Operation Cartwheel

Bougainville Counterattack

Battle of Hill 700

by James Miller, jr.

At 0545, shortly after daybreak of 8 March, Hyakutake's artillery heralded the opening of his counteroffensive by firing on all parts of the beachhead, with especial attention to the Piva airfields.

American observers on the ground, in artillery liaison planes, and on board destroyers, aided by information gained from documents, quickly determined the general location of the Japanese artillery, and counterbattery fire by the corps artillery and the organic division artillery battalions began at once. The Americal Division artillery put its fire on hills to the east and east-northeast, the 37th on those to the northeast. Smoke shells were fired at suspected enemy observation posts to blind the enemy. In the 37th's sector the 6th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 129th Infantry, and the 129th Infantry Cannon Company were so situated that they could shoot directly at enemy gun flashes. The other battalions fired by forward observer. (Throughout the operation U.S. destroyers also fired counterbattery fire and against suspected enemy assembly areas and approach routes.)

At 1045 twenty-four SBD's and twelve TBF's of the 1st Marine Air Wing dropped fourteen tons of bombs on Hills 250 and. 600. A strike against Hill 1111 was planned for the late morning but was postponed when a sudden cloud screen obscured the hilltop. Finally, at 1600, fifty-six SBD's and thirty-six TBF's, guided by artillery smoke shells, dropped 100- and 1000-pound bombs on Hill 1111 and environs.

In the course of the day's firing the Japanese destroyed one B-24 and three fighters, and damaged nineteen planes on Piva strips. Before nightfall all bombers except six TBF's which remained for local support left for New Georgia to escape destruction. The enemy also damaged one 155-mm. gun and several tanks. Early next morning, the 9th, the enemy guns turned their attention to the Torokina fighter strip and forced its planes to take to the air for safety. Almost no shells fell on the front lines except in the 145th Infantry's area, where shellfire and mortars caused several casualties.

The sector of the 145th, now commanded by Col. Cecil B. Whitcomb, extended from low ground in the vicinity of the Numa Numa Trail eastward past the south shore of Lake Kathleen and up along the military crest of Hill 700, a frontage of about 3,500 yards. The 3d Battalion, on the left (west), held the low ground just south of Lake Kathleen and Cannon Hill, an eminence slightly lower and to the west of Hill 700.

On the right the 2d Battalion held Hill 700 with two rifle companies (E and G) and machine gun sections of H Company in line, F Company in reserve, and H Company's 81-mm. mortars grouped on the reverse (south) slope.

Hill 700, which commanded the entire beachhead, was steep, with slopes of 65 to 75 percent in all directions. American intelligence estimates, though not ruling out an enemy attack here, had tended to discount its probability. The steepness that increased the difficulty of attack also complicated the defense, for the forward (north) slope fell away too sharply to permit it to be completely covered with grazing fire.

Thus the 2d Battalion had an extra allotment of machine guns. Its pillboxes housed 37-mm antitank guns, light and heavy machine guns, BAR's, and rifles. The front was wired in, with some mines in front. In direct support were the 105-mm. howitzers of the 135th Field Artillery Battalion and, starting on 8 March, the 4.2inch mortars of D Company, 82d Chemical Battalion. (This company also supported the 129th Infantry.)

60mm Mortar emplacement on Hill 700 held by 145th Infantry, 15 Feb. 1944.

That the 145th Infantry was in danger of attack had become obvious on 6 March when patrols reported the presence of large numbers of Japanese about fourteen hundred yards north of Hill 700.

Additional ammunition was made available to the troops, and two days' C rations, ammunition, and a five-gallon can of water were stocked in each pillbox against a breakdown in supply. For nocturnal illumination each machine gun section was issued four incendiary grenades and a gallon can of flame thrower fuel.

On 7 March Japanese wire-cutting parties started work in front of the 145th. Next day patrols in front of Hill 700, Cannon Hill, and along Lake Kathleen's shores kept running into enemy troops. At the same time 129th Infantry patrols reported many enemy contacts, and Americal Division patrols also observed enemy troops east of the Torokina River, along the East-West Trail, and around Hills 25o and 6oo. In front of the 145th fire fights and skirmishes went on all day.

