat diary reported, "After the return of the commander, a wave of work poured over the entire army area of operations." Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 150.
[43] Cross, Robin, Operation Citadel, London, 1993, p. 152; this contrasted with the tactics of von Manstein in the south, who planned to lead with his tanks. Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel, p. 141.
[44] Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, pp. 154-160; Perrett, Knights of the Black Cross, pp. 170-174. Model's forces advanced only some 16 km.
[45] Orel fell on 4 August, but not before Model had evacuated 20,000 wounded and 53,000 tons of supplies. Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, pp. 95-97.
[46] Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel, pp. 244-248; Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 318; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, pp. 235-238. "Model's appointment signalized the emergence of a new type of German high commander - the specialist in stubborn defense.. ..After the summer of 1943 he [Hitler] came more and more to rely on Model and a few others because they seldom disputed his orders and because they appeared to have a knack for staving off catastrophe. Model was the best and most successful of this type .... In combat he spared neither himself nor his subordinates." Ziemke, Earle, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 138, 139.
[47] The Fiihrer also was rapidly sending troops to the West, as the Allies had just landed in Sicily. Army Group South lost II SS Panzerkorps for this purpose, and von Kluge's Army Group Center lost several divisions as well. Id.
[48] The withdrawal operation was very tough on the local civilians. Model used Russian laborers to help prepare the 'Hagen' position, and brought 250,000 civilians out with the retreating armies. The areas evacuated (and the year's harvest) were destroyed to every extent possible. Id., p. 141; Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 318. Perhaps this was one reason for his place on the Soviets' list of war criminals.
[49] Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 170.
[50] Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 319.
[51] Warlimont, Walter, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, Novato, 1964, p. 453. This image of the hard, lonely leader was Brillowoantly created and embellished by Nazi film propaganda. See, e.g., "Inside Enemy Eyes," a video series of wartime-era German newsreels reproduced by International Historic Films, Inc., Chicago, Illinois, vols. 5 and 49. "I am, however, not one who will ever haul in the flag. I never learned that." Adolf Hitler - speech of 30 January, 1940, at the Berlin Sportpalast.
[52] "[I] n spite of his [Model's] leanings toward the Nazi party, he never became what one might call a political soldier." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 158. Hitler greatly admired the steadfastness exhibited by Frederick the Great during the darkest days of the Seven Years War, and once observed, "Military qualities don't show themselves in an exercise on a sand model. In the last analysis, they show themselves in the capacity to hold on, in perseverance and determination. That's the decisive factor in any victory. Genius is a `will of the wisp' unless it is founded on perseverance and fanatical determination." Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 499.
[53] Hitler had to deal with a body of higher officers whom he mistrusted collectively and, for the most part, disliked individually. This poisonous situation degenerated further in November, 1943 - he now wanted men unhampered by scruples, who got things done by hook or crook. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 211.
[54] Arguing against the projected Ardennes offensive at a Fuhrer conference on 2 December, 1944, "Model was, as always, well prepared .... He had a great day. Everyone in the large conference hall had to acknowledge his ability as he delivered his masterly summary. Even Hitler failed to interrupt him, and was visibly impressed. Model expressed his point of view with complete frankness and great force." Hasso von Manteuffel, "The Ardennes," in Frieden, Seymour, and Richardson, William (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, New York, 1956, p. 238 - quoting conference participant General Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of 5 Panzer Army.
[55] "It seems an open question whether Model supported Hitler out of personal allegiance or to further his own ambitions." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 158. This from von Mcllenthin, who spent significant time with Model in the last few months of the war and thus had the opportunity to form a firmer opinion had he been able. We know that Hitler had specified in 1943 that generals who were to be promoted were to be those "who exude confidence" and "who have positive inner convictions favoring the National Socialist Weltanschauung." Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 212.
[56] Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 210. The millions of Germans who found steady employment in the rearmament program presumably appreciated the policy as well.
