Skirmishing and
The Third Rank
Part 1

The Prussians and Austrians

Austrians

by John Cook, UK

During the 18th Century the Austrians were innovators where the use of light troops was concerned. In the context of Pandors during the Seven Year's War "These Austrian light troops were the ones, long before the American farmers and French tirailleurs, who showed the tactics of the future." [35] However, information from the early part of the Revolutionary and Imperial period concerning the Austrian's use of skirmishers from the line battalions, and the employment of the third rank, sometimes appears unclear and contradictory. Archduke Charles' Observationspunkte 1796 was conservative in tone, and seemingly attempts to curb trends towards skirmishing by line troops, which had emerged during the campaigns in the Low Countries. This document, or at least the parts of it I have seen reproduced, seems to be hostile to skirmishing by line infantry whilst, apparently, accepting the need for it to do so sometimes, which is done by companies, rather than the third rank. On one hand, whilst pointing out that "The war in Flanders, on terrain so irregular that it was not possible to attack in closed line, had the unfortunate consequence for the army of upsetting the ideas on the true method of attacking the enemy, held not only by the private soldier but by the officer as well. Even by the line infantry, attack 'en tirailleurs' is almost the only method used on the most important occasions, or at least the attack degenerates into this as soon as the heat of battle reduces the original order of the advance", it also says, "If when attacking a village or wood it be considered useful to employ a few companies or scattered tirailleurs, it should be impressed upon the men that as soon as the company commander has the drummer beat the alarm, they must gather by him without the least waste of time, and reform in rank and file". [36] There remains, however, an apparent disdain for dispersed-order fighting "Regular drilled and solid infantry, if they advance in lengthened pace courageously under artillery protection, cannot be hindered by scattered skirmishers." [37] Zach agreed and decreed in 1800 "Only a few skirmishers are necessary to the front, but behind them closed-up troops." [38] It was probably a later dearth of specialist light infantry that caused the line infantry to be drawn more and more back into the skirmishing role, which will be examined later when discussing the Exercier-Reglement für die Kaiserlich-Königlichen Infanterie 1807. There is, however, sufficient evidence to support the use of two ranks by the Austrians during the Revolutionary War period when tactically expedient to do so, usually to extend the line when covering a frontage which it was not possible to do in three ranks. In other words, for exactly the same reasons as the Prussians and the British. In 1794, for example, the then GM Mack's Instructionspunkte recommended that the third rank be used to extend the line. [39] Gallina states that Mack intended the third rank to be used as a general reserve and for skirmishing, and that the practice saw use in the Low Countries in 1794 and Germany 1796. [40] The use of two ranks was clearly dictated by circumstances and terrain. Also in 1794, according to Lloyd, FM Coburg-Saalfeld, commanding the Austrian forces in the Low Countries, ordered that a third of each battalion be used for skirmishing, with the usual three component parts of firing line, support to the firing line, and a reserve. [41] Although this particular extract does not make it clear from which part of the battalion these skirmishers were found, it is clear from the history of the Revolutionary Wars that Coburg intended them to come from the third rank. [42] There is further evidence that the third rank was used to provide skirmishers at this early period. At Tournai in 1794, "From the regiment (IR7 Schröder) the third rank was dissolved into skirmishers, which set up a continuous fire against the enemy." The battle was "largely fought with small arms. With the exception of the grenadiers, almost all the infantry were in open order, their fire lasting 15 hours." [43] The efficacy of Austrian skirmishers in general is evident from the accounts of the celebrated French light infantryman Duhesme [44]. "These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order; they, in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men." Despite references to line battalions skirmishing at this early period, it seems that this function remained largely the domain of the Jäger, Grenzers and Freikorps (later the short-lived light infantry). The Exercitium für die sämmentliche Kaiserlich-Königlichen Infanterie 1769 certainly places the most experienced and skilled soldiers of the line battalions on the flanks, rather than in the third rank, but in order to help maintain the cohesion of the close order line, rather than for detached specialist duties. [45] Be all that as it may, it seems that the Exercitium 1769 was never entirely replaced by these other instructions, and so one must assume that it remained relevant. It is first to that, the most venerable of infantry regulations used during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, which we ought to turn. Although it is not helpful where skirmishing doctrine is