Taking of Dutch Frigate
by Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands
2nd Division: The Taking of a Dutch FrigateAfter having prevented the cutting of the dike near Hagestein on 15 September, Lieutenant von Geel was ordered to reconnoitre in the direction of the city Vianen with 20 hussars. Von Geel could only advance with much trouble, because the patriots had demolished the dikes and the roads, and it was impossible to reach Vianen with the horses. Von Geel managed to come near enough to notice an Orange colour flying from the church tower. Receiving word of this, Lieut-Gen Gaudi immediately dispatched his engineer officers to supervise the quick repairs of the dikes and roads, and ordered his advance guard to move on Vianen. Captain von Meckling arrived at the gates of Vianen, and finding them closed smashed one in, entering the city with his troops. There he learned that the patriot garrison had consisted of 150 men of the Regiment Saxen-Gotha, 40 dragoons, and some auxiliaries. They had all taken flight when they knew the Prussians were in the vicinity. According to the citizens the auxiliaries had crossed the river Lek, while the regular troops had retreated to Nieuwpoort, where part of them would be taken prisoner the next day by the advance guard of the 1st Division. The Prussians took three 24pdr guns, six 12pdr guns, three 3pdr guns and two mortars, beside many provisions. In addition, during the day Von Meckling collected 35 infantry that had deserted. From these deserters, Von Meckling learned that a 10-gun frigate, armed with six 12pdr guns and four BDpdr guns, which had taken position on the river Lek near Vreeswijk, was grounded on a sandbank in the river. Its Captain was busy with boats trying to refloat his ship. To prevent this and to capture the ship, on the 16th Von Meckling despatched Lieutenant von Hallmann with 24 fusiliers of the Battalion von Langelair No. 1, of which force 12 fusiliers crossed the river. Von Hallmann ordered the captain of the ship to surrender, but this was refused. Fire was opened, which was replied by the guns of the ship and with musketry, although the Prussians suffered no loss. The musketry of the fusiliers could make no impression on the Captain of the ship, and in the evening, Von Hallmann retreated. When Lieut-Gen Gaudi heard about the frigate, he was determined to capture it, and ordered Major General von Eben to do so with the grenadier battalion of Rgt von Budberg, 50 Fussjäger, a squadron of his own hussars and 2 heavy guns. He was to be assisted by Major von Schöler of the engineers. After these troops had taken up positions, Von Eben summoned the surrender of the ship, threatening to sink it if the Captain did not comply. Since he was in a difficult position, the Captain of the ship surrendered, with his crew of 24, and 50 soldiers. The Brigade Woldeck had advanced further along the north bank of the Rhine, and reached on the 16th Wijk-bij-Duurstede. The remainder of the 2nd Division had reached Everdingen in the meantime, where Lieut-Gen Gaudi received news of the Orangists occupying Utrecht. This made his attack on the defence line along the Vaart canal much easier, because now there was no chance for a possible flank attack from this city. Lieutenant Schauroth reconnoitred the defence line along the Vaart near Vreeswijk, and found all the redoubts deserted. The Brigade Woldeck crossed the Vaart, and on the 19th arrived at Schoonhoven. 1st Division: Probing and SkirmishingAs already described, on 15th September the 1st Division had reached Barnevelt. The following day it reached Amersfoort, and made contact with the Orangist troops camped there, learning of the developments at Utrecht. After sending some cavalry to reconnoitre, Lieut-Gen von Lottum proceeded to Hilversum in person, with an infantry battalion and two cavalry regiments, followed by the remainder of his troops. At Hilversum, camp was made, and numerous cavalry patrols were ordered to search the countryside and to disarm the predominantly patriotic inhabitants. It soon became clear to the Prussians that the defence lines along the river Vecht were weak and the inundations were not adequate because of the continuing strong eastern winds. Arriving in Hilversum, Captain von Heyden was despatched to Vreeland, with 25 dragoons (Dragoner Rgt von Lottum) and 25 cuirassiers (Kürassier Rgt von Rohr), to throw back some patriot troops and to reconnoitre. The Quartermaster-General of the 1st Division, Captain von Massenbach, accompanied them. Arriving at the bridge near Graveland sluice, Von Heyden left behind 15 men to cover his back. He himself moved with 18 men to the right in the direction of Ankeveen, while Von Massenbach moved with the remainder to Kortenhoef. Leaving behind small detachments at important crossroads, Von Massenbach arrived at Kortenhoef, learning from the inhabitants that an hour ago about 200 men from the (patriot) Rgt von Bylandt had passed on their way to the Hinderdamsche Schans ('redoubt'), to reinforce its garrison of 40 men. To prevent this, it was decided to follow them to either cut them off, or to engage them in battle. However, at the other end of Kortenhoef, the Prussians advance was stopped because the bridge there was demolished. The Prussians had to use force to 'persuade' the inhabitants of Kortenhoef to repair the bridge, and because in the eyes of the Prussians these could not be trusted, some cavalry occupied this bridge. [4]
What were left were two officers and eight troopers, who went in pursuit of the patriot infantry. It soon became clear that these were not moving to the Hinderdamsche Schans, but to Vreeland. Their rear guard was attacked and put to flight, and some prisoners were taken. An attack on the main force was not possible, being outnumbered and only able to attack along a small dike, so the Prussians retreated. During this combat, Captain von Massenbach was severely wounded to his left hand, and not able to participate in the remainder of the campaign.
