Bernadotte 1806

Is There A Case For The Defence?

Defense's Case

by John Cook

Napoleon's Criticism Questioned

Petre in Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia bases his critique of Bernadotte primarily on that of Napoleon, written on 23 October, in which he accuses Bernadotte of disobeying an order to march with Davout and turning back on Dornburg.

"According to a very precise order you should have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal passages of the Saale, on the same day as Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In case you had not executed these orders, I had informed you during the night that, if you were still at Naumburg, you should march with Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumburg when this order arrived; it was communicated to you; but nevertheless you preferred to make a false march in order to turn back on Dornburg, and in consequence you did not find yourself in the battle, and Marshal Davout bore the principal efforts of the enemy's army.".

This document is a classic example of wisdom after the event. There was no 'very precise' order to Bernadotte to be at Dornburg on the same day as Lannes was at Jena; Lannes is not even mentioned in any of Bernadotte's orders. This claim, to be blunt, is untrue. Lannes was already at Jena on 13 October. Indeed, Lannes was only 6 kilometres from Jena on the evening of 12 October.

There was no possibility of Bernadotte being at Dornburg on the same day as Lannes; he was not directed to Dornburg until 0900 on 13 October, through orders sent to Murat. Indeed, Napoleon himself, in his written concept of operations, did not anticipate that Bernadotte would be at Dornburg until 14 October and prior to the despatch of the 0900 orders to Murat, the time of receipt of which by Bernadotte is unclear, Bernadotte was expected to be at Naumburg on the same day as Davout. It is also worth mentioning that the 0900 orders not withstanding, Murat was also not at Naumburg until 13 October. Either Napoleon's famous memory failed him, or he was being deliberately selective and altering the facts to suit his case against Bernadotte. Bernadotte, as we have seen, received no orders during the night at Naumburg. Davout did, in which there was the post script from Berthier saying that if Bernadotte was at Naumburg he could march with Davout. Precisely what Napoleon did or did not say to Berthier is not left to us, but an order, in any language states "you are to" or something similar. "You can march together" is too ambiguous for words and is not an unequivocal instruction and is, by no means, an order to support Davout.

It is, however, fairly typical of the kind of vague order that was generated by the staff at Imperial headquarters. Such orders allowed the recipient to choose one course or another. If he chose the right one, they congratulated themselves, and the recipient, on their collective judgement. If he chose the wrong one, the order was used as evidence to show that he had disobeyed it.

Bernadotte made no march back to Dornburg, as Napoleon claimed, he was proceeding to that place in accordance with the 0900 orders sent via Murat, which were actually confirmed by the orders to Davout. They were take effect if Bernadotte was at Naumburg. I Corps was not at Naumburg; it was approaching Dornburg.

When the 2200 orders were received by Davout and transmitted to Bernadotte, most of I Corps was already through Naumburg, albeit halted by the roadside. Furthermore, in those orders, the express wish of Napoleon was still that Bernadotte should be at Dornburg. Not only did Bernadotte not disobey Napoleon's order, he did not turn back on Dornburg either. I Corps was already marching in that direction.

As for the final sentences about Davout being left to bear the brunt of the enemy's efforts, that is pure hindsight. Napoleon had no idea, whatever, that Davout would encounter the enemy main body when he ordered him to Apolda, and anything he said in that context immediately afterwards, and later, is nothing more than wisdom after the event. If Napoleon had complained that Bernadotte did not arrive in time to take part in the Battle of Jena, that would have been another matter. It would have, however, required Napoleon to concede that he had mistaken the ground, and the date, on which he expected to fight the principal battle.

I think it important to recognise that Napoleon was an arch disseminator of deliberate misinformation, not only in his version of events on St Helena, but on 'the march' as well. His criticism of Bernadotte's Corps at Wagram in 1809 is another example. Bernadotte clearly did not interpret 'can' as a direct order and refused to alter the direction of march of his Corps on Dornburg which was evidently, from Davout's latest orders, still the place where Napoleon hoped Bernadotte would be if at all possible.

Furthermore, had he turned his Corps round and followed Davout, depending on when he spoke to Davout, it would have taken at least 3 hours, say 0600 at the very earliest, which is optimistic, before the tail somewhere between Naumburg and Dornburg was on the move, thus it can be doubted whether he would have arrived at Auerstädt in time to make any difference, one way or the other (even if he had a crystal ball). Furthermore, he was already much closer to Dornburg, where he had unambiguous orders telling him to be. Even had he received orders to move to Apolda, which he did not, unless they told him to march specifically via Timbuktu, or wherever, he would still have been correct to move via the road that he was already on, and committed to, which was not occupied by another Corps and was the most direct route.