[57] Model, unlike many senior Wehrmacht commanders, had relatively good relations with the Waffen SS. In the `First' Battle of Rzhev, the Der Fuhrer regiment of the Das Reich SS Division was the centerpiece of his defensive line, losing more that 98% of its strength in Model's great victory. Lucas, War on the Eastern Front, p. 39. During the Battle of Arnhem in September, 1944, Model's professional relations with General Bittrich's II SS Panzerkorps HQ were quite good. Does this indicate allegiance to National Socialism, or is this the attraction good troops have to a fighting general, and vice versa?
[58] Both von Mellenthin and Speidel have identified this appointment as being indicative of Model's leanings (or kowtowing) toward the Nazi Party. Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 148. (This caused his fellow officers to lose "some of their confidence in him." Id.); Speidel, Hans, Invasion 1944, New York, 1972, p. 138. Actually, the reason for the controversial appointment was quite simple. When Model took over Army Group North in the beginning of January, 1944, he requested a personal adjutant from the Army Personnel Office. His request was denied for the totally specious reason that there were no `personal' staff for commanders of army groups. Furious, he publicly complained of this treatment while at Fuhrer HQ and was overheard by Himmler. The Gestapo chief, never one to miss an opportunity to expand his web of influence, immediately offered Model one of his SS officers, an offer which Model immediately accepted. Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 211. Speidel also pointed to Model's request that a National Socialist Leadership Officer be attached to Army Group B in the West (when Model assumed command of that Army Group in August, 1944) as being a further "symptom" of Model's attempts to garner favor with the political leadership. Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 138.
[59] Shulman, Milton, Defeat in the West, New York, 1948, p. 170.
[60] Fritz, Stephen, Frontsoldaten, Lexington, 1995, p. 216.
[61] General Gunther Blumentritt, interviewing with Liddell Hart after the war, said of von Manstein: "He was not only the most Brillowoant strategist of our generals, but he had good political sense. A man of that quality was too difficult for Hitler to swallow for long. At conferences Manstein often differed from Hitler in front of others, and would go as far as to declare that some of the ideas put forth by Hitler were nonsense." Hart, B. Liddell, The Other Side of the Hill, London, 1948, p. 148.
[62] Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 257.
[63] "General Model, who spent most of his time forward with the fighting troops, personally led the attack [a counterattack on 31 January] forward and saved the situation once more." Haupt, Werner, Army Group North - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, Atglen, p. 207. See also Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943, pp. 352, 357: - (in the Rzhev battles) he would spend about one hour with maps and ten hours with the troops. For the latter, he was like a `battery recharges.' The regiments seemed to gain strength whenever he would appear, by jeep, horseback, tracked motorcycle or Fieseler Storch.
[64] Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 319.
[65] Haupt, Army Group North - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-1945, p. 205. In the crisis, "Model had never had a greater opportunity to display his talent as an improviser, and he took it with a flamboyant zest which, though it did not change the tactical situation, quickly dispelled the sense of hopelessness and frustration that had been hanging over the army group. He also had the advantage of Hitler's tendencies to give new appointees, particularly when they were his favorites, greater latitude, at least temporarily, than he had allowed their predecessors." Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 258.
[66] Zaloga, Steven, Bagration 1944, London, 1996, p. 15.
[67] For example, throughout his defense of the Orel bulge in the latter part of July, 1943. Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel, p. 251. Model
was not afraid to argue tactical situations with the dictator, and did so frequently. Hitler sometimes "valued Model's straightforwardness and respect for the truth." Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 214. However, unlike von Manstein, Guderian and others of similar professional courage, Model seemed to place less emphasis on winning the arguments than on `getting the job done.'
[68] Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, pp. 258, 259. Note that sometimes there was no intention to thrust; this deception by Model was the expedient he selected to obtain tactical freedom of action from the dictator. Model was "well enough acquainted with Hitler to know that it was always advantageous to make a retreat look like the first stage of an advance." Id., p. 258.
[69] This pronouncement was purely psychological; Model recognized quickly that withdrawal to the `Panther' line was the correct prescription for the Army Group's desperate situation.
