Peter Bagration:
The Best Georgian General
of the Napoleonic Wars

Part 2: Feint or Flight:
Battle at Saltanovka

By Alexander Mikaberidze,
Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia

Having found that Davout had already seized Mogilyov, Bagration decided to lead the 7th Infantry Corps to attack the French in accordance with his earlier plan. The objective was to discover the composition of the enemy forces in the area of Mogilyov and, in the case of finding only advance elements of Davout's

Bagration urged Rayevsky to speed up the preparation for his attack on the French so as to hit them before they could be reinforced. Simultaneously, Bagration took vigorous measures to search for a ferry between Mogilyov and Stary Bikhov. The Russian commander wrote to Rayevsky on July 11: "If our Lord gives us an opportunity to find a ferry between you and Stary Bikhov, then we shall immediately cross the river."Corps, to seize Mogilyov and a ferry route across the Dnepr for the 2nd Western Army. If, on the other hand, Davout's main body were found to be in the area of Mogilyov, Bagration expected to use this attack to distract and pin the enemy in a position at Mogilyov while passing the 2nd Western Army over the Dnepr to the south of Mogilyov and thereafter force-marching to Smolensk.

By July 10 (22), Bagration's troops occupied the following positions. The 7th Infantry Corps occupied Dashkovka; the 8th Infantry Corps was at Stary Bikhov, one march from the 7th Corps. Platov also arrived there with the object of passing over the Dnepr at this point and moving along left bank in order to contact the 1st Western Army. Bagration, however, intended to attack the enemy on July 12, by which time he expected to have concentrated all of his forces in area to the south of Mogilyov. In connection with forthcoming fight, Bagration asked Platov to postpone temporarily the ferrying of his command across the Dnepr.

In the meantime, Davout, having discerned Bagration's intentions, had begun looking for a battle-position in which to detain the Russian army. Taking into account his significant cavalry and artillery forces, Davout selected a position at Saltanovka. The position extended about two kilometres and was bound to the east by the Dnepr, and to the west by forests. To the front, it was covered by a brook, which flowed southeast through a ravine and into the Dnepr. Davout occupied the field in the following battle array. On the right flank, at Fatova, five battalions of the 108th and one battalion of 85th Line Regiments were posted. On the left flank, at Saltanovka, were three other battalions of 85th Line Regiment. Behind the right flank, between villages of Fatova and Selen, were four battalions of 61st Line, and at the village of Solets, the general reserve stood consisting of the 5th Cuirassiers Division, the remains of the 3rd Léger Regiment, and two battalions from the 61st and 85th Line Regiments.

About 7 PM on July 11, the advance guard of the 7th Corps of the Russian army, composed of the 6th and 42nd Jäger Regiments, led the attack from the direction of Saltanovka. Having pushed back the French sentry posts, it reached the bridge at 8pm. Despite strong musket and artillery fire which the enemy conducted from the left bank, the Jägers, under command of Colonel Glebov, overcame the bridge defences and continued to advance, but shortly after, attacked by the French 85th Line Regiment, the Jägers were compelled to retreat.

Having arrived on the battlefield and considered the situation, Rayevsky was convinced of the difficulty of success on the present axis of attack and clearly saw the threat to his left flank from the enemy forces located at Fatova. He therefore decided to mount attacks simultaneously against the French at both Saltanovka and Fatova, with the main forces directed against the former, and elements of the 26th Infantry Division under General Paskevich, against the latter. In accordance with this revised plan, the 26th Infantry Division was ordered to manoeuvre on a narrow wood

footpath toward Fatova to attack French forces there. The beginning of this attack would serve as a signal for the approach march of the main body of the 7th Corps. Paskevich's 26th Division deployed in one column: two battalions of the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments, with 12 guns were, were at the head followed by the Poltava and Ladoga Regiments, while one battalion of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regiment and cavalry brought up the rear.

