Anglo-Russian Landings
in Holland, 1799
Part 2
by Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands
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27th August 1799, First LandingsAt 5.00 a.m. the first troops, about 2500 men, were landed. Weather was good, and they were supported by strong naval gunfire. This gunfire forced the outposts from the jager battalions out of the forward dunes, and prevented them from interfering with the landing. The first battalions ashore entered the dunes and fiercely attacked the jagers. The commanders of these battalions didn't keep them together as ordered, but had them dispersed in skirmish order. The jagers didn't have a chance against the more formed attackers and were quickly routed. The commander of 2nd Bat Jagers was killed. Lt-Col Herbig, commander of the 2nd Bat/5th H.B., saw the routing jagers, and tried to counterattack the British, instead of providing the jagers with support in order to rally as ordered. This battalion had also no chance against the superior British, and was also routed after the death of Lt-Col Herbig. The survivors of the centre were thrown back to the south, into the Koegras marshes. The jagers continued the fight from there for sometime, while the survivors of 2nd Bat/5th H.B. retreated in the direction of Kleine Keeten (to the north!), where they joined 2nd Bat/7th H.B. The centre of Daendels' army ceased to be a real threat. Meanwhile the British landing passed very successful. After 3 hours 7000 men and some sailors had been put ashore. Abercromby arrived with part of his division, but limited his action by immobilising the Batavian troops near Huisduinen and Kleine Keeten. Pulteney left some troops facing Koegras to engage the jagers, and advanced south. Gen-Maj Guericke had observed the rout of the jagers. He could do nothing but watch the British build up their forces, and after some time his mere 2100 men were facing about 5000 British. Every half hour he dispatched a staff officer to Daendels, to ask permission to engage the British, but didn't receive any answer. After hours waiting, he left his positions with part of his force on his own initiative and moved into the Koegras with 2nd Bat/7th H.B. and his 2 squadrons of cavalry to support the jagers, leaving 1st and 3rd Bat/7th H.B. and the artillery, commanded by Col. Herman Jan Gilquin, to defend Den Helder. Naturally he couldn't do much in this marshy terrain. The British now had consolidated their positions, and were already advancing in great force in the direction of Groote Keeten. Pulteney had been reinforced by the 1st Guards Brigade. It was to late now for Daendels' counter-attack plans. Instead of attacking immediately after the first landings, he had postponed the counterattack to 1 or 2 p.m. At that moment it was already to late. The reason why Daendels postponed his counterattack is not known. When he at last gave the order to attack, Gen-Maj Guericke couldn't take part any more (with half of his force in the marsh es), so the attack was only made by the left wing. The 2 battalions (1st and 3rd Bat/5th H.B.), supported by the 2 guns from the horse artillery, and under the command of the capable and brave Colonel Crass, attacked vigorously, and succeeded in driving back the British some kilometres! Daendels was also in the front line all the time without an escort. Eye-witnesses recorded him "standing in a rain of bullets". The artillery, commanded by Captain d'Anguerand and protected by a squadron of dragoons, inflicted heavy loss on the British troops, and a shot from these guns killed Lt-Col Hay (Commander of the engineers), who was watching the Batavians through his telescope. The other 3 squadrons of dragoons couldn't take part in the combats that took place. The British troops took their positions on the crests of the dunes, and couldn't be reached because of the loose sand. The attacking battalions at first drove back the British, but were then stopped by the gunfire from the supporting ships, who were covering the open spaces between the dunes, and shot at in the flank by British infantry who were occupying some dunes near the beach under cover of the gunfire. Losses were heavy. The British received reinforcements, but so did the Batavians by the arrival of 1st Bat/4th H.B., 3rd Bat/6th H.B. and 1st Bat/3rd H.B. , but without the simultaneous attack from the other wing a decision could never be reached. The Batavian RetreatAt about 3.00 or 4.00 p.m. Crass was forced to retreat and give up the captured terrain because of the heavy losses sustained. At this time the British had disembarked two field guns. With these guns, manhandled by sailors, the 1st Guard Brigade, commanded by Gen-Maj Doyle, attacked Crass and his troops along the beach. But Crass reformed and received the attack, which was beaten back. After this he resumed his retreat to Groote Keeten. The fighting ended at about 6.00 p.m. after which the Batavian troops retreated to Calandsoog. Gen-Maj van Guericke had left his troops in the Koegras and went to Daendels in person to ask for orders. He found Daendels still alone in a "rain of bullets". Daendels, knowing that Den Helder was not to going to have to be defended against an