Landings: Part 1 Landings: Part 2 Landings: Part 3 Landings: Part 4 Anglo-Russian Plan of Attack York decided to attack the Franco-Batavian positions for a second time on 2nd October. Again the attack would be made in four columns: The first column, on the right wing, was commanded by Lieutenant General Abercromby. It was to consist of 7910 infantry and 1010 cavalry (9 squadrons light dragoons), all British troops. These troops consisted of the 1st Guards Brigade (Doyle), the 2nd Brigade (Moore), the 4th Brigade (commanded by General Major Hutchinson, Lord Cavan having been wounded on the 19th September), and the 5th Brigade (McDonald). Abercromby had to advance along the beach to Egmond aan Zee, and from there to Egmond op de Hoef, and to cut of the Franco-Batavian retreat. The second column was commanded by General Major d'Essen. It was to consist of 8000 Russians with their artillery, the regiment hussars and the cossacks. The greater part of them had to advance along the Slaperdike, and at their arrival at the road from Groet to Kamp, move to the left in the direction of Groet and Schoorl to Bergen. The brigade of Major General Zedmoradzky had to cover the left flank of these troops, and had to advance through the terrain between the Slaperdike and the Kanaal van Alkmaar. They then had to support the attack on Bergen, and to attack Schoorldam from the west. The third column was commanded by Lieutenant General Dundas. It was to consist of 6130 infantry and a squadron of the 11th Regiment Light Dragoons, all British troops (2nd Guards Brigade (Burrard), 1st Brigade (Coote) and 6th Brigade (Chatham)). These troops were split in the separate brigades and received the following orders: The 1st Brigade (Coote) started from Petten, and had to follow the advance guard of Abercromby, circumnavigate Kamp through the dunes, and clear the road to Groet. In this way they first supported the Russians in their advance to Groet, and then they had to cover the right flank of them. The 6th Brigade (Chatham) had to follow the Russian brigade of Zedmoradzky, and then move to the right to join with the left wing of General Major d'Essen, and support him with the capture of Bergen. Also this brigade had to maintain contact with Abercromby's troops. The 2nd Guards Brigade (Burrard) started from Tuitgenhorn and Krabbendam, and had to advance at the northeast side from the Kanaal van Alkmaar in the direction of Schoorldam. They then had to attack Schoorldam simultaneous with the Brigade Zedmoradzky. This attack would be supported by 7 gunboats in the Kanaal van Alkmaar. Burrard also had to maintain contact with the fourth column. The fourth column was commanded by Lieutenant General Pulteney. This column was 6930 infantry and a regiment cavalry strong. It consisted of the 3rd Brigade (Don), the 7th Brigade (Prince William), the 8th Brigade (Manners), the 18th Regiment Light Dragoons (2 squadrons) and 2 Russian battalions. Their orders were to cover the left flank of the Anglo-Russian army, to threaten the Batavian Division of Daendels and to prevent in this way the possibility of Daendels reinforcing the left wing of the Franco-Batavian army. Pulteney was free to use his troops in any other way, if he thought the situation made it necessary. This plan of attack made it clear that York had learned from his earlier mistakes. This time 23,000 men attacked on a small front, with both flanks effectively covered (by the North Sea and the Kanaal van Alkmaar). If Abercromby acted the correctly, he could cut off the retreat of the French and destroy them completely. In this way a decisive victory could be gained. The Russians were placed in the allied centre so they would be supported closely by the British. They wouldn't have a reason to complain about being abandoned. Also this was done because of the British distrust of the Russians after their disorderly retreat from Bergen. The battle of Alkmaar (see Map 9) Abercromby's column had to wait for low tide to start their advance along the beach. At 06.30am he advanced, with the Brigade of McDonald, reinforced with 2 battalions, acting as advance guard. McDonald attacked the village Kamp and succeeded in driving of the French easily. After the taking of Kamp he advanced southeast into the dunes, and then after some time to the southwest, to rejoin Abercromby (b). This proved to be impossible for the moment, because of the extent of the dunes and the many engagements with the French. The Brigade Coote, which followed McDonald and his advance guard, turned left at Kamp, and followed the road to Groet. Brushing aside the French, they cleared the road for the Russians, and captured Groet (c). At this