When patrols reported that the enemy was massing, the 37th Division artillery, the 145th's Cannon Company, and the 4.2-inch mortars fired a counterpreparation twelve hundred yards wide and two thousand yards deep in front of the 2d Battalion. Japanese orders had called for an attack on 8 March, but none developed. The 23d Infantry had spent the day moving into position in front of the 145th; the 2d Battalion reconnoitered Cannon Hill, the 3d, 700, but for some reason the regiment did not assault. (In 1949 General Kanda said that as the 23d's attack had not succeeded, and as the 13th had taken Hill 260 on 8 March, he ordered the attack continued on the 9th. Either his recollection was faulty or his subordinate commanders deceived him.)

Rain fell throughout the night of 8-9 March. Shortly after midnight, concealed by darkness, rain, and mists, about two companies of the 23d Infantry attacked up the north slope of Hill 700 against the ist Platoon, G Company, 145th, which held a level saddle between the topmost eminence of the hill and a rise to the left (west) dubbed Pat's Nose. Other elements of the 23d put pressure on E Company, 145th, on the highest point Of 700. This attack was repulsed.

About 0230, 9 March, the 23d Infantry attacked G Company's ist Platoon again, this time in column of battalions. The 2d Battalion, in the lead, blew up the barbed wire, knocked out a pillbox, and through the gap its forward elements moved onto the saddle and set up machine guns. American mortars and artillery opened up and appear to have severely punished the 3d Battalion, which was following the 2d.

When day broke the Americans were not sure of the extent of the enemy penetration, as mists and enemy fire hampered reconnaissance. Some local counterattacks, largely un-co-ordinated, were attempted but all failed. Soldiers of the 145th tried to attack northward up the south slopes of Hill 700, but the Japanese drove them back by rolling down grenades.

By noon the situation was clarified. The Japanese had made but a minor penetration; about one company held a salient on the saddle about one hundred yards from cast to west and fifty yards deep. It had captured seven pillboxes, plus observation posts, in the 1st Platoon's line and had set up light and heavy machine guns.

General Beightler released the 1st Battalion, 145th, from division reserve to Colonel Whitcomb, who attached it to the 2d Battalion, and elements of the 117th Engineer Battalion took up positions in the 145th's regimental reserve lines south of Hill 700.

About noon C Company, 145th, started northward up Hill 700 toward the saddle in frontal assault while two F Company platoons attacked the saddle from the east and west. By 1530 the platoon attacking from the east had recovered some of the lost ground but C Company had been halted about two thirds of the way to its objective.

TWO LIGHT TANKS M3 OF THE 754TH TANK BATTALION heading up Hill 700 during the afternoon of 9 March.

Two light tanks of the 754th Tank Battalion, released out of corps reserve by General Griswold, tried to support an attack later in the afternoon, but the hill proved too steep for them. The F Company platoons pressed their attack anyway and by 1735 had retaken five pillboxes. By nightfall a solid line had been established in front of the Japanese. It ran along Hill 700 south of the crest in the region of the penetration and joined its flanks with the original main line of resistance. B and C Companies and one platoon of D Company held the new line.

During the day the Japanese used their point of vantage on the saddle to put mortar and machine gun fire on McClelland Road, a lateral supply route south of the crests of the hills, roughly parallel to the main line of resistance. This fire halted the 3/4-ton trucks and half- tracks that were used to bring up ammunition and required the use of hand-carrying parties, which hauled ammunition forward and took out the wounded under Japanese fire.

Neither Japanese nor Americans made any aggressive moves on the night of 9-10 March, but it was a noisy night. The Japanese laid mortar and small arms fire on the American lines, while the 37th Division artillery and mortars put close in and deep supporting fires in front of the 2d Battalion, 145th.

Renewed Attack

At 0645 the next day, 10 March, while the Muda Unit began its attack against the Americal Division troops on Hill 260, the 23d Infantry troops on the saddle renewed their attack and other elements of the Iwasa Unit attempted to get through the curtain of American artillery and mortar fire to reinforce the saddle. The Americans on Hill 700 responded with fire and local counterattacks. There was no change in the location of the front lines.

During the morning Griswold released the Provisional Infantry Battalion, 251st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, from corps reserve; it proceeded to the 145th's regimental reserve line. Elements of the 117th Engineer Battalion thereupon made ready to destroy the Japanese positions with bangalore torpedoes and pole charges of TNT. But this came to naught when four engineers, trying to snake a torpedo into a pillbox, were killed outright by the torpedo, which either exploded prematurely or was detonated by a Japanese shell. A Japanese-speaking American soldier brought a loud-speaker up close to the enemy and urged immediate capitulation; the Japanese responded with a mortar shell which knocked the loud-speaker out of action.