attack from the land-side, ordered van Guericke to evacuate Den Helder, after nailing the guns and throwing the powder in the water, and to join him. Van Guericke now returned to his troops still in the Koegras and ordered his A.D.C., Captain C.H. Schober to deliver, with an escort of 1/2 squadron cavalry, the above order to Col. Gilquin. Schober told his commander that such an important order, not written and given without the presence of any other officer (because Daendels was all alone), could be a great risk. Van Guericke would be held responsible and had no defence if Daendels were to be killed (something that was very likely, taking into account the way Daendels was exposing himself to enemy fire). Knowing that Schober was right, van Guericke with his A.D.C. went back to Daendels, to ask him a written order. Daendels now went into a rage, but let the order be written down. Schober now went to the 3 squadrons of dragoons still in the dunes, and took 30 dragoons with him as escort. The time was 2.00 p.m. On his way back he had to cross open terrain, where the British had posted a field gun. Here he released his escort so as not to expose them to enemy fire and continued with a sergeant and an orderly. Arriving at Huisduinen he met Col. Gilquin, and told him his orders. Gilquin too had problems with obeying such far-reaching orders, and evacuating such an important position, and asked Schober to repeat these orders in the presence of all the officers that were under his command. This done Schober returned to Daendels with the answer that Gilquin would execute the orders. At 5.00 p.m. Gilquin left Den Helder, after sending a message to the Batavian fleet, and moved into the Koegras. The Batavian fleet now had no choice other than to leave the roads of Texel and to fall back to the Vlieter (roads east of Texel). AftermathThe troops of Gilquin now had a very difficult night. To evade the British they had to go as near to the Zuiderzee as possible. Sometimes they had to wade up to their middle through the water and mud. But favoured by the darkness, and led by Captain Jozef Jacobus van Geen with the advance guard, they reached Zand at 2.00am, with the loss of 3 howitzers (who were stuck in the mud) and only a few men. From there they retreated with the other troops to the new positions chosen by Daendels: The right wing was at the Zuiderzee near Oude-Sluis; the left wing at the North Sea near Petten; the centre behind the Oost-Egalement-Sloot (sloot = ditch). The Head-Quarters was to be at Schagerbrug. The first day was a disaster for the Batavian troops. 1400 men were dead, wounded or missing, including 57 officers. The British had succeeded in consolidating there positions and had gained a strong bridgehead. They captured Den Helder at little cost. Losses were small, especially for a landing : 3 officers and 54 others killed; 18 officers and 371 others wounded; 26 men missing. RemarksIt was not very difficult for Daendels to make out where the landings would take place. But he didn't concentrate his troops near the coast. So when the landing did take place, he didn't have enough troops to make a decisive attack. And the reinforcements that did arrive had to attack immediately after their march to battlefield. Daendels plan didn't work, because of the reasons already told. Obviously the counter-attack should have taken place much earlier. It was clear that it would be very difficult to coordinate the attacks from both wings. The Batavians did know how essential the possession of Den Helder was. But they did nothing to protect this village against an attack from the land-side. After the failure of the Batavian attack it was only a matter of time before the British troops would take Den Helder. But it was wrong for Daendels to evacuate such an important position without any serious fighting. The Zuiderzee now was open for the British fleet, and the British could support their actions now on both sides of North-Holland by sea. The initiative of van Guericke to move into the Koegras with half of his total force was a bad one. He couldn't give the jagers strong support in this marshy area. And, being already outnumbered, he still divided his few troops. If he wanted to show initiative, he would have done better to have attacked the British when they were fighting the jagers. This would have been very dangerous, with the supporting fire of the British ships, but would have had a chance of success. Van Guericke was later relieved of his command. Of course it was very brave from Daendels to stay in a dangerous position the whole afternoon, but also foolish. The death of Daendels would have a bad effect on the Batavian operations, and how difficult command and control became we have already seen. Surrender of the Batavian FleetOn the 28th August Abercromby occupied Den Helder. On the 30th August Admiral Mitchel approached the Batavian fleet in battle formation. The ships flew both the British and the Orange colours. On seeing this a mutiny broke out amongst the Batavian crews. Rear-admiral Story now held council of war, and unanimously the Batavian captains decided to surrender the fleet to the British. Now there was no opposition left against the activities