Peter Bagration:
The Best Georgian General
of the Napoleonic Wars
Part 3: Withdrawal and Guerrilla War
By Alexander Mikaberidze,
Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia
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Borodino: the Final GloryBy August 22, the Russian army had established itself in the area of Borodino. Under Kutusoff's orders, active preparation went forward to give battle on a favorable defensive position. The position chosen by Kutusoff occupied a front of 8 kilometers. The front line passed through Maslovo, Gorky, Borodino, Semyenovskoe, and Utytsa. The right flank lay on the Moscow River at Maslovo, and the left flank was anchored in the almost impassable Utytsk Forest. The center was based on Kurgan height. The Borodino position covered two important routes to Moscow: the New Smolensk Road and the Old Smolensk Road, the route by which Napoleon's army was moving. Kutusoff had a high opinion of the Borodino position. In his report to Alexander, dated on August 23, 1812, he wrote to the Czar: " . . . The position in which I have stopped, at the village of Borodino, 12 miles forward of Mozhaisk, is one of the best that it is possible to find on otherwise flat terrain…. It is desirable that the enemy attack us in this position, which offers great hopes for a victory." The most vulnerable portion of the Borodino position was its left flank. Kutusoff understood this well and reported to Alexander that, "the weakness of this position is located on the left flank, and I shall try to correct it." Kutusoff assigned his most proven troops, Bagration's 2nd Western Army, to the left flank. Moreover, he ordered that this flank be strengthened by the construction of earthworks. At Semyenovskoe, three redoubts, the so-called "fleches" ("flèche" - a fieldwork whose sides meet to form an obtuse angle), were constructed. They were subsequently named after Bagration, whose troops so courageously defended them during the battle. To the west, from Semyenovskoe, was located an advanced work, the so-called Shevardyn Redoubt. On the Kurgan Heights was an 18-gun battery known under the name of "Rayevsky's Battery". Kutusoff intended to wage a defensive battle against Napoleon, possibly leading to such large losses that the result would change the ratio of forces advantageously, and in the case of a favorable outcome, to permit an advance against the French army. The Russian order of battle consisted of the right wing, the center, the left wing, and reserves. Barclay de Tolly was assigned command of both the right and center. With the right wing, from Maslovo up to Gorky, the 2nd and 4th Infantry Corps, along with the 2nd Cavalry Corps, were deployed. In the center, from Gorky up to Kurgan heights, Kutusoff placed the 6th Infantry and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. On the left, most dangerous wing, Bagration's troops were established: the 7th and 8th Infantry Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps. Six Cossack Regiments under Karpov defended the area of Utizy. Here Kutusoff ordered the 3rd Infantry Corps, under command of N.A. Tuchkov, to be deployed almost perpendicularly to the 8th Infantry Corps, with the objective that it should be in readiness to operate against the flank and rear of Napoleon's army. However, Kutusoff's chief of staff, General Benningsen, failed to implement this order. On the eve of battle, he placed Tuchkov's Corps with its front to the French, which did not correspond to Kutusoff's order. Kutusoff gave great attention to the creation and the conservation of reserves. "Reserves," he specified, "should be saved as long as possible, since the general who still possesses a reserve is not defeated." Bagration valued the presence of reserves as extremely important. In his order to the army on the eve of the battle, he wrote, "It is necessary to have strong reserves and to locate them as close as possible to the works." Kutusoff had in reserve the following troops: the 5th Infantry Corps and the 1st Cuirassier Division positioned at Knyazkov. The artillery reserve (306 guns) was assembled at Psarev. These forces made up the main reserve available for use on the right wing, the center, or on the left wing. Moreover, each wing had special reserves. The right wing's reserve was composed of the 9 Cossack Regiments under M.I. Platov and the 1st Cavalry Corps under F. P. Uvarov. The left wing's reserve consisted of the 2nd Grenadier and the 2nd Cuirassier Divisions, the Don artillery, and a separate artillery reserve of the left wing. This reserve was located to the east from Semyenovskoe. Having pondered the Russian positions, Napoleon decided to strike the left flank of the fortified Russian positions, to break through Russian defenses here, drive through to its rear, and to destroy it, having pressed to the Moscow River. Napoleon concentrated the great bulk of the French army, the Army Corps of Murat, Davout, Ney, and Junot, on the axis of the main attack. With the purpose of concealing the direction of the main effort, Napoleon planned demonstrative