Bernadotte 1806

Is There A Case For The Defence?

Prosecution's Case

by John Cook

It is usually suggested that Bernadotte's actions were deliberate but it has never been determined whether this was the case or not. If it was the former then, of course, it was indefensible, but I see no motive for it, either for Bernadotte personally or in general terms. The basis for the charge, inferred or repeated as received wisdom, by observers writing in the latter part of the 20th Century, is based on a number of things.

The first, and to which most weight is usually given, is Napoleon's critique written immediately after the battles, which will be shown to be somewhat disingenuous. Added to this is his writing on the subject years after the event at Saint Helena, which is not worth admitting as serious evidence. Further prejudice is generated against Bernadotte for his having taken up the offer of the Swedish throne, insofar as he became Crown Prince in 1810, and, in particular, for participating in the campaign of 1813 against his former master and country. This does, however, ignore the simple fact that the French invaded Swedish Pomerania, and had they not done so Sweden, and therefore Bernadotte, may not have become involved in the penultimate campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. In any event, where is it written that an individual may not openly change nationality and allegiance? The matter of Bernadotte's 'immigration', however, is not germane to his actions in 1806. As part of the general equation, it must also be admitted that Napoleon and Bernadotte did not like each other at all.

Bernadotte is, at best, seen as the 'Grouchy' of 1806 and, similarly, with considerable hindsight. At worst he is seen as a coward and a traitor for having disobeyed a direct order and not having marched to the sound of Davout's guns. It is also often claimed that a personality clash between Davout and Bernadotte was at least in part responsible for the latter's actions on 13th/14th October, and that as a result Bernadotte deliberately abandoned Davout. There is no real evidence to support this. It may be pointed out, however, that Bernadotte was once a supporter of the Jacobins, whilst Davout was not (though he didn't actively oppose them), or that Bernadotte was a former soldier in the ranks of the old army, whilst Davout was from the officer class. There is no substantive evidence to show that any of these were particular issues, though it may be admitted that the two men were not close.

Additional material in this vein is produced by Petre and Elting, to the effect that Bernadotte refused Suhac, commanding a Division of dragoons, permission to retrace his steps and go to Davout's aid at Auerstädt. This may be true (the evidence is far from compelling, as will be explained later), but under the circumstances such a decision would have been the correct one. Auerstädt was not the vicinity of the anticipated decisive battle and it is impossible to emphasise this point too much.

More Bernadotte and 1806

A Footnote To Bernadotte: Scapegoat for Intelligence Failure?

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #48
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1999 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com