by Warren and Stuart Kingsley
The German offensive began with a
sudden barrage at 5:30 a.m. on 16 December,
and initially made significant progress. Model
planned to lead with his infantry, as he had at
Kursk, and then release his panzers through
breaches established in the American lines.
[136]
This tactic succeeded in most sectors,
but gradually the attacking columns slowed,
stymied by stiffening U.S. resistance, massive
Allied reinforcements, and hopeless traffic jams.
[137]
Model considered the offensive doomed
by its third day, and when the weather cleared
the day after Christmas, Allied airpower utterly
smashed the snarled German vehicle columns.
[138]
Model repeatedly urged Hitler to call
off the operation, but the Fuhrer persisted until
Allied counteroffensives from the northern and
southern flanks of the German "bulge" forced
the armys hasty withdrawal. By 6 January the
Germans were back to their start-line, having
suffered heavy casualties and the loss of the
bulk of their remaining armored strength.
With the failure of the Ardennes offensive
the morale of the German army in the West
began to crack. Under steady Allied pressure,
German units were pressed back to and beyond
the Siegfried Line, losing thousands of prisoners
and much of their remaining fighting power. It
was evident that Hitler's repeated "stand-fast"
orders to defend the West Wall no longer made
any sense, and that the only hope for Army
Group B was to fall back to the Rhine as
quickly as possible and attempt to defend its
east bank. Throughout January and February
Model repeatedly remonstrated with the
Fuhrer to permit such a withdrawal - when
Hitler refused, Model conducted one anyway.
[139]
During this period of retreat OKW, in
order to facilitate the escape of the retreating
divisions, issued strict orders to all commands
not to blow the Rhine bridges prematurely or
without permission. As is well known, in the
confusion the railroad bridge over the Rhine at
Remagen was not destroyed, and fell intact into
American hands on 7 March.
[140]
Model launched several vicious
counterattacks to take it back, but all attempts
to crush the American bridgehead failed.
[141]
Hitler had dismissed von Rundstedt in
early March, exasperated by the latter's
intellectual detachment from the increasingly
hopeless situation, and appointed Field
Marshal Kesselring to take over as Chief of OB
West.
[142]
Kesselring had not worked with Model
before, but knew him "as a veteran leader with
the widest possible experience who had, in my
opinion, the right to act independently and the
duty not to wait for my advice."
[143]
Model concentrated his strength to the
north of the Remagen bridgehead, expecting the
Americans to strike for the Ruhr when they
eventually broke out. Kesselring warned that
the Americans would most likely drive east,
and encircle the Ruhr from the south and east,
but Model disagreed.
[144]
In the event, the American breakout
from Remagen to the east on 25 March, and
their near simultaneous crossing of the Rhine to
the north of Germanys most important
industrial area, caused Model and 320,000 men
of Army Group B to become trapped in the
Ruhr Festung on 1 April.
Model had seen the envelopment
coming in the last days of March, and had
desperately asked OKW to rescind the Ruhr's
Festung status and permit a breakout to the
east.
[145]
This request, as usual, was adamantly
refused. Model ordered an attempt anyway,
but all efforts to do so on 30 and 31 March
were in vain.
[146]
Further haphazard breakouts were
attempted in early April, but were thwarted by
lack of fuel and the local German commanders'
natural reluctance to incur further casualties in a
lost situation. Model ignored Hitler's orders to
destroy everything, limiting the demolitions to
points of military importance.
[147]
On 13 April, General Bayerlein
surrendered the four divisions of his Corps to
the Americans, and the Ruhr Pocket began to
dissolve.
[148]
Model was torn between his desire to
save his soldiers and the dictates of his duty to
fight on. "Like all senior commanders he was
faced with an insoluble dilemma; as a highly
qualified officer he saw the hopelessness of
further resistance, but on the other hand he was
bound in duty and honor to his superiors and
subordinates."
[149]
He continued to visit the front lines
every day, rallying his men; it is said he
actively sought death in combat.
[150]
The situation was irremediable,
however, and on 17 April he disbanded his
Army Group, discharging all soldiers under age
18 and over age 47, and giving the others the
choice to surrender individually or attempt to
fight their way out.
During the next four days the Field
Marshal and a small group of officers and men
traveled aimlessly around the ruins of the Ruhr,
evading capture but uncertain of what to do
next.
[151]
Model had been told by his officers
that the Russians had named him a war criminal,
and he was certain the Americans would turn
him over to the Soviets if he were captured.
[152]
It is not known whether a guilty
conscience convinced him to commit suicide, or
if he felt that taking his own life was his final
act of duty as a German officer.
[153]
He wrestled with the decision for
several days, but in the end chose death the
traditional way, with a pistol shot to his
temple.
[154]
He was buried under an enormous oak
on the grounds of the von Spee estate, in an
unmarked place.
[155]
Ten years later his intelligence officer,
who was with him at the end, led Model's son
and a group of helpers to the gravesite and
disinterred him; he rests today with his soldiers
in the Ehrenfriedhofat Vossenack, in the
Huertgen Forest.
The Fuhrer's Fireman Field Marshal Walther Model
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