Vietnam Climax
Siege of Khe Sanh

Opening the Road to Khe Sanh

by John Prados

Even before Tet, General Westmoreland had been concerned about the situation in the northern provinces. He sent reinforcements north, principally elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), as well as the mechanized brigade that arrived from the U.S. about this time. He put in place a forward echelon of MACV headquarters under his deputy, General Creighton Abrams. Beginning in February Westy contemplated an overland offensive to punch through to Khe Sanh along Route 9.

On March 2 General Abrams and the commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, approved the concept for the relief effort, to be called Operation PEGASUS. On the 10th, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, leader of a new Provisional Corps Vietnam (later renamed XXIV Corps), controlling the forces just below the Demilitarized Zone, presented his plans for an offensive, starting with clearing efforts in the coastal lowland then, beginning April 1, the attack toward Khe Sanh. Westy approved.

Much would depend on Major General John J. Tolsor's 1st Cavalry Division, "The Cav." It had been Tolson's concept, which Westy had ordered him to prepare even before Tet, that had been briefed on March 2.

On the 11th, following the Da Nang meeting. where Westmoreland and Cushman had pushed on Khe Sanh and rejected the alternative of a main effort in the lowlands, Tolson began detailed planning. Forces involved included The Cav (with attached elements some 19,000 Army troops), the 1st Marine Regiment plus at Khe Sanh (10,000 Marines in all), and a task force of two South Vietnamese airborne battalions (together with Rangers at Khe Sanh, about 1,400 troops). It would be the largest coordinated ground offensive thus far in the Vietnam war.

Tolson prepared the operation by creating a forward base at the village of Ca Lu, in the foothills at the edge of the Annamites. The Cav called this place "Landing Zone (LZ) Stud." Army and Navy engineers and Seabees endowed Stud with artillery emplacements, bunkers, supply storage areas, and an airfield capable of handling C123 Providers. When the offensive jumped off at 7 AM on April I the Army swiftly left LZ Stud. Instead its security would be left in the hands of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

Along Route 9 it would be the 1st Marines' show. Though Colonel Stanley S. Hughes left one of his battalions behind at LZ Stud, he had a solid force on line. Attacking on the right north of the road, was Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Duncan's 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. On the left, to the south of Route 9, was Lieutenant Colonel Jack W Davis's 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines. The Army's 11th Combat Engineer Battalion advanced along the road itself, rebuilding bridges and approaches, clearing brush, and generally attempting to restore Route 9.

Ten ARC LIGHT strikes per day were laid on to support PEGASUS, beginning four days ahead of the offensive itself. Many of the targets were identified by the "Headhunters," the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, an air-ground scout formation innovated by the Cav.

Early the afternoon of the first day the mountain fog cleared and The Cav's 3rd Brigade began air assaulting into a series of LZs along the flanks of the Marines. Good weather in the hills would be a relative thing -- General Tolson recalled it would be defined during these weeks as any conditions in which the ceiling was at least 500 feet and visibility more than a mile and a half. On most days these conditions did not occur until 1 PM or after. Fortunately few PEGASUS forces would ever be subjected to the kinds of heavy combat that might tempt commanders to challenge the weather.

Colonel Hubert S. ("Bill") Campbell's 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division had been working the mouth of the A Shau valley, west of Hue, until very recently. He had brought his units to LZ Stud just twenty-four hours ahead of the jump off for PEGASUS. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Wasiak's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, playing the song "Gary Owen" made infamous by George Armstrong Custer, opened the airmobile phase with its assault into LZ Mike. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Roscoe Robinson) then leapfrogged through Mike to land next day at LZ Thor, about two thirds of the way to Khe Sanh. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Vaught, who gained notoriety some years later as a general and joint task force commander of the Iranian Hostage Rescue Fission (Desert One), took the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry into LZ Cates, on the lower slopes of Long Chio mountain. Poor weather limited tactical air support to just 23 sorties, but instead there would be seven ARC LIGHT strikes involving 42 B-52 bombers.

The Americans captured documents from the 29th Regiment of the People's Army 324-B Division, as well as the 66th of the 304th. But until April 4 there was little evidence of the north Vietnamese troops themselves. In the interval General Tolson committed his 2nd Brigade. But it was Colonel Robinson at LZ Cates who faced the most serious opposition, and was unable to push beyond his initial gains. Of 2nd Brigade (Colonel Joseph C. McDonough), two battalions assaulted into LZ Wharton, south of the Old French Fort that had guarded Route 9 as it neared Khe Sanh. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Runkle would be killed as his Ist Battalion, 5th Cavalry attempted to capture the French Fort.

At Khe Sanh itself Colonel Lownds had orders to break out of the perimeter towards the west. Lieutenant Colonel John J. H. Cahill's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines pushed out of the Rock Quarry to clear Hill 471, a couple of kilometers to the southeast. The People's Army 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment lost a platoon holding that position, then suffered many casualties In a counterattack during the early morning hours of April 6.

