Vietnam Climax
Siege of Khe Sanh

The Siege

by John Prados

After the first contacts, in particular the village action, Marines at Khe Sanh were under orders to hunker down and protect themselves. Such patrolling as was done came from those not under the orders of Colonel Lownds, primarily the MACSOG commandos of FOB-3. But no one, it seemed, could kick up much dust for some days after Ter. Aside from Hanoi's artillery, its army seemed all but invisible. Until February 5, that is.

The night of February 5/6 came another heavy assault, this one on Hill 861-A, held by Echo Company of 2/26 under Captain Earle Breeding. This hill dominated one of the most vital approaches to the combat base, a route down the valley of the Rao Quan - (Rao being the word for river in the local Bru tribal language).

About midnight Marines atop Breeding's hill began to smell something out of the ordinary. Some remember it as akin to the stink of unwashed bodies, others to the smell of burning marijuana. Shortly after 4 a.m. came a brief but intense volley of 82mm mortar fire, then a battalion of People's Army troops was running for the top of the hill. Barbed wire barriers, swiftly blown with Bangalore torpedoes, did nothing to halt the advance. Marines on the adjoining hill, 881South weighed in to help their buddies with supporting mortar fire, and the combat base contributed a barrage of over 2,000 shells, boxing in the North Vietnamese assault battalion and cutting it off from reserves that lay in wait behind. Five Navy Crosses would be awarded to heroes of that night's fight on 861-A.

Off to the south, two days after Captain Breeding's stout defense, came the end for Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Battalions from the 24th and 66th Regiments of General Thai Dung's 304th Division made the attack, with a second battalion of each regiment in support and the third in reserve. As at Ban Houei Sane, the People's Army committed tanks to make the attack even more overwhelming. Captain Frank A. Willoughby's Detachment A-101 which controlled Lang Vei camp, which housed four companies of Bru tribesmen, a company of indigenous troops recruited by the Green Berets, called the MIKE Force, about two dozen each of Americans and South Vietnamese, mostly Green Berets and their South Vietnamese counterparts, in all maybe 400 troops. Their heaviest weapons were a couple of 106mm recoilless rifles.

Once this attack commenced on February 7 there could be no doubt about the outcome. The tribesmen fought as long as they could but were no match for North Vietnamese regulars with substantial reinforcement and heavy support. By morning there were tanks on top of the bunker that served as Lang Vei's command post. Incredibly enough, many of the American Green Berets escaped from Lang Vei, some evading cross-country once their positions were overrun, others escaping from the bunker after daylight, when the People's Army troops and tanks drew back into the jungle to avoid being caught by U.S. airpower.

Fall of Lang Vei

The massive American firepower, air and artillery, could not save Lang Vei. The combat base received initial reports of the attack at about a quarter to one in the morning of the 7th. Before any support plan could be activated, in fact just three minutes later, the People's Army began an intense mortar and rocket barrage on Khe Sanh to suppress Marine artillery. Shells impacted at a rate of six a minute.

The Marines did shoot back, but a combination of incredulity at the reports of Vietnamese tanks, communications problems, and simple delays robbed the fire of its effect. The preplanned sortie of a company-size relief column to save Lang Vei would be cancelled by Colonel Lownds. By morning, when fighter-bombers arrived overhead, the Green Beret camp essentially had already fallen. During the night only bombers (allweather aircraft) and AC-47 gunships had been available and these were hampered by variable cloudiness and low overcast.

Next night came an assault even closer in. Lownds had posted the 1/9 Marines outside the combat base proper, at the rock quarry the Marines were using to get most of their stone. In turn the battalion put out a reinforced platoon atop Hill 64, a low hummock that overlooked the "Walking Dead's" main position.

About two hours before dawn, General Nguyen Hun An threw a battalion of the 101-D Regiment of his 325-C Division against the hummock. Americans fought a hand-to-hand battle that degenerated into a stalemate until reinforcements arrived after first light.

However, in the aftermath of these attacks Khe Sanh settled down to a traditional siege, punctuated by daily barrages from Vietnamese mortars and artillery. An average of 150 rounds a day fell on the combat base, with the high point on February 22 when 1,307 shells pounded Khe Sanh.

In the third week of February, People's Army trench systems were discovered on aerial photographs, and as the days wore on the trenches became more extensive and progressed ever closer to the Marine perimeter. The big bombardment ignited another ammo dump fire - - Khe Sanh's third-- while intelligence informed the U.S. high command that a new North Vietnamese artillery regiment had reached the area.

To a significant degree the Vietnam People's Army moves may have been a cloak to screen withdrawals of its forces from the Khe Sanh sector. American intelligence detected moves of other North Vietnamese troops from the Demilitarized Zone area further into South Vietnam, and starting in mid-February from the Khe Sanh sector as well. Some People's Army units from divisions identified at Khe Sanh were participating in the battle of Hue as early as the second week of the Tet offensive.

Towards the end of February Hanoi made one more push at Khe Sanh. Emboldened perhaps by the People's Army success in capturing Lang Vei, or misled by a feeling of security from the trenches close to the combat base, the North Vietnamese tried again. The target would be Khe Sanh's perimeter at its eastern end, where the airstrip emerged, which was guarded by the South Vietnamese 37th Ranger Battalion.

On February 21 the People's Army probed here, using a company-size force, and were driven off with 25 or 30 dead. Four days later, attempting to explore the enemy trench system, the Marines lost the same number of dead themselves -- 23 killed in action -- from Bravo Company of 1/26.

Ghost Patrol

After this episode, called the "Ghost Patrol," Colonel Lownds prohibited any further sorties from the perimeter. Resulting ignorance made it doubly ominous on February 29, when sensors placed around the base began to light up like Christmas trees. Intelligence specialists estimated, from the length of time the People's Army column needed to march past fixed points, that a regiment of troops were involved. Once more the North Vietnamese were aiming at the sector held by the 37th Rangers.

The Khe Sanh command reacted instantaneously. Lownds asked higher command -- the 3rd Marine Division -- for an immediate ARC LIGHT strike. Major General Rathvon Tompkins agreed, and there happened to be B-52 bombers in the air headed for Vietnam at that moment. The planes were diverted to this target and hit it, very close to the Ranger Positions. Marine artillery also fired a box barrage around the estimated enemy assembly area, then rolling fire back and forth within it.

Colonel Lownds later recalled that this day was the only time Marines on the line ever told they had actually seen bodies being thrown up into the air. The supposed regimental attack degenerated into three small residual assaults, none of which even penetrated the barbed wire in front of the Rangers. The South Vietnamese reported killing just seven enemy soldiers, though after dawn they were able to count seventy-eight bodies.

Over the next few days there were increasing indications Hanoi was pulling back from Khe Sanh. Radio intelligence could pace only four regiments of the People's Army around the combat base, and the National Security Agency spooks watched as those which were of the 325-C Division receded into Laos over the first part of March.

By March 6 some U.S. intelligence agencies put the number of People's Army troops around Khe Sanh at only 6,000 to 8,000; others still estimated as many as 20,000. By late March there was consensus on a low figure for the People's Army forces. By then it was more important how many of Hanoi's soldiers had infiltrated further into Quang Tri province, for the scene of battle was about to change. General Westmoreland was poised to launch an offensive for the relief of Khe Sanh.

Vietnam Climax Siege of Khe Sanh

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