of the British fleet. The Zuiderzee was open, and the British had safe roads for their ships. But admiral Mitchel didn't embark on any ambitious activities. He restricted himself to the occupation of Medemblik and Enkhuizen. Also Stavoren and Lemmer were temporarily occupied. The Batavian retreat to the Schermeer PolderDaendels in the meantime was busy strengthening his defence. His position was not as good as it looked. The Oost-Egalement-Sloot was filled up with dune-sand on many places. The left wing was very weak. The British could advance over the beach, under the protection of their fleet, and turn the Batavian positions. Daendels had under his command only 9000 men to hold a front line of 16 kilometres. His ammunition supply was not sufficient, and there was no chance of quick support. Lastly, the British could support their attacks with gunfire from their fleet and landings behind the Batavian positions. Batavian engineers made an entrenchment near Petten, batteries and parapets were thrown up. But the British did nothing. Abercromby believed that the Batavians had received strong reinforcements, so he was strengthening his defences. He had reached his objective; capture and consolidate a place to land the next echelons of British and Russians, so he didn't want to take any risks. On 28th and 29th he received reinforcements: Gen-maj Don arrived with his 3rd Brigade (17th Rgt Foot (2 battalions) and 40th Rgt Foot (2 battalions). Abercromby now had about 18000 men at his disposal. On the 28th Daendels dispatched a message to Brune. In this he stated he would hold his position as long as he could without risking the loss of his whole Division. If forced, he would retreat slowly to Haarlem, and there unite with the Brune's forces. 5th H.B. would be detached to the southeast to cover the northern approaches to Amsterdam. On the 29th he was of the opinion that the British had been reinforced to a strength of 30000 men, with 8000 Russians about to arrive any moment.
Large Map 3 (slow: 117K) Brune received Daendels message on the 29th. He then ordered Daendels to leave his position in the Zijpe only if forced to do so, and in that case to execute a fighting retreat, defend Alkmaar, and if necessary to fall back to Haarlem. When he heard that Daendels was already retreating, he ordered him to defend Alkmaar to the last, and, only if forced, to fall back on Beverwijk. Daendels had started his retreat at 3.00am. After receiving Brune's orders half way along his march, and knowing that General Gouvion, with reinforcements, had arrived at Haarlem, he decided to take position with his left wing at Alkmaar, and the right wing at Avenhorn (see map 3). His HQ was at Schermerhorn. This new position was a very strong one, especially the part behind the very deep circular canal of the Schermeer polder. Two French battalions were to defend the terrain between Alkmaar and the North Sea. When Brune received the news of Daendels' retreat he is reported to have said : "He is mad, or he is a traitor!" (Il est fou, ou il a traitre). It was only the sending of strict orders to Daendels, to stay in his new positions in the Schermeer, that prevented him leaving this position and retreating even further! In a letter from the 30th to the Batavian Agent of War Pijman Daendels wrote: "Today I left the untenable position of Zijpe, but I shall stay here because at last the French are beginning to appear, and I have strict orders to stay; but I would state it is a crime to my country to stay there any longer." That Daendels was no coward can be seen by his behaviour on the day of the British landing. But now he was panicking. He felt isolated, and was left alone for to long in such a responsible position as C.I.C. Brune was still expecting the landing in North-Holland to be a feint, and expected landings elsewhere. So the first French troops only arrived 30th August, and Brune only established his HQ at Alkmaar on 2nd September. It is even said that Daendels had plans to leave North-Holland with his Division, to take into Amsterdam a huge amount of money from the Bank and then to retreat to Gorkum with the Batavian government, and so save the Batavian Republic! Only the strict orders from Brune prevented Daendels executing this plan. Many measures for the defence were carried out (see map 3). Gunboats were posted on the IJ and the Pampus. The batteries on the coast of the Zuiderzee were made ready. The front line in North-Holland was strengthened with entrenchments, and also defences in depth were made ready: Entrenchments were constructed near Spaarndam, Penningsveer and Liebrug. Inundations were prepared in the line Monnikendam Purmerend Knollendam Krommenie Beverwijk. In the accesses, entrenchments and batteries were constructed. This line would need few troops to defend it, and protect Amsterdam in the north. In the second line inundations were made ready along the line Uitdam Oost-Zanen. The stores at Hoorn were moved. The dunes were most suitable for a British attack, and had to be occupied strongly. The commander of the Batavian engineers, the very able Lt-Col Cornelis Rudolphus Theodorus Kraijenhoff was sent to Amsterdam, to prepare the defence of the capital.