[70] For a description of III SS Panzerkorps' defense of northern Estonia at Narva from 13 February to mid-July, see Pat McTaggart, "Bloody Standoff at the Narva Bridgehead," in World War II magazine, July, 1999.
[71] Model's operational masterpiece is described in Newton, Steven, Retreat From Leningrad, Atglen, 1995, pp. 39-80, and Haupt, Army Group North - The Wehrmacht in Russia 19411945, pp. 207-214.
[72] Newton, Retreat From Leningrad, p. 119.
[73] Model at this time displayed a character fault remarked upon by several commentators. With the front of Army Group North stabilized along the `Panther' line, Model was drafting a report to OKH detailing that two divisions could be transferred from the Army Group for employment with Army Group South. When he heard of his appointment as C in C Army Group North Ukraine, however, he revised the report to specify that six divisions (including a panzer division) were available for transfer. Only the intervention of General Zeitzler, chief of OKH, prevented this emasculation of Army Group North following the transfer of its commander. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, pp. 159, 265, 266; Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 320.
[74] Stahlberg, Alexander, Bounden Duty, Oxford, 1990, p. 339. Model's career "...displayed an impulsive dash and unyielding determination to carry out orders, at whatever cost, which marked him as the kind of officer Hitler wanted... Model belonged to that growing group of commanders - Rommel, Dietrich, Student, Hausser were others - who might truly be called "Hitler's Generals," in that they had achieved prominence by winning the confidence of the Fuhrer rather than that of the officer corps." Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 171.
[75] The bulk of identified Soviet armor was in the Army Group's sector, and the Germans felt that a successful Soviet drive into Poland and then north toward the Baltic would outflank and thus force the withdrawal of Army Groups North and Center. German strategic assessments were very well reasoned, but in the event they were completely incorrect. For a synopsis of these assessments, see "Bagration - Study of the Destruction of Army Group Centre during the Summer of 1944 as Seen From the Point of View of Military Intelligence," in 1985 Art of War Symposium, 29 April - 3 May 1985, Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, p. 245.
[76] Model specified the following principles to his Army Group: "Forward lines are to be held at all costs, artillery and armor are to be disposed in the rear along a defensive line showing no gaps; if the enemy breaks through he must meet with obstacles everywhere." Von Mellenthin, EW, The 48 Panzer Corps: November 1942 to July 1944, Germantown, 1994, p. 71. These orders were very irritating to the XLVIII Panzerkorps' commander, the highly competent General Hermann Balck, and one wonders whether Model actually intended them only for the Fuhrer's consumption.
[77] Zaloga, Bagration 1944, p. 22; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 314.
[78] Busch had performed well as commander of 16 Army on the Leningrad front, but was wholly out of his depth as an Army Group commander. A loyal National Socialist, he was well aware of Hitler's antipathy to generals who consistently demanded withdrawals and reinforcements. Indeed, in an incident occurring a month before the opening of Bagration, he had been advising Hitler that his Army commanders were reporting Soviet activity to their front and were advocating a tactical retreat from the front line trenches. Hitler stung Busch by saying that he [Hitler] had only just realized that the Field Marshal "was yet another of those generals who spent their whole time looking over their shoulder." Adair, Paul, Hitler's Greatest Defeat, London, 1994, p. 136. The Field Marshal dropped his arguments. His senior staff officer, Col. Groeben, recollected, "I was present at some of the discussions in which he [Busch] attempted to dissuade Hitler from a particular course of action. If he failed, he considered himself committed to carrying out the decision. He often said to me: 'Groeben, I am a soldier. I have learned to obey.' " Id., p. 62.
[79] The Feste Platze were seriously understrength, and had received only the barest minimum of defensive fortification. The units left behind in them had no chance, and their destruction contributed to the enormous gaps being torn in the Army Group's front. Hitler's theory that the `fortified places' would be relieved by timely counterstrokes was a pipe-dream. Seaton, Albert The Russo-German War, Novato, 1971, pp. 438, 439; Zaloga, Bagration 1944, p. 16; Niepold, Gerd, Battle for White Russia, McLean, 1989, pp. 266, 267.
