Walther Model was not a 'victorious' general, in the sense that von Manstein, Rommel and Guderian were in the heady days of Nazi Germany's early victories. Instead, he gained his reputation by being the unquestioned master of the defensive battle, often against hopeless odds. [156] As the most eminent German field commander, Field Marshal von Manstein, wrote, "Model never gained his laurels for success in any bold set-piece operation. He had become more and more the man Hitler sent to restore the situation on a threatened or tottering front, and in such situations he achieved extraordinary success." [157] Despite his curt manner and zero tolerance for excuses, "Model never lost sight of the practical problems of the men who must actually lead the troops nor the needs of the troops themselves." [158] He was a soldier's soldier, completely devoted to the profession of arms. During his long career Model had the opportunity to demonstrate his leadership skills in virtually every area and at every level of the military craft. As a junior combat officer in World War I, he won the Iron Cross, First and Second Class, for bravery, and was wounded in battle three times. Without a traditional military background or political connections, he received coveted appointments to the General Staff, where his excellent performance and grasp of new technical concepts earned him repeated promotion and enhanced responsibilities. He succeeded admirably in both battalion and regimental command, and performed well in operational staff assignments in first the Polish, and then the French campaigns. As a panzer division commander, his dynamic success in the 1941 Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was unmatched. Moving upward to command of a Panzerkorps, he again demonstrated great skill, both offensively and defensively, in the exceedingly difficult operational situation of late 1941. As an Army commander, his successftil defense of the Rzhev Salient throughout 1942 against the best leaders and repeated hammer blows of the Red Army brought him Wehrmacht-wide acclaim. While he failed at Kursk, so did all the other senior German generals employed there, unable as they were to overcome Hitler's repeated delays of the offensive and the Soviets' massive defensive buildup. Yet he proved to be a past master of the strategic defensive withdrawal, as demonstrated in Operation Buffalo, the strategic withdrawals to the Hagen position and the Panther line, and the desperate defense by Army Group Center against Bagration. In the West, he retrieved the broken Western Army from the Falaise disaster, and subsequently inflicted heavy operational defeats on the Allies in both Market-Garden and the Huertgen Forest. By the time of the Bulge and the Ruhr Pocket, successful large-scale operations were no longer possible. Given this outstanding record of military leadership, we should tread slowly in judging harshly the personal and professional reputation of Walther Model. [159] As is the case with evaluating any historical figure, we should carefully examine the primary and secondary sources available before reaching conclusions, being sure always to probe the biases and motivations of the authors. Model did not survive the war, so we have no self-serving autobiography embellishing his successes and blaming others for his failures. His personal papers were burned on his own orders, and we have no full-length biography of him available in English. Primary sources which we do have are often anecdotal, and are usually short compilations of recollections, impressions and judgments of his peers, which in turn are regurgitated over and over in the secondary sources. By illustration, it may be useful to pursue the historiographical basis for Model's professional reputation of being impulsive, rash, erratic and detail-obsessed. [160] This judgment of history may be true, or it may not be: certainly the cool and determined manner by which Model overcame the strategic crises afflicting Army Groups North and Center in 1944 would seem to vitiate its accuracy. One should remember that Speidel, von Mellenthin, Blumentritt, Zimmerman, and Stahlberg were staff officers, operating from perspectives vastly different than that of a Field Marshal responsible for hundreds of thousands of men and in daily contact with the outrageously 'pig-headed' Fuhrer. [161] Speidel hated the National Socialist regime and venerated his boss Erwin Rommel; his Invasion 1944 testifies to this and, unsurprisingly, his disgust with the vigorously apolitical Model shines through it. Von Mellenthin is a key primary source to virtually all secondary sources, but one should remember that von Mellenthin in turn honored his own boss, the skilled panzer general Hermann Balck, who found Model's methods 'very irritating.' Von Mellenthin was also writing for a popular Western audience which at the time, although very eager to see the 'view from the other side,' had also been thoroughly schooled in and therefore was receptive to the German generals' desired conception that Hitler's role in the conduct of the war had been entirely detrimental to the work of the General Staff General Westphal, another staff officer, was great friends with von Mellenthin, and like Generals Blumentritt and Zimmerman thought very highly of Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who