Later that day Lieutenant Colonel Richard W Sweet's 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry air assaulted onto Hill 471 to make the first contact between Khe SanEs defenders and the relief forces. Meanwhile back at the combat base, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McEwan's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines sortied in a push toward the North Vietnamese trench system where the "Ghost Patrol" had been lost more than a month earlier. Marines discovered the bodies of twenty-one dead comrades.

Finally, the actual relief of the combat base would be marked with a South Vietnamese air assault, when the 84th Company of the 8th Airborne Battalion linked up with the 37th Rangers. Soon afterwards, Americans and South Vietnamese troops were joining up throughout the area. Colonel Nguyen Khao Nam's 3rd Airborne Task Force then air assaulted into a position called LZ Snake; the intent was to prevent Hanoi's forces from retreating out of the Khe Sanh area. Nam's South Vietnamese paratroopers sustained a People's Army counterattack early on April 8.

That day too, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry engaged in a hot firefight with the People's Army alongside Route 9. Shortly thereafter the Marines who had been following the road from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh actually arrived at the combat base, marking the formal relief of Khe Sanh. The engineers declared Route 9 reopened on April 11. The siege of Khe Sanh had ended. Lang Vei would be recaptured on April 12 by Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kerner's 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry.

The relief of the combat base marked the beginning of a period of mobile operations in which American forces attempted to maneuver around Khe Sanh. Initially the forces employed were the 2nd Brigade of The Cav plus the 26th Marines, but the longtested Marine defenders were progressively culled back to the lowlands. The 1st Marine Regiment, assumed operational control of the Khe Sanh sector on April 18.

Radiating out, especially south of Route 9 but also in the hills to a degree, the 1st Marines took real losses -- more men wounded (though fewer killed) than during the siege itself In early July the command quietly abandoned Khe Sanh, blowing up the last bunkers and installations left from the combat base.

There are problems with the casualty figures on the siege of Khe Sanh. The official Marine figures are 205 killed, 816 wounded and evacuated, 852 less seriously wounded, and one man missing. However, these numbers exclude Army, Navy, and Air Force losses, and any men lost by MACSOG are still unknown. Lutheran chaplain Ray W. Stubbe, a naval officer attached to 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, kept detailed records of deaths for purposes of condolences, and monitored the casualties admitted to the main field hospital at the combat base. Stubbe recorded 353 deaths and 903 seriously wounded. Even these figures do not count wounded who were treated at battalion aid stations and put back in the line.

Also excluded are the other combat actions of the Khe Sanh campaign. There were 25 killed and 40 wounded in the fight for Khe Sanh village, with 27 Americans and 74 South Vietnamese killed in the tragic helicopter relief attempt. Another 52 Americans, minimum, died in assorted plane crashes, accidents and mishaps. In the battle of Lang Vei there were 219 killed, 77 wounded, and one American missing in action. A more accurate count of losses might include 750 dead, 872 wounded, and two missing.

Even the last set of numbers excludes important parts of the campaign. During operation PEGASUS the losses amounted to 262 killed in action, 897 wounded, and five missing. The phase of mobile warfare between April and July 1968 brought another 362 dead, 1,888 wounded, and three missing in action. Thus an over-all count of Khe Sanh campaign losses should total over 1,300 dead and 4,650 wounded.

By way of comparison, U.S. losses during the 1970 invasion of Cambodia numbered 284 killed and 2,339 wounded. Cambodia would be touted as the biggest offensive of the war. By any measure, Khe Sanh would be a climax of the Vietnam war.

The People's Army of Vietnam fought against the odds at Khe Sanh. With an unparalleled panoply of aerial and artillery firepower arrayed against them, plus an American military machine still close to its peak of proficiency and professionalism, the People's Army had little chance of decisive victory. The question of whether Hanoi knew this, and its consequent actual intentions in the battle of Khe Sanh, has mystified analysts ever since.

Despite the odds, however, the North Vietnamese managed to capture and hold several positions during the siege, including Lang Vei and Khe Sanh village, though attacks against Marine positions in the hills or at the combat base uniformly failed. By body count the People's Army suffered 1,602 dead during the siege, another 1,304 as a result of operation PEGASUS, and 2,440 killed through the months of mobile warfare. Mathematical projections by U.S. Intelligence estimated North Vietnamese casualties at between 10,000 and 15,000. The stiff price reflected the long odds. But Hanoi's sacrifice proved justified in the end due to the political victory it gained, inadvertently or not, in the Tet Offensive.

John Prados is a well-known author and game designer. His current book is on the French version of Khe Sanh, Dien Bien Phu, titled Operation Vulture: The Secret Bombing Mission in Indochina, Dien Bien Phu 1954 (iBooks/Visual Press). Up next will be Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (Oxford University Press). On the game front he is the designer, among others, of Third Reich, Crisis: Sinai, Campaigns of Robert E Lee, Spies, and other exciting simulations. Khe Sanh, 1968 uses the game system Prados pioneered in his magazine games Monty's D-day and Warsaw Rising, and puts this in a modern setting. Look forward to Third Reich: The Card Game, a new release from Prados from Avalanche Press.

Vietnam Climax Siege of Khe Sanh

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