Operation Cartwheel

Bougainville Counterattack

Battle of Hill 260

by James Miller, jr.

While General Iwasa was meeting defeat at Hill 700, Colonel Muda was attacking the American outpost on Hill 260 in preparation for operations against Hills 309 and 608 in the Americal Division's sector. The Muda Unit--principally one battalion and two companies of the 13th Infantry--completed its assembly at Peko and moved forward.

On the night of 9-10 March small enemy forces infiltrated between Hill 260 and the main line of resistance, while an assault force assembled east of 260 and made ready to attack. (In addition to sources cited above, this account of the Hill 260 action is based on comments of Col. William A Long on draft MS of this volume, at. tached to his Ltr to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 21 Mar 54, no sub, OCMH.)

Some 800 yards east of the main perimeter line and 7,500 yards north of the Torokina's mouth, Hill 260 is shaped like an a's mouth, Hill 260 is shaped like an hourglass. Its long axis runs from northwest to southeast. The two ends of the hourglass are rises called North Knob and South Knob. Each knob is about half the size of a football field. The handle between them is slightly lower and so narrow that there was room for only a trail. North and South Knobs lie so close together-less than 150 yards apart-that to hit one knob with artillery or mortar fire inevitably showered the other with fragments. The slopes to the east and west are very steep.

The East-West Trail crossed the Torokina just east of 260 and, bending south of South Knob, entered the main perimeter line between Hills log and 608. A small north-south stream, called the Eagle River by the Americans, flowed between 260 and the main perimeter before running into the Torokina River.

In the early part of March only one trail led from the main line to South Knob. The last hundred yards to the top consisted of a steep stairway revetted into the southwest slope. A small vehicular bridge had been built over the Earle. The entire area, including the east and west slopes of 260, was heavily jungled.

"OP TREE" ON HILL 260

From a platform on a 150-foot-high tree ("OP Tree") on South Knob, American mortar and artillery forward observers could view the banks of the Torokina below, the East-West Trail, and Hills 250 and 600 to the northeast. Conversely, in Japanese hands Hill 260 would have provided good observation of Hills 608 and 309 and of the corps' rear area between them.

On 10 March the American garrison on 260 consisted of about eighty men including forward observers and a reinforced platoon from G Company, 182d Infantry, which regiment held the main perimeter west of 260. It was "a sore thumb stuck out into the poison ivy." (Ibid.) Defenses, all on South Knob, consisted of pillboxes and bunkers inside barbed wire and defensive warning devices arranged in a triangle around OP Tree. Fire lanes faced northeast, cast, and southeast.

The Americans had been maintaining ambushes on the northeast and southeast approaches to South Knob but on 9 March withdrew them to put harassing and interdictory fires over the whole area from 1830 to 2330, 9 March, and again from 0415 to 0500, 10 March. A few minutes after 0600 on 10 March, during the 182d's normal stand to for the two hours before daylight, fire from Japanese mortars, machine guns, and rifles began striking the American positions on 260. At 0638 an officer of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion, Americal Division, reported from his post in OP Tree that the Japanese had attacked and were all around the base of his tree. He was not heard from again. The attack, which the Americans estimated was made by one company, was actually delivered by all or part of the 3d Battalion, 13th Infantry. It overran most of the American positions, captured OP Tree, and drove the survivors of the American garrison to North Knob. One six-man group from the mortar and artillery observation teams took refuge in two pillboxes and put up such stout-hearted resistance that they held their positions in spite of the fact that the Japanese had surrounded them. (For a stirring, well-told account by one of the observers, see Griswold, Bougainville, pp. 103-09, Or SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville Campaign, Ch. VIII, PP. 368-75, OCMH. Colonel Long, in his comments on the draft MS of this volume, expressed his admiration for the skill of the Japanese who delivered the attack "from the most difficult direction with complete surprise.")

When the enemy attack was reported to General Griswold, he ordered General Hodge, the Americal Division's commander, to hold 260 at all costs. This order came as a surprise to the Americal's officers, who had not expected to be required to hold 260 in the face of a strong enemy attack. (Comments on draft MS of this volume by Lt Col Carl D. McFerren, formerly ACofS, G-2, Americal Div, on Bougainville, in OCMH.)