[80] Hitler had already ordered the transfer of several divisions to the Army Group, including 5 Panzer Division from Army Group North Ukraine. The Fiihrer then issued his Operations Order No. 8, which was signed by Field Marshal Busch: "What I now expect [after the unit transfers] of the Army Group is, however, that no yard of ground shall be given up without fighting for it, and that every commander and man in the Army Group shall have instilled in him the iron will to hold firm." Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat, p. 182. Being in this frame of mind, it is unsurprising that the Fuhrer turned to Model. Himmler helpfully chirped in: "In my view the Army Group's command [under Field Marshal Busch] was too soft and war weary." Id., p. 136.
[81] Id., pp. 119, 136; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 324. Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 148. Model performed his role as troop transfer facilitator almost too well; when the Soviets finally launched the expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine on 14 July, the Army Group's reserves (3 panzer and 2 infantry divisions) had already been picked clean and sent north.
[82] Guderian felt that Model was "the best possible man to perform the fantastically difficult task of reconstructing a line in the center of the Eastern Front." Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 336.
[83] General Jordan, Commander of the ruined 9 Army, wrote bleakly in the Army's War Diary: "It is a bitter pill to swallow though, when one feels that, behind these Army Group instructions which so utterly ignore one's own pressing suggestions, and behind the answers given by the Field Marshal and his Chief of Staff, one can see no sign of a commander showing any purposeful will to do his utmost, but just the execution of orders whose basis has long since been overtaken by events." Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat, p. 117. In contrast, the entry in 9 Army's War Diary for 29 June was, "The news of Field Marshal Model's arrival is noted with satisfaction and confidence." Id., p. 118. Model must have been conscious of the basic leadership principles he had been taught in the 1930's as a rising General Staff officer: "The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgment, with clear view and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders." Condell, Bruce, and Zabecki, David T (eds. and trans.), On the German Art of War -Truppenfuhrung, Boulder, 2001, pp. 17-18 (precept #6).
[84] There was no mitigating the disaster. By 29 June, twenty-eight of Army Group Center's thirty-seven divisions were either cut off or destroyed. Mitcham, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 321. Model met that day with Generals Zeitzler and Lindemann (then CinC of Army Group North) and obtained the transfer of two divisions each from Army Groups North and North Ukraine. Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 149. On 30 June Hitler demanded an attack be made southeast from Polotsk by two divisions of Army Group North in an attempt to relieve the pressure on 3 Panzer Army. Lindemann appealed to Model, who agreed the attack would be too weak and then convinced Hitler not to try it. Newton, Retreat From Leningrad, p. 191.
[85] Carrell, Paul, Scorched Earth, London, 1970, p. 505.
[86] Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 98. "That was Model's method. He stopped the most dangerous holes, stiffened the collapsing front, and constantly moved around his units, encouraging, intervening, and even leading them into battle... " Carrell, Scorched Earth, p. 505. See also von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 151. Mellenthin here credits Model for these tactics, praising him for halting the Soviet summer offensive.
[87] Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat, p. 150. "Army Group's main problem ... was to get troops to the points which were critical for keeping the lines of retreat open, in good time and regardless of the local consequences. In this way it would at the same time conserve its operational freedom of maneuver." Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 192. Niepold was G-3 of 12 Panzer Division, which was immersed in the fighting as a sort of `fire brigade' for 9 Army.
[88] "The attacks of smaller battle groups into the sides of the marching or stationary columns of the enemy attack troops had considerable effect. The danger of cutting supply lines led, as a rule, to the immediate halting of the lead attacking enemy elements and the deployment of additional forces,..." Hinze, Rolf, East Front Drama-1944, Winnipeg, 1996, p. 141. No less an adversary than Marshal Zhukov acknowledged the operational efficacy of Model's methods: "I must admit that Headquarters Army Group Center hit upon the right technique to deal with this absolutely critical situation. Since the Germans had no continuous defensive front any more and lacked the forces to establish a new one, the German High Command decided to check our troops' offensive with short counterpunches. Under cover of these, they rushed in troops from Germany and from other sectors of their Eastern Front to take up defensive positions in depth." Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 272.