village, General d'Essen refused to advance any further till the dunes at his right and in front of him were occupied by the Brigade Coote. This was done by Coote (d), in cooperation with McDonald (b). Zedmoratzky, meanwhile, also advanced (e), supporting the column of General d'Essen (f) on his right flank, and himself supported by the gunboats in the Kanaal van Alkmaar. He was followed by the British Brigade Chatham (g), 150 light dragoons and the reserve artillery. At the other side of the canal, Burrard advanced with his brigade in the direction of Schoorldam, covering the left wing of Zedmoradzky and Chatham, and maintaining in contact with Pulteney by way of some infantry detachments. Upon discovering the advance of Zedmoratzky and d'Essen, the French withdrew their outposts and took up a position between Schoorl and the Kanaal van Alkmaar. Their left wing resting on the dunes, and their right wing covered by the canal. From this position they opened fire on the advancing enemy. In spite of this fire, the Anglo-Russians were still advancing. Coote by way of the dunes, and already advancing beside Schoorl (d), and d'Essen on the road to Schoorl (f), still very reluctant. Zedmoratzky showed much more energy, but he was hampered by the terrain, which was intersected by many ditches. The movement of the artillery was especially very difficult. At around 11.00am, after several attacks, supported by Chatham, Zedmoratsky succeeded in dislodging the French from their position, and the villages of Schoorl and Schoorldam were taken. After this the Russians advanced to the south, but then d'Essen stopped their advance, and limited their actions for the remainder of the day to the bombarding of the Franco-Batavian positions at Bergen and Koedijk. This gave the French the time to reinforce and rally their troops. They took up a strong defensive line from Koedijk across the fields to Bergen, and from there dominating the dunes to the east to the coast. The dunes here were about 300 feet high. At the east side they were very steep, and planted with very thick brushwood, to the sea the slopes were much more flat. York believed that a decision couldn't be reached before the French were dislodged from the dunes. To achieve this, Coote was ordered to advance through the left part of the dunes (h). He did this, with the 85th Regiment of Foot in front on his right wing. The Brigade of Major General Chatham was ordered to advance with one battalion on Coote's left wing along the edge of the dunes. His other three battalions to connect on the 85th Regiment of Foot on Coote's right wing (k). In this way the British advanced, the three battalions of Chatham in line with the 85th Regiment of Foot in front, and connected with them the remainder of Coote's battalions in oblique formation. In this way they succeeded in dispelling the French from the dominating part of the dunes, and to drive back the French to the environs of Noord-Wimmenum. At this stage time was right to undertake an attack on Bergen, but Major General d'Essen refused to attack. The brigades of Lieutenant General Dundas (Brigades Coote and Chatham) were too weak to undertake this attack and to occupy the dunes and were also without the necessary artillery, which couldn't advance into the dunes. So the British had no choice then to stay in the dunes and maintain in their position. The refusal of d'Essen to attack is not mentioned in York's official report, probably for political reasons. There is no doubt d'Essen's refusal, it being mentioned in various sources. The French, seeing the Russian hesitation, decided to attack in two columns, the British troops in the dunes. They were driven back, one column by the 85th Regiment of Foot, the other by the 27th Regiment of Foot. At this stage McDonald arrived on the British right, and, seeing the time was right, he undertook an attack on the French, and succeeded in dispelling the French out of the dunes into the open terrain south of Bergen. Now 11 British battalions took up position in the dunes, and the French, commanded by General de Division Boudet and Gouvion (promoted on the battlefield the 19th September), were too weak to resist these superior numbers. But still they occupied Bergen. Abercromby meanwhile had continued his advance along the beach, and had already advanced south of Bergen (a). The absence of the Brigade McDonald, who had to cover his left flank, forced him to advance cautiously, and to undertake many reconnaissances on this flank. Thus far he hadn't encountered any serious opposition. The French were aware of Abercromby's advance. General de Division Vandamme received reinforcements, including some Batavian