Almansa is notorious as the battle where a Franco-Spanish army under an English-born commander defeated an English and Allied army under a French-born one. But it was also one of the most decisive battles of the 18th C and one of the rare occasions when two armies really did form into two lines of battle and go at it hammer and tongs.

The year 1706 had generally been a good one for the Allied cause against the Bourbons: Marlborough had won Ramillies and overrun the Spanish Netherlands, while Eugene, by raising the siege of Turin, had cleared Italy. Things had at first appeared to go well in Spain, too: a Franco-Spanish siege of Barcelona was lifted by a naval relief, and forces from Portugal under the Earl of Galway advanced to occupy Madrid, driving out Philip V. However, Charles III, the Allies' Habsburg candidate for the throne of Spain, failed to join them in time. Galway discovered that military occupation of the capital had no effect on Philip's rule or on Bourbon ability to fight.

Berwick, skillful commander of the Franco-Spanish forces, manoeuvred Galway out of Madrid and forced him, in spite of reinforcements brought by the tardy Charles III, back to the Allied base of Valencia. Awkwardly, this left the main Portuguese army with most of Spain between it and the home frontier it was supposed to defend.

Reinforcements

Over the winter, both the Allies and France prepared reinforcements for Spain: the former laid on a new 'expedition' of English and Dutch troops under Earl Rivers; while Louis XIV organised units released by the disaster in Italy, with his nephew Orleans as commander. Reform of the Spanish army under French tutelage continued apace; the defeat before Barcelona had damaged its morale, but during the winter major administrative changes dramatically improved recruitment capability - though desertion remained abnormally high, and since Madrid had not yet mastered how to feed and pay properly the troops it could raise, soldiers having to plunder to stay alive did not help discipline.

Meanwhile, both sides discussed strategy, Berwick held a measured and intelligent debate with Versailles; their sensible conclusions were to be overtaken by events, but Berwick, anticipating the possibility of an early battle, ensured that his siege equipment was in the right position for the promptest and best exploitation of any success. The Allies, on the other hand, wrangled ferociously all winter. None of them could get on with the others, except for Galway and the Portuguese under Das Mintas; Rivers' arrival in February 1707 only added to these differences. Debates revolved around whether strategy would be defensive, favoured by Charles III and his advisers, or offensive, with a renewed advance on Madrid, which other commanders including the Portuguese (as well as the government in London) were sure would bring the rest of Spain to heel.

Relentless bullying of Charles by the English ambassador Stanhope only confirmed the Habsburg's determination to fight a defensive campaign on his own, back in Catalonia, and, against the strong protests of Stanhope and the Portuguese, he left with his own forces in March. a fatal division of strength.

Rivers soon after went home in disgust, but his successor Thomas Erie, a depressed and normally subservient old man, shared his attitudes and was as awkward as could be. Repeated councils of war eventually thrashed out a plan: they would go round the head of the River Tagus to get to Madrid, but first, would destroy Berwick's magazines in Murcia - partly so that he could not attack Valencia behind them, but also in hope of catching some of the Bourbon army scattered in its winter quarters.

On hearing of Rivers' arrival, Berwick had begun bringing his troops together in case the Allied reinforcements presaged an attack, though this partial assembly caused him great supply difficulties. His movement caused Erie, on the other side of the Valencia-Murcia border, to fear an attack himself, and to pull in the extended quarters of his own units, not yet recovered from their voyage.

In the middle of March, Berwick sent his most trusted leader of light troops Zerecada forward into Valencia with 80 dragoons and and 30 volunteers, to obtain inteligence. Hearing of a convoy coming up towards the Allied quarters from the port of Alicante, Zerecada prepared an ambush, but into it instead on 22nd March stumbled Montandre's Foot, heading to join the main forces - 322 officers and men fell prisoner to the little Spanish party, and despite being burdened with such a large number of prisoners, Zerecada had the check to send a patrol on to reconoitre Alicante before rejoining Berwick.