concerned, it does describe the method by which the Austrian infantry formed two ranks. The third rank executed a turn towards the desired flank and marched towards it in file. When the first half of the third rank had passed the flank of the battalion it was halted. The first half was then advanced and dressed forward on the flank of the first rank. Large Figure 5 (30K) The second half of the third rank then continued its flank march in file until it too was past the flank of the battalion, at which point it was halted, advanced and dressed forwards on the flank of the second rank (Figure 5). [46] Firing when in two ranks was conducted with both ranks standing. The so-called Mack regulations, because he was Chief of Staff at the time, appeared in 1804, which according to Rothenberg was based on the Instructionspunkte 1794. Although Rothenberg expresses some doubt about the extent to which Mack's regulations were implemented, [47] they were adopted in April 1805, including the reorganisation of the line regiments into four battalions and a grenadier battalion, which was promulgated on 1 August 1805 and, apparently contrary to popular belief, was implemented throughout Germany and Italy. [48] Amongst other things the practice of kneeling the first rank for firing was abolished, as was firing by the third rank which could now also be used to form a reserve. [49] This is essentially the same two-rank musketry system used by the Prussians post-1806, and it clearly frees the third rank for other things. In May 1805 the Abrichtungs Reglement für die K. und K.K. Infanterie 1806 received the signature of Archduke Charles. This was the training regulation for soldiers, and it establishes that the infantry "shall on no occasion fall-in other than in three ranks." [50] It confirms that for musketry the third rank stood with shouldered arms and only the first and second fired. The second rank stepped to the right so that the left shoulder of each soldier was behind the right shoulder of the man to their front. [51] It is now to the Exercier-Reglement 1807 that we turn our attention. This document has several pages of instructions for the use of two ranks and according to Rothemberg it incorporated much of the April 1805 regulations. Like the Abrichtungs Reglement 1806 it states that the infantry employed three ranks. However, in addition to confirming the two-rank firing system, Chapter 1 to Part Three of the Exercier-Reglement 1807 contains 19 pages of instructions for the detached use of the third rank. The chapter opens by saying that there are many opportunities for the use of the third rank as a separate body. The first section deals with detaching the third rank from the battalion in line and forming it in twelve Züge. This was done by doubling the third ranks of the four Züge in each company, as we have already seen in the Prussian regulations. At full strength a German fusilier company consisted of 54 files, or 162 men. Doubling the third rank, therefore, produced twelve Züge consisting of approximately 27 men each, at full strength, in two close-order ranks. Subsequent sections describe how these could be either sent forward through intervals in the line to provide an advance guard, retired to form a reserve, or to extend the line to a flank in two ranks which shows, in terms that are indisputable, that from 1807 a two-rank close-order line was part of the Austrian infantry's repertoire, if required. The final section concerning the battalion in line describes forming a flank guard by extending the two-rank line to the flank of the battalion and then refusing it to make an L-shaped arrangement. [52] Chapter 1 to Part Three of the Exercier-Reglement 1807 also describes, using the doubling procedure already described, detaching the third rank from columns of Züge, half-companies and half-divisions (companies), to provide a flank guard consisting of a column of half-Züge or Züge, parallel to the main column, and deploying from a column of half-companies in three-ranks by Züge in two-ranks, to form a two-rank line. [53] For skirmishing, the familiar three elements of reserves, supports and skirmish line are described and illustrated. In brief, the skirmish line deployed in dispersed order in an arc up to 300 paces in front of the battalion and consisted of three Züge from the third rank, approximately 80 men. Approximately a hundred paces behind the skirmish line were the supports consisting of three further Züge in two close-order ranks, which were rotated through the firing line as required, and a similar distance behind the supports was the reserve comprising the remaining six Züge of the third rank, also in two close-order ranks. The skirmish line and supports were usually taken from flanking Züge, the reserve from centre Züge. Large Figure 7 (47K) Finally, approximately a hundred paces to the rear of the reserve was the battalion in two close-order ranks (Figure 7) [54]. It will be noted that this arrangement, and the number of men deployed in dispersed order, mirrors Prussian practice in the Exerzir-Reglement 1812, except that the reserves are posted to the front of the battalion, rather than to the flanks or rear. The role of the skirmish element was fourfold: [55] 1. To keep enemy skirmishers at a distance from the front of formed troops in a defensive position. 