After the main force had made camp near Hilversum, Major General von Kalkreuth advanced on the fortress-city Naarden with the 1st musketeer battalion/Rgt von Eichmann, 56 Schützen of the 2nd musketeer battalion, and the Kürassier Rgt von Kalkreuth. On the 17th, Von Kalkreuth occupied Bussum and then advanced further with 40 cuirassiers, summoning the governor of Naarden [5] , Colonel baron de Mattha, to capitulate. Mattha answered Von Kalkreuth that he would send his summons to Amsterdam, and that he would receive an answer at 9 o'clock in the evening.
While these negotiations went on, the patriot troops fired at every Prussian they saw, another violation of the rules of war, while they were reinforced by another infantry battalion. In the evening, Mattha answered that Lieut-Gen van Rijssel, commanding the patriot infantry, had arrived to take command, and that negotiations would have to start again. Von Kalkreuth suspected a trap because of this delay, and reinforced his troops before Naarden with the 2nd musketeer battalion/Rgt von Eichmann. He knew he was much too weak to try to take Naarden by force, and in the morning of the 18th, he retreated. He moved with the cavalry, two infantry companies, and a 3pdr gun in the direction of Breukelen, while the remaining six infantry companies returned to the main force at Hilversum.
While his negotiations with the governor of Naarden were going on, Von Kalkreuth send four strong patrols out to make good use of the confusion caused by the retreat of Van Salm, to probe the strength of the patriot defences along the river Vecht. In addition, his orders were to alarm the patriots along their whole defence line behind the Vecht, to keep the troops placed here away from the southern part of their defence lines, where according to the initial plan the main attack would take place.
The first, second and third patrol consisted of 15 cavalry and 13 Schützen each, and were commanded by the Captains von Kleist (who had to advance to Breukelen), Von Quitzow (who had to advance to Maarsen) and Von Winterfeld (who had to advance to Zuylen). They all had to try to capture crossings over the Vecht. Von Kleist was not able to reach Breukelen, because it was within range of the guns from the fortress Nieuwersluis. However, the latter two patrols managed to reach their objectives and found at these places demolished bridges, which they repaired during the night, supported by the inhabitants.
The fourth patrol consisted of 42 cavalry and 18 Schützen from the Rgt von Eichmann, commanded by Lieutenant Wirsebitzki. His task was to move on Weesp, Muyden, or the Uitermeersche Schans. Advancing to the vicinity of Weesp, he learned from a farmer that the Uitermeersche Schans was not properly guarded. He also reported that the seven men sent to guard the drawbridge on the road leading to this redoubt had left the guarding of the important bridge to a farmer, while they themselves were inside the guardhouse. Wirsebitzki wanted to profit from this negligence, and immediately advanced along the dike to the bridge.
Arriving there, the farmer was told that he would be shot if he did not lower the drawbridge, after which the scared man complied. The Prussians crossed the drawbridge, and managed to surprise and capture the patriots at the guardhouse before they could fire a shot. Then the small cavalry troop charged into the redoubt, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and although the Prussians had to dismount to enter the redoubt proper, there was no resistance. 52 infantry were taken prisoner, and the 15 8pdr guns arming the redoubt were captured.