On the approach to Fatova through the woods, battalions of the 26th Infantry Division met a battalion of the French 85th Regiment. This French battalion had been advancing on the right bank of the brook with the intention of attacking the flank of the Russian forces moving on Saltanovka. Russian Jägers halted its progress and threw it back from the wood. To the aid of this battalion, the French command directed a battalion of 108th Regiment. Both French battalions located themselves on the height to the south of Fatova, in columns, with a clear field of fire ahead.

Paskevich, having deployed the battalions of the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments on the wood's edge, resolutely ordered his troops forward to the attack. The Russian battalions, with a shout of "Hurrah", advanced and overthrew their opponents and, pursuing them, seized Fatova. Positioned on the height south of Fatova, 12 Russian guns supported the Russian attack

After passing through Fatova, the advancing Russian battalions were suddenly counterattacked by four battalions of the French 108th Line Regiment which had been stealthily waiting nearby for the Russians to emerge. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued in which, despite their courage and heroism, the Russians troops were compelled to withdraw.

At almost the same moment the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments launched their assault on Fatova, the Poltava Regiment opened its offensive. At first its attack developed successfully: the regiment crossed the brook by the bridge and struck toward Fatova and a battalion of the French 108th Line. Soon after, however, the French threw two battalions of 61st Line against the open flank of the Poltava Regiment and have forced it to retire.

In the meantime Paskevich had advanced 6 more guns to the heights, deployed the Ladoga Regiment on the height to the west of road, and positioned Jägers further to the west, in a wood. These troops beat back all attempts by the French to advance across the brook on the left flank and centre. But on right, two French battalions in pursuit of the Orlov and Nizhniy Novgorod Regiments retreating from Fatova, managed to cross the brook and to capture the right flank of Paskevich's Division.

With the intention of liquidating the threat which hung over his right flank, Paskevich ordered forward the Poltava Regiment, supported by four guns to their rear. The French resolutely attacked this Russian regiment, which slowly began to retire on the battery hidden behind it. As the Russian infantry drew near its guns, it quickly parted to both sides, unmasking the artillery to the oncoming French. The Russian gunners worked their guns to deadly effect, after which the infantrymen of the Poltava Regiment counterattacked the French battalions and threw them back across the brook.

Main Efforts

As these events unfolded around Fatova, the main efforts of the 7th Corps were directed against Saltanovka. For the initial approach on Saltanovka, General Rayevsky chose the Smolensk Infantry Regiment, which was one of the best regiments in the Corps, and deployed it in column on the road. The column was to seize a dam and cover the approach march of other forces of the Corps. This column was to be supported by the 6th and 42nd Jäger Regiments, which were also to advance to the dam, and by the artillery located on the heights to both sides of the road. Owing to a variety of reasons, the attack on Saltanovka did not begin simultaneously with that against Fatova, as had been provided for in the original plan, but opened much later.

The progress of the Smolensk Regiment toward Saltanovka was met by heavy French fire. Russian troops did not hesitate, but continued to advance courageously. The French command, aspiring to break up the Russian attack, threw against it a battalion of the 85th Line. This battalion crossed the brook below the bridge, with an objective of striking the right flank of Russian column. Rayevsky, at the head of the Russian column, discovered the threat to his right flank only as the column headed approached the dam. This threat was so dangerous that Rayevsky was compelled to turn the column aside to face the French threat, eventually crushing the French battalion after a tenacious fight.

From prisoners seized during the fight, Rayevsky learned that the French command was concentrating the main forces of Davout's Corps, some five divisions, upon the 7th Infantry Corps. In light of the obvious superiority of enemy forces, and also considering that operations of his Corps at Saltanovka had held down French troops, thereby accomplishing their assigned task, Rayevsky did not dare to renew attack. He gave the order to withdraw, a decision that Bagration subsequently approved. Rayevsky directed the 7th Infantry Corps, covered by the rearguard, to Dashkovka.