[89] Rumor had it that the captured Field Marshal von Paulus was teaching this method to Soviet general officers at the Red Army's Frunze Academy. Hinze, East Front Drama-1944 pp.
140, 141. The absence of German reserves meant that Army Group leadership had to hold along the whole front, and wait for every attack and its schwerpunkt to be established, before troops could be released to the threatened sectors.
[90] Fester Platz Vitebsk fell on 27 June with 35,000 men, and Bobruisk on 30 June. Another 70,000 encircled soldiers of 4 and 9 Armies surrendered on 3 July, the day Minsk fell. For further discussion of the course of the fighting in this period, see Seaton, The Russo-German War, pp. 439-442.
[91] "Army Group Center was forced to prevent deep penetration of its broken front by withdrawing its forces in good time to safeguard them against encirclement. The broad aim was to strengthen the defense by feeding in new divisions as the withdrawal progressed, and eventually to stabilize the front somewhere in depth." Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 223.
[92] Id., p. 257.
[93] In this `disobedience' he was actively joined by Colonel-General Reinhardt, Model's predecessor as leader of XLI Panzerkorps and now commander of 3 Panzer Army.
[94] An admiring General Niepold, who as G3 of 12 Panzer Division had personally survived the horrors of Bagration, wrote: "It is hard to understand the way Hitler gave way to Field Marshal Model's pressing advice and demands, albeit ... hesitantly, grudgingly and mostly too late. Those who said that Model was one of the very few top-level commanders in whom Hitler still had some degree of confidence must have been right." Id., p. 203.
[95] "Although he had been schooled in strategy, he could not free himself of the details of tactical leadership...." Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 130. Model, "although a soldier of great driving power and energy, ..could hardly be regarded as an adequate substitute for Manstein. In particular Model was too prone to interfere in matters of detail and to tell his corps and army commanders exactly where they should dispose their troops." Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 281. Von Mellenthin's mentor, the renowned panzer commander General Hermann Balck, "found this very irritating." Id. Model "kept up a display of energy as he toured the battle area, livening up his divisions and often leaving a trail of disorder behind him, losing some of the confidence and respect of his subordinate commanders by a wanton interference in details which were not his concern." Seaton, The Russo-German War, p. 444. Contra Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 271 - "Field Marshal Model was a past master of this kind of operation. Always present in person at the critical point, he conducted the defense in a way that was at one and the same time ruthless, harsh and risky - and Brillowoant. He pulled groups - sometimes just a battalion - out of less threatened sectors to plug holes elsewhere, or to carry out a short counter-attack and thus create the opportunity for back-up action on a larger scale. This maintained the coherence of the front and prevented the Army Group being broken through again. The breaking up and mixing of formations that resulted was the lesser evil by far" (emphasis added).
[96] "[I]n the face of the Russian offensive he
clearly adopted the correct tactics and his eye for detail, his efficiency and hard work surely contributed to his military efficacy." Chant, Christopher (ed.), Hitler's Generals and Their Battles, New York, 1976, p. 176. "Model knew that the soldier fought best in his group and that separation of the unity of commander and his troops was difficult. However, often the dangerousness of the situation compelled the commitment of units where they happened to be at that time. Intuitively, Model anticipated the enemy's options and undertook the necessary long-range measures. The skillful, timely siphoning of troops from non-active sectors - he surveyed all sectors simultaneously - and the insertion of them into favorable strong points was the secret to his defensive success." Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, p. 289, quoting from Grossman, H., Rzhev: The Cornerstone of the Eastern Front, 1980.
[97] "His administrative capacity was not respected by his junior officers, and amongst them the expression `to Model' was sarcastically used to describe a state of hopeless confusion, while `to de-Model' was to sort things out again." Shulman, Defeat in the West, pp. 171-172. However, an officer attacking the Americans outside of Nijmegen during Market-Garden recalled, "[H]e was always feared, because he constantly demanded precise reports over the situation...." Robert Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, Ramsbury, 1990, p. 123.