Col. William D. Long, commanding the 182d, promptly released two companies--E and F--of his 2d Battalion from regimental reserve and placed Lt. Col. Dexter Lowry, commander of the 2d Battalion, in charge of operations. (Long had served as ACofS, G-2, Americal Division, during the Guadalcanal Campaign.)

F Company left the perimeter, crossed the Eagle River and pushed northward through virgin jungle to North Knob, made contact with the G Company soldiers who had made their way there, and established a perimeter defense. At 0845 E Company was ordered to advance east over the trail to attack the South Knob from the southwest in conjunction with a southward move by one platoon of F Company.

By 1045, when E Company reached the base of Hill 260's southwest slope, the troops on North Knob had become aware that some Americans on South Knob were still alive. (They apparently based this conclusion on fire fights between the Japanese and the trapped observers.)

The attack began immediately after E Company's arrival. One E Company platoon started up the steep slope as the F Company platoon attempted to move south, but after a gain of about thirty-five yards both platoons, now coming into the cleared areas, halted under enemy fire. Shortly after 1300, Long authorized Lowry to contain the Japanese at the base of OP Tree until he could send flame throwers forward.

Lowry therefore held up the attack, received the flame throwers, and by 1420 was ready to go again. This time he planned a double envelopment from 260's southwest spur. One platoon of E Company was to move left (north) to make contact with the F Company platoon advancing south while a second E Company platoon moved right to attack from the south and southeast. The platoons moved out and began their attack at 1445. The Japanese quickly halted the northern attack.

SOUTH KNOB, HILL 260, 19 March 1944.

The southern platoon started up South Knob, met grazing fire, retired, moved to the right, and assaulted again. This time, using flame throwers and grenades, the platoon drove up onto a shelf on the southern edge of South Knob that protected it from small arms fire. It was within earshot of the trapped Americans. Colonel Lowry, now estimating that at least two enemy companies held South Knob, reported that his and the enemy's forces were too close for him to use 60-mm. mortars safely. The attack was renewed at 1800, but by then battle casualties and exhaustion had reduced E Company's strength by one half. Lowry and Colonel Long, who had arrived at South Knob at 1715, decided to hold their present positions. The six Americans in the pillboxes thought E Company had secured the hill, and stayed where they were. Active operations for the day were concluded by an enemy bayonet assault which F Company repulsed by fire.

Early next morning the Japanese, apparently strengthened during the night, struck at E Company in a quick attack. The company turned back the attackers, but of its 7 officers and 143 enlisted men who had left the perimeter the day before, only I wounded officer and 24 enlisted men remained at the front. Colonel Long therefore ordered G Company (less its original outpost platoon) out of the main perimeter to relieve E.

As G Company advanced up the west slope of South Knob it ran into enemy troops attacking from the east, southeast, and south. Colonel Lowry reported his troops in distress as the enemy threatened to encircle his position on South Knob and began driving E Company off. But there was almost no way to strengthen him. General Hodge was required to hold one battalion available for service in corps reserve, and there were few other troops that could be committed without weakening the main line of resistance, which was now under attack on Hill 700 and in the 129th's sector.

NORTH KNOB, HILL 260. Note effects of artillery and mortar fire.

With the foothold on South Knob practically lost, and because South Knob could be neutralized from North Knob, Hodge and Long decided to pull E and G Companies off South Knob and send them to North Knob, and to send B Company forward to assist them in breaking contact. (B Company's sector was taken over first by B Company, 57th Engineer Battalion, and then by G Company, 164th Infantry.)

The Japanese, failing to follow up their advantage, did not pursue E and G Companies as they retired toward the Eagle River, where they were joined by B Company. All companies proceeded to North Knob. B Company, cutting a trail from the old trail northward parallel to the northsouth axis of 260, led the way. When a larger perimeter on North Knob was completed, G Company went back to the main line of resistance.

In midafternoon, Brig. Gen. William A. McCulloch, the Americal's assistant commander, arrived at the 182d Infantry command post and assumed command of operations at Hill 260. ( McCulloch, then a colonel, had commanded the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division during the Guadalcanal Campaign.)