troops. Bonhomme had to send 3 battalions infantry, the Regiment Hussars and the 1st Cie Horse Artillery (m); Daendels had to send 2 battalions infantry, the Regiment Dragoons and the 2nd Cie Horse Artillery (n). Clearly Brune didn't underestimate a British advance along the beach. However, because of the distance the reinforcements had to cover, most of them came to late. Only the artillery and the Hussar Regiment (which received the order to reinforce Vandamme at 05.00pm) took part in the battle. Vandamme took up a strong position in front of the village Egmond aan Zee: The infantry was positioned in the dunes, and the artillery was placed across the beach covered by the cavalry. In this position he waited for the arrival of the British. Upon their arrival, the British were welcomed by heavy artillery fire and musketry from the dunes. They received heavy losses, however, after heavy fighting, that lasted until dark, the French were forced back to Egmond aan Zee. Vandamme made use of the fall of darkness to surprise the British with an attack of the French cavalry. Their charge succeeded and the British horse artillery was forced to abandon their guns, which were taken. The charge was stopped by the British cavalry commanded by Colonel Paget, and they had to retreat, pursued by the British cavalry who retook the lost guns. On their turn the British cavalry was attacked by the Batavian Regiment of Hussars, which, commanded by Colonel Quaita and supported by the musketry from the dunes, succeeded in stopping and driving them back. At this stage it became to dark to fight, and a restless night followed, with both sides remaining under arms. Vandamme's position now was unstable. The British could easily outflank him now they controlled the dunes. So in the night Vandamme retreated (some sources state without the permission of Brune). Burrard succeeded in taking the part of Schoorldam on his side of the Kanaal van Alkmaar, and continued his advance (l), supported by the gunboats. The 2nd Batavian Division, still commanded by General Major Bonhomme (after the wounding of Lieutenant General Dumonceau) had to retreat inside the entrenchments near the village Koedijk. At this point Burrard couldn't advance any further, because the position was too strong. So the rest of the day nothing happened on this part of the battlefield. The fourth column, commanded by Lieutenant General Pulteney, made three attacks on the position of the Batavian troops at Oudkarspel (p). The British didn't make any impression on Daendels, who had entrenched his troops in a very strong position. Pulteney kept the Batavians under fire, but this didn't prevent Daendels to sent part of his troops to reinforce the left wing of the Franco-Batavians. Franco-Batavian Retreat (see Map 10) The retreat of the left wing under Vandamme made the rest of the Franco-Batavian position untenable. So Brune was forced to retreat with his whole army. His Head-Quarters were moved from Alkmaar to Beverwijk. The 2nd Batavian Division (Dumonceau) was united with the French troops, and occupied the terrain between Uitgeest and Wijk-aan-Zee, with Castricum in the centre of their position. Outposts were at Akersloot, Limmen and Bakkum and in the dunes. The 1st Batavian Division (Daendels) retreated to Purmerend and flooded the terrain to his front, creating an unapproachable position. To occupy this position 4000 men were sufficient. The rest of the Franco-Batavian army, about 20,000 men, had to defend the left wing. They had to defend a strip of terrain, about 7 km wide, between the Lange Meer and the sea. The Franco-Batavian retreat wasn't interfered with by the Anglo-Russians, clearly a sign that they had suffered in the attacks, especially the British. (York's reason for not pursuing was the exhaustion of the troops and the great difficulties that were encountered). York made his entry at Alkmaar, and set up his headquarters which were soon attended by the Prince of Orange. The Franco-Batavian losses are not known (York estimated their losses at 4000 men and 7 guns). It may be clear that the French had suffered badly, at least as badly as the Anglo-Russians, while the Batavians, who weren't engaged much, had only light losses: Daendels' losses were 15 wounded. The official Anglo-Russian losses were as follows: British troops: 237 dead, 1102 men wounded, 193 men missing. Russian troops: 170 men dead or missing, 423 men wounded. That the attack didn't succeed (except the subsequent retreat of the Franco-Batavian army) was mainly due to the following factors: 1. De Russians were moving to cautiously, and by advancing to slow (and later refuse to advance any further) deprived