2. To throw back enemy skirmishers, reconnoitre the enemy position, divert the enemy's attention and threaten the enemy's flanks, when moving forwards with close-order troops, and to prepare, screen and support the attack. 3. To hold enemy skirmishers during a retreat so that close-order troops are able to make a continual and undisturbed withdrawal. 4. To protect the flanks of a column against enemy skirmishers during flank and column marches by keeping close to the flanks of the column. By 1807, then, the skirmish element of the infantry battalion was officially found from the third rank and accounts in Krieg 1809 [56] show that the line regiments provided skirmishers routinely during that campaign. Indeed, Charles' orders of 5 June 1809 state "In the direction of the enemy, a light screen of skirmishers can be deployed in front of the mass." [57] One only has to turn comparatively few pages of Krieg Volume I to find an example of IR33 producing 60 skirmishers during the engagement at Landshut, and later, together with IR3, repeating a deployment of skirmishers on the orders of GM Radetsky. At Teugen-Hausen, described in the same volume, we find "Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively fire-fight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods". This seems to be a text book deployment of skirmishers, as described in the Execier-Reglement 1807. Here we have an account of the line regiments' skirmishers augmenting the Grenzer sharpshooters. When contact with the French is made, what appears to be the close order skirmish züge are ordered to their support, whilst the formed battalions take up their position behind the screen as they arrive on the field. Coincidentally, one of the regiments involved was IR7 Schröder, which we previously saw skirmishing at Tournai in 1794. Elsewhere, in Volume IV, there is yet another description of IR7 deploying skirmishers at Urfahr from the third rank, also to reinforce the Jäger and Grenzer. There are similar accounts involving other regiments. Notwithstanding this evidence, the author of a recent American study, [58] the bibliography to which cites Krieg 1809, says that in 1809 the Austrians had no official understanding of how to skirmish. How such a conclusion could be drawn by this author, after having apparently read material which shows it to be nonsense, is not clear. Furthermore, what could be more official than the Exercier-Reglement 1807 or, indeed, the Exercier-Reglement für die K.K. Gränz-Infanterie 1808? [59] The same author further states that there is little evidence that skirmishers were provided from the third rank. Although there are numerous examples of the Austrian line regiments deploying skirmishers in Krieg 1809, it is true that most accounts do not specify where skirmishers were drawn from. On the other hand, one cannot construe that this is an indication that they were not drawn from the place their regulations specified they should be. It is rather like saying that because accounts of charges by French cuirassiers do not state that they were mounted, there is little evidence that had horses! Where no source of skirmishers is given, one must assume that they were drawn from the third rank. There are accounts other than Krieg 1809. Carl Varnhagen von Ense, an officer in IR47 Vogelsang, left an account of his regiment at Wagram in Die Schlacht von Wagram, last published in 1909. In this he describes how his regiment was lying down to avoid enemy cannon fire when "almost all" the company commanded by Hauptmann von Marais was deployed as skirmishers. The company "dissolved into skirmishers, behind willow tree trunks and high corn", later "The skirmishers were called back from the Russbach and stepped back into line." [60] This is interesting for two reasons, first we have an example of a line regiment lying down to avoid cannon, something the pundits will tell you only the British did. Another myth dispelled perhaps. Secondly, this account appears to show an entire company, or at least the larger part of it, being deployed for skirmishing, which harks back to the Observationspunkte 1796. Both these examples demonstrate the kind of tactical flexibility popular authors tell us was generally outside the capabilities of the Austrian infantry. There are other accounts. At Znaym "To the left, and not far from the fifth Corps the first was formed in two lines on the heights before Brenditz; it occupied with one battalion the entrance to the ravin (sic) on its right flank, and the neighbouring vineyards with riflemen and hunters." [61] From the same source, also at Znaym, "The advanced pickets of Mitrowsky (IR10 Mittrowsky), engaged, and were supported by their battalion, which covered by the 12pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowarth (IR11 v Kollowrat-Liebsteinsky), and two pieces of ordnance commanded by Lieutenant Loffler, came up." Later, "a second battalion was detached to this height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village." [62] Subsequent to the 1809 campaign, in 1812, FM Schwarzenberg ordered that "In open ground, 20-30 skirmishers will be enough to hold enemy skirmishers from the front of the battalion or mass". He conceded, however, "In restricted ground they can be increased to one third of the battalion, but the remaining two thirds must remain closed up in one or more