[6]
Wirsebitzki occupied the redoubt with the Schützen, and moved with the cavalry to Weesp. This city was nearly captured, because the garrison was also surprised, but before the Prussians could smash in a gate, the patriots noticed that only cavalry was present and opened fire, after which the Prussians retreated quickly without loss to Bussum. Von Kalkreuth, receiving news about the capture of the Uitermeersche Schans, despatched Captain von Boineburg with 100 infantry from the Rgt von Eichmann to occupy the redoubt. In the meanwhile, as already described, he himself advanced on Breukelen, but because of the very bad weather, that turned the roads into mud, movement was difficult and slow. On the same day, Lieut-Gen von Lottum despatched Major von Zürson with 60 dragoons (from the Dragoner Rgt von Lottum) and 10 infantry (Rgt von Eichmann) to capture the Hinderdamsche Schans. Lieutenant Borkowski would support him with 30 men, part of the garrison of the Uitermeersche Schans. Arriving in the vicinity of the Hinderdamsche Schans, Von Zürson moved forward with some dragoons to reconnoitre, and learned that the redoubt was situated on an island in the river, without any bridge. Its guns covered the road leading to the redoubt, so Von Zürson decided to attack at night.
His plan was to keep the garrison of the redoubt busy with an advance guard of 20 dragoons and 40 infantry. These troops had to make a feint attack on the redoubt from the front, while 14 men with two small boats would attack the redoubt from behind. The plan worked well: the whole garrison engaged the Prussians in front, and the boats reached the redoubt unnoticed. The Prussians landed and took up positions behind the guardhouse, opening fire on the startled garrison. The boats returned and brought another 14 Prussians to the redoubt, and this time Von Zürson himself was with them. The patriots, fired upon from two sides and confused, surrendered, except for a few who took flight with some boats and made good their escape to Weesp. The Prussians took 81 from the garrison of 100 prisoner, and captured eight guns and four howitzers. The redoubt was occupied by Lieutenant count Baro with 60 infantry. Prussian losses were five killed and 16 wounded.
On 19 September, Major General von Kalkreuth arrived in the vicinity of Breukelen and the fortress Nieuwersluis. The surroundings were very wet and marshy because of the inundations. Being very optimistic because of the easy victories over the recent days, Von Kalkreuth decided to try to capture Nieuwersluis as soon as he arrived. As already described, he had with him the Kürassier Rgt von Kalkreuth, two infantry companies from the Rgt von Eichmann, and a 3pdr gun. First, he wanted to cut communications and isolate the fortress, not wanting a repetition of what happened at Naarden. In order to do this, part of his troops crossed the river Vecht: a bold move, but not especially dangerous taking into account the behaviour of the patriot troops.
Between Breukelen and Nieuwer-ter-Aa, a piquet consisting of 13 infantry was placed in a water mill and a piquet with the same strength a little bit further inside a farmhouse. Captain von Winterfeld stood near Breukelen with his patrol (15 cavalry, 13 'Schützen'), together with another infantry company and the 3pdr gun under Lt-Col von Hartog. The 1st squadron ('Leib') of the Kürassier Rgt von Kalkreuth patrolled the terrain between Breukelen and the river. Near that river, an infantry piquet was situated, commanded by Lieutenant von Haagen.
The governor of Nieuwersluis, Colonel d'Averhoult, assisted by the French engineer Lt-Col Prevost, was determined not to stay idle, and already the same day a sally was made to cut a dike, in order to inundate more terrain. Lieutenant von Haagen quickly noticed the sally, and attacked with his piquet. He was supported by the cuirassiers, firing their pistols at the patriots. In spite of the covering fire from the fortress, the patriots were driven back to the fortress before they could do much damage to the dike.
At the eastern side of the Vecht, the terrain was very wet because of the inundations. Movement was only possible along the roads on the dikes, and sometimes very difficult. To guard Nieuwersluis and to confuse the governor of Nieuwersluis regarding from which side the Prussians would attack, Colonel von Borstell [7] was ordered to send out many patrols consisting of cuirassiers, on this side of the river. On the 19th, Lieut-Gen von Lottum ordered Major Niebelschütz to move with 200 infantry from the Rgt von Eichmann to the village Oud-Loosdrecht. Arriving there, he would link up with some cuirassiers.