Petre's comment that Bernadotte marched by a circuitous route to Apolda via Dornburg, the inference of which is that this was deliberate, is nonsense. The map show that it was the direct and shortest route. Indeed, he had almost reached Dornburg on the night of 13/14 October 1806, perhaps even with elements of his advance guard in it, in accordance with all the orders he had received up to that time.

The Sound of the Guns

We come now to the criticism that Bernadotte should have marched to the sound of Davout's guns.

Why?

Should he have not marched to the sounds of Napoleon's guns?

If he heard Davout's he surely must have heard those at Jena which was, after all, where he knew the main body of the French army was, and on which vicinity all orders, not only Bernadotte's, were intended to concentrate Napoleon's forces. Even if he did hear Davout's guns, Bernadotte had no business marching towards them.

As Maude points out, "Napoleon aimed only at an economy of force, i.e. of human life, essentially on the whole transaction, and provided that he was successful in this, the fate of a detachment troubled him not at all.".

We know that the head of Davout's column was on the march by 0600 on 14th October, at approximately the same time as Tauenzien's cannon were opening fire in the fog at Jena, and the Prussian main army commenced its march along the road towards Kösen. At approximately 0700 the advance guard of Davout's III Corps blundered into this army near Hassenhausen, in the same fog, and the classic encounter battle of Auerstädt began.

If Bernadotte is supposed to have heard Davout's guns at Auerstädt from Dornburg, is it not equally possible that Davout heard Napoleon's guns at Jena from Naumburg as he began his march to Apolda? It is certainly possible. However, if he did, and bearing in mind that the prosecution maintains that Bernadotte should have marched to the sound of Davout's guns, should not Davout be equally criticised by Napoleon's latter-day armchair generals, if not more so, for not marching to the sound of Tauenzien's cannon at Jena, if they were audible at Naumburg at 0600 on 14 October?

In fact, if he was to be criticised for that supposed omission, we should come to his defence on the same basis as we ought to Bernadotte's. The route Davout chose for III Corps was undoubtedly the quickest and most direct to the decisive point, as was Bernadotte's for I Corps. Maude also points out, in an interesting aside on the audibility of artillery fire, that in some conditions guns can be heard at 60 miles, in others they are inaudible at two miles, even though discharges may be observed. The conductivity of sound in air is, apparently, dependent on the uniformity of the tension of aqueous vapour between two points. If this is broken by cloud shadow or water, for example, between the two points the sound is arrested.

Furthermore, Chandler, in his Jena 1806 (in which, incidentally, he is far less scathing about Bernadotte than in his Campaigns of Napoleon) also suggests that the topography of the Saale may have masked the sounds of firing from Auerstädt, whilst amplifying those at Jena. Could the fog on the morning of 14 October, as well as terrain, have been as issue in this context?

Whether he heard Davout's guns or not, which I am happy to concede that he may well have done, the suggestion that he should have marched towards the sound is nonsense. Not only was it not in the direction in which the principal battle was expected, but if he heard Davout's he must also have heard Napoleon's. Furthermore, such an absurdity can only be suggested without even cursory reference to the ground between Dornburg and Auerstädt.

Col Elting says that Bernadotte had stern words with Suhac and refused to allow him to retrace his steps with his Division of dragoons and march to Davout's guns, presumably via Naumburg. Suhac had been earlier chopped from Murat's command to Davout's, but was now back under Murat's orders and was also marching towards Dornburg with I Corps and the Reserve Cavalry. As a Division commander he would have been even less well informed than a mere marshal and had even less qualification to question Napoleonic infallibility.

Petre says much the same thing, but unlike Elting he does identify the source of the alleged conversation as the memoirs of General of Division Savary, the Duke of Rovigo. Savary was at Jena with Napoleon for the entire day and could not possibly know, first hand, of any conversation Bernadotte had with Suhac on the matter.

Furthermore, even Elting's appreciation of Savary is that of a man so devoted to Napoleon "that he willingly did the Empire's dirty work.". It is also, perhaps, worth pointing out that Savary was one of Davout's colleagues from the Armée de l'Orient who, together with Davout, had opposed the convention by which the French withdrew from Egypt. Was Savary doing some 'dirty work' here on behalf of the Emperor, or possibly on behalf of his old comrade. It really doesn't matter for Bernadotte, even if the story is true, was right to prevent Suhac marching to Davout, for all the reasons already given. Jena was the important battle, not Auerstädt. If we presume that he could hear firing from both Jena and Auerstädt, what was Bernadotte to do? Bearing in mind that he was not informed as to the intricacies of Napoleon's plan, and probably could only surmise the precise reason for his presence at Dornburg, does he disobey his orders and march away from where he must have known Napoleon expected to fight a battle against the Prussian main army, without really knowing what was happening to Davout to his north, or perhaps even exactly where he was ?