actions against Borodino and Utizy. On August 24, Napoleon launched as assault against the Shevardyn Redoubt. The Emperor committed 30,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 186 guns. The Russians met them with 8,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 36 guns. Both sides fought with great courage and boldness. After several attacks the French managed to seize the redoubt. Bagration then sent two divisions to assist the redoubts defenders finally throw back the French by a vigorous counter-attack. In the general orders of the following day, Kutusoff declared that, "the heated affair that took place yesterday on the left flank, finished to the glory of the Russian Army." The fight for the Shevardyn Redoubt was important. It provided the Russian Army with an opportunity to finish construction of the basic defensive works in the Borodino position. Moreover, this engagement made clear Napoleon's intention to direct the main French thrust against the Russian left wing. The Russian forces having carried out the task put before them, Kutusoff ordered Bagration to redeploy his troops from Shevardyn Redoubt. With the approach of darkness, Bagration's troops withdrew from the redoubt and occupied their main defensive positions. During August 25 (6 September), both sides made their last preparations for the forthcoming battle. The French army totaled some 135,000 men and 587 guns. The Russian army confronted the French with 120,000 soldiers and 640 guns. The Borodino battle began at dawn of August 26 (7 September), with a powerful artillery cannonade from both sides. The French then advanced on Borodino, which lay, defended by Jägers, in front of the Russian positions. The Jägers, after firm resistance, were compelled to retire to the Kalacha River under the pressure of superior enemy forces. Nevertheless, these French attacks were principally designed to be feints. The main effort was developing at "Bagration's fleches" and at the Rayevsky Battery. The Fight for the FlechesAbout at 6 am, Marshal Davout's Corps attacked Bagration's positions, with approximately 25,000 men, supported by 102 guns. The Summary Grenadier Division under command of Vorontsov and the 27th Infantry Division under the leadership of Neverovsky defended "Bagration's fleches". In total, there were 8,000 Russians and 50 guns to meet the attack. Despite of the three-fold French superiority of manpower and two-fold advantage in artillery, the Russians had confidence in their forces and were in high spirit. "In their first onset they advanced like devotees, with the cry, 'God have mercy upon us!' and, as each forward rank went down before the relentless invaders, those behind pressed onward over the bodies of their comrades," wrote W. Sloane in his book Life of Napoleon. The Russians met the attacking columns of the French with a heavy artillery fire. Simultaneously, Russian Jägers, scattered in front of fleches, opened fire on the enemy. The French could not sustain the Russian storm fire and leaving behind many killed and wounded withdrew in disorder. The first French assault against "Bagration's fleches" has exhausted itself. At 7 am the French renewed their attack. Suffering great losses, they managed to grasp the left-most fleche. However, Bagration ordered some battalions of 27th Infantry Division forward in a vigorous counter-attack against the enemy flank. The French were again thrown back, again suffering heavy losses. Thus the second attack on "Bagration's fleches" also finished in failure for the French. Napoleon was impressed with the tenacious resistance by Bagration's troops. The French Emperor supported Davout with the corps of Ney and Junot, as well as Murat's cavalry, and ordered a third attack against "Bagration's fleches." In the meantime, Bagration considerably strengthened his position by bringing up his reserve: the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Cuirassier divisions. He had also directed eight battalions from Raevsky's 7th Corps to redeploy to the north of the fleches. And finally, Bagration positioned Konovnitsyn 3rd Infantry Division at Semyenovskoe. Kutusoff, who was closely watching the development of the fight at "Bagration's fleches," sent large reserves to strengthen Bagration's position. The Russian Commander-in-Chief ordered forward on the left wing the 2nd and a part of 5th Infantry Corps, and also 100 guns from the main artillery reserve. However, relocation of these forces was likely to require at least l-2 hours. Therefore Bagration would have to rely on only his own forces during the next French attack. At 8 am, after a powerful artillery bombardment, the third attack on "Bagration's fleches" began. The French managed initially to rush into both the right and left fleches, but Bagration's troops beat them out with a prompt counter-attack and restored the position by 9 am. Simultaneously with the third attack, the forces of Poniatowski's Corps attacked Utizy with the purpose of striking for the rear of Bagration's forces, but Tuchkov's 3rd Infantry Corps repulsed this attempt