Oud-Loosdrecht was to be occupied by 100 infantry, and with the remaining infantry and the cavalry he had to advance to the village Mijndensluis, to alarm the garrison of Nieuwersluis from there. Arriving at Oud-Loosdrecht, he found no cuirassiers, because von Kalkreuth needed them elsewhere. Niebelschütz decided to follow his orders, and advanced with only 100 infantry and without the cavalry. Before reaching Mijndensluis, a farmer brought news that the patriots occupied this village with a strong force, and had thrown up a small redoubt at the entrance. The only way to reach the village was along a dike, because of the inundations, and half way along this dike a bridge across a canal was demolished.
Major Niebelschütz was not sure if he would be able to take this position, but at least he wanted to try to follow his orders. To cross the canal, he collected some beams and boards, and repaired the demolished bridge. The patriots occupying the redoubt did not wait for the arrival of the Prussians, but retreated to a strong stone building surrounded by a ditch in the middle of the village and some houses in the vicinity. When Niebelschütz arrived at the redoubt, he found it deserted. Lacking the artillery to drive the patriots from the houses, he ordered Lieutenant von Bremer to move to the right with 20 men, to attack the houses that were occupied from behind, and to dislodge the patriots.
However, before Von Bremer could come to action the patriots hurriedly retreated, leaving behind three field guns that just had arrived from Nieuwersluis. Von Bremer threw the guns in a deep canal, but by then the patriots realised they were only opposed by a small force, and counterattacked with fresh troops including two guns, despatched from Nieuwersluis. The Prussians were shot at with grapeshot and could not reply, lacking guns, and they did not have a clear view on their flanks because of the houses, bushes and trees. To prevent being surprised and cut off, Niebelschütz moved his troops out of range to the right, into some cover. The patriots in their turn did felt threatened by this movement and they also retreated, back to Nieuwersluis. In the evening, Niebelschütz was ordered back to Oud-Loosdrecht, and the following day returned to the camp at Hilversum. During this action, the Prussians lost five men wounded and seven men taken prisoner by the patriots. [8]
On the same day, Von Lottum ordered Major von Pastau to drive the patriots from the village Vreeland. Von Pastau had 150 dragoons of the Dragoner Rgt von Lottum at his disposal. Arriving before the village, occupied by 250 infantry and 50 cavalry, Von Pastau noticed that the road was barred with cut down trees, covered by two guns. In spite of the fire from these guns, some dismounted dragoons removed the barricade, but it was clear to Von Pastau that he could not do much against the enemy without infantry. Asking Von Lottum for infantry, he was reinforced by 80 men from the Rgt von Eichmann, and after their arrival resumed the attack, dislodging the patriots from Vreeland which retreated to Loenen. Von Pastau repaired the bridge across the canal, and went in pursuit of the enemy troops. However, Loenen was occupied by some companies of the Rgt Grenadier-Wallons with some guns in a strong position behind a canal, now reinforced by troops retreated from Vreeland. Von Pastau was outnumbered and had no guns to attack this position, so he retreated to Vreeland. Because of the inundations, the water level rose and with the road back to Hilversum flooded, next day Von Pastau returned to the camp near Hilversum. Prussian losses in this action were three infantry killed and 12 infantry, three dragoons, and seven horses wounded. Four patriots were taken prisoner.
Major General von Kalkreuth now was in a perilous situation. He had taken up positions on the enemy side of the river, while his force consisted only of two infantry companies and 50 Schützen of the Rgt von Eichmann, the Kürassier Rgt von Kalkreuth, and two 3pdr guns. Especially his infantry especially was weak, and had to guard all the routes to Nieuwersluis. To improve this situation, the cuirassiers had to act on foot as infantry, and in a hussar role. Lieut-Gen von Lottum was not able to send him more troops, because he was blockading three fortresses (Naarden, Muiden, and Weesp) and was patrolling along the river Vecht. So on his own account, on the 19th Von Kalkreuth despatched Cornet von Kleist to Major General von Woldeck of the 2nd Division, to ask him for an infantry battalion and two heavy guns. Von Woldeck was supposed to be in the vicinity of Vreeswijk, but Von Kleist was carefully instructed to go to the Duke of Brunswick if he could not find Von Woldeck there. Arriving near Vreeswijk, Von Kleist learned that Von Woldeck had already advanced further with his force, after which he crossed the river Lek and moved to the Duke of Brunswick. Von Brunswick, pleased with the rash actions of Von Kalkreuth, immediately ordered the Grenadier Battalion von Schlottheim and two 12pdr guns to reinforce him.