[98] "Both commanders-in-chief (Model and General von Tippelskirch, Commander of 4 Army) tried again and again to put battalions, and in particular tank companies, of our division under the command of other divisions. This was strongly opposed by our 5 Panzer Division Headquarters. In an extremely short time these units were completely ruined due to the lack of knowledge of the principles of operations and the lack of any logistical support (supply and maintenance)." General von Plato's speech on "Defensive Combat of 5 Panzer Division, 1985 Art of War Symposium, p. 410. Perhaps the text's comments are too harsh; divisional headquarters are naturally jealous of the integrity of their formations, and are taught to be so by professional textbooks. But 5 Panzer Division, east and northeast of Minsk, would have been swallowed whole by the Soviet flood if employed as a full division. By dividing it into `penny packets,' Model gave the local infantry divisions the opportunity to strike the Soviet spearheads with a little armor and thereby force them to deploy, creating a `breathing space' which the infantry could then use to escape westwards.
[99] "Model ... was no novice at dealing out punishing counterblows." Erickson, John, The Road to Berlin, Boulder, 1983, p. 271. For example, he counterattacked Soviet units crossing the Bug River on 23 July with 5 SS Panzer and 4 Panzer Divisions, and pushed them back. The Soviets were driving the Army Group's right flank on 4 August when he hit them again. He personally supervised the destruction of a Soviet tank corps just to the east of Warsaw on 11 August by the Hermann Goering, 5 SS, 4 and 19 Panzer Divisions. Hinze, East Front Drama-1944, pp. 306-3 10; Haupt, Army Group Center - The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-45, p. 204.
[100] Elstob, Peter, Hitler's Last Offensive, London, 1971, p. 33. Goebbel's press began to make Model a "media darling" about this time. Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 151.
[101] Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 450-455. Field Marshal von Kluge's 18 August suicide letter to Hitler recited the reasons for the catastrophe, and said of the commanders in the West: "We were not listened to. Our appreciations were NOT (bold in the original) dictated by pessimism, but from the sober knowledge of the facts. I do not know whether Field Marshal Model, who has been proved in every sphere, will still master the situation. From my heart I hope so." Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 154.
[102] Hitler was sending other generals west who had demonstrated an ability to fight, commanders such as Dietrich, Hausser and von Manteuffel. Given Hitler's (in hindsight clearly justified) suspicions of the political loyalty of certain of the Western commanders and members of their staffs, he also made sure the new commanders all had the requisite National Socialist Weltanshauung. Hitler knew Model "was a master of improvisation and defensive strategy and if anyone could stabilize the crumbling Western Front, Hitler was sure Field Marshal Model was the man,..." Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive, p. 33.
[103] Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 19.
[104] "... [He] was hurriedly briefed in the head
quarters and then dispatched westwards to make the impossible possible once more." Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 456.
[105] "He began his work, just as von Kluge had done on July 5, with preconceived notions and accusations against his new staff and the army commanders." Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 131. Speidel also noted in frustration that Model, "... would not hear of independent strategic decisions in the West,..." ...[Model] would "remind them [the staff] of the trials that followed the mutiny of July 20." Id., pp. 131, 138. Exasperated, Speidel complained, "No decisions of basic political or military importance could be expected from this commander." Id.
Note Speidel's use of the "buzz" words, "independent strategic decisions." Apparently, this meant negotiating a cease-fire with the Western Allies. "Accusations" probably refers to defeatism, or worse. Model had just come from a briefing at Fuhrer HQ where no doubt these issues were the subject of much discussion. As far as decisions of "basic ... military importance," Model's immediate orders, issued without the permission of Fuhrer HQ, for the army to break out of the Falaise Pocket and retire beyond the Seine, would seem to meet that description. Speidel himself was arrested on 7 September on Himmler's orders, and spent the rest of the war in various Gestapo prisons. Id., p. 137. Speidel's courage was exemplary, and his loyalty to Germany unquestionable.