and thereby broke up the French enveloping maneuver. This new failure infuriated Napoleon. He strengthened Davout's and Ney's Corps by sending forward Murat's Corps, and at 9 am the French launched their fourth attack. They managed to seize the fleches and the village of Semyenovskoe. By this time, however, the 2nd and 5th Corps began to arrive to reinforce Bagration's 2nd Army. Bagration now threw all of his available forces against his enemy. The French troops were again ejected with heavy losses. Thus the fourth attack against "Bagration's fleches" had also finished in failure. Disregarding casualties, Napoleon decided to seize "Bagration's fleches" by any and all means. At 10 am the French mounted their fifth attack; at 10.30am, their sixth; at 11 am, their seventh! Each of these attacks, however, was rebuffed. With a view to counteracting the French hammer-blows, Kutusoff continued to strengthen his left wing. He threw in the 4th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry Corps. In addition, he prepared a courageous maneuver with the objective of attacking the left flank and rear of the enemy. To accomplish this task he chose Platov's Cossack Regiments and Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps. At noon, the French opened their eighth attack on "Bagration's fleches." This time against Bagration's 18,000 soldiers and 300 guns Napoleon sent 45,000 men with 400 guns. Bagration decided to meet the enemy boldly and fierce hand-to-hand fighting erupted. Military historian Buturlin, one participant of this fight, wrote: "An awful combat took place, in which, on both sides, miracles of almost supernatural bravery were displayed. The infantry, cavalrymen, and gunners of both sides, having got mixed up together, presented an awful spectacle of the great bulk of soldiers struggling in private, furious despair." Bagration Falls Wounded
"When he was wounded," wrote N.B. Golitsyn, "he, despite his sufferings, wanted to wait for the outcome of the attack by the Second Cuirassier Division and to make sure with own eyes of its success; after that, feeling sincere gratification, he left the battle-field." The news of Bagration's injury made for some confusion among the troops. The management of 2nd Western Army was broken and, under pressure of superior enemy forces, the Russians were compelled to retire. "This unfortunate occasion," wrote Kutuzoff to Emperor Alexander, "rather upset the hitherto successful action of our left wing, which until that time had enjoyed an ascendancy over the enemy…." After Bagration's wounding, temporary command of the left wing has taken up by Konovnitsyn, who was soon replaced by Dokhturov. The Russian forces retreated and occupied Semyenovskoe, "Bagration's fleches" remaining in French hands. Napoleon now decided to commit his reserve to the battle - the Imperial Guard - to complete this initial break-up of the Russian positions. At the same time, by order of Kutusoff, Platov and Uvarov bypassed the left flank of Napoleon's army and launched a sudden attack in the Valuem-Bezubovo area. The panic among the transport and troops of the left flank temporarily distracted Napoleon from further attacks against the 2nd Western Army for about two hours while he dealt with the eruption on his left. During the time thus won, Kutusoff rearranged his forces and strengthened the center and the left wing. Subsequently, the continued attempts by Napoleon to break through the Russian defense experienced no success, save that of managing to grasp the battery of Rayevsky. By the end of day, the Russian army stood firmly on the Borodino position. Having become convinced of the futility of continued attacks, Napoleon order his troops to resume their initial positions. Thus concluded the famous Battle of Borodino. Kutusoff informed Alexander of its results on August 29 (September 10), 1812: "This battle, which took place on the 26th, was the most bloody of those known in modern times. The battlefield remains entirely ours, and the enemy retired to those positions from which he had opened his attack against us." Who Won Borodino? The question of who won the Battle of Borodino has always caused fierce debate. To my mind, Napoleon won at Borodino while losing the campaign. In this regard, the Battle of Borodino may be considered a great Russian victory. The French suffered serious losses as a result of the battle and Napoleon's plan to crush the Russian army in a decisive engagement was derailed. The French army lost about 58,000 casualties from 135,000 effectives; Russian losses amounted to about 44,000. The forces under Bagration's command played an especially important role in the battle. Operating under the main blows of the enemy, they courageously repulsed numerous attacks by the French and in many respects contributed directly to the general victory of Russian army. "This day," wrote Kutusoff, "will be an eternal monument to the courage and excellent bravery of the Russian soldiers, where all infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. The desire of everyone was to die on the