in turn disdained Model's non-aristocratic background, loyalty to the political regime, and quick rise to Field Marshal, and who also lived long enough to discuss his own views of the war, the Fuhrer and the Fireman with Liddell Hart. [162] Stahlberg worshipped his boss, Field Marshal von Manstein, and viscerally believed, as did his boss, that if only von Manstein had been given full command in the East the Soviets would never have gotten to the Reich's frontiers. Are we surprised then, when their respective views of Model follow a pattern? If we select the correct paradigm by which to view Model, however, it may perhaps be possible to reconcile these views with the often favorable perspectives of his professional prowess which we garner from the recollections of veteran combat leaders like Bittrich, Niepold, von Manteuffel and Guclerian. The paradigm is that Model's actions were governed, at almost all times, by the harsh demands of expedience. [163] If victory (or continued successful armed resistance) could be attained by ignoring the dictates of the Fuhrer, Model would do so. If good relations with, or at least decreased meddling by, the political leadership could be obtained by appointing a National Socialist Leadership Officer to the staff of Army Group B, he was willing to try. [164] If Model believed that the trust and devotion of the fighting troops could be won by occasionally abusing his subordinate officers, he would not hesitate. [165] If personal intervention by the Field Marshal were needed at the battalion level to overcome a local crisis, it was simply too bad if this offended the responsible staff officers or increased their workloads. If Model had to temper his religious convictions and put up with a vile regime in order to achieve high rank and continue to command his soldiers in his nation's darkest hour, he was willing. If aristocratic fellow officers did not like his middle-class background or were jealous of his meteoric rise, fine, he would live with no friends. At least it seems clear that Model's expedients only sought, at first victory, and then the Army's survival -- they apparently were not devoted to the pursuit of post-war wealth, professional acclaim, the favorable judgment of history, or the avoidance of his personal and professional responsibility for his long association with the Nazi State. [166] Our judgments of Model are difficult to make because he does not quite fit the moral stereotypes many have established by which to categorize Nazi Germanys generals. He certainly was not, as (for example) Colonel- General Beck and Colonel-General Blaskowitz certainly were, an unbending professional soldier repelled by the vile stink of Nazism. Correspondingly, he was not a brawler lifted from the ranks (and perhaps above his depth) by his staunch loyalty to the Fuhrer, as were (for example) Field Marshal Schomer and Colonel-General Dietrich. He was never a full- fledged professional 'sellout' to the Nazi regime, as were Field Marshals Keitel or von Reichenau, but his loyalty to Germany's political leadership was clearly greater than that of professional, aristocratic commanders such as Field Marshals von Rundstedt, von Manstein and von Meist. Like his famed colleague Field Marshal Rommel, Model lived to sample fully the underlying poison of the regime he served, but Model survived until the shattering end of the war, while Rommel had the good fortune, at least from the perspective of his historical and professional reputation, to run afoul of the dictator's evil machinations. It is worth pondering the accidents of fortune which affect the reputations of great men; both Rommel and von Manstein actually looked forward to appointments by Hitler to new assignments, but did not receive them - and today they are considered honorable soldiers, while Model ended up trapped in the Ruhr Pocket, torn by the powerful and conflicting demands of duty, honor, fear of Sippenhaft and the uncertain judgments of history. [167] Model was useful to Hitler as a paragon of the 'National Socialist' fighting general, particularly during the latter part of the war when Rommel was in political eclipse and Hitler needed a public counterweight to the increasingly restless General Staff. [168] Model, being apolitical but not at all averse to professional or public acclaim, willingly 'fit the bill' as Hitler's defensive genius who would keep the enemy from the soil of the Fatherland until the 'miracle' weapons and the Allies' own internecine squabbling saved Germany at the fabled 'eleventh hour.' Model paid the price for this continued 'loyalty; he was destroyed along with his beloved Wehrmacht, and his reputation today is besmirched by the odium accorded the regime for which he fought. [169] As a World War II warrior 'against the odds,' however, GeneralFeldmarschall Walther Model is without peer. Warren E. Kingsley is a military history enthusiast and long-time board wargamer. His son Stuart is in in 11th grade, an excellent student, and an aficionado of the adventures of Luke Skywalker and Han Solo. The Fuhrer's Fireman Field Marshal Walther Model Introduction Pre-World War II WWII 1939-1943 The Fuhrer's Fireman and 1944 Battle of the Bulge into 1945 Conclusion Bibliography Footnotes Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 4 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.