By afternoon of this day of patternless and ineffective action (which also featured enemy fire on McClelland Road and a 36-plane strike against Japanese positions), the American units in contact with the enemy had become intermingled. Sorting and reorganizing them consumed much of the afternoon, so that it was 1700 before elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 145th, after a tenminute mortar preparation, delivered a co-ordinated attack.

The Americans used bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers, and pole charges in the face of artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. The fighting was close work; several pillboxes were recaptured and then lost. As darkness fell, however, the Americans had achieved some success. The Japanese penetration was now reduced by more than half. By 1930, G, F, A, C, B, and E Companies held the line; the 37th Reconnaissance Troop, which General Beightler attached to the 145th at 1815, was in reserve.

During the night, as Colonel Magata prepared to deliver his attack against the 129th Infantry, General Iwasa sent the rest of his command against the 145th's front from Cannon Hill to the crest of 700. The Japanese came in closely packed waves, shouting, the 37th Division reported, imprecations in Japanese. The fields of fire at Cannon Hill and Pat's Nose were better than at 700, and the 145th, heavily supported by artillery and mortars, handily repulsed Iwasa everywhere except on the saddle, where the Japanese captured one more pillbox.

As dawn broke on 11 March, a day on which Muda was active at Hill 260 and the Magata Unit began its attack against the 129th Infantry, General Beightler was obviously concerned over the 145th's failure to reduce the enemy salient. The night before he had ordered the 2d Battalion, 148th Infantry, to move from its regimental reserve positions to the 145th's sector.

To replace it General Griswold placed the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, at Beightler's disposal. Beightler also dispatched his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Craig, to the 145th's sector to observe operations and keep him informed. The regimental commander was suffering, Craig reported later, from extreme battle fatigue and was relieved. Colonel Freer, who had been serving as executive of the 145th, took his place. (Ltr, Gen Craig to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 30 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.)

In the meantime the Japanese made valorous efforts to put more troops onto the saddle. The Americans resisted with vigor and with all the fire power at their disposal. Charging, literally, over the piled heaps of their dead comrades, the enemy soldiers fought hard but vainly, and failed either to budge the Americans or to strengthen the saddle.

The 2d Battalion, 148th, reached its assembly area behind the 145th at 1115. Colonel Radcliffe, its commander, reconnoitered in preparation for an afternoon attack.

Three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, the 145th Infantry Cannon Company, 4.2-inch chemical mortars, the 81-mm. mortars of D, H, and M Companies of the 145th, and the 60-mm. mortars of all the rifle companies of the 2d Battalion, 148th, fired a preparation from 1320 to 1330. Then elements of the 148th attacked. Two platoons from E Company moved east from Pat's Nose in an effort to envelop the saddle from north and south while a third platoon delivered a holding attack westward from the crest of Hill 700. The whole target was blanketed by artillery smoke shells. The 145th supported the attack with overhead fire. The platoon making the envelopment from the north gained the crest, losing eight dead, whereupon the platoon leader and four enlisted men seized a communication trench, then a pillbox. But the Japanese killed the five men and the attack halted about 1900. The troops dug in on the ground they had gained. During the night the Japanese harried the Americans but failed to penetrate the line.

The attack on 12 March followed the previous day's pattern. While intense local battles raged in the 129th Infantry sector and on Hill 260, E Company continued its attack and F Company attacked northwestward from the top of 700. Using grenades, rifles, flame throwers, and rocket launchers, the 148th soldiers methodically reduced the pillboxes one by one. When nearly all the officers in both companies were wounded, sergeants took over command. By 1300 the Japanese held but one pillbox; by 1317 they had lost it, and by 1530 mopping up was completed, all the Japanese save two wounded prisoners were dead, the 145th's line was restored. Three hundred and nine enemy corpses were counted in the immediate area. During the next day the Iwasa-Unit, which had suffered heavily in its unsuccessful attack, withdrew behind a screen of combat patrols and fire.

During the period 8-13 March the 37th Division lost five officers and seventy-three enlisted men killed. (Memo, G-1 37th Div for G-2 and G-3, 14 Mar 44, no sub, in 37th Div G-3 Jnl File, Vol. 13, Serials 4601-5400.)

The artillery expended a considerable amount of ammunition in defense of Hill 700: 20,802 105-mm. rounds; about 10,000 75mm. rounds; 13,000 81-mm. and 811 4.2inch mortar shells. (On 14 March General Kreber ordered 90-mm. antiaircraft guns to supplement certain 40-mm guns already in use on the front lines. Thereafter these flat-trajectory weapons sniped at enemy guns emplaced on the forward slopes of the hills to the north and northeast.)

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