In late afternoon B and F Companies, reinforced by a provisional flame thrower platoon from the 132d Infantry, attacked again. F Company pushed frontally while B Company attempted a flanking movement around OP Tree. This time flame throwers burned out two Japanese positions, and B Company managed to drive onto South Knob. The six trapped Americans successfully sprang for safety, but at 1915 both companies withdrew to North Knob. B Company established a trail block on EastWest Trail, but unlike Magata and lwasa in the 37th Division's sector, Muda attempted neither night attacks nor harassing infiltration.

The next day, 12 March, was subsequently referred to by the 182d Infantry as "Bloody Sunday." By now all combat elements of the Muda Unit were emplaced on South Knob. Operations on Bloody Sunday opened about 0700 when the Japanese put artillery and mortar fire on the Americal's main perimeter and the rear areas. Before 12 March the presence of American troops on both knobs had inhibited the employment of American artillery and mortars, but now that the Americans were off South Knob the supporting weapons could shoot with a little more freedom. The Americal Division, using OP Tree as a registration point, replied therefore to the Japanese with artillery and mortar fire on targets of opportunity, especially on South Knob and the approaches to Hill 260. This fire, like all similar fire, forced the Americans on North Knob to move back to avoid being hit by fragments from the shells landing on South Knob.

Meanwhile supplies on North Knob were running low, and getting more food, ammunition, and water to the companies there was proving difficult.

The only supply route was the trail B Company had cut northward from the old trail, and it was a footpath too narrow for vehicles. Carrying parties on the north leg of the trip encountered so much fire from the Japanese on South Knob and on the west slopes that they made the trip by running in spurts while covered by riflemen. This, to phrase it mildly, was tiring. But by noon these methods had succeeded in amassing enough ammunition to mount an attack, and the American commanders decided to deliver one and so capitalize on the advantages they presumed the morning bombardment had given them. (Later, when more troops became available, a trail wide enough for jeeps was built from the perimeter directly to North Knob.)

The plan of attack called for F Company, 182d, to provide a base of fire from the perimeter on North Knob while B Company, with six flame throwers attached, moved south and west to attack South Knob from the west and northwest ( Colonel Lowry, lightly wounded and weary, had by this time been temporarily replaced in command of the 2d Battalion by Lt. Col. William Mahoney, until then the regimental executive officer.)

In column of platoons, B Company started off North Knob at 1300. The 2d Platoon, in the lead, tried to storm the crest of South Knob from the northwest, but as it moved across a small gully two new Japanese pillboxes on the west slope opened fire and it halted. The enemy had revealed his positions, and 81-mm. mortars and machine guns opened tip on the pillboxes. Under cover of this fire, and freely using flame throwers, the next platoon in column (the 3d) crossed the gully and moved as far as the top of South Knob without losing a man. It had reached a point southwest of OP Tree when fire from Japanese positions on the east slope struck and the soldiers hit the ground. Every attempt to maneuver brought down enemy fire, but when American mortars struck the Japanese positions the 3d Platoon renewed the assault with grenades and flame throwers, with the latter protected by BAR men who blazed away almost continuously at the enemy. The fearsome sight of the flame is reported to have caused some Japanese soldiers to throw down their arms and flee.

At this point, when victory seemed almost won, the 3d Platoon was struck by machine gun fire from the east of OP Tree and from a machine gun at the base of the tree itself. The day was nearly gone; it was 1620, and the attackers' ammunition was running low. No fresh troops were immediately available on Hill 260. The 1st Battalion (less C and D companies), 132d, had been attached to the 182d and A Company was alerted for movement at 1515, but it was 1600 before A Company reached the 182d's main line of resistance. Hoping to hold the ground gained, McCulloch and Long decided to send A Company, 132d, along the old trail to attack the South Knob from the southwest, make physical contact with B Company, 182d, and establish a defensive position on the crest of South Knob. Time was running out. Another hour went by before A Company began its move, and as it neared Hill 260 it received enemy gunfire which killed the company commander. There was confusion and further delay until order was restored. By now it was obvious that A Company would not reach B before dark. Thus, because there were not enough men to hold the ground B Company had gained, the American commanders reluctantly made the "painful decision" to order B Company to return to North Knob, A Company to the main perimeter. ( Americal Div Rpt of Bougainville Opus, P. 4.)

