Bernadotte 1806

Is There A Case For The Defence?

Defense's Evidence

by John Cook

The orders received by Davout and Bernadotte during the hours prior to Jena were designed to close the trap on the Prussian main army, which Napoleon expected to find in the vicinity of Weimar. In the absence of critical elements of information about enemy locations, movements and intentions, Davout, Bernadotte and, indeed, Napoleon would have needed second sight to have predicted Auerstädt.

What orders, then, did Bernadotte and the other relevant personalities receive?

12 October 1806

All the information Napoleon received during 11 October, from Soult, Lannes and Murat, indicated that the enemy was concentrating at Erfurt, some 16 kilometres west of Weimar. He determined to surround the enemy if it remained there by manoeuvring against its left, which would also cut it off from Berlin and Dresden if it retreated. As usual, Napoleon's planning took at least two options into account.

At Auma, sometime between 0300 and 0400 on the morning of 12 October 1806, he worked out a concept of operations in rough note form. These were not orders as such and were not disseminated.

"Guard 10th in the evening at Bamberg, 11th at Lichtenfels, 12th Beyond Kronach, 13th at Lobentstein;

From Hautpoul, the 11th to two leagues (a league is approximately 5 kilometres) beyond Kronach, 14th at Auma, 15th at Jena;

Klein, the 11th to two leagues from Kronach, the 15th at Jena, the 14th at Jena, the 13th at Auma;

Klein, the 12th at Lobenstein;

Jena to Weimar 4 leagues, reserve cavalry (Murat), the 14th at Jena;

Naumburg to Weimar, 7 leagues, Guard, the 15th at Jena;

Kahla to Weimar, 5 leagues, park, the 15th at Auma;

Neustadt to Jena, 5 leagues, Davout, the 14th at Apolda;

Gera to Jena, 7 leagues, Lannes, the 15th at Weimar;

From Zeitz to Jena, 7 leagues, Augereau, the 14th at Mellingen;

Bernadotte, the 14th at Dornburg;

Soult, the 14th at Jena;

Ney, the 14th at Kahla.

Note throughout: My emboldening and (parenthesis).

Napoleon then dictated his operation order to Berthier. It was short and to the point. "Give orders to Marshal Davout to leave his position for Naumburg, where he must arrive as quickly as possible, but always holding his troops ready to fight. He will be preceded by all his light cavalry, which will send out skirmishers as far as possible, as much for the purpose of obtaining news of the enemy as to make prisoners, stop baggage, and get accurate information.'

'General Suhac's division of dragoons will be under his orders. It will proceed to Mittel-Pöllnitz, where it will receive Marshal Davout's orders. Prince Murat and Marshal Bernadotte are also ordered to Naumburg, but are to follow the Zeitz road.' Marshal Lannes proceeds from Neustadt to Jena. Marshal Augereau to Kahla. Marshal Ney will be at Mittel-Pöllnitz. Headquarters will be at Gera, noon.'

'Give orders for the sending off of the Divisions of heavy cavalry and the Divisions of dragoons which have remained in the rear, as well as the park of artillery, to Gera." There are two significant things absent from these orders. No details are given about the concept of operations, merely instructions to move from one place to another, and there is no information about the enemy.

Thus, none of the individuals concerned were to know the purpose of their orders and were not briefed about the locations, movement or intentions of the enemy. More serious omissions were to occur when Berthier, rather than repeat this order to each individual verbatim, extracted the parts which concerned them, thus, in addition to being ignorant of Napoleon's operational plan and whereabouts of the enemy, they were similarly uninformed in the context of each others movements.

For example, at Auma timed 0400 on 12th October, based on Napoleon's operation order, Berthier sent this order to Murat.

The Emperor orders, My Prince, that you are to leave Gera immediately for Zeitz, and send out skirmishers in the direction of Leipzig.