reserves depending on terrain." In October 1813, at Hanau, 2nd battalion IR14 "moved forward to support the Bavarian skirmishers in front of the Lamberwald. When the skirmishers were driven back, skirmishers of this battalion moved forward, established a lively fire and halted the enemy advance." A later account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi , published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814. "GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march". The masses were drawn up in a checker board arrangement with IR63 on the left. "Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines." Another example of entire sub-units deploying as skirmishers. [63] It is clear that the Austrian line regiments were perfectly capable of skirmishing, and did so throughout the period. Most first hand accounts typically either do not mention the source of the skirmishers or specifically mention the third rank. There are certainly far more general references to line regiments deploying skirmishers or sharpshooters than those specifying the third rank, but in the absence of statements to the contrary, one simply has to assume that they were drawn from the third rank, in accordance with the Exercier-Reglement 1807. There is, however, some evidence that skirmishers were not always drawn from the third rank, but where accounts specify another source of skirmishers, it is possible that this is the exception rather than the rule. In summary, the trends seen in the Austrian service are similar to those seen elsewhere. There is evidence that they probably used the third rank of line battalions to provide skirmishers from at least 1794 and that it was increasingly utilised for that purpose. It also appears that entire line companies were sometimes employed as skirmishers from this early period. However, by 1807, although the Grenzers and Jäger continued to be the primary light infantry assets, a significant additional skirmish element was officially provided by third rank of line battalions, and accounts in Krieg 1809 show that line battalions routinely deployed skirmishers during that campaign. This continued during the final campaigns of the period. We can say, therefore, that there are more than sufficient accounts to demonstrate that the deployment of skirmishers by Austrian line battalions was by no means unusual and, furthermore, that the Austrians were sufficiently flexible to deploy entire sub-units for skirmish duties if needs be. The Austrian infantry could also detach their third rank for a variety of other purposes, very much like the Prussians, including to provide an extended two rank line, which appears to have been done as early as at least 1794 and was official doctrine by at least 1807. It is also clear that the use of the third rank for musketry was in decline and it is possible to say that the Austrians had abandoned its use by early 1805, perhaps before. More Skirmishing Prussians Austrians French British Footnotes [35] Fuchs. Geschichte des europäischen Kriegwesens. Pt III. Vienna, 1974. p187. PH. [36] Observationspunkte für die Generale bei der Armee in Deutschland in Jahre 1796 from Beitrage zur Geschichte des österreichischen Heerwesens, Vienna, 1872, redproduced in Paret. [37] Observationspunkte 1796. p139. [38] Gallina, J. Beiträge zur Geschichte des österreichischen Heerwesens. Vienna, 1872. p132. Courtesy Dave Hollins (DH). [39] Rothenberg, G. The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814. London, 1982. p40. [40] Gallina. pp143-144. DH. [41] Lloyd, Col E. A Review of the History of Infantry. London, 1908. p200. [42] Kriege gegen die Französische Revolution. 2 Vols. Vienna, 1905. DH. [43] Geschichte des kk kärntnerischen Infanterie Regiment Nr7. 1891. p337. DH. [44] Lloyd. p201. Quoting from the 1864 reprint of Duhesme's Essai historique sur l'infanterie légère. p72. [45] Wagner, W. Von Austerlitz bis Königgratz - Osterreichische Kampftaktik im Spiegel der Regelements 1805-1864. Osnabrück, 1978. pp8-9. [46] Die österreichische Armee Betreffend 1779. Ch49. This is a generalsreglement intended for the use of senior officers, which includes the Exercitium 1769. DH. [47] Rothenberg. p87. [48] Gallina. DH [49] Wagner. p7. [50] Abrichtungs Reglement für die K. und K.K. Infanterie. Vienna, 1806. p119. [51] Ibid. pp126-132. [52] Exercier-Reglement für die K.K Infanterie. Vienna, 1807. pp161-171. [53] Ibid. pp172-177. [54] Ibid. pp179-183 and PL46 [55] Ibid. p179. [56] Krieg 1809. 4 Vols. Vienna, 1907-1910. A translation by Dave Hollins. [57] Gallina. p224. DH. [58] Arnold, James, R. Crisis on the Danube. London, 1990. [59] Kunisch, J. Der Kleine Krieg, Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus. Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen. Wiesbaden, 1973. p16. [60] DH. [61] Müller, W. Relations of the Operations and Battles of the Austrian and French Armies in the Year 1809. London 1810. pp89-91. (Ken Trotman facsimile, Cambridge 1986). [62] For hunters read Jäger and for riflemen, probably, read skirmishers from a line battalion. Skirmishers in this particular translation of this source are rendered as riflemen generically, including French voltigeurs, who were nothing of the sort. [63] DH. Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #39 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com