I don't think so.

Communications

Consider now the communications. To march towards Davout he would have to either retrace his steps and follow the route Davout took, via Naumburg, which was just too far, or march via Apolda.

To march to Napoleon at Jena, the battle actually taking place some 3 miles north west of Jena, he could have gone back to Dornburg and followed the west bank of the Saale to Jena, and thence to the battlefield, which would have served no useful purpose at all, or continued west to Apolda and thence south to Hermstädt and into Hohenlohe's rear.

Whether he chose to support Davout or Napoleon, the only possible practical route was via Apolda. There were high ground and the Ilm river system to his north and more high ground to his south. A direct march across country and via small tracks towards either, even if he abandoned his guns and vehicles, was simply not a practical proposition. The going precluded it. Furthermore, it is impossible to avoid the fact that he had no orders to support Davout. I and III Corps were part of the encircling movement in the Prussian rear. Bernadotte, Davout, and Napoleon, would have needed second sight to predict Auerstädt. Indeed, Napoleon's appreciation of where the Prussian main body was, was just about as wrong as it could be.

Having arrived at Dornburg, presuming that he could hear Davout's guns, Bernadotte was too far away to have reached Auerstädt to be useful, even if he was able to identify that place as the source of the firing. A cursory look at the map shows that he was better placed to intervene at Jena, in which context it is important to note that Bernadotte did not possess reliable maps and even Napoleon worked from Petri's outdated cartography of Saxony produced in 1763.

Bernadotte's Alleged Slothfulness

Bernadotte concentrated his I Corps at Dornburg, in accordance with his orders, where the last of it arrived at approximately 1000 on 14 October. It is said that he did not march with much urgency, but his Corps was spread out over some distance, had been marching all day, in fog that did not lift until 1030, and had to defile across the Saale at Dornburg. Morand's Division of III Corps, it should be noted, did not arrive at Auerstädt until 1000 having covered roughly the same distance over similar roads. By 1100 Bernadotte was on the west bank of the Saale; he does not appear to have marched at a pace significantly different from Davout's formations. Here we have a Corps commander who has specific orders to be "in the position indicated to him at Dornburg.". He had obeyed these to the letter but which "position", we may ask, as Bernadotte may have done. This was not made clear and it is suggested, by Maude, that Bernadotte may even have been anticipating further explanatory orders.

There is also another suggested explanation for his alleged slow progress from Naumburg to Dornburg. Chandler offers the possibility that in the darkness and fog on the night of 13/14 October, Bernadotte's Corps mistook Kamburg for Dornburg. If correct, it is also possible that elements may even have crossed the Saale at Kamburg, roughly equidistant between Naumburg and Dornburg. This was a 'dead end' to all intents and purposes and would have cause delay and confusion. This, it must be admitted, is no more than speculation.

Having reached Dornburg, in the absence of new orders but presumably aware of a battle in progress to his south, and probably another to his north, he decided to move to Apolda, covering the approximately 13km between the two in what can only be admitted was a very slow six hours. The generous might conclude that he wanted to remain close to Dornburg, where he was supposed to be, whilst trying to make contact with I Corps, where he knew Napoleon expected Davout to be. The ungenerous put another slant on it. Cowardice and treason.

However, by opting to continue in the direction of Dornburg, rather than following Davout's Corps, he appears to have had a good grasp of Napoleon's concept of operations, even though he had not been briefed, for by the time he reached Dornburg complete with his Corps, he was in the rear of what Napoleon thought was the main Prussian army at Jena.

The effect of the orders received by these two marshals, had events not intervened, would have placed their Corps at Apolda and Dornburg respectively on 14 October. In his concept of operations Napoleon calculated that I Corps and III Corps would be in these positions on that date. He really did not have much to complain about.

What Napoleon did not know, and neither did anybody else at the time, was that the Prussian main body was actually much further north. It was this which Davout encountered at Auerstädt, by accident rather than design.

It is only possible to conclude that Bernadotte took the right decision to continue to march on Dornburg, in the direction of what Napoleon thought was to be the decisive battle against the enemy main body.

Ultimately, between Dornburg and Apolda, he moved slowly, that is undoubtedly true, and the reason for this has never been satisfactorily explained. He can be criticised for that but bearing in mind the 'order, counter-order, disorder' environment, and indeed the absence of up to date orders, in which he was operating, perhaps it is not too surprising. Ultimately, he placed his Corps where Napoleon originally expected it to be, at between 1000 and 1100 on 14 October 1806.