spot without conceding an inch to the enemy. The French army under Napoleon's personal leadership, and being of superior numbers, could not overcome the determination of the Russian soldier who, endowed with courage, offered his life for the fatherland." After the victory gained at Borodino, the Russian army prepared for a transition in its approach to the ultimate objective of ejecting Napoleon's army from Russia. Its huge losses and the absence if necessary reserves with which to rebuild, however, postponed the development of active operations and compelled commander-in-chief Kutusoff to order a withdrawal to Moscow to enable the Russian army to replace its losses and to continue the war under more favorable conditions. "As the business of war looks not only to the glories of the battles won, but also bends all resources and efforts to the destruction of the French Army… I have taken the decision to retire…." Kutusoff now informed Alexander. With the retreat of the Russian army from Borodino, a new period in the Great Patriotic War of 1812 began, during which the Russian Army, under the leadership of Kutusoff, skillfully carried out a flank march to Tarutino, finished their preparations for broad offensive actions and, having passed over to mounting resolute counter-attacks, defeated Napoleon's armies. Bagration was not fated to participate in all these events. Evacuated to the village of Simy, in Vladimir province, he died there from his battle-wound on 14 September (26 September) 1812, bringing an end to the account of his life just short of his 47th year. Bagration - "The God of an Army"On September 17, the day of Bagration's funeral, General - Aide-de-camp Sen-Pry was one of Bagration's only intimates present at the mourning ceremony in Simy - and only because, being himself wounded, he was in the vicinity for treatment. Twenty-five years later, on the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, which was celebrated rather solemnly, it was decided to set up on the battlefield a memorial obelisk in honor of fallen heroes. The famous Denis Davydov, who was still alive, arranged with the permission of Czar Nikolay to transfer ashes of the great commander and hero of the 1812 war to rest at the bottom of this monument. And so the resting-place worthy of the great Bagration was finally determined. Peter Bagration bears a huge share of credit for the victory of the Russian army in the Great Patriotic War of 1812. The Russian forces under his command inflicted serious defeats on French arms by their skilful actions during the summer retreat and at the Battle of Borodino. Bagration takes his place in the history of military art as a remarkable commander who made a great contribution to the development of advanced methods of conducting the armed struggle. He demonstrated outstanding examples of skilful decision-making amidst complex strategic and tactical tasks on various battlefields. "Suvarov's disciple," wrote S.G. Volkonsky about Bagration, "never betrayed the instructor and up to the end of his life was a Glory of the Russian army." Being the talented representative of the Suvarov's strategy, Bagration, together with other progressive figures of Russian army at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th Centuries, was a bearer of advanced military ideas for that era. Highly gifted by nature, with a "wise and flexible mind", he rendered practical decisions of radical problems. In the field of strategy, the one of the most urgent questions was to define ways of achieving quick and decisive victory over the enemy. In spite of its out-datedness, Prussian positional strategy was still very much "alive"; yet, new strategic Napoleonic and Suvarovian insights into strategy did much to herald changes and to sweep it aside. In contrast to adherents of positional strategy, who gave greatest value to the struggle for fortresses and the communications of the enemy, supporters of new strategic insights advanced the idea that the destruction of enemy's armed forces in open battles was most important. They rejected the requirement of old strategic thinking that required equal distribution of forces and means on a battlefield for maintenance of coverage in all directions and instead championed the necessity of massing of forces and means at the major strategic points to achieve decisive battlefield decisions against the enemy as the best means of achieving a fast and complete victory. The champions of this new decisive strategic thinking in the Russian army were A.V. Suvarov and whole group of his followers, among whom was Bagration. Bagration's actions gave many vivid examples of the skilful execution of tasks in light of this new thinking. It was especially evident in his actions as commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army and during the Great Patriotic War of 1812. Bagration acted as the commander-innovator placing before the Russian army decisive strategic tasks and rejecting the increasingly obsolete positional strategy of the old school. The forms of military operations used by Bagration