It is the Emperor's wish that from Zeitz, if the information you receive shows that the enemy is still near Erfurt, you should proceed to Naumburg, where Marshal Davout will be. Headquarters will today be at Gera.

The position of the army today, the 12th, is as follows:

Marshal Soult at Gera, Marshal Ney at Mittel, Marshal Lannes at Jena, Marshal Davout en route from Mittel to Naumburg.

Murat is given the location the Imperial headquarters and most, though not all, other formations. An important omission is any mention of Bernadotte's I Corps. It is evident that

Lannes is already at Jena, which is important in the context of Napoleon's later critique of Bernadotte's conduct.

The inclusion of the instruction to send out skirmishers is interesting for it does not feature in the operation order. It was probably a verbal instruction from Napoleon, for Berthier did nothing without precise instructions.

Also from Auma at 0400, Berthier sent an order to Bernadotte. I beg to inform you, Monsieur le Maréchal, that I am sending an order to the grand Duke of Berg (Murat) to proceed to Zeitz and thence to Naumburg, if the information concerning the enemy still leads him to believe that its principal forces are near Erfurt. The Emperor's intention is that you should support the Grand Duke's movement. Arrange with him regarding your march.

Headquarters will be transferred today, at noon, to Gera.

Bernadotte is told of the transfer of the Imperial headquarters to Gera, but given no information whatever about the locations of other formations. He is not told that Davout is also ordered to Naumburg. It will be noted that although Bernadotte is told to co-operate with Murat, the latter has not been told about this.

Finally, at 0500, Berthier writes Davout's order.

Marshal Davout is ordered, with the whole of his army corps, to leave the position he occupies and proceed direct to Naumburg, but always holding his troops ready to fight. He will be preceded by all his light cavalry, which will send out skirmishers as far as possible, as much for the purpose of obtaining news of the enemy as to make prisoners, stop baggage, and get accurate information.

General Suhac's division of dragoons will be under Marshal Davout's orders. I beg to inform Marshal Davout that I am instructing General Suhac to proceed to Mittel, where he will receive the Marshal's orders.

The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshall Bernadotte are also ordered to proceed to Naumburg, but to follow the Zeitz road. Marshal Lannes proceeds towards Jena from Neustadt. Marshal Augereau proceeds to Khala; Marshal Soult to Gera; and Marshal Ney to Mittel. Imperial headquarters will be today, at noon, at Gera.

It tells him to move to Naumburg, but not by which route, but at least informs him that Murat and Bernadotte are also moving there via Zeitz. The precise location of the army differs from what Murat has been told, insofar as the former is lead to believe they are located in the places where Davout is told, at a later hour, they are moving to. Davout is not told that Bernadotte has orders to co-operate with Murat

In a parallel private despatch, also from Auma at 0400, Napoleon wrote personally to Murat. I shall be at Gera today before noon. You will see from the position of the army that I am completely surrounding the enemy. But I need information as to what it intends doing. I hope you will find out at Zeitz. You saw what I did at Gera. Do the same. Attack boldly everything which is on the march. these forces are columns which endeavour to reach a meeting place, and the rapidity of my movements prevents them receiving counter-orders in time. two or three successes of this kind will crush the Prussian army and perhaps make a general encounter unnecessary. Marshal Davout sends all his cavalry direct to Naumburg. Cover the whole plain of Leipzig with yours.

Murat is still not told of Bernadotte's orders to co-operate with him and Davout has not been told to send his cavalry "direct" to Naumburg. Furthermore, it orders Murat to cover the "whole plain of Leipzig" with his cavalry, which tends to support the possibility that the issue of reconnaissance towards Leipzig by the cavalry was an after-thought. Did Napoleon not know that Berthier had included it in Murat's orders? When it comes to such detail the left hand does not seem to know what the right hand is doing.