Large Map 4 (slow: 119K) They had outposts at Warmenhuizen, Haringkarpsel and Dirkshorn, with a strong reserve at Schagen. This reserve was placed there to prevent a Batavian attack on Oude Sluis, and to execute a flank attack on Batavian troops who would attack the centre of the British position. The next day the armies faced each other without fighting, apart from some clashes between patrols and outposts. At 30th August Lt-Gen Dumonceau, still defending the northeastern provinces with the 2nd Batavian Division, received orders from Brune to assemble 2/3 of his division and to march as quickly as possible to Amsterdam, to await further orders.
Large Map 5 (slow: 90K)
5th battalion `Waldeck' at Nieuwe Schans and outposts 2nd bat 4 H.B. at Harlingen and on the islands of Vlieland, Terschelling and Ameland Part of 3rd Bat Jagers (160 men) and the coy Vriesche Garde (volunteers)(140 men) at Koevorden Company of Groningsche Garde at Groningen Commander of these troops was Col Boonacker. The Orangist InvasionAs we already saw in part 1, Prince William Frederick of Orange assembled a group of Orangist officers and soldiers at Lingen in Germany. After the receiving news of the British landings and the leaving of the greater part of the Batavian troops in the northeastern provinces, Prince William Frederick judged that the time was right to invade the Batavian Republic. On 31st August a farmer was sent to Lt-Col Tieleman Evert Hoynck van Papendrecht, who commanded the troops at Koevorden. Prince William Frederick demanded that Lt-Col Hoynck van Papendrecht should change sides and to follow his orders. This demand was repeated by Col Louis van Plettenberg, who was authorised by Prince William Frederick to negotiate with the garrison of Koevorden. But Hoynck van Papendrecht refused. The same happened at Zutfen, where artillery-captain Johan Georg Arentz refused to cooperate. He took measures to prevent a surprise-attack, and was aided by armed civilians. On 3rd September, a group of 100 Orangists, armed with shotguns and pistols, commanded by Lt-Col van Dongen, took the town Enschede. Another group, commanded by Lt-Col J.G. Spengler, marched to Westervoort and took this village and the bridge over the river Ijessel on the 4th. Also the ferries at Lathum and Rheede were taken. The countrymen were raised with exaggerated reports about the strength of Prince Williams Fredericks `army', and the Orangists were joined by farmers armed with sticks, cudgels and scythes. An uprising took place in Deventer and the city elected to support the Prince. But captain Johan Godefroy Vognetz managed to get into the city (4th September) with 2 companies infantry, and quelled further uprisings and deterred an Orangist attack. At Arnhem the commander of the Civilian Guard, Col D. Schoonman, heard the news of the taking of Westervoort. He at once called out the Civilian Guard, and dispatched some volunteers with two light field guns to the river Ijessel. At Westervoort shots were fired. The Batavians had 3 men wounded, the Orangists only 1 man, but the Orangists retreated. Also of short duration were the Orangist occupations of Enschede, Oldenzaal, Almelo, Delden, Winterswijk, Aalten and other places. To further frustrate their plans the armed civilians did good service. 300 civilians from the city of Zwol marched to the Twenthe region to suppress the Orangist uprisings. Part of the Civilian Guard of Utrecht moved to the threatened provinces, and 4 companies of the Amsterdamsche Garde forming a flying column under the command of the French General Girod to complete the failure. On 16th September the last Orangists left the Batavian Republic. Prince William Frederick moved to North-Holland. The British DefenceAbercromby in the meanwhile was busy consolidating his position. His troops were placed behind the wide and deep circular canal along the Westfriesche Dike (see map 4). In Den Helder Abercromby possessed a safe harbour to unload reinforcements, horses and supplies. The weak spots in the British defence line were strengthened. Petten