Early in April, Galway organised supplies to support operations, assembled his forces and despite miserably cold, wet weather, began to move forward. He was joined by Eric, bringing his troops up from their separate quarters in southern Valencia, on 11th April. Discord within Allied headquarters had not eased. Galway issued a new order of battle, giving Das Minas and the Portuguese the place of honour on the right wing, as he was required to do by the treaty of alliance, but many of his English generals vigorously opposed this.

Nevertheless, the Allies advanced through the hills towards the Bourbon forward quarters in the Yecla area. Berwick, forewarned, fell back 40 miles or so to the plain of Chinchilla, where all of his army was ordered to assemble; his retreat was too hurried for the Bourbons to carry off or destroy the stores, which the Allies captured - though they failed in an attempt to trap d'Asfeld's cavalry force of 32 squadrons left to observe them from an intermediate position at Montalegra.

Besieged

Now the Allies besieged Villena, partly because it covered a major route through the difficult hills back into Valencia, partly in hopes of drawing Berwick into battle on ground where the numerically superior Bourbon cavalry could not be used. The town itself was occupied, but the castle held out, and a bombardment begun on 19th April had no effect, except to leave the Portuguese artillery short of ammunition. Lack of forage and dreadful terrain conditions had meanwhile so wrecked the overworked Royal Dragoons that they had to be sent to the rear, further weakening the Allied army.

In the meantime Berwick's movements had been seriously hindered by lack of provisions and transport: but d'Anfeld knew of sufficient stores of grain and forage at the small town of Almansa, so the Bourbons moved haltingly forward, still with supply difficulties, and camped at Almansa on the 23rd April. Some of the reinforcements from France had already arrived; Orleans had left the rest of them marching through Navarre and was now pelting across Spain in the vain hope of joining Berwick before a battle.

News of the Bourbon move reached Galway, though Allied intelligence was o poor, headquarters did not know whether or not Orleans had arrived with all the reinforcements. Galway called a council of war. The issue was confused by orders arrived from Charles 111, to defend the Valencian frontier because he had decided to attack Roussillon from Catalonia; but all the Allied generals felt that with no supplies left in Valencia, the army would perish anyway, unless they abandoned the kingdom to the Bourbons. So, the only unanimous decision they made in the whole campaign was this one: to go forward to Caudete.

As day broke on the 25th, Galway began the long march from Caudete to Almansa. At the pass of the tower on Don Enrique, the baggage was left behind and the army moved on in four columns, two of infantry in the centre, one of cavalry on each flank, the standard pattern for an approach march. Galway, who had gone ahead with his staff to get a view of Berwick's camp, began sending back orders to the army to form up in order of battle. Since the terrain was broken up with rocks, brush and gullies and the enemy still seemed far away, this was utterly inappropriate; Eric, as senior commander of the infantry, sent forward his aide Hawley to tell Galway, and discover the reason for these orders. Hawley rode on two miles up the rocky, uneven slope. He found Galway at the crest watching the Bourbons, who were in the middle of some movement that the Allied watchers, at such a distance, could not understand.

Hawley thought that the enemy was switching his troops round to change the relative positions of the French and Spaniards, but Galway was certain that the Bourbons were moving off and the movements visible were Berwick pulling his cavalry wings together to cover the infantry's withdrawal; he told Hawley that the army was to move up as fast as possible. Hawley returned and about 9 or 10 a.m. reported to Erie who, gloomily remarking "We are then beat already", prepared to comply.

Spanish vedettes had first seen Galway's approach at 8 a.m. A signal gun from Berwick's headquarters called in foragers; tents were struck, the baggage went into Almansa, and the Bourbon army began to form up, a process which took two hours or more. From the apparent direction of the Allied approach, many Bourbon commanders thought Galway was intending a flank attack against their left and urged swinging round, to a new position with Almansa in front of the army instead of behind it.

Berwick disagreed, feeling that the chances of a flank attack were slim, and any shift would lose the few advantages of his present position; a change could be made quickly anyway, and just in case, the brigadiers were ordered to reconnoitre the routes their brigades would have to follow.

(No account tells us what was the move that so confused Galway; it may simply have been part of the deployment, with the less experienced Spanish troops getting in a muddle).

