Napoleon at the Berezina

Napoleon's Options

by Robert Markham

At this point, it is interesting to look at Napoleon once again. Faced with a worsening situation on most fronts (even Ney's partial escape was a success in avoiding a complete disaster), Napoleon's actions tell a lot about the state of the Emperor at this time.

"The Emperor showed himself a match for each emergency, and therefore fitted to prevent them all." This reflects perfectly the view of the majority of French toward their leader. It did not, however, reflect the actions of the leader himself. Since leaving Moscow, the retreat had been a series of missteps and miscalculations. The army at the beginning of the retreat had resembled more mob than well-disciplined army. Laden down with booty, the army from top down had seemed more concerned with saving the valuables they had taken, than with correcting the military situation.

While the French at home may have waited for the retreat from Moscow to be revealed as another brilliant maneuver, the reality was that the French army had already lost its cohesion and that loss had come as much from leadership as it had from the foot soldier.

One action of Napoleon's can be used to illustrate this point. On November 21, he learned that Minsk had fallen to Tchichagov. It was a hard blow to the French army since Minsk had had enough supplies to feed the army throughout the winter. Faced with this, he ordered the destruction of all unnecessary equipment including the bridging train. By doing this, he eliminated the possibility of bridging the Berezina. Or it would have, if it had not been for General Eble, who realized the possibly disastrous results this order could have and had exempted from this order several forges, chests of tools, and scrap-iron. As it was, Napoleon had increased the difficulties that the army faced through his order.

It would be three more days before news would reach him that the Borissow bridge (his goal to a quick retreat across the Berezina) had fallen to Tchichagov, who surprisingly had made a quick march to grab the lightly defended bridge. Had it not been for Oudinot's rapid response and counterattack, all hope for taking the bridge would have vanished. As it was, Tchichagov had retreated across the bridge and set fire to it in three places. It was still standing but the bridge needed to be repaired before a crossing in force could be attempted. With Tchichagov in control of the other side, Oudinot found that task to be next to impossible.

Options

When Napoleon learned of the situation on November 24, he was faced with a number of choices of action, all of them bad. First, he could try to retake the bridge in a coup de main. Secondly, he could march to Beresino and hope to cross and retake Minsk. Third, he could find a rumored ford at Weselowo and trap Wittgenstein's army. All three offered small chances of success, given the quality of the roads, which had turned to mud. Any plan that put speed at the center would be doomed to failure.

In assessing the situation, Napoleon had only two strong formations, Victor's and Oudinot's. He also was fortunate to face a hesitant opponent, whose command structure was weak at best.

As Napoleon pondered these choices, a fourth miraculously appeared later that day. Brigadier-General Corbineau and his cavalry regiment had discovered another route across the Berezina. He had observed a peasant on horseback crossing the river near the village of Studianka. The peasant had been captured, and he had showed them that the water, except in the middle, was very shallow and that the 100 yard wide ford was crossable. There were drawbacks. As the thaw continued, the river would deepen, and the current would get stronger. Therefore, it would have to be bridged. Also, there were marshes on each side of the river next to the ford that would have to be crossed and on the other side there was no main road for quite a distance.

Even given these drawbacks, Napoleon seized upon this choice. He directed Oudinot to occupy the village of Studianka, while he marched toward Borissow to maintain the subterfuge that the Borissow bridge or Beresino was his main objective. He ordered that preparations for crossing be made at Ucholodi and Sabashevichy as well as at Borissow. Between the use of stragglers appearing as massed forces and the noise created by the felling of trees, Napoleon kept Russian eyes away from the real crossing for hours.

Tchichagov has rightfully come under criticism for his handling of the situation. Ever hesitant, he failed to adequately patrol and reconnoiter the entire front. Instead, he contentedly accepted the obvious as the real course of action. In doing so, he played directly into Napoleon's hands. While it is understandable that he would be hesitant to boldly move against such an adversary, there can be no excuse for his passive actions during this time. Being careful to cover as many contingencies as possible was the prudent thing to do, not the overly ambitious thing to do. It is true that the two other Russian leaders, Wittgenstein and Kutusov, also must take a share of the blame for not sealing off Napoleon, but Tchichagov was the man on the scene and the onus of immediate failure falls squarely on his shoulders. He certainly did not have a large enough force to cover all places in force, but he did have enough to make some good choices.

In the crucial days of November 24 and 25, he did only one move -- sending reinforcements in the other direction to Sabashevichy. To be fair, Tchichagov was functioning under the misconception that Napoleon had 100,000 troops at his command, when in truth he did not have an effective half of that. Whatever the reasons, Tchichagov neglected the reports from his Cossack detachment at Brillowo and prepared to defend Borissow.

Napoleon at the Berezina 1812

Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 4
Back to Against the Odds List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2003 by LPS.
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com
* Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.