Peter Bagration:
The Best Georgian General
of the Napoleonic Wars

Part 1: War Plans

By Alexander Mikaberidze,
Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia

French Plans

Napoleon intended to destroy the Russian army at the border and then, by rapid marches, take possession of Moscow and to dictate to Russia terms of the armistice. Napoleon expressed the strategic importance of possessing Moscow with the following words: "If I occupy Kiev, I shall take Russia's legs; if I acquire St. Petersburg, I shall take it's head; by occupying Moscow, I shall spear Russia in its heart"

In accordance with this plan in the beginning of June, 1812. Napoleon deployed his army along the Vistula stretching from Warsaw to Konisgberg, in three groups: the left wing, centre, right wing.

The Left Wing consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Corps, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps and Imperial Guar, totaling about 220,000 men and 527 cannons. This force was under Napoleon's command.

The Central Group, under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais consisted of the 4th and 6th Infantry Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Corps and Italian Royal Guards; for a total of 85,000 men and 208 cannons.

The Right Wing, consisting of the 5th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Corps, and the 4th Cavalry Corps had 75,000 men and 166 cannons. It was commanded by Napoleon's brother - Jerome Bonaparte.

The left flank of Napoleon's army was guarded by the 30,000 man Prussian corps of Marshal McDonald, and the right flank by the 35,000 Austrians of General Schwarzenberg.

Napoleon had another 160,000 men in reserve in Prussia.

French Tactical Objectives

The main attack would be by the Left Wing which had the mission of crossing the Nieman River and defeating the 1st Western Army and take in possession Vilna.

Central Group of corps were to support the Left Wing.

The Right Wing was to prevent the 2nd Western Army from moving north to unit with 1st Western Army.

General Bagration's Plan

After resigning from his post of commander-in-chief of the Moldavian Army, General Bagration was unemployed. Only on 7 August 1811 he receive an imperial decree appointing him commander-in-chief of the Podolsk Army (which was deployed in Ukraine in the Kiev, Volynsk, and Podolsk Provinces.

At the beginning of September, 1811 Bagration took command of the Podolsk Army, and by spring of 1812, was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western Army, which had been organized with the Podolsk Army as its core. The new army at first settled down in Lupk area, and then was relocated to Volkovysk area. Command of this army meant that Bagration had the responsibility of defending Russia's borders.

Facing extensive military preparations of France, Bagration showed a large concern for the destiny of the native land and took concrete measures to defend his country. He wrote a campaign plan and sent it as a special report to Czar Alexander. Characterizing the situation that has been occurred in Europe, Bagration noted, that in his aspiration to of world domination Napoleon had taken over many European peoples and that there was a real threat to Russia.

"He (Napoleon) is waiting for an appropriate minute to set up an ardent banner on limits of your empire !" - wrote Bagration to Alexander. Considering war inevitable, Bagration recommended to Alexander to accept urgent measures for the safety of Russia and to protect the country from a sudden attack. Furthermore, he offered to send immediately to the French government a note, in which would state the conditions that were acceptable to Russian government for maintenance of relations between Russia and France, and to specify all actions of Napoleon that were consider a threat to the peaceful intentions of Russia.

Having confirmed the readiness of Russian government to preserve and strengthen relations between both states, the note would also make an offer to the French government to establish a border on the Oder River or any other boundary. Across this boundary, Napoleon and his army could not pass. The transition of this boundary by any French force, even one battalion, should be considered by Russia as the announcement of war. In Bagration's opinion, the establishment of a such border line could serve a sufficient guarantee ensuring Russia from a sudden attack by an enemy. Simultaneously with departure of the note, Bagration advised to carry out the following measures to prepare the Russian military:

    1. To strengthen the armies, located on western border, deploy them in two groups: one in the vicinity of Belostoc, with at least 100,000 men with enough of artillery; and another in the Baltic area with at least five divisions, having supplied it not only field, but also, as far as it is possible, with siege artillery, and a full stock of ammunition.