[106] General Bodo Zimmerman, Operations Chief at OB West, noted that with Model in charge "staff work suffered under his too-frequent absences and erratic, inconsistent demands." Zimmerman's boss General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of OB West, stated, "We rarely saw him. Model hated paper work and spent most of his time in the field." Ryan, Cornelius, A Bridge Too Far, New York, 1974, p. 45, fn. As we have seen, these criticisms of Model's methods are too consistent to be untrue, although one might argue that the last thing the western German army needed in the waning days of August, 1944, was tidy staff work.
[107] The successive disasters in France were met by repeated 'stand-fast' orders by Hitler, but "all were overtaken by the rush of events or simply disregarded by Model who, being sure of Hitler's confidence, felt he could exercise some freedom of initiative." Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 467. Orders from Berlin were always `hold, hold, hold.' "Since it was impossible to carry out this order, we advised units to report any retreat they were forced to make in the following words, `Thrown back or fought back. Countersteps are being taken.' " Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 174 (quoting General Blumentritt, Model's Chief of Staff at OB West). In dealing with Hitler, "...Model avoided making too many requests; he either came up with forceful proposals or simply reported what he had already done." Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 272.
[108] General Bodo Zimmerman, "France, 1944," in Frieden and Richardson (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, p. 214. In his usual biting way Model took the opportunity to chastise yet another intelligent officer, who in turn had lots to say about Model to U.S. Army historians after the war. General Fritz Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, told Model that now that his division was behind the Seine it needed to be pulled out for a rest. Model responded, "My dear Bayerlein, in the East our divisions take their rest in the front line. And that is how things are going to be done here in the future. You will stay with your formations where you are." D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 326.
[109] Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 134. Hitler then wanted to hit the city with V- bombs and artillery, but Speidel did not pass these orders down. Id., pp. 134, 135. Model was certainly ruthless; he had blown up the entire Polish town of Kovel earlier in the summer to help stop the Soviets short of Warsaw, and no doubt would have flattened Paris had he had the chance. He is reputed to have told von Choltitz not to worry, that what had taken 40 minutes to do with Kovel would take 40 hours with Paris, but could certainly be done. See Parker, Battle of the Bulge, p. 35.
[110] OB West's headquarters at Soissons, and Army Group B's headquarters at La Roche Guyon, were sixty miles apart. The workload was too much to be handled by one man, and Model twice asked Hitler for relief from the dual appointment. Blumentritt, Gunther, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man, London, 1952, p. 242; Zimmerman, "France, 1944," in Frieden and Richardson (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, p. 216.; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 45, fn.
[111] This was a serious problem. Army Group G, which was retreating from Southern France as a result of the Allies' "Anvil" and "Dragoon" landings, was under OB West's purview, as was responsibility for coordinating Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine activity with the Wehrmacht in the West. Model was far too busy trying to reestablish a defensive front with the remnants of Army Group B to oversee these important functions. Id., p. 43.
[112] Zimmerman, "France, 1944," in Frieden and Richardson (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, p. 216. "The reader should know that hitherto any mention of the West Wall had been absolutely taboo... .Nobody had yet dared to make such a proposal to Hitler, but Model's outspoken message broke the spell." Id. Grudgingly, Hitler permitted a withdrawal, but not all the way to the West Wall.
[113] Blumentritt begged OKW to recall Field Marshal von Rundstedt to OB West, and Hitler, after checking with Model, agreed. Model was delighted. Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian, New York, 1991, p. 203. "Normally temperamental and ambitious, Model reacted calmly to this occasion. He was more aware of his shortcomings as an administrator than his critics believed." Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 45.
[114] General Zimmerman at OB West recalled von Rundstedt's reappointment, and noted that "all we staffers were heartily glad to see him back." Zimmerman, "France, 1944," in Frieden and Richardson (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, p. 217. The pigeons had survived the cat.
[115] Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive, p. 49.
