THE WAR UNTIL BARBAROSSA Model served with distinction in the Polish Campaign as Chief of Staff of IV Corps, earning promotion to Lieutenant General in April, 1940, and was Chief of Staff of 16 Army during the German invasion of France. After the spectacularly successful conclusion of the French Campaign he was injured in a car accident, but recovered quickly and was given command of 3 Panzer Division in November, 1940. 3d Panzer, the famous 'Bear' Division from Berlin, was somewhat of a shell at the time of his appointment because its armor and artillery components had recently been stripped off and designated as seed elements for the fledgling Afrika Korps. Nonetheless, Model set out with his usual energy and drive to build it into an 'elite' division. [6] He instituted a rigorous divisional training regimen emphasizing inter-combat arms cooperation, and got to know his men personally through repeated inspections. [7] Route marches honed the division's efficiency, and by the time Model brought 3 Panzer Division to the Polish/Soviet frontier just south of Brest-Litovsk in June, 1941, as part of Colonel-General Guderian's 2 Panzergruppe, it was a finely-tuned fighting formation. RUSSIA 1941 3rd Panzer Division exploded into the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941, as part of the massive armored spearheads of Army Group Center. The preponderance of German armored and Luftwaffe strength in Army Group Center's sector, coupled with Soviet command paralysis and inspired German combat leadership, garnered spectacular gains for the Army Group throughout the summer campaign. River barriers succumbed in rapid succession to Model's thrusting panzers: the Bug, the Berezina, the Drut, the Dnieper and the Desna all were overcome by 3rd Panzer units with various combinations of speed, force and Kanipfkrafl ("battle skill"). Enormous numbers of Russian soldiers were killed or captured in the great encirclement battles of Bialystock, Minsk and Smolensk. The Division~s rates of advance were staggering: 3 ' Panzer was 150 km cast of the border on the second day of the invasion, 300 km on the fifth, and crossed the Dnieper on 4 July. [8] Model mercilessly drove his units forward, constantly flying over the front in his Fieseler Storch, repeatedly creating and disbanding Kampfgruppen and overcoming obstacle after obstacle with verve, imagination and ruthless energy. [9] He was seldom to be found at his headquarters, but was usually at the front in his command jeep with the forward units, cajoling, threatening and leading by personal example and sheer force of will. [10] s a practitioner of Blitzkrieg at the level of a panzer division commander, Model's efforts resembled those of Erwin Rommel in 1940 in France with his 7 Panzer Division. Model was very highly regarded by "Schnell Heinz" Guderian, his Panzergruppe commander. [11] As summer faded into fall Model drove 3 Panzer Division into the vast expanses of the Ukraine, spearheading Guderian's Panzergruppe as it sliced south and east in an effort to link with Field Marshal von Meist's armor pounding north from Army Group South. Despite appalling mud conditions and the virtual absence of the Luftwaffe (which had outrun its bases), Model hurled his Kampfgruppen forward, operating at the very tip of Guderian's 155 mile-long northern pincer. [12] The Kiev encirclement was the apex of the 1941 Blitzkrieg, yielding close to 700,000 Soviet prisoners and a stunning haul of war materiel. On 14 September Model slammed the Kiev Pocket's door shut at the village of Romny, east of Kiev, his performance as a panzer division commander at the pinnacle of combat leadership. [13] The Kiev Pocket triumph, however, yielded no respite for the weary 3 Panzer Division, which was now operating with approximately 40% of its initial panzer strength. The German High Command elected to make a final push on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), and 3rd Panzer was tasked again to spearhead 2 Panzergruppe in its drive north to the Soviet capital through Orel, Mtensk and Tula. [14] Its battle-hardened combat elements commenced the offensive in the last days of September, and made excellent progress until slowed, to a crawl, by the onset of the mud season. Model was again to be found everywhere, improvising, driving, adjusting and leading his divisional battlegroups forward. He knew time was critical this late in the fall season, and he, like Guderian, was thoroughly exasperated by the thick, oozing mud. Orel and Mtensk fell, but the Panzergruppe faltered before Tula. [15] Model, however, was no longer commander of 3 Panzer Division. Instead, he was promoted General der Panzertruppen (as of 1 October) and ordered to the front west of Moscow to assume command (as of 26 October) of XLI Panzerkorps (1 and 6 Panzer and 23 Infantry Divisions), which was entirely bogged down in heavy attritional combat south and west of Kalinin. [16] News of Model's uncomplimentary views of staff work and staff officers had preceded him: the entire Corps' staff requested transfers upon hearing of his appointment! [17] Model quickly stopped offensive operations during this period of continuous mud, rain and declining temperatures, and gave his weary units