was surrounded with entrenchments, and 2 gunboats were anchored near the coast to provide fire support. On the left flank Oude Sluis was fortified, because this was the place were supplies from Den Helder arrived by boat. British ships and gunboats patrolled along the Zuiderzee coast looking for positions from where they could support the British forces on land, and occasionally making a raid on a village or island or to destroy a signal-post. Other ships were sailing as far as the East Sea to guide the ships that would bring the Russian troops, and to deliver messages and orders from and to Great Britain. Batavian ReinforcementsBrune assessed the situation and planned an attack on the British defences for the 10th of September. He had estimated the British to have a total strength of about 20,000 men. Since the landing the Franco-Batavian army was reinforced by about 7,000 French under the command of General de Division Dominique Joseph Rene Vandamme:
3 bttn: /49e D.B. 3 bttn: /54e D.B. 1 bttn: 1st Bat/60e D.B. 5th Rgt Chasseurs a Cheval (1 squadron) 16th Rgt Chasseurs a Cheval (4 squadrons) and the artillery, commanded by General de Brigade St. Martin; 4e coy du 4e Regiment a Cheval 1e coy du 8e Regiment a Cheval 2 coys des 6e et 7e Regiments a Pied On his arrival Vandamme occupied the terrain around the villages Schoorl and Groet, on the left flank of the Franco-Batavian army. A bridge was build over the Kanaal (canal) van Alkmaar, to maintain in close contact with the centre. On 7th September General Dumonceau reached Amsterdam after marching 240 kilometres in 7 days, and on the 9th he reached Alkmaar. The Batavian troops were reorganised to create 2 Divisions of almost equal strength. They were placed at the following positions (see map 4): Right wing: 1st Division (Lt-Gen Daendels) Advance Guard (Col Crass)
Noordscherwoude 2nd Bat Jagers 1st Brigade (Col Rietveld)
Broek 1 battalion grenadiers 2nd Bat/1st H.B. 3rd Bat/1st H.B. St. Pancras 2nd Cie Horse Artillery Rgt Dragoons (4 squadrons) 1 Cie pioneers with bridges 2nd Brigade (Gen-Maj van Zuylen van Nyevelt)
1st Bat/4th H.B. 3rd Bat/4th H.B. St. Pancras 3rd Bat/5th H.B. 5 coys 2nd Rgt Heavy Cavalry Centre: 2nd Division (Lt-Gen Dumonceau) Advance Guard (Col Gilquin)
6 coys grenadiers 1 squadron Rgt Hussars 1 division (1/3 coy) 1st Cie Horse Artillery 1st Brigade (Gen-Maj Bonhomme)
3rd Bat/6th H.B. 7th H.B. of 3 battalions 3 squadrons Rgt Hussars 1 division 1st Cie Horse Artillery 2nd Brigade (Col Bruce)
2nd Bat/6th H.B. 1st Rgt Heavy Cavalry (3+ squadron) Rear Guard (Maj Tulleken)
3 coys grenadiers 1 coy 1st Rgt Heavy Cavalry 1 division 1st Cie Horse Artillery Total strength of the Franco-Batavian army now was about 25,000-26,000 men. Brune had the assurance from General Kellerman at Brussels that he would receive reinforcements from the Belgian Garrisons. Since the landing nothing important happened. But on the morning of the 9th the British tried with a force of 20 light dragoons to penetrate to the village Oud-Karspel. But the jagers, who were in position behind some fascines, let them advance till they were only a few metres away. And then they fired a volley, killing or wounding 12 light dragoons and as many horses. The survivors were routed instantly. This engagement convinced Brune that he now had to attack, before the British received more reinforcements. So he planned an attack on the morning of the 10th September. More Anglo-Russian Landings in Holland
Landings: Part 2 Landings: Part 3 Landings: Part 4 Landings: Part 5 Landings: Part 6 Landings: Part 7 Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #9 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
This was the reason he decided to retreat in the night from 29th-30th August, this time in the direction of Amsterdam, and to take up new positions in the line Edam (or Monnikendam) Purmerend Zaandam (see map 3).
On 1st September the British advanced to take positions behind the Westfriesche Dike (see map 4).
Next day he left, leaving behind the following troops (see map 5):