[116] "...Field Marshal Model took charge with an iron hand, and managed to effect a substantial regrouping of units in southern Belgium and Holland." Goerlitz, Walter, The German General Staff New York, p. 480. The Fiihrer thought highly of his `Fireman': in discussing the overall situation with his headquarters cronies at the end of August, 1944, he noted, "It's been my particular job ever since 1941 never to lose my nerve and whenever something collapses always to find ways and means of patching it up somehow. I must say no greater crisis than the one we've had this year in the East could be imagined. When Field Marshal Model arrived Army Group Center was nothing but a yawning gap. It was more of a gap than a front and finally it became more of a front than a gap...." Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 452.
[117] Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 218; McKee, Alexander, The Race for the Rhine Bridges, New York, 1971, p. 122. Model's assumption about the paratroopers' objective, so falsely dramatized in the famous movie "A Bridge Too Far" as being ridiculous, was not unreasonable (emphasis added). If the objective of the paratroopers was to take the Arnhem bridge (and remember he did not then know their strength), why did they land seven miles away from the bridge?
[118] The veteran SS general commanded divisions which in the not too distant past had extensively practiced reactions to parachute landings. Within an hour, and in the absence of Model, Bittrich issued expert orders to his two panzer divisions in response to the Allies' parachute drops. Tieke, Wilhelm, In The Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, Winnipeg, 1999, pp. 231-233. There is no doubt Model was surprised somewhat by the landings on an operational level; he did not think the Allies would use their crack airborne divisions so aggressively or that the normally cautious Montgomery would be the general to lead them. Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 154. "Rundstedt was glad that the resourceful and energetic Model, always calm in a crisis, was so close to the threatened area." Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man, p. 256.
[119] Their detailed plans for the reaction went out at 2315 hours that night, only ten hours after the landings began. The reaction planning was not, however, particularly facilitated by the Germans' early capture of a set of plans for a large portion of the Allied offensive. Model simply did not believe the intelligence prize he had been handed, and just sent it on to Berlin without sharing it with Bittrich or OB West. If the objectives outlined in the plans were accurate, he reasoned, then why did the British drop so far from the Arnhem bridge? Nevertheless, he told Col. Harzer, commander of 9 SS Panzer Division, about them. Harzer recalled: "Model was always prepared for the worst, so he did not discount it entirely. As he told me, he had no intention of being caught by the short hairs." Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 283, 284.
[120] Model followed his old recipe of, "Attack, regain the initiative, impose your will on the enemy." Carrell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943, p. 353. "Model's presence did much to facilitate the rapid buildup of German forces around Arnhem which quickly contained the Oosterbeek pocket. In order to speed up the passage of reinforcements and logistic support Model approved a direct command interface between Harzer's 9 SS Division HQ and Army Group B." Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 228. "Generalfeldmarschall Model showed up daily at the Kampfgruppe 9 SS Panzer Division command post. His dash and dynamic personality carried everyone along with him. He was at the front and uncomplicated. For every action he required two or three plans so that if one proved unsuccessful, another would already be there to replace it." Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, p. 247.
[121] McKee, The Race For The Rhine Bridges, p. 158.
[122] Id., p. 217; Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 379, 452, 453. Model saw Market-Garden not just as an operational crisis to be surmounted, but rather as an opportunity to cut up a British corps and a couple of Allied airborne divisions. He concentrated his attacks on the bridges supplying the Allies' land-corridor, going for their logistical jugular. Id., pp. 533, 534.
[123] The Americans called the Huertgen Forest
the Death Factory.' The horrendous fighting there lasted from 19 September - 28 November; both sides were bled white. Kessler, The Battle For the Ruhr Pocket, p. 4.
[124] Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 216. Responding to the Aachen commandant's request for permission to break out when the situation had become hopeless, Model ordered, "Fight to the last bullet, let yourself be buried in the ruins!" Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 18. No doubt these thrilling words were well received in Fiihrer headquarters; moreover, there is no evidence that, unlike the case with many less `hard-core' German commanders, Model did not mean them seriously.
[125] Eisenhower,