some much-needed rest. When Typhoon resumed on 15 November, XLI Panzerkorps drove north and east, at first with sustained rapidity, and then more and more slowly as the weather turned increasingly cold and Soviet resistance stiffened. Model's formations were able to take Kalinin, cross the Volga Canal northwest of Moscow, and subsequently capture the bridges over Moscow's reservoirs in heavy fighting. [18] His spearheads were within 20 miles of Red Square when the German offensive at last sputtered out all along the front of the exhausted Army Group. In December, under intense pressure from the great Soviet winter counteroffensive, the burnt-out shell of XLI Panzerkorps withdrew gradually to its pre-15 November startline, albeit in good order and with its lines unbreached. RUSSIA 1942 As is often the case, great crises give rise to the careers of great men, and it was during this time of defeat and retreat that the tenacious determination of Walther Model began to attract the attention of his Fuhrer. The withdrawal of XLI Panzerkorps was very well-handled, and thus stood out starkly against the gloomy backdrop of a crumbling Army Group, panicked and overstressed generals, and badly shattered formations verging on total collapse in the face of the resurgent Red Army. Hitler dismissed the Commander-in- Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, in mid-December, and assumed command of the Army himself, issuing nonnegotiable "stand fast" orders to an officer corps terrified by the example of Napoleon some 130 winters before. [19] Indeed, there was no real ability to retreat and no mobility to be found given the horrendous weather conditions, and there was a real danger that the morale of the German central front would crack if a retreat got out of hand. Hitler's intransigent orders thus made some sense in the face of the looming disaster, and no doubt he decided that he needed men in charge ruthless enough to see that his declarations were obeyed. Over the heads of many more senior generals, Walther Model thus received command of 9 Army west of Moscow on 12 January, 1942, in the midst of an operational crisis of the first magnitude. On 9 January, a massive Soviet offensive had sprung southwest across the Upper Volga and penetrated south of and to the west of Rzhev (which is about 112 miles west of Moscow) on a path leading directly to the main Warsaw-Moscow motor highway, the key supply route of all of Army Group Center. 9 Army's front had been penetrated to the west of Rzhev, and its westernmost corps, the XXIII, encircled, while the eastern face of the Army, running south-north from the motor highway to Rzhev, was under intense frontal pressure from Soviet armies attempting to cut the Army's only supply line (a railroad running north from Vyazma to Rzhev). [20] Model immediately organized a counteroffensive west from Rzhev (in temperatures of -450C) with the object of relieving =II Corps and sealing off the Soviet 39 Army and part of 29 Army, both of which had broken through the German front and penetrated far to the south and west. [21] He also ordered a strong counterattack to be made from Sychevka, to the immediate south of Rzhev, to drive the Soviets eastward and back from the critical rail line supplying his Army. [22] The counteroffensive west of Rzhev began on 21 January, and by 23 January its spearhead had relieved the encircled NXIII Corps and had in turn cut off more than nine Soviet divisions. [23] The counterattack at Sychevka also succeeded, and drove the Soviets back out of artillery range from 9 Armys supply route. Desperate breakout attempts by the trapped Soviet divisions, and powerful relief efforts launched from the Upper Volga area, were all beaten off in bitter fighting. The 'First' Battle of Rzhev ended on 24 February, a signal German victory which greatly restored the morale of Army Group Center's battered formations. [24] Model was personally awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross by an impressed Hitler, and promoted to Colonel- General. The 'Rzhev Salient,' as 9 Armys sector of the front line came to be called, was a magnet for Soviet offensives throughout 1942. Historians and military enthusiasts have generally been attracted to the grand sweep of the German summer campaign to the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and thus the fighting in the central portion of the Eastern Front in 1942 has been somewhat overlooked in the literature. To the Soviets, however, the Rzhev Salient, only 112 miles west of the Red capital, was a priority target, and the scene of repeated, massive offensive operations and bitter fighting. Throughout these battles, Model proved himself a defensive commander of the first rank, practicing many of the methods which he would apply to situations of even greater scale and responsibility in the years to come. [25] As he did with 3 Panzer Division, he spent much of his time directly at the front, pushing, cajoling, improvising and leading by example. [26] Often his personal intervention involved the rapid creation and disbanding of scratch battlegroups needed to overcome local crises, and the combing of rear areas for every soldier who could walk and carry a rifle. [27] His troops