Anyway, this causes Murat to reply from Zeitz that he has conflicting orders; Berthier's telling him to "send out skirmishers" towards Leipzig and Napoleon's telling him to "cover the whole plain of Leipzig" with his cavalry. He asks for confirmation, therefore, if he is still to move towards Naumburg, which is in the opposite direction from Leipzig, and draws up a half-cocked plan to accomplish all the contradictory tasks he has been given!

So, Murat's confusion notwithstanding, he remains unaware of the support he is to receive from Bernadotte, Bernadotte is left ignorant of the general movement of the army and can only learn that Davout is also moving to Naumburg from Murat. None of them are told anything substantial about the enemy or, more importantly, Napoleon's plans for bringing the Prussians to battle.

Furthermore, in Napoleon's original instructions to Berthier he mentioned Davout first, and most importantly. Berthier is to tell Davout he is to arrive at Naumburg "as quickly as possible", whilst the others, later in the text, "are to follow the Zeitz road". Davout is clearly vital to the success of the encircling movement and has approximately a further 12km to march, yet Berthier prepares and despatches Davout's order last of all. Berthier's system of making a number of individual orders from the single order given him by Napoleon resulted in a number of important and serious omissions. So much for the efficiency of the Imperial general staff and its consummate Chief of Staff.

Napoleon then follows all this up with another personal despatch, this time from Auma to Davout at 0830, apparently as an after-thought, asking him by which road he intends to move to Naumburg. "I mount into the saddle to go to Gera. Inform me of the road you are taking to Naumburg. It is possible that the enemy will carry out its retreat behind Ilm and the Saale; for it seems that it is evacuating Jena. It will be easy for you, on arriving at Naumburg to make certain of this. Scout the whole plain with the whole of your light cavalry and send news as soon as you can to Prince Murat, who will be near Zeitz, and to me near Gera. Marshall Ney will be at Gera early. You can inform him of what comes to your knowledge."

This further contradicts what Murat has been told about Davout's cavalry in the former's 0400 despatches from Berthier and Napoleon personally. Murat knows nothing of Davout's orders to "scour the whole plain" and still believes Davout's cavalry is marching "direct" to Naumburg. Furthermore, Ney was not at Gera. At 0400, according to Napoleon's operation order, he was still at Mittel-Pölnitz, approximately 18 kilometres south-west of Gera. There was no possibility of him being at Gera "early".

This downward transmission of orders, with inconsistent or no lateral transmission, is appallingly bad staff work. Orders sent by Berthier's, although they collectively reflect the instructions given to him by Napoleon, do not always advise each Corps commander of the others' orders and leave Bernadotte particularly uninformed. These people, remember, are Corps commanders, the largest independent formations in the army, who are supposed to be able to act in concert with each other. It is almost beyond belief. The felony is compounded by Napoleon's habit of sending additional private despatches to certain individuals, which tended, at times, only to confuse and contradict.

Davout received his 0500 order at 0600, a one-hour transmission time, and his vanguard set out a half hour later, followed by the head of the column at 0700 and ultimately by Gudin's Division at 0930. This, incidentally, serves to show just how difficult it was to get an entire Corps moving; three and a half hours in this case. Murat and Bernadotte received their 0400 orders at 0715, more than three hours after despatch and, in contrast, were not on the move until 0900, their advance guards, presumably, leaving somewhere around 0830.

13 October 1806

At 0700 on 13 October, Napoleon sent Murat an order from Gera telling him to "to make no move today, in order to give the troops a little rest". He went on to say "If the enemy is at Erfurt, my plan is to direct the army on Weimar and attack it on the 16th.". Evidently, even at this late stage, a battle was still not considered imminent and the anticipated time and place for the decisive battle remained the same. This assessment was as incorrect as it had always been.

In the meantime scouts were sent out from Imperial headquarters. These produced new information which indicated that the enemy was, at last, moving. At 0900 on 13 October Napoleon penned another personal despatch to Murat based on the intelligence he derived from this information.