Losses of Rayevsky's corps amounted to 2,548 killed, wounded, and missing. The French suffered losses of 4,134. Russian troops demonstrated noteworthy heroism and courage during the battle. General Raevsky reported to Bagration:

"The combined bravery and diligence of Russian troops spared me destruction by a superior enemy and in a such disadvantageous place; I bear witness that many officers and soldiers being twice wounded, having bound up these wounds, returned to battle as if to a feast. I must praise the bravery and art of the gunners: on this day everyone was a hero.…"

In the orders to the 2nd Western Army on July 13, 1812, Bagration declared gratitude to the generals, officers and all troops who had participated in fight at Saltanovka and later bestowed awards upon some 409 soldiers and officers.

The Final Slip: Arrival in Smolensk

With the intention of deceiving the enemy concerning his further actions, Bagration ordered to the 7th Corps to arrive at Dashkovka on July 12, and asked Platov to direct the Cossack Corps entrusted to him to reach the 1st Western Army on the left shore of Dnepr, past Mogilyov. Bagration sought to induce the French command to believe that Russians were going to renew their attack against Mogilyov from both the east and south. On July 12, Platov's Cossacks crossed the Dnepr at Vorkolabov and set off in the direction specified by Bagration. Throughout the day, the 7th Infantry Corps remained at Dashkovka. The French, expecting a Russian attack, waited at Mogilyov without moving.

In the meantime at Novy Bikhov, construction of a bridge was completed, and on July 13, the Russians began to cross the Dnepr the 8th Infantry Corps and 4th Cavalry Corps. The next day, the 7th Infantry Corps withdrew from Dashkovka and, following in the wake of its fellows, traversed the Dnepr. The final flank march of 2nd Western Army, from Novy Bikhov, via Propoysk - Cherykov - Krychev - Mstyslav - Khyslavichy, to Smolensk, was covered toward Mogilyov by a strong veil of Cossack Regiments.

On July 22, the 2nd Western Army arrived in Smolensk where, since July 20, the 1st Western Army had stood awaiting Bagration's arrival. The two armies had united; Napoleon's design for the destruction of the Russian army had been frustrated.

The withdrawal of the 2nd Western Army from Volkovysk to Smolensk during the Great Patriotic War of 1812 numbers among the more remarkable events in the history of military art. Bagration demonstrated an outstanding example of strategic management of an army in difficult fighting conditions. For 35 days, Bagration's army, with the enemy constantly in its rear and on its flanks, had marched over 750 kilometres, with daily stages amounting at times to 35-40 kilometres. "Even the great Suvorov would have been surprised by the hardships troops experience nowadays and the speed of marches made by the 2nd Army, all accomplished on sandy roads and through marshy areas…" - Bagration wrote.

Skilfully manoeuvring on a battlefield and waging persistent rear guard fights, the Russian army under Bagration, had managed to upset the plans of Napoleon and repeatedly to slip away from the embrace of and destruction by superior French forces.

The "marche - manoeuvre" of the 2nd Western Army, concluded by its rendezvous in Smolensk with 1st Western Army, ranked highly in the estimation of Bagration's contemporaries. On military commentator of first half of the 19th Century, N. A. Okunev, remarked:

"Looking at a map and grasping a compasses for verification, it is easy to be convinced, even at a superficial glance, how small were the chances left to Prince Bagration to achieve this unification. I assess, you see, a person by his actions, even Prince Bagration, and consequently, I allow myself to pose one question: Whether any general was ever put in a more urgent situation, and whether any commander has emerged from a similar position with greater honour?"

N.V. Golitsyn, one of Bagration's aide-de-camps, also justly observed: "Fast and skilful movement, to which we are obliged for unification of the Russian armies near Smolensk, numbers him [Bagration] among the saviours of Russia in 1812."

The French command, which had failed to prevent the rendezvous of the 1st and 2nd Western Armies, gave due acknowledgement to Russians' skilful accomplishments. According to Bagration, even the "talented Napoleon was surprised" by the march of the 2nd Western Army.

Next issue: Withdrawal from Smolensk, Bagration Unleashes Davydov and Borodino

More Peter Bagration

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #54
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2000 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com