called this "Vermodelung," or "Modelization," and because his efforts succeeded he eventually came to be viewed by his soldiers as a "lucky' general. [28] In the thick forests and swamps of the Rzhev Salient the fighting descended to 'World War I-like' levels of close, defensive attritional combat. Despite the widespread view of the Eastern Front as a prototypical mobile war, the nature of battle at this time in its northern and central sectors was rather that of a classic infantryman's war, with a premium placed on defense lines, reserves, artillery and sudden counterattacks rather than on the employment of massed armor. This situation, which some historians have denominated the "demodernizatior~' of the Eastern Front, and Model's mastery of its nuances, demonstrated his far-ranging skills as a combat general by contrasting well with the exemplary offensive abilities he had already demonstrated as a panzer division commander throughout the 1941 B1itzkrieg. [29] An illustration of Model's command versatility can be found in Operation Seydlitz, a localized offensive by 9 Army in early July, 1942, designed to "clean out" masses of Soviet troops and partisans milling around the Army's rear following the defeat of various Soviet offensives earlier in the year. A centerpiece of Seydlitz was Model's creation of a special cavalry brigade designed specifically to be able to operate and fight in the exceedingly difficult swampy, forested terrain behind the Rzhev Salient's front. This unit was created by combining the recon battalions of all eight of 9 Army's infantry divisions with a tested cavalry formation, augmented with light armor and horse-drawn artillery. In the course of the operation from 2- 12 July, 9 Army took 50,000 prisoners and decisively cleared its rear areas. [30] The ultimate 1942 crisis for 9 Army came with the 'Fourth' (and final) Battle of Rzhev, when the Salient became the target of the Soviets' Operation Mars in late November to early December. This little-known but enormous offensive, planned and executed by Marshal Zhukov and General Konev, came close to shattering 9 Army and penetrating to the very heart of Army Group Center. [31] Designed to complement the stunningly successful (and nearly simultaneous) Stalingrad counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), Mars was intended to break the German central front in a decisive way. [32] Model had seen it coming, and after the (barely) successful conclusion of the 'Third' Battle of Rzhev (1-23 August) had succeeded in obtaining strong armor and artillery reserves from OKH. [33] Thus fortified, 9 Army was in position to stand up to the massive Soviet onslaught, which was comparable in scale to the one which destroyed 6 Army at Stalingrad. At one time during the 'see-saw' fighting 9 Army was actually beset from three sides, but in the end the battered German formations held the Rzhev Salient and the Soviet tide fell back once more. Model had won his greatest Eastern Front victory. RUSSIA 1943 In the months immediately following the conclusion of Mars the Germans stripped forces from the northern and central sectors of the Eastern Front in a desperate effort to mitigate the disasters befalling Army Groups A and B in the south. 9 Army too was affected, and by February its formations had been picked clean of all available reserves. Given the serious nature of their strategic position, the German High Command considered ways to shorten the front and thereby release divisions for alternative commitment. The blood-soaked Rzhev Salient was an ideal place to start. Moltke the Elder once observed that the most dangerous task a commander can receive is to conduct a strategic withdrawal in the face of an active, superior enemy. When Hitler approved Operation Buffalo, the evacuation of the Rzhev Salient, in early February, Model was faced with this grim challenge. [34] He met it with his usual energy and attention to detail, outlining in advance successive phase lines for the withdrawal of twenty-one divisions, assigning retreat routes and lines of communications, building over 1000 km of rail lines and 200 km of roads in the Germans' rear to facilitate the transport of troops and war materiel, and arranging for the evacuation of 60,000 civilians, supplies and his wounded. [35] During the withdrawal (1-23 March) the Soviets hit his forces six times, suffering over 42,000 casualties while inflicting only a small number on the Germans. [36] When the operation was complete, one army and four corps HQs, fifteen infantry, two motorized and three panzer divisions became free for employment elsewhere on the Eastern Front. [37] An appreciative Fuhrer awarded Model the Swords to the Knight's Cross on 3 April. By the time Model received the coveted decoration 9 Army HQ had moved south, first to Smolensk, and then to Orel on 30 March, to participate in the planning for Operation Citadel, the projected German summer offensive against the Soviet salient around Kursk. From 12-19 April, Model temporarily commanded Army Group South while its famous leader, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, was home on leave. Model was very dissatisfied with the forces allocated to him for the northern pincer of