"At last the veil is drawn aside, the enemy having begun its retreat to Magdeburg. Move as quickly as possible with Bernadotte's Corps in the direction of Dornburg.". "I believe that the enemy will try to attack Marshal Lannes at Jena, or that they will flee. If they attack marshal Lannes, your position will enable you to assist him." Unfortunately Murat, in accordance with the earlier contradictory orders of 12 October, discussed above, had sent a large part of his cavalry to reconnoitre the plain of Leipzig, with the result that neither Beaumont's dragoon Division, the Brigade of Lasalle, nor that of Milhaud would be available on 14 October 1806. This situation was a direct result of contradictory orders being sent by two people; the chief of staff, in the name of Napoleon, and Napoleon himself in a private despatch. It was a classic case of order, counter-order, disorder.

Davout, Bernadotte and Murat were thus at Naumburg on the night of 13 October. It was at here that orders written by Berthier at 1500 arrived for Bernadotte and Davout. They were identical.

"The Emperor, Monsieur le Maréchal, learns, one league from Jena, that the enemy is face to face with Marshal Lannes with nearly 50,000 men. The Marshal even believes that he will be attacked this evening. If, this evening, you hear an attack at Jena you must manoeuvre on the enemy and outflank its left. If there is no attack this evening at Jena you will receive tonight the dispositions for tomorrow.".

Bernadotte, however, was already en route for Dornburg, presumably in accordance with the 0900 order received earlier by Murat, with whom he was co-operating. Indeed, Prussian reconnaissance reported, with some astonishment, the presence of French troops in Dornburg during the late morning of 13 October. Bernadotte halted his corps for the night, which was by now strung out all along the road between Dornburg and Naumburg, with its head probably in the vicinity of Kamburg and, perhaps, its advance guard in Dornburg, and awaited the promised orders.

14 October 1806

Subsequently, at 0300 on 14 October, Davout received further orders from Jena written at 2200 the previous evening, instructing him to march on Apolda.

"The Emperor has recognised a Prussian Army which stretches a league away before and on the heights of Jena as far as Weimar. He proposes to attack it on the morrow. He orders Marshal Davout to proceed to Apolda in order to fall on the rear of that army. He leaves the Marshal the choice of his route, provided he takes part in the fight." Berthier added this post script,

"If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which he pointed out to him at Dornburg.".

The fact is that Bernadotte, or at least his Corps, was not with Davout; I and III Corps were on opposite sides of Naumburg, I Corps strung out between Naumburg and Dornburg, with only its rear still in Naumburg. Furthermore, he had received no personal orders to countermand the last ones, which instructed him to march on Dornburg. Ignoring the commander of I Corps in this way is another example of just how bad staff work at Imperial headquarters was. Could it have been a deliberate slight? I doubt it, and think it more likely to be Berthier's incompetence at worst, lack of imagination at best. If it was important that Bernadotte marched with Davout, proper and unequivocal orders should have been sent to the former personally, not an ambiguous and vague suggestion by proxy.

On the strength of the post-script to his orders, Davout met with Bernadotte near Naumburg and, it is said, handed him a copy of the order, though the III Corps journal says that it was a verbal transmission. Davout determined to march west and approach Apolda from the north, rather than via Dornburg. Why, one wonders, did he choose this route? The answer is probably because Bernadotte already occupied the Naumburg/Dornburg/Apolda road with I Corps. A Corps took up a considerable distance on the march laterally and lengthways, not counting straggling for which the French army was notorious; the artillery and vehicles normally used the road, whilst others arms marched parallel to it. Anyway, both routes were main roads, such as they were in 1806, and in the context of distance, and therefore time, were 'six of one and half a dozen of the other'. Bernadotte probably chose not to march with Davout for much the same reasons, and to avoid having to defile through Naumburg again.

Those then are the facts and circumstances of the orders received. No further orders were sent to either Davout or Bernadotte until 0500 on 15 October 1806.

More Bernadotte and 1806

A Footnote To Bernadotte: Scapegoat for Intelligence Failure?

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #48
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1999 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com