    2. To deploy reserve armies with 50,000 men a second line, about 1OO-150 kilometers from the main armies.

    3. To stock warehouses with supplies to ensure the uninterrupted maintenance of armies. They should contain not less than annual stock of food and fodder for a 250,000 man army; and also to prepare vehicles for transportation of a monthly supply of food and fodder for a 150,000 man army.

    4. To prepare the Baltic fleet for war.

Bagration considered as most probable, that Napoleon in interest of securing time to expand his army would be slow in answering the specified Note and "not looking on anything" throw his armies across the border line. If this occurred, Bagration offered to push forward to the Vistula with the army located at Belostoc and to occupy Warsaw. The armies, located in the Baltic area on border with East Prussia, would be pushed forward to Graudents on the same day and with the same speed, then proceed to Vistula and with an assistance of the Baltic fleet to take possession of Danzig. Once the forward armies began moving it would be necessary to move the armies of the second line. Further plans of actions were provided, but were to be defined depending on the actions of the enemy. "... Main...advantage of such sudden and speed movement, advised by me, - wrote Bagration, - is, that the theatre of war will leave the limits of our empire and that we shall be in a condition to occupy on Vistula such a position that would provide us with an opportunity to act against the enemy with a great courage..."

Bagration understood well, that the future war would be waged with a large pressure on both parties, and consequently recommended to create beforehand reliable reserves to supply the main forces. He offered to arrange the third line, on a distance of 100-150 miles from the 2nd line, a structure of recruits, trained in special depots, that would also recruit more soldiers.

These are the basic features of the plan of campaign 1812 drafted by Bagration. The analysis of this plan testifies about deep and correct estimation of Bagration of conditions on the eve of the invasion. The measures, planned by him, were forceful and provided reliable protection of Russia against a sudden attack of an enemy. Bagration's plan, as well as valuable suggestions by many other military figures on the question of conducting war against France, were not accepted by the Imperial government. At the same time, they did not inform Bagration neither about the plan that was accepted for conducting the war, nor did they tell him the mission that was assigned to the 2nd Western Army.

Bagration's Thoughts on the Russian Deployments

Concerned by the situation, General Bagration requested on 17 April 1812 from the Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly, the general plan. "I believe, - wrote Bagration, - that before the beginning of military operations I should receive on this account the most detailed remarks from Your Excellency, for you are more aware of the political businesses and items, on which an opponent shall throw the forces" However an answer was not received. Only on 3 June, that is 9 days prior to the beginning of war, the Headquarters of the 2nd Western Army received three instructions from Barclay de Tolly, dated 1 June. These were written on behalf of Czar Alexander, and were the first instructions on the mission of Bagration's army.

    1. According to them the task of 2nd Western Army was reduced to conducting defensive operations and was ordered to abstain from offensive actions.

    "When it will be decided to conduct offensively, then Your .... will be informed, in appropriate time about the general plan of operations, but before its reception you must conduct defensive operations"

    2. In case the approach of superior enemy forces, it was necessary for the 2nd Western Army to retreat at first to the River Sharu, and then to Novogrudoc and the Nieman River, where it would receive further instructions either about the continuation of its retreat through Minsk to Borisov or about movement north in the shortest possible way to link up with the 1st Western Army.

    3. Bagration was ordered to familiarize himself with the conditions of Bobruisk and Borisov and to begin immediately strengthening Nesvij. Additionally, he was ordered to establish communication both with Lieutenant General Eytel's Corps, which had 18 infantry battalions, 16 squadrons and two Cossack regiments and was formed at Mozyr to defend Pripyat, and also the 3rd Western Army, Platov's corps, and the left wing of the 1st Western Army.