The Franco Spanish army completed its deployment in a 'classic' order of battle, in two lines, with a smaller third line or reserve placed behind each cavalry wing; the Spanish had the right wing, and the numerically inferior French had brigades mingled with the left and the second line. The second line of the Centre was close to the medieval walls of Almansa; the right wing rested on rising ground, the left on some hillocks overlooking the Valencia road; and the Centre was fronted by a depression variously described by Conteporarics as a hollow way, a little valey, or a ravine. The last, which levelled out towards the right wing in such a way that it merged with the slopes there, formed no serious obstacle to movement Hawley described it as "very even ground"; the terrain in front of the wings could not seriously hinder operations either, though that beyond either flank was unsuitable for cavalry.

The battlefield was completely open: "there was nothing to bide the men's shoes on either side", Hawley remarked. Berwick's artillery was evenly spread, with a battery of 4 guns opposite "the right of the Allied left", 5 roughly opposite McCartney's brigade, 5 opposite the Centre, 5 each in front of the Portuguese infantry and cavalry. (Chandler consistently gives Berwick 40 guns, though without ever citing his source; if correct, presumably the remaining 16 guns were distributed singly along the first line).

At least some of these batteries may have been entrenched, and there are suggestions of an advanced detachment in front of the right, half-way down the slope, which may have been guarding one of the batteries. Berwick rode along his army once it was ready, speaking encouragingly to both the Spanish and French troops in their own languages.

After deploying, the Allies had moved on up the rocky slope to the crest to join Galway. here, about noon, they could see the Bourbon army, but a halt for rest was essential, as the troops, especially the infantry were exhausted. Around 2 p.m., they moved down the slope; about half- way across the remaining distance separating them from the Bourbons, they halted to make final adjustments to their battle-order. The bulk of the infantry was in the Centre, with the cavalry on the wings. Das Minas commanded the right wing, Erie the Centre (though it is not clear if his authority was supposed to extend to the Portuguese foot) and Baron Tyrawley the left wing - this last being an exceptionally odd post for an infantry general.

The 20 Portuguese cannon under Mascarenas were concentrated in three batteries opposite Berwick's left, and the only remaining artillery, six English guns under Michael Richards, were spread across the front of the left wing. Infantry brigades had originally been placed between the two lines of cavalry on each wing, to provide fire support, but as it became obvious that the Bourbons with their numerically superior horse could outflank the Allied wings, these battalions were brought into the cavalry lines to extend their frontage. (This was not a tactical innovation as it is often suggested, but a not uncommon measure of desperation; Galway may have heard of its use for the same purpose at La Marsaglia in 1692, as he had served as ambassador to Piedmont later in the Nine Years War.)

To equalise the strength of the two wings, some Portuguese squadrons had already been transferred from Das Minas' command to the left; even with all this, and with the Allied regiments in two ranks instead of the usual three, the Bourbons still looked capable of outflanking, so Tyrawley ordered d'Atalaya with the second-line cavalry of the left "to double into our first line, to make an equal front with the enemy". No effective reserve existed, and with all this doubling-up to extend the frontage, the Allied army was dangerously stretched and lacking in depth. The nearest thing to a plan of battle was the arrangement that the attack was not to be simultaneous but effectively in echelon: the left was to open the action, with the infantry and then the Portuguese ordered to engage as the battle passed down the line to them.

With deployment completed, Galway passed back down the line from the right, where he had been conferring with Das Minas. He stopped next to Erie, and remarked that "our disposition seems to me to be very wrong, our Foot being all in the plain and our Horse upon the hills," to which Erie replied tartly "You should have thought of that before, or not come here at all." Galway, with his wealth of experience as a diplomat, ought to have made some effort to smooth over the situation, or simply ignored Erie's uncooperative attitude and got on with running the battle, but this hostility seems to have been the final straw for him. He said he would go to the left and begin; Erie merely repeated his belief that the Allies were already beaten, and Galway rode off to lead the left wing, abandoning any central control of the battle.

More Battle of Almansa 25th April 1707

Part One
Part Two

Part Three

Casualties and Aftermath
Commander: Berwick (1670-1734)
Commander: Galway (1648-1720)
The Armies: Allied and Bourbon
Uniforms and Bibliography
Allied Order of Battle
Bourbon Order of Battle