corresponded to his advanced perspective on the character of strategy. Under his command the Russian forces gave instructive examples of offensive and defensive actions. Under adverse conditions, Bagration was equally capable of applying his methods to retreat. But he considered offensive action as the basic form for the conduct of combat, for only by approach and contact was it possible to achieve the rout of the enemy's armed forces and to accomplish one's strategic purpose in the shortest time-frame. "In all cases," wrote Bagration, "I prefer offensive war to a defensive one" Bagration's strategic views defined also his insights about the character of tactical military action. It is possible to discern these insights, for example, by considering the famous order to the forces of the 2nd Western Army, dated June 25, 1812. In the order, written by Bagration with own hand, instructions were given concerning actions to be taken against the French armies if they invaded Russian territory. He wrote: "For us, it is necessary to attack them bravely, quickly, not to become engaged in shooting matches; artillery must fire precisely; irregular armies must try to surround their flanks and rear . . .The regular cavalry attacks quickly, but as a part of concerted action, without dividing into small bodies. Squadrons must support each other in the attack, not forgetting to provide for reserves and flanks. The cavalry should be located under the chess order." Attacks were to be conducted with troops formed in columns. "Commanders of Corps must try to turn all attention to attacking the enemy with bayonets, using columns, and to attack until the enemy retreats. The horse artillery should operate energetically, as should cavalry, but harmoniously and without the slightest confusion. It is especially necessary when the enemy has strong reserves and may frustrate our attacking forces; for that we must try to have our forces in columns and in readiness, and as soon as everyone is driven into flight, then the Cossacks must prick and harass them, with the regular forces in close and harmonious support." Bagration recommended deployment of the forces in a battle array that was not too closely packed, but sufficiently so to permit soldiers to fell each other's presence with their elbows. In case of counterattacks by enemy cavalry, Bagration advised the use of battalion masses and squares, or "carres". "When the enemy cavalry attacks infantry, it takes only a minute to form either a column closed on all sides, or a battalion in a 'carre'." With the purpose of increasing the enthusiasm of armies, all attacks were to be made with a shout and during the approach the drums were to be beaten and music to be played. Influences Similar insights are reflected in a number of Bagration's other orders, instructions and letters. In particular, as the characteristic of his tactical perspective, the "Manual for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" may serve as an example. This document was prepared on the basis of the "Manual to Officers of the Narva infantry Regiment," authored by M.S. Vorontsov in 1812. According to military historian P. Simansky, Vorontsov's manual "was strongly influenced by Suvarov's precepts, and was appraised by the most favorite disciple of Suvarov, Prince Bagration; it was slightly corrected by him, as in some places it concerned only Narva infantry Regiment, and then in July 1812 it was dispatched to all units of the 2nd Army." The "Manual to Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" recognized the offensive as the fundamental form of combat. The principal manifestation of offensive combat was the bayonet attack, concluded with a vigorous pursuit of the defeated enemy. This "Manual" considered in detail the question of action in separate lines and in columns and about conducting aimed fire. The necessity of maintenance by skirmishers of a close communication with their columns was specified; movement forward was to be determined only by an order of the chief of division or battalion. If it was necessary to operate on separate line in forests, it was suggested to hold a reserve behind one of flanks in order to have an opportunity to envelope suddenly the flank of a counter-attacking enemy. Attacks by enemy cavalry acting in separate lines was to be met by fire, having permitted the enemy to advance to within 150 paces; after that it would be necessary to divide into small groups of 10 and to repulse the enemy by fire and bayonets until the approach of reinforcements. Upon approaching, reinforcements were to be redeployed from a column into square, firing on enemy cavalry from a distance of 150 paces. The "Manual" demanded that officers demonstrate constant care for their soldiers, to remind them of their duties and the oath, to explain what was required from them during military actions. Special attention was addressed to maintenance of trust in the virtue of "Russian bayonets", a spirit of boldness, courage and persistence in the fight. "Persistence and courage," declared the "Manual", "have won more