The fight for Hill 260 had gone on for three days. Continued bombardments and attacks had failed to dislodge the Japanese. No reinforcements were available. The supply line to Hill 260 was tenuous, and it seemed that a resolute attack from the north might cut off the two-company garrison. In view of these factors, and perhaps because the cost of holding a small hill a halfmile in front of the main perimeter seemed disproportionately high, the Americal Division asked permission to pull off the hill. Corps headquarters refused. (It is not clear where the request originated. On 11 March there was talk of withdrawal, but Colonel Long forbade it as authority to withdraw could come only from headquarters higher than his.)

The 13th of March was largely a repetition of the previous day's action, except that different companies were involved. To improve the supply situation and prevent the Japanese from severing the old trail by attacks from South Knob, a more direct trail from the main perimeter was cut to North Knob. At 1000, A Company, 132d, relieved E Company, 182d, on North Knob. Additional flame throwers, this time a provisional platoon from the 164th Infantry, were attached to the 182d. During the morning about one thousand 105-mm. and another thousand 4.2-inch mortar rounds hit the enemy on South Knob. (As Colonel Long put it in his comments, "Artillery with its dispersion and range had to be used on South Knob carefully. Artillerymen were strong for an impact fuse which gave a treetop burst of help to the observer in adjusting fire. I wanted the artillery to dig after the Japanese with delayed action fuses. I think we finally compromised on 50- 50." And "you can work up a healthy argument on the type of fuse to be employed in any Officers' Club throughout the world. The Artillery like to get it in the air where their FO's can see it, and the Infantry likes to get it down into the ground where the enemy can feel it.")

At l400, B Company, 132d, having moved out from the main perimeter, attacked up the southwest slope toward OP Tree after an artillery and mortar preparation. On North Knob A Company, 132d, provided a base of fire; B Company, 182d, was in reserve. The uphill attack succeeded in getting two platoons abreast on the southwest and west slopes of South Knob but halted in the face of grenades and rifle fire. The Japanese then retaliated with a counterattack against the left flank of B Company. A Company pushed one platoon toward OP Tree to relieve the pressure on B but it too was quickly stopped. B Company's reserve platoon drove off the attacking Japanese, whereupon the American units withdrew.

Next day the American commanders considered using tanks against the Japanese but decided against it because the vehicles could not ford the Eagle River over the new trail and the hill was too steep for them to climb. After one more unsuccessful effort to capture OP Tree, the American commanders changed their plans. Patrols to the northeast of 260 had failed to find any large bodies of the enemy. Since the Japanese apparently had no more reserves to commit in that sector, and were obviously incapable of driving beyond Hill 260 against the main perimeter, the Americans decided to reduce their casualties by halting general attacks against South Knob, but to harry the enemy and reduce his strength by raids and combat patrols, by sapping forward from North Knob, and by extensive artillery and mortar fire.

Ironically enough, on 15 March, after the Americans had made their decision, the Japanese commanders made a similar one. As Colonel Magata's main attack against the 129th Infantry had gone badly, Hyakutake and Kanda decided to send Muda's main strength to reinforce Magata, leaving only a screening force on South Knob.

From then until 18 March, when General McCulloch launched a series of coordinated attacks, the Americans shelled South Knob heavily and made several ingenious attempts to burn out the Japanese with gasoline. They threw gallon cans of gas by hand and tried to ignite them with white phosphorous grenades. They jury-rigged a 60-mm. mortar for throwing cans. Finally they took two hundred feet of flexible pipe and snaked it to within nine feet of an enemy emplacement; with oxygen pressure they pumped gasoline from a drum through the pipe and over the enemy, and ignited it with a white phosphorous grenade. All the while mortars and artillery hammered away, the artillery firing at the reverse slopes while the mortars covered the hilltop.

The 182d Infantry's Cannon Company emplaced its 75-mm. pack howitzers on Hill 309 for direct fire and did its best to knock down OP Tree. By 14 March South Knob, jungled no longer, was a bare, blasted slope. At 1900, 17 March, OP Tree fell to the ground. During the action more then ten thousand 105-mm. rounds struck South Knob. When all was over, the Americans reported counting 560 enemy dead. American casualties totaled 98 killed, 24 missing, and 581 wounded. (These figures come from Griswold, Bougainville, p. 120. The 182d Infantry's report gives figures which differ slightly from these. Colonel Long later wrote, in his comments, that the wounded-in-action figure was somewhat inflated because fatigue cases had been diagnosed with unreasonable freedom" and counted among the wounded.)

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