Operation Cartwheel

Bougainville Counterattack

Japanese Plan of Attack

by James Miller, jr.

General Hyakutake organized most of his infantry into three forces, each named for its commander. The Iwasa Unit, under General Iwasa, consisted of the 2d Battalion, i3th Infantry; the 23d Infantry; and two batteries of field artillery, some mortars, and engineers and other supporting troops. The Magata Unit, led by Col. Isaoshi Magata of the 45th Infantry, whom Kanda considered to be a crack regimental commander, included nearly all the 45th Infantry plus mortirs, field artillery, and engineers.

The third unit, under Col. Toyoharei Muda, who had succeeded the late Tomonari in command of the 13th Infantry, consisted of the remainder of the 13th plus engineers. Supporting the attacks of the three infantry units was an artillery group commanded by a Colonel Saito. This consisted of four 150-mm howitzers, two 105-mm. howitzers, and a number of smaller pleces. (General Kanda specified 18 70-mm. battalion guns; ACofS G-2 XIV Corps, History of the "TA" Operation lists 168 75-mm. mountain guns. The Japanese 105 is often called a 10-cm. piece.)

Artillery ammunition supply totaled three hundred rounds per piece, of which one fifth was to be used for direct support of the infantry, the rest for interdicting the airfields.

Also present were elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 53d Infantry, and part of the 81st Infantry, all from the 17th Division. At first these were either placed in 17th Army reserve or were assigned diversionary missions against the northwest part of the XIV Corps' beachhead.

The Izvasa Unit assembled behind Hill 1111, the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampel, a shoulder-shaped ridge extending outward from the Crown Prince Range just northwest of Blue Ridge. The Muda Unit assembled at Peko, a village on the East-West Trail about 5,400 yards east-northeast of Hill 260. The artillery group emplaced in the vicinity of Hill 600.

The plan of maneuver involved two thrusts from the north coupled with an attack from the northeast, all on a complicated schedule. Briefly, the Iwasa Unit was to attack and secure Hill 700 on Y Day (set, after some delays in moving into position, for 8 March), reorganize on 9 and 10 March, and advance to the Piva airfields. During this period the Muda Unit was to capture Hills 260 and 309, whereupon it and one battalion of the Iwasa Unit were supposed to attack Hill 608 from the southeast and northwest on 12 March.

All these attacks were preliminary to an effort which was to be delivered, starting 11 March, by the Magata Unit against the 129th Infantry in its low ground west of Hill 700. Magata's men, after cracking the 129th's line, were to advance against the Piva airstrips in conjunction with Iwasa's advance. Then all units were to drive southward on a broad front to capture the Torokina fighter strip by 17 March. Haste was essential, since the 17th Army had brought with it but two weeks' rations.

Hindsight indicates that the Japanese plan was unsound. Even had Hyakutake's estimate of American strength been correct, he still lacked enough strength in manpower and in artillery (he had no air support whatsoever) to attack prepared positions, and under the actual circumstances he was hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned. If his object had been to inflict maximum damage regardless of his own losses, he might have achieved a larger degree of success by concentrating his forces from the first in order to overwhelm a narrow portion of Griswold's front, break through, and spread destruction throughout the rear areas until Griswold could redeploy his infantry regiments.

Of course, Hyakutake might have achieved more success had the American soldiers elected to turn and run instead of standing their ground, but that was an imponderable that he could not count on. The Americal and 37th Divisions were veteran units. (Hyakutake, in 1942, had delivered a similar, unsuccessful, counterattack against Vandegrift's positions on Guadalcanal. See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, Ch. VI.)

By 8 March almost everything was ready. The rhetorical manifestoes by which Japanese officers exhorted their troops were issued. General Hyakutake expressed himself along these lines:

The time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of the American rascals. Our cry of victory at Torokina Bay will be shouted resoundingly to our native land.

We are invincible! Always attack. Security is the greatest enemy. Always be alert. Execute silently. (Quoted in Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World War II, pp. 142-43. The "red emblem" referred to was probably the shoulder patch of the 6th Division.)

Not to be outdone, General Kanda had this to say:

"We must fight to the end to avenge the shame of our country's humiliation on GUADALCANAL. . . . There can be no rest until our bastard foes are battered, and bowed in shame-till their . . . blood adds lustre . . . to the badge of the Sixth Division. Our battle cry will be heard afar . . . . "(Quoted in Griswold, Bougainville, p. 81.)

Again, the most apt comment is in Proverbs XVI: 18.

More Bougainville Counterattack

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