Peter Bagration:
The Best Georgian General
of the Napoleonic Wars

Part 1: Preparations for the
French Invasion of Russia

By Alexander Mikaberidze,
Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia

French Preparations

Napoleon used Russia's violations of the conditions Tilzit peace agreement as a pretext for beginning the war. His goal was to isolate Russia and to use his Allies in the war against. The governments of these states, trembling before Napoleon, obediently deployed their armies. On 12 February, 1812 the King of Prussia signed an agreement with Napoleon to take joint action against Russia and to provide a 20,000-man contingent, along with 60 cannons, and to provide the French army with supplies during its march through Prussian territory. On 2 March, 1812 a similar treaty with Austria was made. The Austrian Emperor promised to provide a 30,000-man army with 60 pieces of artillery.

Only Sweden, having incurred heavy casualties in the War of 1808-1809, did not side with Napoleon and concluded on March 24, 1812 an agreement with Russia. Napoleon was also unsuccessful in his attempt to bring Turkey into the Alliance. As a result of the rout of the Turkish army in 1811, by the Russian army under General M. Kutusoff, the Turkish government was compelled to sign on 16 May, 1812 the Bucharest Peace Treaty. One of its conditions was the obligation of Turkey to remain neutral in the event of war between Russia and France.

Despite of these two failures, Napoleon nevertheless has managed to form an extensive coalition, led by France, that possessed huge material resources. Simultaneously with diplomatic preparation, preparation was being made for the military forces. This preparation was carried out on a scale never seen before: "Never till now, I did not do of so extensive preparations" - declared Napoleon. By continuous mobilization in France and its allies, Napoleon had available almost 1,200,000 men, from which 600,000 with 1,372 pieces of artillery, were earmarked for the war against Russia.

Napoleon's Army consisted of almost all of the nationalities of Europe: from Italy, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Westphalia, Saxony, Poland and others. A significant part of the foreigners serving in the Grand Army were conscripted and were reluctant about war. These circumstances, as well as many others, did not promote maintenance of discipline and morale. Nevertheless it was well trained, had an experience command structure, still trusted in the power and authority of Napoleon, and consequently, despite its shortcomings, represented a very powerful force.

Much attention was given to the preparation of supplies and logistical support. In fortresses along the Vistula River, huge stocks of foodstuffs were concentrated, the warehouses of an ammunition were created, the hospitals were developed, and the road network was improved.

Russian Preparations

These extensive preparations by the French did not go unnoticed by the Russian Royal Court, which also began taking measures to organize its defense. However the Royal Court, knowing about approaching danger, failed to prepare properly the country to repulse the enemy invasion.

First of all the imperial government appeared powerless to draft a concrete war plan. On the eve of war, a large number of military plans and drafts concerning possible courses of action against France were submitted to government. The preference was given to the plan proposed by the military adviser of Czar Alexander I, General Pfuel, a former Prussian officer. Recognizing that the western borders of Russia was divided by the bogs of Polesye on two parts -northern and southern, Pfuel supposed that the likely approaches of Napoleon's army could only be in one of two directions: either to the north from Polesye or to the south of it. He proposed to build two armies and to deploy the first in northern part of the frontier, and the second in the southern. In case of the enemy approached from the north, the first army would retreat to a strongpoint at Dryss on the Western Dvina, and to hold the enemy there. In the meantime, the second army would act on enemy's flank and rear. If the opponent approached from the of Polesye, the second army would retreat to Jitomyr and Kyiv, and the first army would attack the enemy's rear and lines-of-communications.

Before discussing the plan, it is worthy to quote here a fragment from the great "War and Peace":

"Pfuel was short and very thin but broad-boned, of coarse, robust build, broad in the hips, and with prominent shoulder blades. His face was much wrinkled and his eyes deep set. His hair had evidently been hastily brushed smooth in front of the temples, but stuck up behind in quaint little tufts. He entered the room, looking restlessly and angrily around, as if afraid of everything in that large apartment. Awkwardly holding up his sword, he addressed Chernyshev and asked in German where the Emperor was. One could see that he wished to pass through the rooms as quickly as possible, finish with the bows and greetings, and sit down to business in front of a map, where he would feel at home. He nodded hurriedly in reply to Chernyshev, and smiled ironically on hearing that the sovereign was inspecting the fortifications that he, Pfuel, had planned in accord with his theory. He muttered something to himself abruptly and in a bass voice, as self-assured Germans do- it might have been "stupid fellow"... or "the whole affair will be ruined," or "something absurd will come of it."... Prince Andrew did not catch what he said and would have passed on, but Chernyshev introduced him to Pfuel, remarking that Prince Andrew was just back from Turkey where the war had terminated so fortunately. Pfuel barely glanced- not so much at Prince Andrew as past him- and said, with a laugh: "That must have been a fine tactical war"; and, laughing contemptuously, went on into the room from which the sound of voices was heard.