Citadel, and when he returned to 9 Army HQ on 19 April he peremptorily demanded that Army Group Center provide him with, "More tanks! More officers! More artillery! Better training for the attack troops!" [38] General Zeitzler, Chief of OKH, came to 9 Army HQ on 22 April to placate Model, but the latter was not satisfied and traveled personally to see Hitler on 28 April. [39] The result of his protests was that Hitler postponed the start of the operation to 10 May. At an enormously important (in retrospect) Fuhrer conference held in Munich on 3 May among Hitler and his senior commanders, Model (by invitation of Hitler) led the discussion and stressed his severe doubts about the offensive's prospects. He based his presentation in part on detailed air reconnaissance photos of the Kursk Salient, which clearly revealed enormous, systematically-designed defensive works and the presence of vast parks of Soviet artillery, tanks and other weaponry. Generaloberst Guderian, who also opposed the planned offensive due to its projected heavy armor losses, noted that Hitler was visibly impressed by the depth and clarity of Model's arguments. [40] Nonetheless, the operation was only postponed, while additional men and materiel were sent to the battlefront. [41] During the next two months Model organized the massive northern pincer of Citadel, which in his sector alone involved more than seven panzer and mechanized and fourteen infantry divisions. With his usual energy he worked out every detail of the planned offensive, from advance routes to Luftwaffe support, in an effort to overcome the enormous advantages conferred on the Soviets by the repeated delays of the attack. [42] Model intended to break the Soviets' strong defensive crust with infantry, engineers and artillery, and then commit his armor to exploit any breach created in the front. [43] He hoped that the panzers, once through the Soviet lines, would engage and destroy the Soviet armored reserves in open, mobile battle. The great German offensive commenced on 5 July, but met with fierce resistance from the first and achieved only limited results. 9 Army in particular had terrible difficulty effecting a breach, and casualties were so heavy Model had to order a brief halt to operations on 8 July to reconfigure his attack plans. His forces did no better when the battle recommenced on 10 July, and by 12 July his units were bogged down in heavy attritional combat in the depths of the Soviets' defensive zone. [44] On 12 July the Soviets launched a vast counteroffensive (Operation Kutuzov) to the northeast of Orel against 2 Panzer Army, 9 Armys northern neighbor, and its quick success began to threaten Model's rear. Recognizing the danger, Model immediately called off his own attack, withdrew his forces to their start line, and began to redeploy his units to the northeast to face the Soviet threat. He also began the construction of a defense line (the 'Hagen' position) along the base of the Orel bulge, in case a strategic withdrawal were needed. Orel was a gigantic German supply base, and Model had to gain time both to evacuate it as well as extract the shattered units of 2 Panzer Army. [45] To facilitate Model's handling of the crisis, Hitler ordered Model to assume command of both 2 Panzer Army and 9 Army, and gradually the Soviet offensive slowed in the face of Model's elastic defense and heavy Luftwqffie activity. [46] Despite local defensive successes, the crushing losses the Germans had suffered in Citadel and the Orel bulge necessitated another shortening of the Eastern Front. [47] Once again, as in Operation Buffalo earlier in the year, Model was tasked with conducting a strategic withdrawal in the face of an active and determined enemy. From 1-15 August, Model brought 2 Panzer and 9 Armies back some 100 km to the 'Hagen' position. The withdrawal, hampered by heavy rains and an increasingly dominant Red Air Force, was considered a major tactical achievement and brought Model further esteem throughout the Wehrmacht as a 'defensive specialist' of the first order. [48] The Germans received no rest, however, as Soviet blows continued to rain down on all of Army Group Center. By 10 September 9 Army had been pushed back to Bryansk, the scene of the Germans' great encirclement victory in October, 1941. A sharp counterblow by Model cut up a Russian Guards cavalry corps on 19 September, but the Army Group nonetheless was forced to fall back to the 'Panther' positions from 18 September-10 October. [49] This defense line, which generally ran along the Dnieper River through Orsha up to Vitebsk, was to be Army Group Center's front until the following June. Model received a muchdeserved leave in November, but had to rush back to the front later that month when the Soviets blasted a 50 mile gap between 2 and 9 Armies. The Germans retreated behind the Dnieper, where heavy counterattacks by Model from 21-26 December finally restored the frontline. [50] The Fuhrer's Fireman Field Marshal Walther Model Introduction Pre-World War II WWII 1939-1943 The Fuhrer's Fireman and 1944 Battle of the Bulge into 1945 Conclusion Bibliography Footnotes Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 4 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.