Carrying out these instructions, Bagration sent the staff officers to reconnoiter the roads to Volkovysc-Zelva-Slonim and the crossings across the River Shara from its mouth up to Bitten. To his military engineer, Major General Ferster he entrusted the examination of Nesvij and to present options about measures on strengthening it, and also to survey the fortress of Bobruisk and the redoubt at Borysov, to reconnoiter the roads from Nesvij to Borysov and Bobruisk.

The communication with the commander of the reserve corps Lieutenant General Eytel was established and Bagration was informed of their organization, strength, and dispositions. Once he began carrying out his orders, General Bagration wrote a letter on June 6 to the Czar. In it he stated his opinions of the present situation and a proposed plan of action. Having stipulated, that, not having many answers to the political questions, he would speak only about subjects that are known to him on the basis of his battle experience, Bagration proceeded to sharply criticize the strategic deployments of the Russian army, pointing out the following problems:

    1. The Russian armies were deployed on too large of a front and in if the enemy attack one of them, it would be impossible for the other armies to support it.

    2. The Russian armies were located too close to border and they would not have time to concentrate if attacked by superior forces along one approach.

    3. The strategic deployment of the Russian armies allowed the enemy to prevent them from ever uniting.

General Bagration also resolutely condemned the plan of action. He specifically emphasized the extremely negative consequences if the armies were forced to retreat. Bagration again confirmed the idea on the necessity of not waiting for an attack but to strike first "... Much more useful would be, without waiting for an attack, to fight in its borders" - specified Bagration.

On 8 June, Bagration wrote the Czar another letter, in which, again marking negative consequences of retreating, insisted on necessity of striking the first blow.

"Order to us to assemble at Grodno and attack the enemy - wrote Bagration - Any retreat encourages the enemy and will give him great amounts of this territory, and take away our spirit... What are we afraid of and why do we have to exhaust the army?"

On 11 June Bagration received Barclay de Tolly's answer. Barclay informed Bagration, that his orders to retreat, did not mean he was prohibited from taking offensive actions and that he will receive additional instructions in due time. However, the Military Minister wrote, that care requires us to be prepared to retreat, and that the Russian armies must not be compelled to fight decisive battles with superior enemy forces under unfavorable conditions.Bagration was informed also, that the order to guard the left flank of 2nd Western Army was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of 3rd Western Army general Tormasov.

Thus, in the Barclay de Tolly's letter did not answered Bagration's major questions about the deployment of the Russian armies and its passive strategy.

Also it followed from the letter, that the Supreme Command was going to support Pfuel's's plan. As for the statement of the Military Minister concerning an opportunity of to take offensive actions, obviously, it was purpose was only to calm Bagration.

It is quite clear, that Barclay de Tolly's reply did not satisfy Bagration. On 12 June, he again sent a letter to the Military Minister, asking him to report to Alexander I about the situation of 2nd Western Army, and also about the necessity to carry out immediate measures to prevent the Russian armies from being surprised by a sudden attack by the enemy. Bagration again pointed out the over-extended disposition of the 2nd Western Army, which, having only two corps and insufficient cavalry, was compelled to occupy a hundred miles. In this situation, reported Bagration, the army will not be able to prevent the enemy from moving on Grodno and Belostoc. General Bagration also pointed out the large gap between the 2nd and 3rd Western Armies. To close this gap, he proposed moving the 3rd Western Army closer to the 2nd Western Army, by concentrating the 3rd Army at Kovel, with its right flank at Kobryn.

"In the proportion of strength of the Third Army with the Second - wrote Bagration - we shall find its ability to repulse the enemy much less because of the inability to provide mutual assistance to each other."

Lastly, Bagration pointed out that the 2nd Reserve Corps of Lieutenant General Ertel, located at Mozyr, was too remote to render assistance to the 2nd Western Army. According to Bagration, moving this corps closer to the 2nd or 3rd Armies would required at least 10 days. Therefore he suggested to moving the corps to Pynsk so it could support both armies.

More Peter Bagration

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