Pfuel, always inclined to be irritably sarcastic, was particularly disturbed that day, evidently by the fact that they had dared to inspect and criticize his camp in his absence. From this short interview with Pfuel, Prince Andrew, thanks to his Austerlitz experiences, was able to form a clear conception of the man. Pfuel was one of those hopelessly and immutably self-confident men, self-confident to the point of martyrdom as only Germans are, because only Germans are self-confident on the basis of an abstract notion- science, that is, the supposed knowledge of absolute truth. A Frenchman is self-assured because he regards himself personally, both in mind and body, as irresistibly attractive to men and women. An Englishman is self-assured, as being a citizen of the best-organized state in the world, and therefore as an Englishman always knows what he should do and knows that all he does as an Englishman is undoubtedly correct. An Italian is self-assured because he is excitable and easily forgets himself and other people. A Russian is self-assured just because he knows nothing does not want to know anything, since he does not believe that anything can be known. The German's self-assurance is worst of all, stronger and more repulsive than any other, because he imagines that he knows the truth- science- which he himself has invented but which is for him the absolute truth.

Pfuel was evidently of that sort. He had a science -- the theory of oblique movements deduced by him from the history of Frederick the Great's wars, and all he came across in the history of more recent warfare seemed to him absurd and barbarous -- monstrous collisions in which so many blunders were committed by both sides that these wars could not be called wars, they did not accord with the theory, and therefore could not serve as material for science.

In 1806 Pfuel had been one of those responsible, for the plan of campaign that ended in Jena and Auerstadt, but he did not see the least proof of the fallibility of his theory in the disasters of that war. On the contrary, the deviations made from his theory were, in his opinion, the sole cause of the whole disaster, and with characteristically gleeful sarcasm he would remark, "There, I said the whole affair would go to the devil!" Pfuel was one of those theoreticians who so love their theory that they lose sight of the theory's object- its practical application. His love of theory made him hate everything practical, and he would not listen to it. He was even pleased by failures, for failures resulting from deviations in practice from the theory only proved to him the accuracy of his theory."

Pfuel's plan was flawed for several reasons:

    1. It did not take into account the possibility of the French attacking along both approaches.

    2. It divided the Russian forces into two groups, each isolated from the other by the un-passable bogs of Polesye. There was a real danger of the French being able to rout each of the armies separately. Nevertheless Alexander, blindly trusting in his adviser, accepted the plan and made it the basis for waging the upcoming war with France. According to this plan to the north of Polesye, in area of Vilno, the 1st Western Army was deployed, and to the south from Polesye, in area of Lunk - the 2nd Western army. In Western Dvina at Dryssa, the urgent construction of the so-called "Camp of Dryss" began.

In the Spring of 1812, the Imperial government attempted to improve the strategic expansion of Russian army by the redeployment of the 1st and 2nd Western Armies. With this purpose the 2nd Western army was re-located to the north from Polesye, at first, in the area of Pruzhan, and then to Wolkovisk. In Lunk, in place of the 2nd Western Army, the 3rd Western Army was organized.

However this measure did not result in a radical improvement of the strategic position of the Russian Army. Even after these redeployments, the military forces of Russia, located along the western border, remained stretched and fragile. Along the western borders Russia had 210,000 men with 903 cannons deployed:

The 1st Western Army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Infantry Corps, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps, and one corps of Cossacks. It had 127,000 men and 558 cannon deployed on a 180 kilometer front from Rossyena up to Lyda, with the Cossack Corps deployed along its front in the vicinity of Grodno.

The 2nd Western Army consisted of the 7th and 8th Infantry Corps, the 4th Cavalry Corps, and nine Cossack corps. It had 36,000 men, and 180 cannons. (These numbers do not include the 27th Infantry Division, which was part of its structure on 9 May, but was still in Moscow.) The 2nd Western Army was deployed along a 100 kilometer front in the area of Wolkovysk, having Cossacks deployed along border.

The 3rd Western Army had a strength of 43,000 men and 165 cannons and was located in the vicinity of Lunk. The gap between the 1st and 2nd Western Armies was 100 kilometers, and between the 2nd and 3rd Armies was 200 kilometers.

Further weakening the Russian forces was the fact the government did not create a single overall headquarters. Nor were strong points and fortresses developed sufficiently. In frontier areas, the repair and strengthening of fortresses began, as well as construction of a number of new fortresses and bastions. However all these works were carried out extremely slowly and by the beginning of the war they were not finished. Organization of supplies and logistical support was in a poor condition. Although, in many places, especially along the rivers of Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnepr, food warehouses were built.

Thus, to the moment of the French invasion, the situation in Russia and for its armed forces was not good. The opponent had an overwhelming numerical superiority; the Russian armies were scattered, there was not a single commander-in-chief, and they had no real plan for conducting the war.

More Peter Bagration

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