battles than all other military talents taken altogether." Dissemination of all rumors of disaster and panic, such as "we are cut off", were categorically forbidden, under a threat of severe punishments. It was specified in the "Manual" that: "Brave people are never cut off; wherever the enemy goes, turn your breast to follow and defeat him." Thus, in the field of tactics, as well as in the field of strategy, Bagration acted as an innovator, a convinced supporter of decisive offensive action. He doggedly introduced advanced tactics; he dispensed with obsolete positional tactics and applied tactics of columns in a combination with separate lines. Paying great attention to the value of offensive combat, Bagration at the same time did not reject the opportunity to conduct defensive operations. He creatively approached planning for his assigned tasks, applying such forms of combat as provided exactly the right answers to particular circumstances. His practical legacy offers experience rich in the conduct of offensive battles as well as the development and practice of waging both advance and rear guard fights. Bagration was the unsurpassed master of organization of these extremely complex kinds of actions. It was not casually that at the most crucial moments of wars of 1799-1807, it was Bagration who was appointed to command the rear guards and advance guards of the Russian Army. The engagements, conducted by Russian armies under Bagration's leadership during the Italian campaign of 1799, and also the advance and rear guard combats during the Swiss campaign of 1799 and war between of Russia and France in 1805-1807, belong among the finest accomplishments in Russian military art. Bagration built a process of education and training of soldiers on the basis of the system developed by A.V. Suvarov. He paid great attention to the training and education of troops to develop soldiers with courage and initiative, capable of carrying out orders quickly and skillfully. Bagration constantly worried about soldiers' health, and that they were well clothed and be fed on time. S.G. Volkonsky, who during the Franco-Russian conflict of 1806-1807 was frequently was in Bagration's group, wrote: "... I visited several times an avant-garde where many of my friends were serving at Prince Bagration's headquarters. The hospitable manner of the Prince with subordinates, amicable relations between themselves, harmony, cleanliness in tents, the fresh and pleased appearance of the lower grades - proved the Prince's good treatment and attitude toward them, and in all hearts the pledge of general trust in him". Cases of the careless attitude of other commanders towards their subordinates provoked feeling of deep indignation for Bagration. For example, in the order to the 2nd Western Army dated on February 13 (25), 1812, Bagration underlined the poor organization of medical treatment in the 11th Jäger Regiment and specifically noted that soldiers were left without any attention owing to the carelessness of Dr. Baranovich, whom "I order to be arrested and detained for one month . . ." While showing a concern for the soldier, however, Bagration at the same time demanded the maintenance of high military discipline, considering it to be the foundation of military service. "In military service," he wrote, "the first objective is order, subordination, discipline, unanimity and friendship." First of all Bagration was extremely demanding of himself. "...To execute the will of the sovereign, of the emperor and my commanders is the most sacred obligation which I follow and obey at every step of my service…. I love soldiers, I respect their bravery, and equally I demand order and discipline." Armies under Bagration's command were always distinguished by high discipline and, in some sense, this was one of the main reasons for their brilliant victories over enemies. Bagration's military achievements had brought him great glory. "The God of an army" ("Bog [the God]-rati [army]-on [he is]") - thus was he named in the Russian army. Bagration's name was widely known not only in Russia, but also is far beyond its boundaries. Many outstanding contemporary military figures of Western Europe estimated his military talent highly. In the opinion of Polish General Kolachkovsky, one of the participants of the 1812 campaign, Bagration "belonged among the most famous military leaders of his time" and might be numbered with the glorified military commanders like Napoleon, Suvarov, Kutusov, Ney, Davout and many others. Napoleon himself considered Bagration to be the best general in the Russian army. BibliographyGeneral Bagration. Summary of Documents and Materials published by Gospolizdat, 1945 (in Russian).
More Peter Bagration
Part 1: 1799-1810 Part 1: Preparations for the French Invasion of Russia Part 1: War Plans Part 2: Change of Plans
Part 3: Withdrawal and Guerrilla War
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It was at exactly this moment that Bagration fell fatally wounded. A splinter from a French shell struck him in a leg, but Bagration did not lose courage.