Abercromby of his reserves and the cover on his left wing. 2. Abercromby advanced to cautiously. His orders were to cut of the Franco-Batavian retreat, but now the French troops had the time to retreat, and take up new positions. The even had the time to reinforce their left wing with reinforcements from the centre and the right wing. 3. Their was no cooperation with the fleet, which could make Vandamme's position on the beach untenable. So again a decisive battle had not been fought, York was in desperate need of one. The distance between his troops and Den Helder was now too great to supply the troops sufficiently. The area that they now occupied had been denuded of supplies by the opposing army. The weather was wet and deteriorating, and most of the soldiers had to sleep without cover. Furthermore, hopes of the taking of Amsterdam were small, it having been turned into an impregnable fortress by Kraijenhoff. York would make one final attempt to gain a decisive victory and eliminate the Franco-Batavian army. The morale of the Franco-Batavian troops was very high. In spite of their retreat, they didn't think themselves beaten. In every combat it was clear that they were more then a match for the British and especially for the Russians. Beside this they were fighting in their own country and for their own country. They were acquainted with the terrain, and were supplied with everything they needed. Also the French, and especially the Batavian troops were led by very capable officers, something that was not (always) the case with their opponents. The Franco-Batavian Commander in Chief wasn't that capable either, but all his subordinate commanders were prepared to act on their own initiative, according to the situation. Of course they were secure in the knowledge that if something did go terribly wrong, Brune was the first who would be blamed. The Russians and British had very capable commanders, but their efforts were too no effect because of the mistakes of the high command, the friction between the British and Russians, and last, but not least, the unfamiliar terrain where they had to fight on. What was needed in this kind of terrain, were rash commanders who didn't look over their shoulders to often, who dared to take decisions and could act independently. It was simply, not the terrain where a commander could set up his Head-Quarters on a hill in the centre of his lines and lead all his troops from there. On each occasion the Anglo-Russian troops were divided into separate columns and issued with detailed orders, only to have them changed at the last minute, because of the ever-changing strategic situation. Beside this, the soldiers were already fighting for nearly five weeks, mostly to their ankles or knees in the mud, without a dry place to sleep, and without enough food and other supplies. Many soldiers at this time wore only rags and were barefooted. Hundreds fell sick every day and there was nowhere they could be nursed properly. The Batavian government was in poor spirits, most of North-Holland was occupied by the enemy and the damage done to this province was enormous. Vast tracts were flooded and made unusable for agriculture by the salt water. Whole villages were nothing more then ruins, and dikes, canals, bridges and roads were destroyed. Brune didn't take any notice of the Batavian government's pleas. The Batavian republic was nothing more than a French satellite, and could only decide matters that didn't dispute French interests. York's Plan for the Decisive Battle The battle of that was to occur on 6th October was not intended by either side. York had decided to fight a last decisive battle (probable on the 7th October), but to gain the right starting positions on the 6th he attacked the Franco-Batavian outposts at Bakkum, Limmen and Akersloot, who were blocking the roads to the south. With the possession of these he could start his attack closer to the Franco-Batavian positions, and by using the roads rather than travelling across country, his troops would be less tired on arrival. The attempt to take these outposts would escalate to a complete battle, with both sides feeding in more and more troops. Daendels didn't take part in this battle, his troops were too far from the battlefield, and separated from it by very difficult terrain. Jumbo Battle of Alkmaar Map (extremely slow: 383K) Jumbo Franco-Batavian Retreat Map (extremely slow: 718K) More Anglo-Russian Landings in Holland Landings: Part 1 Landings: Part 2 Landings: Part 3 Landings: Part 4 Landings: Part 5 Landings: Part 6 Landings: Part 7 Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #12 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com