It is worth noting that Capitaine Foucart in Campagne de Prusse (1806) Jena estimated that, combined with the drift of the battle towards Weimar, the earliest that the leading Division of I Corps could have arrived on the field was approximately 1230, followed by the second Division at approximately 1600. The battle was effectively over at 1300 when Hohenlohe ordered the retreat, Rüchel's futile demonstration being dealt with by 1430, which quickly turned into a rout and pursuit. Foucart further estimated that the remainder of I Corps, together with Grouchy's and Suhac's dragoon Divisions would not have arrived in time to be of any use. If Foucart is correct Bernadotte was never in a position to influence the outcome of the battle. In the event the leading elements of Bernadotte's Corps did not arrive in Apolda until 1630; some I Corps formations, however, had been marching all day, possibly taken a wrong turn, defiled across a river and were exhausted.

Elting's observation, in his Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, that Bernadotte's "near treasonous behaviour" compromised Napoleon's operational plan and "upset his calculations" is absurd. Setting aside the issue of 'treason', Napoleon's calculations were flawed from the outset when he made the mistake of believing that the battle would take place on 16th October with the entire Prussian army which he thought was concentrated near Weimar. Far from upsetting Napoleon's 'calculations', Bernadotte was exactly where Napoleon calculated he would be on 14 October, when he wrote his concept of operations two days earlier.

CONCLUSION

Bernadotte, executed the letter and intent of his orders, such as they were, in precise accordance with Napoleon's concept of operations, written in note form at Auma on 12 October. The only thing Bernadotte can really be criticised for is not marching with more vigour to Apolda. When he arrived at Dornburg, his appointed place, in the absence of orders or sure knowledge of Napoleon's intentions, his apparent caution is, perhaps, understandable. Had the main Prussian army been where Napoleon thought it was, and the battle fought on 16 October, as Napoleon expected, Davout's and Bernadotte's Corps would probably have completed the manoeuvre Napoleon intended, and the entire Grand Army would have been concentrated on the anticipated battlefield.

In contrast with his record during the Revolutionary Wars, there is nothing particularly distinguished about Bernadotte's career as a Marshal, but there is no evidence that he deliberately set out to sabotage Napoleon's plans in 1806. If Bernadotte is to be criticised for his lack of urgency in his movement from Dornburg to Apolda, Napoleon needs to be criticised for a flawed assessment of enemy locations and intent, issuing ambiguous and contradictory orders, and Berthier needs to be equally censored for indifferent staff work.

Could Bernadotte have done better? Perhaps, but there are questions to which there are no answers at this distance, the most intriguing of which is the possibility of mistaking Kamburg for Dornburg on the night of 13 October, in which case he may have thought, prematurely, that he was where he was supposed to be. Furthermore, if he did cross the Saale at Kamburg it would account for a loss of time. It's a tempting explanation but is, it seems, no more than speculation. In any event, as we have seen, no significant time was lost between Naumburg and Dornburg and Bernadotte covered much the same distance over similar ground, in roughly the same time that Davout did on his march west. In other words, both Corps were complete at Dornburg and Auerstädt respectively, at roughly the same time.

The place where Bernadotte really did loose time was between Dornburg and Apolda, by which time the sounds of battle at Jena would have virtually ceased. The explanations for his slowness here can only be guessed at.

Napoleon, it is said, drew up papers for Bernadotte's court martial but then withdrew them because he felt it would be tantamount to having him shot. I suspect that on reflection Napoleon realised there was no real case to answer, and that a court martial would embarrass him as much as it might Bernadotte.

Sources

F G Lees - Napoleon at Work. Translation of Colonel Vachee's Napoleon en Campagne. Originally published 1914. Reprint PDI Publishing and Athena Books, Doncaster, 1995.
Colonel F N Maude - 1806: The Jena Campaign. Macmillan & Co., London 1909.
F L Petre - Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia 1806. Originally published 1907. Reprint Arms and Armour Press, London, 1972
Professor D G Chandler - Jena 1806: Napoleon Destroys Prussia. Osprey Publishing Ltd., London, 1993.
Capitaine P J Foucart (French General Staff) - Campagne de Prusse (1806) Jena, Paris, 1887. (also quoted at length in Petre and Maude).
Brigadier V J Esposito and Colonel J R Elting - A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. Faber and Faber, London, 1964.

More Bernadotte and 1806

A Footnote To Bernadotte: Scapegoat for Intelligence Failure?

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