On the 20th, some farmers told Lieutenant von Pirch, on guard duty at the sluice of Nederhorst, that they were willing to lead him on a safe road to the small town Abkoude, to surprise the patriots present. After conferring with Von Lottum, he received permission to undertake this, and advanced to Abkoude. When he arrived at the village, it became clear he had been deceived: about 300 patriots occupied Abkoude, and immediately attacked him. Von Pirch managed to extricate his troops, losing one men killed and four wounded, but taking five prisoners. After having been reinforced by another 30 men, Von Pirch again advanced to Abkoude, but this time he found it deserted, the village being evacuated by the patriots, and occupied it.
On the same day, after the arrival of Von Kleist with news of the reinforcements that were on the way, Von Kalkreuth offered Colonel d'Averhoult, commanding the garrison, free retreat with his troops if he would surrender. If not, the fortress would be bombarded with the heavy guns and howitzers that were to arrive in a short time and no quarter would be given. D'Averhoult would not comply, because he had a very strong garrison and French gunners at his disposal. However, morale of the garrison was bad. Many deserted; telling Von Kalkreuth that greater part of the garrison consisted of burgher patriots and auxiliaries, with no military training or stomach for a fight.
In addition, they told him that the fortress lacked provisions, and that d'Averhoult would be in an impossible position if the castle at Loenersloot was taken, because this would cut communications with Amsterdam. Von Kalkreuth immediately ordered patrols to reconnoitre the terrain in the direction of Loenersloot, but because of the shortage of troops, this could not be done very properly. However, it became clear that the villages Loenen, Vreeland and Bambrugge were occupied by the patriots, while farmers advised that Loenersloot was occupied by another 150 men. Captain von Quitzow offered to reconnoitre the castle of Loenersloot with ten Schützen, to bring Von Kalkreuth more reliable information. Instead of information, Von Quitzow returned a flat-bottomed boat to Von Kalkreuth, big enough for five horses, asking him to follow him. Von Kalkreuth was puzzled by this, but boarded with four cuirassiers and crossed the canal. Leaving behind a cuirassier to watch out for sallies from Nieuwersluis he went to the castle.
Meeting Von Quitzow things became clear, because he had captured a courier with letters making clear that Nieuwersluis lacked provisions, and that the castle of Loenersloot still was not occupied by the patriots: another act of negligence from their side. When the Prussians arrived in front of the castle, it was noticed that the drawbridge was up, but the occupants were quickly persuaded to lower it. Von Quitzow was ordered to garrison the castle with the cuirassiers until 20 infantry would arrive. The castle taken, the patriots evacuated the village Loenen, but from the direction of Bambrugge, a strong patrol appeared, which was promptly attacked by Von Quitzow and his four cuirassiers. The patriots, expecting that more Prussians would follow, retreated.
The following morning, on the 21st, Von Kalkreuth again despatched an envoy to the commander of Nieuwersluis, who told him about the capture of the castle at Loenersloot, and asking for the surrender of the garrison. After conferring with his officers, Colonel d'Averhoult complied and capitulated, and the Prussians occupied the fortress. 772 men were made prisoner, consisting of infantry of the Rgt No. 5 Pallardy, 3rd bat/Rgt Walen van Grenier, some patriots [9] , and 36 French gunners. Inside the fortress, the Prussians found 58 guns and 20 mortars. From these guns Von Kalkreuth took two 3pdr guns, made into horse artillery to accompany his cuirassier regiment. After the capitulation the reinforcements send by the Duke of Brunswick arrived, and made camp near Breukelen.
More Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787 Part II
Section 2: Capture of Gorkum Section 3: Taking of Dutch Frigate Section 4: Capture of Dordrecht Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787: Order of Battle: 2nd, 3rd Divisions The Dutch During the Revolutionary Wars
Battle of Swalmen, 1793 Part 12 [FE65] Defense of the Dutch Republic 1793 Part 11 [FE64] Siege of Willemstad 1793 Part 10 [FE63] Klundert and Willemstad 1793 Part 9 [FE62] Breda and Geertruidenberg 1793 Part 8 [FE60] Battle of Maastricht 1793 Part 7 [FE59] Austrian Troops and Dutch Defense Part 6 [FE57] Intermezzo 1787 - 1793 Part 5 [FE56] Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787: Part IV Part 4 [FE47] Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787: Part III Part 3 [FE46] Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787: Part II Part 2 [FE45] Prussian Campaign in Holland 1787: Part I Part 1 [FE44] Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #45 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |